Navy Vice Adm. Jon A. Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, and Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, chief of U.S. Northern Command, brief the Senate Armed Forces Committee’s Strategic Forces Panel on missile defense programs, June 9, 2021.
This is a hearing on missile defense strategy policies and programs and review of the Defense authorization act request for fiscal year 2022. In the Future Years defense program. Uh First let me thank our witnesses. We have two panels for appearing at today’s hearing. Unlike prior missile defense hearings, we’ve decided to add a non governmental witness panel to obtain a diversity of viewpoints on the subject matter before us. The second panel will be our government witnesses to help explain the fiscal year 2022 budget requests and answer questions that may arise in the first panel. The defense of our homeland and allies from missiles is a technologically complicated and geographically unbounded problem. Today, most missiles follow a predictable ballistic trajectory based on the laws of physics and that those laws haven’t changed since the time of Sir Isaac Newton. They can fly tens of kilometers. Is the recent conflict with Israel demonstrated or thousands of kilometres with an I. B. ICBM moving at about mach five, we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars fielding systems to intercept them premised on this predictable trajectory and with relatively good success. However, a new class of missiles called Hypersonic boost glide missiles are now being fielded with speeds in excess of Mach 20 and with an unpredictable non ballistic trajectory. We have not fully fielded systems to track much less intercept them. These missiles bring back issues of technology and strategic stability that were once at the forefront of the debates in ballistic missile defense decades ago. I hope today’s hearing can address the policy implications of this new class of missiles as well as the advances we’re making an intercepting ballistic missiles that we have invested so heavily in again. Let me thank all of you for appearing today. After Senator Fissures opening statement. Each witness will have five minutes for their own opening statements And then we will alternate with members for five minute rounds of questions. Senator Fisher, thank you Mr Chairman and welcome to our witnesses. We look forward to hearing your views on the broader missile defense policy, particularly as we hear renewed calls for limitations on US missile defenses to be discussed in negotiations with Russia, General Van Herk and General Carver. I also want to express my gratitude to the men and women under your command who have made some extraordinary sacrifices over the past year in order to perform their mission and defend this nation. We are grateful for their service With respect to the fiscal year 2022 funding request. I’m pleased to see its support for programs like the next generation interceptor as well as space based sensors and hypersonic defense. However, I remain concerned about the overall level of funding for missile defense proposed in this year’s budget despite continued testimony and numerous classified briefings for members where we hear that threats are growing and becoming more complex, particularly as adversaries increase their development of highly capable hypersonic and cruise missile systems. This budget proposes to fund The Missile Defense Agency at what would be the lowest level since 2016. I understand that these are part of the hard choices being made across the entire defense budget and the result of adopting a top line that ultimately reduces spending on defense. Nevertheless, I am concerned that this level of funding, especially if sustained into the future will be insignificant, will be insufficient to pace the growing threats facing our nation and we will be left in a precarious situation. As a nation. We rely on the candid testimony of our witnesses to help us understand the difference between a lean diet and starvation. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you Senator Fisher. Uh dr So for would you make your opening statement please? Thank you. Chairman King ranking member Fisher, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. For for most of the post Cold War period we’ve enjoyed a relatively stable bipartisan consensus on the role of missile defense in U. S. National security policy, but that wasn’t always the case. Few national security issues provoked more debate during the Cold War than missile defense. The argument hinged on how one perceives the relationship between missile defense and strategic stability. One school of thought held at preserving mutual vulnerability by limiting missile defenses was the key to stability during a crisis uh essential for avoiding an action reaction arms race. The other school of thought equally strongly held argue that protection against nuclear missile attack was not only a moral imperative but that even imperfect defenses could contribute to the occurrence of nuclear attack. By complicating an adversary’s prospect of launching a successful disarming first strike. But with the collapse of the soviet union, US missile defence policy shifted from building defenses against near pure powers to addressing the emerging threat to the homeland posed by smaller, more unpredictable regional actors, the so called Rogue States, with a return to great power competition. Us missile defence policy must also cope with china and Russia’s growing regional missile defense capabilities meant to prevent the United States from reinforcing its allies during the conflict. So, by centering on regional missile defense and homeland protection against rogue regimes rather than Russia. Policymakers have been able to avoid those bitter Cold War debates about strategic stability. So today, if I may, I’d like to address three issues that I seem to be attracting attention in the missile defence policy world. One is continued funding for the next generation interceptor and homeland defense. More generally, Second is employing the SM three missile in support of homeland defense. And third relationship between arms control and missile defense. So to stay ahead of the north korean ballistic missile threat to the homeland, the Obama administration added 14 ground base interceptors to the 30 fielded by the Bush administration and they sought to enhance the ground basement course defense system through a redesigned cure vehicle are KV. The trump administration altered that acquisition approach uh to include a fully modernized interceptor, both the rocket and the kill vehicle. And plan to add an additional 20 G. B. S to bring the total to 64. It appears the buying, the administration has approved the energy development to proceed. So some uh national security experts uh have criticized the cost, the efficacy and even the necessity for N G I and G M D more broadly, I’d love to, I’d like to offer the following points in response. First of all, Why we believe North Korea intends to grow its icy be enforced in the coming years. Our intelligence agencies cannot know with certainty the pace of that growth today. It’s reasonable to assume that an additional 20GBS combined with the nuclear vehicle and improve reliability. Other GMD system may be sufficient to stay ahead of the threat. We also hope to eliminate a number of North korean I C b M s on the ground, easing the burden on the GPS second with respect to costs. We need to understand this in context. Combined. N G and G M D funding will account for about one half of 1% of the D O. D budget From Fy 21-26. These are not unreasonable sons to protect the nation against north Korea. Third proceeding with N. G. I. And homeland defense more broadly is important for us. Grand strategy modernizing and expanding our homeland defense underpins President biden’s pushed to revitalize our ties with allies and friends. An important element of renewing alliances is convincing allies that the United States is prepared to run risks on their behalf. Strengthening U. S. Homeland defenses provides that confidence by reducing our own vulnerability to north korean reprisals after all, why would our allies expect us to come to their defense if we are not first willing to provide for our own defense? Finally, Russia and china, they’re going to complain about G. I. Despite the fact that they are modernizing their own suite of missile defense systems. They deploy more homeland defense interceptors and we do 68 nuclear tipped missiles and they are modernizing hundreds of regional air and missile defense systems, a missile defense posture which exceeds the U. S. In some respects, My second issue is layer is at the SM three missile. As you know, the SM three missile is a regional missile based on ships. When we did the nuclear posture, I’m sorry, the missile defense review in the Trump administration, we asked the question, could we use the SM three to provide an additional layer of protection for the homeland In addition to the G. B. I. Uh in fact, Congress was thinking along the same lines because it directed in the Fy 18 NBA, that we conduct a test of this sM three missile against a simple I. C. B. M. Target that tests took place last november, resulting in a successful intercept. Now, while the SM 3 to a missile deployed on Egypt’s ships will continue to play an important regional defense role, the interceptor may provide a modest additional measure of protection for the homeland against north korean iCBm in an emergency or during the crisis, the ship would have to be in the right place. Narcos at the right time and given its smaller size compared to the G. B. The interceptor would not provide coverage of the entire United States. Moreover, the SM three would not be capable against more complex Russian and Chinese threats armed with penetration aids and decoys. And nor would it be able to cope with Russia’s nuclear air and sea launch cruise missiles that can also range the US homeland for these reasons. It’s unlikely this capability will upset strategic stability for the foreseeable future if ever. And as President Putin himself is noted by the end of this year, 90% of Russia’s nuclear forces will be modernized and in his words, quote, capable of confidently overcoming existing and even projected missile defense systems. Some have argued that Russia’s new novel systems are a response to our missile defense plans. Well, there is an alternative explanation for right. Russia is developing these new novel nuclear capabilities. According to Rose Gottemoeller, Obama’s former New Start chief negotiator, she said Putin is after nuclear weapons. For another reason to show that Russia is still a great power to be reckoned with. These exotic systems have more of a political function than a strategic or security. one, in my view, It’s more likely and improve SM three missile even in limited numbers, will contribute to collective efforts to meet the challenges posed by the north korean regime, thereby enhancing regional and international strategic stability. In the final analysis, we cannot allow Russia or china to have a veto over the protection of the United States against rogue state threats. Finally, on arms control, uh there is a suggestion that you cannot have both missile defense and arms control. And I think history suggests the opposite. The United States has been pursuing missile defenses seriously since the mid 19 eighties. This was the Reagan’s strategic defense initiative, right? And as since we withdrew from the A. B. M. Treaty in 2000 and two. So despite the fact that we’ve we’ve been pursuing missile defenses, Russia and the United States have signed three arms control treaties that have together drawn down nuclear forces By some 85% compared to cold war. Highs, look if Russian leaders were seriously alarmed about us missile defenses, they would not have agreed to these reductions or more recently to extend the new start treaty for another five years. To conclude, I would just add that homeland and regional missile defences provide protection for