John F. Plumb, assistant secretary of defense for space policy and principal cyber advisor to the secretary of defense, and Army Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, testify before a House subcommittee about military operations in cyberspace and building cyber capabilities across the Defense Department. Their testimony is at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on cyber, information technologies and innovation. March 30, 2023
At any time without objection. So ordered, I also ask that our members and witnesses be mindful of our three city commandments. We start on time check. Uh We use language that the average American can understand. So please uh limit the use of acronyms and jargon if you can and we will enforce the five minute rule, which also includes uh witnesses responses. So we’ll do my best to keep this moving uh with that good morning everyone. And thank you for being here today for uh our hearing on the Department of Defense’s cyberspace activities. We ask a lot from the department in this space from securely operating networks and inherently insecure weapon systems to assisting small and large businesses with their interaction with the defense industrial base. However, more important than anything else is how prepared and capable we are to hold our adversaries at risk. I’ve repeatedly expressed my concerns about the department’s pace for growing and modernizing the ships, the aircraft and the weapons that are required for a potential fight with China. If we accept that we need more time to build the platforms required for a kinetic conflict. It’s my genuine belief that our ability to robustly use information and cyber operations should provide us with the opportunity to buy time to maneuver for our kinetic forces. While there have been some signs of progress such as the first delivery of a budget built through the cyber com commanders enhanced budgetary authority. There are still wide gaps in where we are today and where we need to be very soon. There are chronic issues such as force readiness, lack of sufficient intelligence support to space operations and the shortcomings in agile acquisition of cyber capabilities that continue to plague the cyber force. These problems aren’t new and it’s actually remarkable how much effort Congress has expended on pulling and pushing the department to embrace the promise of cyber operations. Since 2013, Congress has tried to address force design and readiness through 24 different people pieces of legislation 24 over that same period, we’ve tried to address the civilian and military cyber workforce dilemma 45 times. Cyber comm acquisition matters 12 times and defense industrial based cyber security 42 times. And the list goes on more frustrating is that the country’s collective capabilities and readiness are seemingly no better off because of it. In the words of Albert Einstein, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different outcomes. So I look forward to hearing why I am not insane from our witnesses. Dr John Plum, serving as both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for space policy and the principal Cyber advisor, as well as General Paul Nason, the seasoned commander of us Cyber command. And with that, I will recognize the ranking member. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to our witnesses for appearing before us today and the men and women you represent. Thank you General Paul Acai for meeting yesterday and for your uh ideas on uh recruitment uh as well as your suggestions on how we can continue to keep our nation safe from cyberattacks. Our adversaries continue to use cyberspace to conduct malicious activities against the United States, its allies and its interests. These include Iran, Russia and China. I applaud the Department of Defense and us cyber command for the progress that’s been made in recent years. Certainly, the change in posture in the past five years has been quite remarkable as we as we have transitioned to a posture of defend forward, but we certainly still have work to do. China aggressively uses cyberspace to obtain economic advantage and gather sensitive information also. Unfortunately, the C C P has been the prime mover of a lot of trade secret theft IP theft, which I’m particularly aware of. Given that companies in my district in Silicon Valley have been the targets. Russia continues to engage in malicious activities to achieve its ends. And the governments of Iran and North Korea, as well as malicious and profit, profit motivated actors continue to act to further their own interests. Our cyber forces are engaged every day in the whole of government effort to defend the country and given our decentralization and our focus on privacy. This task is harder for us than for many other nations. With these growing threats, then must come increased attention. I appreciate that. Uh We are going to be supporting the cyber command in this president’s budget especially in areas of force readiness training and support for partners and allies in efforts such as hunt forward. The committee is tracking challenges associated with growing retaining and training, training the force. And I want to make sure we can continue to discuss that effort in greater detail and look forward to some creative ideas you may have of how our committee can help the recruitment of first class talent in technology. As I said to the general, I want to make sure that some of the most talented folks aren’t just going to do IP OS and make become multimillionaires but also serving the country. I also hear, hope to hear about