the nation. It’s deployed forces and allies and are critical enablers of the us grand strategy that relies on alliances to maintain a favorable balance of power and a peaceful world order for about 2% of annual defense appropriations. Missile defense provides the United States the freedom of action to respond to crises, to shore up allies to deter adversaries and if necessary to defeat them and limit damage should deterrence fail. And finally, deterrence to be successful requires the demonstration of resolve. Missile defense is a very tangible measure of US resolve failure to do what is necessary to protect this nation against North Korea, A country with one of the lowest ranked economies in this world, could call into question US resolve and commitment in the eyes of ally and adversary alike. This would damage us strategic credibility and that serious implications for America’s broader foreign policy objectives. Thank you. Thank you for the in the interest of time, we’re going to submit the backgrounds of doctor. So for Mr Panda to the, for the record. Uh mister uh Penda. Please thank you. Chairman King, ranking member, Fisher and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I’m honored to be here today before you to offer my views on the missile defense strategy of the United States and its relationship to strategic stability with our nuclear armed adversaries. My name’s Arkan Panda in the Washington, D. C. Based scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where I studied nuclear strategy, missile defense among other issues. For the last 20 years, we’ve sought to develop a national missile defense architecture capable of defending the homeland against limited missile threats, namely those from north Korea, which today possesses a minimally capable rudimentary intercontinental range ballistic missile capability And Iran which May one day possess such a capability. Today, our ambitions for national missile defense remain large plans to develop a layered homeland missile defense architecture in particular form a major plank of the missile defense agencies near term efforts. This layered architecture stands to take what was once limited plans for a modest self contained homeland missile defense architecture, captured entirely in the ground based mid course Defense system. And it’s 44 deployed ground based interceptors soon to be 64 deployed in Alaska and California and extended to include sea based Aegis missile defense. It eventually, even ground based terminal high altitude area defense systems allow me to deposit that this country’s national security could be meaningfully enhanced through the tabling of limitations on strategic or homeland missile defense. As part of a reciprocal process involving Russia and possibly china. Doing so would not only reduce fiscal and opportunity costs in ways that would augment both our conventional deterrence capabilities and nuclear modernization plans, but also promote more stable nuclear deterrence with our adversaries. The case for limitations rests fundamentally on a national reckoning with the necessities of nuclear deterrence. As the last administration’s 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, we rely on nuclear deterrence to cope with the strategic forces of Russia and China which are objectively too vast to be fully absorbed by our existing missile defenses that I do not dispute but Moscow and Beijing reason about our intentions, as we often do. There’s based on our actions and not our statements as a result, both fear the ability of our current and future missile defense posture to degrade their strategic nuclear retaliatory capability if not completely disrupted this. In turn begets instability. To be clear, I do not posit that our missile defense programs are the sole drivers of Russian and chinese strategic modernization and force expansion. However, they are salient and considerable evidence suggests that we are seeing precisely the kind of action reaction relationship between strategic offense and defense that spurred the first round of the U. S. Soviet arms control During the late 1960s. Once again today, as was the case back then, limitations should not be unilateral but should nonetheless be on the table In particular as we seek a follow on agreement with Russia to the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The last treaty of its kind to remain in force between our two countries and due to expire in 2026. Congress in particular has led on this issue in the past and can do so again. For instance, during the final decade of the Cold War, it was Congress that limited the Reagan administration’s desire to reinterpret the ABM treaty in a way that might permit for a capacious expansion of the strategic defense initiative. This facilitated strategic stability and Congress can once again play this role. So there’s numerous ways in which Congress might lead on this issue to forestall what I see is a costly 21st century arms race that’s already underway and enhance American national security in the process. First, Congress should ask the Department of Defense to study and assess the extent to which our investments and missile defense are spurring qualitative and quantitative four structure changes by our adversaries. D. O. D. Has observed in recent congressional mandated reports that missile defense is driving certain forms of chinese and Russian modernization. For instance, a fuller study could inform our national decision making to ensure a prudent path forward Beyond This. Congress should adopt a resolution acknowledging the action reaction relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms as the preamble to the new start treaty in 2010. In doing so, this body can render more credible attempts by this administration or a future administration to seek limitations on Russian and chinese offensive arms of particular concern that would enhance american national security. Finally, congress should remain actively involved in ensuring the missile defense agency is subjecting the ground based mid course defense system too realistic testing and evaluation. This can include mandating testing against I. C. B. M. Target missiles of longer ranges that would be more representative of say a North korean iCBM. Future testing should also include more realistic environmental and other stressors, including decoys designed to emulate the infrared signature of a target reentry vehicle. Something that is eminently within North Korea’s reached today. My written testimony for the subcommittee discusses these and other issues remain to today’s hearing in greater detail. Thank you for this opportunity today. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you both. Uh Mr so far I I’m I’m trying to understand this. Our missile defense system is not designed to intercept missiles from either china or Russia, is that correct? Yes sir. And so what is our principle defense against missiles from china and Russia? The same defense that we had during the Cold War sir? The nuclear deterrent deterrent? If that is effective against china and Russia, why isn’t it effective or wouldn’t it be effective against North Korea and Iran? All right, well uh North North Korea arguably may not have the same rational perspective on these issues as uh Russia. Uh wouldn’t wouldn’t the leader of North Korea understand that if he attacks this country, his country would disappear from the map. Wouldn’t that mean that would deter even the most unstable leader? It would seem to me? Well, the question is, who’s got more at stake at this point? The concern is that he would not believe that we would use nuclear weapons against North Korea for fear of his Reprisal against the United States and by having missile defenses, you take away that consideration. And I mean, let me change the subject slightly to the capability of the missiles. The missile defense system that we’re talking about is principally to deal with the threat of hype of uh ballistic missiles. Is that correct? And my understanding is that would not deal with the threat of hypersonic glide vehicles, correct? Currently they do not. But the missile defense agency is working on defense against hyper sonics, both against long range systems and the shorter range systems are forces would encounter in in the regional campaigns. So we believe that there will be a future capability. Is that going to be a capability of the new missiles that we’re talking about authorizing uh in this process? I am not completely familiar with the budget requests at this point, but I do know that the Missile Defense agency is working on uh sensors And uh an intercept capability against hypersonic threats. But that is not what I was referring to in the SM 3 to a missile, the SM 3 to a is a regional missile, a navy missile that intercept ballistic missiles in the mid course phase. And the hope is that we could give it some capability to also intercept very simple north korean I C B M. S missiles that are headed from north Korea to uh say Guam or Hawaii or even the Continental United States. Mr pena. You talked about the action reaction If there’s a finite number of Interceptors right now, it’s 44. Talking about going to 64. Can’t that capability be defeated by north Korea simply by having more incoming missiles? Excellent question Senator. So I’ll just first note that I’m the author of a recent book on North korean strategic nuclear forces and I spend more time than I would like looking at pictures of North korean missiles As far as I know, North Korea today has 10 icbm launchers as far as I’m also aware, based on open sources. MDS concept of operations for GMD relies on using four interceptors per incoming target reentry vehicle soon to become three, but currently four, I believe. So if we just do the math, North Korea would need to add a single additional I C B M launcher to potentially saturate gmD and based on G M. D s testing record, um, the single shot probability of kill, which is the probability that a single GmD system shot at an incoming North korean reentry vehicle would succeed. Based on open sources. Again, that number appears to be just a little over 50%. So based on that assessment, senator, I would say that North Korea can probably today bet on delivering a thermonuclear warhead to the continental United States. And that I believe that that is entirely the reason that Kim Jong un today feels that he has a nuclear deterrent. He declared in November 2017 that his nuclear deterrent was complete before turning to negotiations with the United States. So I do think that that would be a correct assessment, but, but this is exactly what you’re talking about is as you build up your missile defense, then your adversary is uh, is incented to build up their side of the offensive capability. Is that what your, is that your position? That is correct? North Korea of course, is quite resource constraints, senator. So if we were to go to 64 G B s, I can’t predict today whether kim jong un would have the resources or the wherewithal to keep building ICBM launchers and ICBMS to cope with that. I will however, point out that qualitative modernization is also underway in North Korea. In October 2020, North Korea demonstrated a missile, the largest road mobile missile anywhere in the world today because most countries don’t deploy road mobile liquid propellant missiles like North Korea does. But the missile that they demonstrated appears to be large enough to carry multiple reentry vehicles. North Korea is also working on countermeasures which will include sophisticated and unsophisticated decoys. And so I completely think that even North Korea can certainly cope with qualitative advancements for on missile defense. Mr so far, I’m out of time, but I think you wanted to respond right? So uh, you know, we don’t just try to deal with North korean iCBM with active missile defense. It’s a combination of deterrence as you suggest, as well as attack operations. We’re going to try to find many of the as many of these launchers on the ground as possible and take them out before they launch and then there’s active defense. Right? But the bigger point here is if we were not to compete with North Korea, if we were not to build missile defenses against the North korean threat, what kind of signal is that gonna send to our allies? If we’re not willing to defend ourselves against north Korea, a country that can barely afford to feed itself? Why would their allies think that we’re gonna risk our own lives to come to their defense? Sandra fisher. Yeah, thank you. Mr. Chairman. Dr So for I’m sure you’ve seen a recent letter by a number of advocates. President biden encouraging him to discuss limitations on US missile defenses in the upcoming talks with Putin. The letter refers to comments president made back in 2001 when as a senator, he opposed the Bush administration’s plans to deploy a national missile defense system and predicted it could trigger an arms race with Russia and China. So let me ask you, did that prediction come true? And what empirical evidence is there linking missile defense to an arms race? And more broadly, is there evidence that missile defense is incompatible with arms control? Thank you, Senator. I don’t think that that is what has happened. So exactly what happened? We signed the we withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2000 and two. Everybody had anticipated at the time that you have this huge arms race. Both sides would build more offenses, right to overcome defenses. And what do we have? We had the Moscow treaty which took us from 6000 under start to 2200, 2200. We went down from 6000 to 2200, even though we withdrew from the ADM treaty, right? And then we had the New Start Treaty which took us down to 1550. What arms race are they talking about? There has been no arms race we’ve had. In fact, it’s just the opposite. When we signed the A. B. M. Treaty in 1972 The inventory, the Russian inventory, the Soviet inventory went from about 2500 words to over 10,000 nuclear warheads. It was just the opposite. This idea of action reaction is it’s too simple. There are many reasons why countries build would choose not to build nuclear weapons. But uh clearly our withdrawal from the ABM treaty, our deployment of 44 g based interceptors has not spurred an arms control arms race. The Russians recently agreed to extend the new start treaty by five years. If they were so alarmed by our missile defenses on our plans to add 20 more NGS, why would they agree to that dr so for Russia and china have been expanding their nuclear arsenals in recent years. But these actions have come well. U. S. Missile defense capabilities have remained relatively unchanged. For example, the most significant significant enhancement of our homeland missile defense system has been the construction of the radar in Alaska with the failure of the R. K. V. Program. Are are GMD system has not received the upgrades that were planned for that. And then we’ve seen the expansion the proposed expansion of the fleet from the 44 interceptors to 64 Which was announced in 2017. It hasn’t taken place. So I think I think we have demonstrated also that the SM three to a missile has some capabilities against the I. C. B. M. S. But this demonstration was conducted in December 2020 which is long after the Russian and the chinese have undertaken their nuclear expansions. That’s a comment, Yeah. What is your view of Russia’s complaints against US missile defenses and its attempt to portray its actions such as a deployment of a variety of new nuclear systems that were announced by Putin in 2018 as responses to our Nuclear Defense Programs Center. As a quote I read by Rose Gottemoeller suggests Russia does this for political reasons. They have their own domestic political problems. Putin has to exert his control over the oligarchs, right. Um, he uh, is more concerned about uh, sowing dissension between the US and its allies. Missile defense is a prime vehicle for doing that. And even here in the United States, they interfere with our debates by suggesting that missile defense is something that alarms them. But again, the evidence suggests that despite their talk, they continue to negotiate with US. They continue to reach reductions. I’m not suggesting that we don’t talk to Russia about this. Even the trump administration in at least five occasions, spoke to the Russians about the role of missile defense and strategic stability. And uh, you know, if the bite administration wants to pursue that, then I think it’s totally appropriate. Does Russia need a nuclear powered cruise missile to overwhelm our missile defenses? Clearly not. Clearly not. They have they have air launched cruise missile, sea launch cruise missiles. Thank you. Senator kelly. Thank you. Mr Chairman Mr Panda. Earlier, you were talking about the probability of kill of our systems. I think you said a PK of 0.5 0.5 roughly. So, um where does that data come from? If you can say in an open hearing? Um and then I wanted to go back to the number of I C. B. M. S. That dprk that you believe they they have. And obviously there’s two approaches to this right? We can increase the number of Gps. Um, currently I believe we have 44. But the other approach here could be how do we improve on the on the P. K. Number. So can you elaborate a little bit about where we are in that? Absolutely, Senator. So first of all, I’ve never been in government. I’ve never held a clearance of my assessments are entirely based on open sources. Um The actual PK number is I believe classified. Um the assessment that I’m offering is primarily based on the testing history of the system which allows us to extrapolate are reasonably of course, there have been multiple statements made by officials expressing their confidence in the system, which I’ll just point out that that’s different from the technical parameters of GM. These actual performance. So based on your other observation about the two possible approaches on how we can get our PK up, I will I will say Senator, if we are to sustain missile defenses and when I talk about limitations, I’m not talking about eradicating missile defense by any means. I do believe that the A. B. M. Treaty, for instance, allowed for 100 interceptors at two fixed sites for the 1974 Protocol to the treaty. What what I do want to see is if we do continue to invest in missile defense that we do it right that testing and evaluation are realistic, I will point out that G. M. D. Has been tested against I C. B. M. Class targets that M. D. A. Describes as quote threat Representative. But to my knowledge, the target missiles used in these tests are far shorter range than an actual I C. B. M. They would have to travel from north Korea’s northern provinces where they based their I C. B. M. Forces to the US homeland. So I will just emphasize that again, Senator, if we are to continue to proceed with maintaining a missile defense and this is regardless of whether or not we pursue arms control. Our missile defenses should be realistically tested and evaluated. Um If we are going to continue to spend taxpayer money on this enterprise, it needs to be realistic. It needs to demonstrate a capability that is real because ultimately, and I believe my my co witness pointed this out. Missile defense comes into play when strategic deterrence has failed. And ultimately, no one in this room is in favor of allowing the United States to face a nuclear attack. So if nuclear deterrence is here to stay, my preference and I’m sure the preference of most americans will be that it works as best as it can. And that means that testing and evaluation needs to be done properly and done in ways that are realistic. Thank you. So just to follow up on this, so we’re talking um with SM three G B I s, we’re talking mid course um if we start to look into systems um that could intercept in a boost phase uh any sense for what kind of probability of kill we would have with those systems at this point. Sure. Senator. That’s an excellent question. Boost phase defense has been a topic of query for over 20 years. There’s been multiple studies done the primary pitfall with boost phase defenses that we physically need to base our interceptors or whatever launch vehicle for the interceptors be that a drone, a fighter near the adversaries territory and really the only country with which this will be viable would be North Korea, which has ocean international waters on both sides. But again, this would only come into play in a crisis. Um effectively it would be simply infeasible to keep an F 35 or a drone or any other kind of launch vehicle in the air long enough at all times to intercept any North korean missile launch. Another point that I will point out is that, you know, we’ve been talking about strategic stability and you raised this point with boost face defense. Um There are of course other concepts that we’ve been looking into um counterforce targeting of North korean launchers before they can launch left of launch techniques including cyber attacks, a sub component of strategic stability that hasn’t been surfaced in today’s discussion is crisis stability. We’ve talked about arms race, stability and that and that mostly refers to the peace time build up on both sides. Crisis stability refers to our incentives in a crisis and for kim jong un, knowing that the United States is so fundamentally qualitatively advanced compared to North Korea. The incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis grow, the more we indicate that we are willing to destroy his missiles early in a crisis, kim jong un is fundamentally developed these weapons because he thinks that using them first gives him the best rational chance at survival in a conflict. And so I think, you know, if I could counsel one thing, it would be that it’s fine to pursue missile defense is fine to protect the U. S. Homeland from nuclear attack from north Korea. But we need to be careful about the kinds of incentives that we generate for the north korean leadership in a crisis. Because my assessment is that fundamentally that kim jong un is rational, but that his rationality ultimately has manifested in a way that favors the first use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. Thank you. Mr benton. Mhm. Sandra Cramer, thank you. Mr Chairman. I just kind of off follow up a little bit with that. Given that theory would the same thing apply to say missile uh two missile tracking satellites and everything else in the value chain? Did those have the same impact on a possible response? Thank you. Senator. Missile tracking can facilitate counterforce targeting of of north korean assets and ultimately because these assets will be used anywhere around the world where our forces need them. They can simply also be used against china and Russia. This has already led to for instance Russia’s development of a ground based laser called Perez Fat which is designed to disrupt dazzle our observation satellites. The Russians don’t want us tracking their I. C. B. M. Transporter erector launchers. We haven’t talked a lot about china today, so let me just offer one observation there. The primary Chinese concern is not solely our missile defense China is also quite concerned about our conventional precision strike capabilities because Chinese nuclear forces, Arlene I believe the defense intelligence agency has attested to the fact that Chinese nuclear forces are currently in the low 200 but expected to double in size by the end of the decade. One of the things that china is particularly concerned about is a conventional campaign waged by the United States against its nuclear forces which are primarily land based. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force for the first time since the 1980s, has now re adopted a nuclear mission beginning in 2019. Um but all of this means that missile tracking while an important component of facilitating missile defense and counter force can ultimately be destabilizing. Dr sulfur. Would you want to respond to that? Well, it can be destabilizing but it can also be very stabilizing if if it provides the currents right? If trying to understand that we have these capabilities in place, they won’t start a war at the end. You have deterrence at the outset. So in that case it can be stabilizing depends on your perspective. Thank you. That’s all I have. Thank you. Mr. Uh huh. Senator tomorrow. Thank you. Mr Chairman Dr Super. You previously stated that a strong missile defense system is exactly how us prevents escalation protects our nation. We’re falling behind her peers and near peers at an alarming rate. If us continues down this path, what do you believe the outcome would be? And what changes do you believe we should? What should happen in the next five years? Thank you Senator. I think it’s important perhaps to uh to think of the problem set in two ways. One is the threat to the homeland, right? And that’s by Russia and china and by the Rogues for Russia and china, we’re going to have to continue to rely on our nuclear deterrent, prevent them from attacking us, right? But for the Rogues, we have to stay ahead of them if we don’t stay ahead of them again, it shows it shows the rest of the world that we lack the will to compete with North Korea and china. And that makes your allies very nervous. So that’s the first problem is that the second problems that has to do with regional threats, right? The United States are the strategy of Russia in europe and china, and Asia is to keep us from reinforcing our allies during war. If they can keep us from from from our from intervening, they feel that they can win. And so they’re building all these missiles right in order to attack our basis, our ports, our ships to keep us from reinforcing our policy here is to strengthen our regional missile defenses, help our allies be able to defend themselves with regional defenses. Right? And again, all this provides a deterrent at the outset. So they don’t contemplate a uh even a conventional attack. And I think there’s fairly broad bipartisan consensus on that approach to missile defense. Thank you. We spend a GMD dates back 15 years. Are you supportive updating in India? Well, senator, I think it really depends if we if we proceed with N. G I I won’t focus on the cost issue because ultimately at the at the end of the day, if we have a missile defense system that can prevent damage the US homeland from thermonuclear attack and it works, it’s very difficult to really put a price tag on that. It’s, it’s effectively priceless. Of course, if we look at the record reality is a little bit different there. So once again, I’ll just emphasize that if we are to proceed with N. G. I, and if we are to pony up the big taxpayer bill that comes with that, my preference and my sort of council would be that we we proceed and demand that testing is done in a way that really does facilitate the development of a missile defense system that can work and can provide that level of defense because ultimately, that math I sort of laid out earlier when it comes to north korean I C B M s. And and again, recognizing that is the primary reason we have homeland missile defense. The more we can improve that the fewer number of interceptors we can assign to incoming reentry vehicles, the harder it becomes for kim jong un to keep up with that pace. Unfortunately based on our current approach that just doesn’t seem to be viable. Thank you doctor. So for you want to I can go thank you. Thank you. Mr Chairman. I want to thank this panel. You’ve been very thoughtful and provocative, which is exactly what we needed to discuss. The strategic underpinning of this of this subject. And I want to call our next panel to the, to the table. I hope that both of you in light of the questions and the discussion today will file additional testimony. If you feel it would be helpful to the committee, appreciate it. Uh our government witnesses Mrs Loughner tomorrow. This is your second time in a couple of weeks. So welcome back to the committee. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for nuclear and Missile Defense Policy General Glenn verkerk Commander, U. S. Northern Command. North american Aerospace Defense Command, Lieutenant General Daniel Carr blur Commander, U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and joint functional component command for Integrated Missile Defense. And Vice Admiral john Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency. Um I think we’ll start with Miss tomorrow on uh the policy question. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Missile Defense Policy. Thank you Chairman. Um and thank you for walking me back to uh the subcommittee. Chairman, King ranking member fisher and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the missile threat and the department’s missile defense policy and priorities. Okay, I asked permission to submit my opening remarks for the record. So word. Thank you along with left of launch capabilities in our nuclear and conventional forces. Missile defense plays a key role in US defense with regard to the threat environment as missile as missile technology matures and proliferates the threat to the US Homeland Allies, partners and our deployed forces is increasing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Dprk continues development and deployment of more capable intercontinental ballistic missiles that have de stabilised um and reshaped the security environment in East Asia. Iran’s short and medium range ballistic missiles comprise the largest missile force in the Middle East. Both the DpRK and Iran are extending the range reliability and accuracy of their missile forces. Additionally, Russia and China continued to develop and field increasingly advanced and diverse regional offensive missile capabilities. These capabilities form the backbone of their anti access area denial strategy intended to deny the United States freedom of action to protect military power and to protect our allies and partners to address these evolving challenges. The department will review its missile defense policies, strategies and capabilities to ensure that we have effective missile defenses. The review will align with the National Defense Strategy and contribute to the department’s approach to integrated deterrence. And we expect to complete the strategy by January of 2022 with regard to homeland defense. The department is committed to defending the United States against rogue state missile threats. Dut recently initiated the development of the next generation interceptor. An N. G. Will increase the reliability and capability of missile defense of the United States. As this program moves forward, it will align with the administration’s defense goals and priorities with regard to regional defense. Missile defenses would also remain central to maintaining the U. S. Enduring advantage to flow forces into militarily consisted regional environment and to safeguard those forces should a conflict arise. Additionally, the department will continue to ensure that we bring a more integrated approach to air and missile defense that not only assists with defense against various types of ballistic missile threats but also enables defense against cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. I am the will field interoperable and integrated missile defense sensors, interceptors and commanding control to improve capability against a range of threats. Mhm. With regard to critical enablers. In addition to improving today’s operational systems were examining new enabling technologies. Secretary Austin has noted the importance of enhancing our global network of integrated sensors. Space based and land based sensors enable a variety of capabilities. Such a detection tracking and targeting through all phases of flight for an incoming missile. U. S. Commercial innovation is already transforming this field In Fy 22. We will continue to develop the prototype hypersonic and ballistic tracking space censor the HB TSS that will allow the tracking of hypersonic threats and add resiliency to our sensor architecture. The department’s approach for regional hypersonic defense will first focus on defense in the terminal phase. Information Security is critical to future batter to the future battlefield and is necessary to enable rapid planning and employment in a joint operating environment. To that end, the department is developing multiple cyber harden advanced all domain awareness for a command and control architectures that will enable timely and accurate decision making to address emerging threats. And we will continue to develop capabilities for left of launch and missile defeat. That will play an important role in effectively countering limited missile attacks with regard to cooperation with our allies and partners engaging and working with our allies and partners to enhance our collective missile defense efforts as a core focus area for the department. The indo pacific is a model for a cooperative missile defense efforts with strong allies including Japan, the republic of Korea and Australia. NATO continues to form the backbone of european joint and combined operations. And in the Middle East US Israeli missile defense collaboration demonstrates to the mutual benefits of technology sharing with our allies and partners along with our efforts to strengthen missile defense cooperation with key gulf cooperation countries. Okay. Additional. Additionally, my office leads a series of dialogues that share information on regional global missile threats. In conclusion, as the department prepares its strategic review, I can assure members of this committee that we are steadfastly committed to key missile defense to the key missile defense missions and priorities, including working with allies and partners to meet the challenge of growing missile threats in a cost effective manner that strengthens regional and strategic stability. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Yeah, the chairman, king, ranking member, fisher and distinguished members of the committee. It’s a privilege to testify before you again today. I’m honored to serve as the commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command and I’m grateful to appear beside my colleagues. Here is their crucial partners in homeland defense, the United States Northern Command, NORAD or separate commands yet work seamlessly to accomplish the critical mission of defending north America against all threats whether posed by our competitors, natural disasters or a pandemic. We’re in an area, an era of renewed strategic competition and this time we’re facing two nuclear armed peer competitors, both focusing on circumventing our homeland defenses. Additionally, North Korea’s recent unveiling of a new intercontinental ballistic missile capable of threatening North America and Hawaii is meant to constrain options in a crisis. I remain concerned about my ability in the near future to defend the homeland. Potential adversaries continue to develop capabilities to hold our homeland at risk from all vectors, all domains kinetically and non kinetically. They seek to exploit a perceived gap between our nuclear deterrent, which I believe is the foundation of homeland defense and our conventional homeland defense capabilities. To close this perceived gap, we must accelerate efforts to transform our culture to think and operate globally and digitally across all domains. In fact, our homeland defense into every strategy plan, force management, force, design, acquisition and budgetary decision, United States Northern Command NORAD are aggressively pursuing a left of launch framework that provides the president of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. Less escalatory options. That increased decision space and deterrence in strategic competition. Vice Endgame kinetic defeat in conflict. Whether the with the missile defense agency leading the effort, progress on the next generation interceptor is on the right trajectory but further delays will be detrimental to defense and deterrence by denial capability. We must also capitalize on globally layered multi threat detection systems such as over the horizon, radar, hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking space sensors which can adequately address both my capability and capacity concerns of emerging threats. Progress is also being made on information dominance capabilities within the department. The additional capabilities, US North. Com is pioneering as demonstrated in the latest global information dominance experiment are focused on prying data from existing stove pipe networks to enable all domain awareness. By ingesting data streams into cloud based architecture where the power of artificial intelligence and machine learning is unleashed, we can drastically reduce processing times across the globe and rapidly enable information dominance and decision superiority. All 11 combatant commanders endorsing fielding these capabilities as soon as possible. United States, North. Com and NORAD will continue to lead and accelerate the department’s digital transformation through development of global all domain awareness sensors, networks, data standards and infrastructure to share information quickly and efficiently. In doing so, we will improve our ability to defend the homeland against emerging threats, including improved the list uh improved ballistic missiles, low altitude hyper sonics and long range, low radar cross section cruise missiles. North Common Nor Ed take solemn pride in executing the Secretary of defense is top priority by standing watch to defend our nation. I’m grateful for the trust and responsibility. You place in me is the commander of North calm and NORAD. Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you. General Cutler. Chairman King Ranking member, Fisher. Distinguished members of the subcommittee. I’m honored to testify before you today. Thank you especially during the unprecedented health crisis of this past year for supporting our service members, civilians, contractors, and their families and your continued support to space and air and missile defense. I’m here today is the commander of the joint functional component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. And as the army’s proponent for air missile defense or AMG Forces and capabilities, I’m responsible for providing General Van Herck, the soldiers who stand ready to defend our nation from an intercontinental ballistic missile attack, as well as the soldiers who provide critical missile warning to army and joint war fighters. His air missile threats become more diverse and numerous from adversaries worldwide. The Army AMG Enterprise continues to work hard to ensure our war fighters and our homeland are protected. I’d like to take this opportunity to really fully thank and highlight the mission accomplishments of our team of nearly 3000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians and civilians in the challenging covid environment that we continue to endure during this past year. In support of space. Com stratcom and NORAD North. Com. These outstanding men and women, provided the army and joint force with satellite communications, space, situational awareness and missile warning and defense and protected our homeland 24 73 65 from ballistic missile attack. Even in the pandemic environment, they did not miss a beat to outline one of numerous examples of putting mission first and how army families have sacrificed during the pandemic members of our ground based missile defense Cruz adhered to 12 consecutive months of stringent measures ensuring the uninterrupted execution of their mission, including sequestering crew members from their homes and families, essentially our missile defense crews lived in a bubble throughout their operational rotations on this essential no fail mission. While they’re in the families reside in Colorado Springs, colorado and Fort Greely Alaska. The crew members were basically away from their families for extended periods of time. A positive I have drawn from this pandemic is my daily realization that I’ve never been more proud and thankful for our greatest asset. Our people. Every day I am awed by their dedication and unwavering sacrifices to the nation. I consider an honor and privilege to lead and serve alongside them. The continued support of Congress is critical to our ability to recruit, develop, retain and resource. Such a highly qualified admission ready team. I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you. Thank you very much. Admiral Hill. Good afternoon. Chairman King, ranking member of Fisher and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your time today to discuss the important topic of missile defense for president. Budget 22 MG is requesting 8.9 billion to develop and deploy homeland defenses against the rogue state threat, improve regional defenses against existing and the emerging threats. The threat can be summed up as the ballistic as Senator Fisher mentioned earlier. Uh much less uh predictable today. But they come with countermeasures and multiple warheads potentially with nuclear payloads. The hypersonic cruise missile threats present high speeds and global maneuvering challenges. So despite the pandemic restrictions that general Carbon mentioned now, we have advanced the program on several fronts this past year and I’d like to walk you through some of those uh from commanding control and battle management. We call that program C. T. B M C. Uh We’ve continued with our spiral upgrades to integrate across the missile defense system supporting the commands and services with tracking, queuing and discrimination. Data discriminations are fancy word for picking out the lethal object in the complex. And we’ll come back to that in just a bit from a space sensing perspective, improving our detection are tracking and discrimination. The hypersonic ballistic tracking Space center mentioned earlier that development continues with two competitive awards focused on an on orbit demo in Fy 23. And we will track dim boosting targets and we will track hyper glide vehicles and we need to do that soon so we can leverage that capability in the end up a calm theater where we will first put out our hypersonic defenses in the hypersonic missile defense kill chain. And I’ll come back to that in just a moment. The other space capability I’d like to talk about is a space case space space kill assessment. The Scada system we deployed that a couple years ago. We have a full constellation up. And what we’re doing now is taking what we see is the flashes when we get intercept and bringing that to an operational hit assessment for the combatant commander specifically for General Van Hurt so that he can control the Homeland Defense war. Switching over to land based sensors was mentioned earlier. The long range discrimination radar that we have up in Alaska that’s being built now we did have some pandemic delays. The clear Air Force Base closed. We had radar equipment shipping there. We had to stop and hold it up but the team stayed on path building that radar and we have both panels completed this year. We are now doing radiation which means we the radar is up and running doing low power calibration and we’re gonna learn a lot. Started off at a very small scale radar out in morristown New Jersey. It’s now at its full of race size and we expect to have government acceptance by the end of this year. From a homeland defense perspective, we didn’t talk much about G. B. I fleet reliability efforts, the service life extension program. And I want to thank Congress for their support there. You can’t have a weapons system deployed in 2000 and four and not maintain it, not take those rounds out of the ground and upgrade them. We’re doing that now in coordination with North Command NORAD. Those missiles come out of the ground. We change out the boosters, we update the software and um, we update the seekers, we update the threat libraries that builds capacity and capability now so that we can close the gap between now and when we actually deploy the first N. G. I. What’s also important about that is that hardware that’s been in the silos for all those years now becomes the basis for the analysis that we do to determine reliability. Last year we had this conversation. It was purely analytical base because we did not have that hardware available. So the service life extension programme extends the life of the current GMD fleet increases its capability and capacity, but also gives us the hardware ability to go and really assess reliability to build the confidence of the warfighter. We’re also expanding the missile field for Had some fall backs during COVID but we leverage the waterways. We have all 20 silos installed and now we’re doing integration. The next test for G. M. B. The boost vehicle tests. 03 B V T 03 were developing the capability to not just fully burn full Kinnah Matics of the G. B. I. System. You can fly it and only burn up to the second stage and why is that important? It allows you to engage more and more into the battle space. So there’s a lot of activity going on with the curtain GmD fleet that is providing the warfighter higher confidence, higher capability for the future. N. G. I. Development that was mentioned earlier. We are underway today with 22 competitive contracts and I think that’s really important. The fact that the department has stepped forward to award those contracts and to have to really great teams all the way through critical design review. That is unusual and I’m telling you it’s gonna be hard, but we have the teams that are in place, they’re perfectly proceeds no conflicts of interest as we work those, uh, that that important competition. But why did we do that so that we can manage the technical risk in the program and so that we can get to emplacement earlier than the government estimate of 2028 both of our contract is showing that they’re going to come in earlier and that’s a good thing for General Van Herk and the war fighters. Let me switch to the GIS program. We just integrated air missile defense continues to advance. We’re delivering the SM three block one B missiles on a multi year procurement. The block to a missile, which was a cooperative development with Japan. I’m very proud of what we’ve done. That missile. We are in production now, the Secretary of defense just recently gave us permission to take the 1st 11 rounds that were built out of our DE Tne and deploy those today. So that capability is out in the fleet now and through Global Force Management it will go to the right places. We’re increasing our ability was C based terminal. I’ll talk about that in just a second and continue improvements within the combat system on the ships and then with in with the missiles and total alignment with the Navy. Ftm 44 was mentioned already executed at the end of last year. Another great Covid story. Another great department. All hands on deck story we had originally planned in May. We executed in november due to the pandemic. We had to do a lot of deconfliction on the range dan, helped me keep the target in place on Kwajalein. Right. That’s a tough area to have a target go into shutdown mode. But we charge the batteries charged batteries. We made sure that the ship cruise stays safe. Work very closely with the Navy. So, the USs john Finn, a new construction, integrated air missile defense ship could go out and execute that mission. That same participated in the last GMD tests and tracked the I. C. B. M. So we were all about risk reduction. Making sure that we do things right And that was a threat representative target. It was a defense of hawaii scenario from north Korea to hawaii. That’s what it is. If you look at the geography, that’s what we did. So that was a threat Representative approved by D. A. Teeny worked very closely with the intelligence community to ensure that we’re a threat representative and that we were testing likely fight. Let me shift out to Europe agents short Poland. Right. This has been a tough one for the last couple years. We’ve told you were at 90% construction completion Today. I’m going to tell you we’re at 90% or more construction completion. But the great news within the last couple months through the pandemic, you saw that in Europe, we managed to raise the four spy radar raise, put them in place as a forcing function to construction. We also put up the fire control director. That is really great. Now we’re ready to do install and check out for the Aegis combat system. Very important work. We also took the Aegis Combat system out of the context boxes has been sitting in for two or three years and we ran full digital signal analysis on it to make sure that system works. And we’re going to upgrade that system to make sure there are no obsolescence. We’re in tight coordination with the Army Corps and he just short Poland is on track to to complete its construction a little bit on Egypt’s C based terminal. That is the first regional hypersonic missile defense capability that is deployed with the aircraft carrier strike groups today. And it’s important that we have that capability now because the hypersonic threat is there now. What we want to do is move further back into that trajectory engaged earlier. Make the terminal defense even better. And so the glide phase interceptor is under acceleration in the PB- 22 budget. And that’s an important capability for the country, ties right into h B T s s, ties right into land based sensors and sea based sensors that can give us the fuse track that we need to take a hypersonic maneuvering capability out in the glide phase and then we hit it again in terminal. Let me switch to gum to Guam. PB 22 includes funds for the initial development of a survivable and operationally effective I. M. D. For Guam. And those capabilities that I’ve talked about regional for me just and what I’m going to talk about in just a second and that are all part of that architecture consideration today. And we’re working that hard so that we can come forward and tell you exactly what we’re gonna do on Guam staying very close to into pecan that we’ve continued the interceptor procurement, production and training support and we’re developing the capabilities to address the evolving threat in very close coordination with the US Army. Bad and patriot integration. We have been working there for the last 23 years. We completed the first phase where we separate the launchers from the Bad battery for flexibility for the combatant commander. We have done patriot launch on remote from bad data pretty impressive. Also, flexibility for the warfighter and our next test this year is to control the patriot battery using that. That may not all make sense to you. But what that means is full flexibility where the combatant commands needed and the army will be working in search of material release once we finish that test. So I’ll wrap up by saying a little bit about technology investing in innovative and disruptive technologies to address emerging threats, including regional, layered hypersonic cruise missile defense capabilities, space sensors, land and sea based sensors networked through the commander control battle management system set the stage for hypersonic and cruise missile defense capabilities. And thank you, I appreciate everything that you do for this committee. And thank you for your time today. Thank you very much, Admiral. Uh, this subject is more and more complicated. The more we get into it because I think when we talk about missile defense, it’s important to emphasize. We’re not only talking about Fort Greely and Vandenberg, we’re talking about God, patriot and Egypt. Uh, you have to understand that from the point of view of this committee. One of the important considerations we have is opportunity cost. This is a tight budget year that we’re looking at. And so we’re when you spend money on one thing, that means you don’t have money to spend on something else. And that’s something that we have to uh, we have to look at uh, the uh, you mentioned something very important and that is we’re developing hypersonic defense. Could you expand upon that? Being aware that this is non classified setting? Can we defend a carrier against a hypersonic glide missile? Today? We have terminal capability today. Terminal means in the last stages before it hits the ship. And that’s typically where you will start on taking on that kind of threat. It happens to be in the hardest environment. The right you’re in the atmosphere, you’re maneuvering. But we do have that capability deployed today and we’re continuing to improve it. Where we need to go is to take it out in that glide phase and that’s the glide phase interceptor that you’ll see in the P. B 22 budget. We’re all talking about hitting bullets with bullets. What’s the role of directed energy? And have we, are we putting sufficient resources into directed energy as an alternative and frankly a cheaper alternative and perhaps more effective one to deal with a maneuverable incoming missile. Thank thank Senator. That’s a very tough one to discuss in this environment. I’d love to come see you on that one. There are initiatives there. I just can’t talk about it here at this session. Thank you. It is being considered. Yes, sir. Uh General Van Herck, I think you used the term and I wrote it down. You talked about prying the data out of someplace. Am I correct? Is that what you said, senator? Chairman? That’s correct. I did say that there’s lots of data from domain awareness sensors around the globe that all too often is not shared to develop a globally integrated picture that would give us the ability to get further left and give decision space to our senior leaders. I completely agree. And as you know, Goldwater Nichols was a landmark statute which led us to joint commands, but we don’t necessarily have joint data access and capability development. So I hope that’s something we might be able to address. But when one of our general says he has to pry the data out of another agency in order to to do his job, I think that tells us we’ve got a problem we should address. Chairman. I’m I’m encouraged with the department going down. The Secretary just signed the Joint All Domain command and Control strategy. We’re moving forward going down that path. I would also say that we’re going to have to look at policy and laws as well, especially within the intel community of sharing data to ensure that we get a full global picture. Okay. Uh, Admiral, are you persuaded that the accuracy and the ability of the ground based interceptors is sufficient to justify the cost? Let me put it a more difficult question. Which would you rather have? The ground based interceptors are five additional Aegis destroyers. Mhm. Well, for the ballistic threat. Um, the G. B. I. S today and the N. G. I. S. Tomorrow. Go after that threat. Respect for that. Uh, N. G. I as you know, uh, it’s got a hard requirement on it. It’s to cover all 50 states. That’s why it’s a 50 ft missile and 50 ft in diameter. It’s got a hard requirement on it. I would rather have more G. B. S and G’s against that threat. The Aegis ships and what they do for a totally different mission and their multi mission ships, they have a lot of different missions that their expert, thad Egypt’s and Patriot have a higher success rate, do they not? Um, I the way the success rate was mentioned earlier, it’s always entertaining to me, right. If you have a failure in a program, you’re gonna learn from that failure. Right? Talk about it all the time. Right? You learn from your failures, Right? So whenever there is, there’s an incoming missile from north Korea and we miss it. Right. Learning from the failure isn’t going to make people feel absolutely not. And so that’s why over time you want to improve the program and then your math really needs to take a look at the current configuration that is in the ground and the current configuration that has been tested against realistic targets. If you add up failures from 1998 into the number, of course you’re gonna have a lower reliability number using that White world information. I will tell you that the reliability is much higher and I think that the conference and Warfighters based on that final question and my wife says, I say finally too much it gets people’s hopes up. But in this case, a final question, you heard MR Panda talk about more transparency, clarity on testing, clear reporting on what exactly the targets are. It could be in a classified setting. But would you support that suggestion that because it seems to me we have a responsibility as the people who are funding and using the taxpayer’s money to ensure that these things are going to work. So would you support additional clarity and transparency, transparency with regard to testing absolute senator? If someone’s got a security clearance, I will happily talk to them about that. And I’ll tell you we’ve got a great test record that I’m very proud of and you can’t just look at live fire, right? That’s a one shot right in a broad battle space. We ought to look at the ground test data. Right? That’s where your real numbers and your your statistics come from. So I’d be happy to show that to anybody that’s interested and has the appropriate clearance. I think we can. That’s something we can follow up on. Thank you very much. Thank you all. Uh Senator Fisher. Thank you. Mr Chairman um Admiral Hill. A number of news reports have indicated that the government of Israel plans to submit a request for additional assistance so that they can replenish their iron dome system following the recent conflict that we’ve seen there with Hamas. Has the department received such a request? Um I’m going to defer that question over to policy, but before I do that I will say there are a great partner, We work very closely with Israel on all layers of what they do and uh but beyond that in terms of the emergency acquisition I’ll send that over to Policy Mr Merrill. It’s good to see you again. You’re going to be a regular here I think from now. Thank you so much for being here. Can you answer that question for me? Yes, absolutely. The department is uh is working that request um and as Admiral Hill said um we look forward to working very closely with Israel as as one of our closest partners. Um So the department is working that request um I what I can do is because it crosses over um uh several departments within within duty uh to come back to you and give you more detail. I’d like to know if it’s going to be a request for some supplemental appropriations or if it’s going to um reprogram resources. Mm I think if if you could allow me to come back and give you a better answer for the record on that. But uh again, looking for the department is is looking at at that request for a billion dollars. Okay, great. Thank you. Also, what are the department’s plans with respect to conducting a missile defense review? Um has that begun what organizations are involved in it? Where first of all are you going to have a missile defense review? And what’s the process going to look like on that? Uh Yeah. Thank you senator. We are planning to start a missile defense review imminently uh in the next few weeks. Um and look forward to working across the department with Admiral Hills organization um with General Van Herk and North com with mhm. Uh the acquisition uh community within the department. Uh And so um so it will be done in a coordinated way across the department. And we are playing to to start very soon. Uh We’ll look at um the threat uh end up changing security environment. Um What uh you know, how do we improve uh and have effective and affordable missile defense for both the homeland um and uh and regional defense. Um So as I mentioned, mel burning remarks, we will do that as part of the National Defense Strategy and it will also feed into our integrated deterrence review. Will it be stand alone? Uh That decision has not been made yet. Section 16 84 of the Fy 2017 N. D. A. Requires the department to designate a single entity as the weed acquisition organization for defending the homeland from cruise missiles to my knowledge, that designation has not been made. Um, can you update us on what the status of that is? Yeah, Senator. You’re correct. Uh, that designation has not been made and is still being worked within the department. Okay. Thank you. Do you think we need it? Do we need that designation? Um, This is something that the department is still looking at uh, and uh, and ask for your indulgence in allowing me to to look across and and work with my colleagues on what the best way forward on this is. And I know the previous administration also uh did a lot of work on this too. I’m gonna put General Van Herck on the spot in Admiral Hill. What do you think? Do we need a designation like that? Uh Senator Fisher. I I do believe it would be best to have a single entity designated within the department for cruise missile defense of the homeland. Thank you for your great great question. I also agree we need a single agency involved. Good. Thank you. Um I’ll try and get another one in Admiral Hill. Does the budget support delivery of the next generation interceptor in 2028. Can you describe the life extension programme? M. D. A. Has developed to ensure the current interceptor fleet remains viable until N. G. N. G. I is deployed. Thank you. Senator. When I mentioned the service Life extension programme earlier based on congressional support there, we kick started that program working very closely with General Van Herk and his team. And uh that is going really well and it will increase capacity capability. I mentioned that we will have the old hardware that we can assess and our assessments of reliability are gonna bump up and we’re gonna have a lot more confidence in that. So what what we’re doing is I don’t like to live off of plus ups. I always appreciate when Congress does that. But then now we’re committed to include that in the budget. So you’ll see us including that in PB 22 as we move forward and uh that PV 20 to look into N. G. I absolutely. We were in a good place with both contractors moving out to beat the government estimate of first emplacement in 28. That’s going to come to the left. I’m gonna stay very close to General Van Herck. Gonna stay very close with all the stakeholders in the building because of what that means is flight testing will happen earlier. Which means we’re going to prepare those threat represented targets and we will be ready to go. Good to hear. Thank you. Yes ma’am. Thank you. Center Rosen Mayor Webex. Yeah. Uh Well thank you Chair King and ranking member fisher for holding of these hearings today. I’d like to thank all witnesses for their service for testifying in general. Van Herck always great to see you spend some time with you that we did yesterday. That was a wonderful I’d like to go right into some missile defense cybersecurity issues and as M. D. A. Works to rapidly deploy missile defense systems of course stay ahead of threats. I’m concerned that we may not be taking potential cyber vulnerabilities seriously enough. Before we feel new systems. When the 2019 missile defense review software is mentioned only once and even more alarming. G A O S May 2021 report highlights that none of em D A S 17 operational cybersecurity test planned for fiscal year 2020 were conducted. And that cybersecurity testing since 2017 has revealed several vulnerabilities. So Admiral Hill, in light of recent significant cyber attacks, of course, I don’t have to tell you what they are out in the public space. What steps is M. D. A. Taking to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities. And are you conducting a cyber security testing on all deployed and planned capabilities? Yes. Thank Senator Rosen. Um Part of the difficulty of cyber testing with the missile defense systems is often you have to creep into the networks that are operational. So it does require a lot of coordination with the combatant commands. Uh, and when you look at what it takes to execute a cyber test in a pandemic. No surprise that there were delays in executing those tests in 2020. But I will tell you, we’ve conducted a number of adversarial assessments, those are called the A. S. We’ve also moved out and done uh the PCO, which is the persistent cyber operations. We have an agreement with D. O. T. Any to start executing that this next year. So we have a team in place and ready to roll. Uh I I absolutely agree with you. That is something we should worry about when you look at a system as networked as missile defenses 18 time zones, tying all the sensors together, fusing data. Absolutely. I want to know where those vulnerabilities are. So when we, when we execute those tests, we take action on them. You can see it in our budget exhibits, you will see cybersecurity across every single element of the missile defense system and you will see that we are marshaling the best people on the planet to execute those adversarial assessments and persistent cyber operations. Uh I appreciate that and it is a large operation. It is difficult to test. I would argue that a lot of those tests are also done remotely in the privacy of offices as we do some of those threat assessments. It’s important that we get back on a regular schedule because of the complexity also means it is more easily, it’s more vulnerable because there’s many points of entry. But I’d like to move on now and build on Senator fishers. Question about the iron dome. So miss tomorrow, given the U. S. Army’s acquisition of course of the iron dome technology, what lessons do you think that you’ve learned or we’ve learned from the recent Israel Hamas conflict? And more specifically, are you concerned about the ability of hostile actors to launch a massive barrage of rockets designed to overwhelm the short range missile systems in the mist tomorrow and general car blur. You can both respond. Mr mary. It could go first. Please Thank you are. Uh, again, uh, there’s been a lot of continuity and support for uh cooperative missile defense with Israel and supporting um Israel’s ability and capacity uh, to defend itself. And and we will continue to do so. Uh, and my understanding is according to Israel, the their success rate is very high well and and and maybe general you can talk about the lessons learned because we know, uh, maybe we’re still analyzing what’s just recently happened, but there are lessons to be taken from the most recent conflict. So can you speak to that ma’am, I had an opportunity to go visit the Army soldiers who are out at White Sands missile range uh as we feel the new iron dome batteries uh their training on the systems. Um I don’t know specifically if the lessons learned have been shared, but I know that the instructors out there as they go through their certification and training are providing threat representative scenarios to those soldiers as they go through the training. And we expected that the first battery will be ready for deployment at the end of september of this year. Thank you. I appreciate that. I’ve toured those batteries myself and uh quite impressive and I think there will be a lot of things that we’ve learned going forward. I believe my time is up. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you. Senator Senator Cramer, Thank you. Mr. Chairman thanks to all of our witnesses. I think all but one of my questions that have been already thoroughly um discussed. Although I will just add that I look forward to an update on Israel’s request for emergency military aid um as well and more details regarding that. But I do have a question um for you, General Van Herk and I really appreciated our time together, our discussions about over the horizon radar, the importance of all domain awareness. Uh and of course the the hugely successful test of over the horizon radar at camp craft in a few years ago. And we just ask if you could further explain the importance of over the horizon, greater how it increases capability to defend the homeland and why you need resources frankly to too fast tracks and procurement. Senator thank you. Uh as we look at our competitors potential adversaries, they’ve developed capabilities to hold the homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold. Those capabilities that they’ve developed an hour, extremely long range. So, for example, Russian capabilities to launch cruise missiles now extend to over Russia that can threaten North America. They can also uh, do that from very far ranges from our two o’clock towards europe and the same thing in the Northwest as well. Today’s legacy uh, north warning system has served its purpose and done well. And we’re uh using a system called Pathfinder to give us some additional capability. But uh, you know, physically the system can’t see over the horizon or long distances. So over the horizon radar gives us the capability to have domain awareness much further than we do today, which increases decision space for our senior leaders. And that’s the top priority for me. It’s also my number one unfunded priority list is to fast track the site survey that the additional development so that we can get this domain awareness capability of over the horizon radar sooner I noticed that on the unfunded priority list, which is why I asked the question and given my personal interest, um what would be the next steps then for testing and production? I would have to defer to uh the service on on that one. I’m not sure what those next step for us. It would be to get the the additional funding here, which is $25 million dollars to move forward to fast track site development and those kinds of things as far as testing of the actual system. I defer to the acquisition authority on that one. All right, thank you. That’s everything. Mr john thank you. Senator kelly. Thank you. Mr Chairman uh Admiral Hill. Earlier we talked about terminal phase protecting the aircraft carriers from an ages with the the Ages system. My understanding is you talked about a terminal phase uh intercept. Um Does that change, I mean, this this is a relatively new capability, I assume sm two sm six um S. M. Six base. So, um uh to get this capability with the Ages uh system uh in an S. M. Six, does that change the ability for the battle group? How it’s going to operate the range of the ages? Destroyer cruiser has to be from from the carrier. Um Does this have other operational considerations? Um and you know, how long have we been in this this mode? Because the hypersonic threat is, as we understand it is real. Yes, sir. And uh it’s it’s probably a difficult answer. I will say that, you know, all carrier strike groups are very dynamic, Right? So you’re not gonna tether a destroyer to an aircraft carrier, right? The story is going to go do its business and it will stay in contact story in the strike group commander will determine the positioning of those ships. There’s nothing and remember, I’m the technical developer, there’s nothing that I see that that causes a constraint on where the destroyer or cruiser might operate in order to protect the carrier, is just part of of the other many missions that that strike group is going to carry out. And currently the fire control solution comes from the the The Ages system we’re talking a little bit about about H. B. T. T. S And the test in 2023, once that system is fully developed with regards to our carrier battle groups, does does this change the way um the fire control solution is does it then come from the H. B T. T. S. System down to the cruiser to launch the the the sm two. So the way you just works and you sound very familiar with this is that the ship is going to control the missile. And so typically for an organic engagement where it’s using its own sensor, it’s going to drive the missile because you want to give updates to the missile right? When you’ve got a maneuvering target, there’s a lot of uncertainty in that flight path. And so the help from the larger smarter ship to the smaller, less capable of sensor on the front end, you want to drive that missile to to get to the collision or get it within its what we call region are right within its lethal radius. When you bring in off board sensors which we are. Which is a proven fact with Egypt, we have done launch on remote which means we’re launching on that remote sensor. And we’ve done engage on remote where the ship never sees it with its own organic sensors. It’s just it’s just controlling the missile, giving it maneuver commands as it’s taking data from another radar. H. P. T. S. S will follow a very similar pathway. So being able to see down from space warm tracks going over a warm earth. That is really tough science. But we we’ve got that licked, we’ve shown that we can do that on the ground. That sort of capability gives us that global coverage. But it’s going to work the same way that data will come down and come to see to BMC to the ship and then the ship is driving the missile based on what it’s seeing from H. P. T. S. S. So it does give you more dynamic maneuver within that larger picture. But uh, no big major change now in the future. Uh, it would be great to launch the missile from the ship and have a space asset take it over. We’re not there yet. So we’re gonna crawl walk run on. All right. Well, interesting to see the, how the test goes in 2023. Um, General General van Herck, um, yesterday we’re talking a little bit about cruise missile defense of the Homeland and in the 247.9 Million dollar budget to support development of hypersonic defense capabilities. I believe there’s about 14 million In there. Or there’s a requested 14 million for cruise missile defense of the Homeland. So general, uh, what what progress can we expect to see if that money is approved by Congress in the coming fiscal year? So I believe that’s money that he’s taken internally in the missile Defense Agency that wasn’t actually dedicated towards cruise missile defense, but he’s taken that is that correct? Admiral, that is correct. So I am not the designated agent for cruise missile defense of the homeland. But I recognize the need. That threat is real. Stay very close with NORAD north calm. And so we have leaned forward to put funding into the budget so that we can help with that architecture work. Do the spectrum analysis, get the radars in place. So it’s it’s our way to to put the foot forward. Even though I’m not the designated agent, I would point out on my unfunded priority list. I do have a a request for elevated radar here in the national capital region, which would give domain awareness for potential cruise missile threats much beyond what we have today also gives a warning awareness for movement of senior officials and those kinds of things That that funding is $27 million. You will see that same issue in the unfunded priority list from the missile Defense Agency. Thank you. Thank you. Senator kelly, Senator Sullivan, we’re delighted you’re here. And we reached a consensus to close Fort Greely. Uh, well, mr chairman, I’m glad to be here. And I was actually watching the first panel. So um, I’m sorry, I didn’t get down here in time, but I I actually do have a comment or two. I agree with Senator Fisher on that. The one witness who was making the argument that somehow the china Russia nuclear modernization program was driven in part by the GPS at Fort Greely. I think no offense to our esteemed witnesses was one of the more ridiculous arguments I’ve heard in quite a while. But um in Admiral Hill, can you just mentioned it’s not just North Korea that we’re looking at with regard to our missile defense and some other rogue nations are we have the capability given our location with regard to rogue nations like Iran, don’t we? Yeah, absolutely. So when I say rogue nations, I mean north Korea, I mean Iran and so N. G. I. And the G. B. I fleet today was geared to protect us against north korean and Iranian. And I also watched the chairman’s discussion of deterrence and I think it’s questionable whether kim jong un is a rational actor. I definitely I definitely think it’s questionable whether the ayatollahs, irrational actors and I think it’s the responsibility of this Congress to make sure we don’t place that bet on deterrence. The whole idea is if either of them want to go out in a blaze of glory, we shoot down all their missiles and then we destroyed their countries, but we don’t get destroyed first. Isn’t that the whole point of our missile defense and I will defer to policy, We don’t take the punch, we deliver the punch, we parry the punch and then we deliver the punch. Right? There’s there’s been a long consistency that we have missile defense against a limited attack against the homeland. But you know, as we shouldn’t take the risk though, that kim jong un, the ayatollahs, irrational actors and would be deterred by deterrence. We do again correct if they were to launch a limited attack against the United States, that is the mission of missile defense and we strongly support continuing. Let me ask another question. And this is uh, so the history, unfortunately a missile defense and I don’t want to be too partisan here. But typically, republican administrations have supported it. Democratic administrations, haven’t we made a good breakthrough in this committee. Uh, 2017 My bill, the advancing America’s Missile Defense Act had 20 Republican co sponsors, 10 Democratic co sponsors. So missile defense has become bipartisan, which is really, really important to make it sustainable. But I will tell you, I’m a little bit worried in Admiral Hill. Uh, here’s what I’m worried. Hey, there’s some senators who are now starting to ask the question, hey, do we need it at all? That’s their prerogative. But I think that’s indicative of kind of trying to go back, hey, now that the other parties in charge, we’re going to get rid of it. I’m also very concerned about the President’s budget, which reflects a 15% cut in the India’s budget. Notably 50 plus programs at the M. D. Administers Over 70% are expected to realize a cut including the ground based mid course defense program. So um Admiral Hill, do you have concerns that the requested level of funding will result in reduced readiness and reliability to defend our nation? Senator. Thanks a great, great question. First, I will agree with you that missile defense should always be a bipartisan issue and we’ve made good strides. Yes, sir. Uh you know, for me and my team, I always called him the stellar team and we have a noble mission. Our mission is plain and simple, protect the american people, protect our forward deployed forces and our allies and friends. So straight on that. So the budget, yes or so over to the budget. Um you know, like all and we talked about this before you arrive sir, is uh you know, there’s a top line reduction and so we had to prioritize and I think we did it right. So when you, when you see our unfunded priority list, where we had to take our risk was in production. So you’ll see at the top of that list the need to procure more interceptors because that’s where I had to take risk in order to not See the fall off of availability, reliability of the current G. B. I fleet. In fact, we make sure that program is rock solid and moving forward with the service life extension, you prefer not to have a 15% cut. I always prefer to be able to have a full balance of science, technology, development, testing and sustained support to the services. Thank you. Mr Chairman, can I ask one final question. I know I’m running out of time and it’s one that I’m going to depart a little bit from the primary purpose of today’s engagement. It won’t surprise you. Um General Van Herck as the advocate for the arctic in terms of the military’s capability, um you may have seen the Secretary of defense and the dep sec and their confirmation hearings said that they were going to fully resource the different service strategies, arctic strategies. Um I remain concerned that those strategies are not being effectively implemented by the Army, Navy and Air Force. How do you see the services implementing their respective arctic strategies as part of this budget submission, given your overall role as the arctic military advocate as a north com commander. Senator. I think When I look at Fy 22 budget, I see a inching along is in all of the service. I’m encouraged. They all have strategies now and the department has a strategy and my strategy heavily uh relies on the arctic uh but we didn’t move the ball very far down the field this year in the budget with regards to resource in the arctic. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Tuberville. Oh thank you. Dinner. Ben hurt if we if the N. G. I. Uh development delayed, do we have a good backup plan or we’re gonna fall apart behind? We can’t catch up. Mhm. Senator. Uh There there’s not a backup to N. G. I. I. As I said in my statement, I remain concerned about my capability and capacity to defend against a ballistic ballistic missile threat from DpRK. Or even if Iran developed one Uh and slipping longer than 2028 would increase my concern and risk to be able to meet the mission I’ve been given. Thank you general. You’ve got to follow up on carpet. You got anything to follow up on that. So just with respect to uh, I provide the soldiers that do the missile defense mission. Uh, we trained to the train to the threat scenarios. We work very closely with the FDA through software development and testing etcetera. That so as the threat evolves as the software evolves, our soldiers stay trained and ready for. Thank you. Uh Admiral Hill for the 2nd or 3rd year in a row. Number one unfunded priority is a defensive system for Guam. If our number one commander and our number one command Is saying that’s his # one priority, I believe the best offense is a good defense. Uh and you need both in your opinion, with a defense system for Guam saved the american people money and free up ships for the navy senator. Thank you. Sound like a coach. Um. Absolutely right. So when I look at the defensive Guam and anybody looks at it, uh, you know, you have to have a sense of architecture, you have to have a fire control network and you have to have weapons to protect it. Right? If you’re going to base their, if you’re gonna leverage offensive power and do power projection from Guam, you have to protect it. So yes, I believe that we do save money if there is a way for us to free up the ship station so we can give those ships back to the maneuver forces, the Navy, that’s what we want to go do. So we are looking at regional systems were in the middle of that study now and as soon as we have that architecture laid down, we’ll come and see how many ships does it take moving in and out to protect. So, so generally if you’re going to have one station, you’re gonna need four shifts, right? You got one coming, you got one going, you’ve got one of the training cycle and one under repair, wow. Um, does the NGO involved with the threats we’re seeing build from north Korea and other malign actors. Will we be prepared with N. G. I believe we will be prepared. And I think the reason why if you take a look at what the intelligence sources tell us, right, The firm intelligence, we know that those threats are not going to just be unitary single shot devices right there. Flying with countermeasures are flying with multiple reentry vehicles, multiple maneuver vehicles. So the N. G. I answer to that and having to companies to great american companies moving forward and competing against each other to beat the timeline and to reduce the risk in the program, we’re going to come forward with a capability that has multiple warheads on it. That can reduce the shot doctor. That is our goal. I want to make the job for General Van Herk and his release downstream much easier to where they don’t have to worry about numbers of missiles in the arsenal that they have the capability. They need to take on what’s coming at us. And we know by looking at the threat projection projections and where they’re going that we’ve got to take on that higher complexity threat. Thank you. That’s all I want to thank you all very much. Thank you for your service and for your dedication to this complex, difficult and important mission. Thank you for your testimony here today and I’ll make the same statement I did to the prior panel. If there are thoughts that you have that you think would be helpful to us, uh, please supply them to the committee uh, between now and the beginning of next week. Thank you again all for your service and we’ll look forward to working with you on the in the defense of our Nation. Thank you hearings adjourned.