the command’s service like authorities including enhanced budget control. Thank you. And with that Mr. Chair chairman, thank you for convening the hearing and I yield back. Doctor Plum, you are recognized for five minutes. Well, thank you, Chairman Gallagher, thanks uh ranking member, Kana and distinguished members of the committee. Good morning. Thanks for inviting me to testify on the defense department’s Cyber Posture. I’m honored to appear alongside uh general as Secretary Austin said from his first days in office, the People’s Republic of China is the department’s facing challenge while Russia remains an acute threat. This is as true in cyberspace as it is in any other war fighting domain for decades. China has used its cyber capabilities to steal sensitive information, intellectual property and research from us, public and private sector institutions including the defense industrial base. Today in competition, Chinese cyber intrusions are the most prolific in the world in crisis. PRC leaders believe that achieving information dominance will enable them to seize and keep the strategic initiative disrupt our ability to mobilize, to project and sustain the joint force and to ensure the prc’s desired end. State. Russia engages in persistent malicious cyber activities to support its global espionage campaigns, steal intellectual property, disrupt critical infrastructure and promote disinformation. Russia has also demonstrated that it views cyber as a key component of its war time strategy at the outset of its full scale invasion of Ukraine. In early 2022, Russia conducted cyber operations against VIASAT A US satellite company to degrade the command and control of the Ukrainian forces and enable Russian maneuvers. Other persistent threats arise from North Korea, from Iran and from transnational criminal organizations together. Our adversaries use cyberspace to conduct operations against the Department of Defense Information Network, the do and the US homeland. They do this to weaken our allies and partners and to undermine us interests Since 2018, the department has recognized that it is not enough to maintain a defensive posture while preparing for conflict. We also must defend forward to meet our adversaries and disrupt their efforts in competition. That is the day to day struggle today. The department campaigns in and through cyberspace to sow doubt among our competitors. We conduct intelligence driven, hunt forward operations to generate insights into our competitors tactics while defending us allies and partner computer networks and we disrupt malicious cyber actors through offensive operations. The department is also prioritizing capacity building efforts for our allies and partners who serve as a strategic advantage and a force multiplier that our adversaries can never hope to match. The president’s fiscal year 2024 budget request prioritizes investments in all aspects of cyberspace, our people, our organization, our operations, our intelligence and our capabilities. The request includes 13.5 billion for cyberspace activities which is an increase of 1.8 billion from the enacted level of an FY 23. These investments will enhance the department’s cyber security. They’ll increase capacity for cyberspace operations. They will advance research and development activities for new cyber capabilities. The budget requests $7.4 billion for cyberspace operations including nearly three billion for us. Cyber command. These resources will go directly to supporting our cyber mission, forces protecting the homeland and addressing the threats posed by our adversaries in cyberspace. And I’ll, I’ll just say, uh Chairman Gallagher I do think we are better off and we are getting better every day and I think the help from the Congress and this continued investments, uh We’re more prepared, we’re more effective and we’re integrating cyber more and more into our operations. Operating in cyberspace today is an essential part of the department’s ability to deter aggression and ensure our nation’s security. Our adversaries continue to extend and evolve their cyber capabilities. They’re exercising them in both competition and conflict to degrade our advantages and increase their own. The department is committed to strengthening both our defensive and offensive cyber capabilities and to maturing our cyber forces in partnership with this committee. So thank you for your tireless support of the department and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, General Noone is recognized for five minutes, Chairman Gallagher, ranking member and distinguished members of the committee. I’m honored to testify beside assistant secretary, Doctor John Plum. Joining me today is Commands Major Cheryl Lyon, the US. Cyber Command and NSA senior enlisted leader. We’re honored to represent the military and civilian members of us. Cyber command in the contested cyberspace domain. US. Cyber Command acts against foreign adversaries that threaten our nation through malicious cyber activity and enables actions by our federal private and allied partners. Last fall. A combined us Cyber Command NSA Election Security Group countered malicious cyber actors and oversaw measures to enable the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI among other domestic partners to defend the recent midterm elections. The 2022 election cycle proceeded from primaries to certifications without significant impacts due in part to our effort going forward success for us. Cyber Command will be measured how effectively foreign adversarial actors are prevented from achieving their strategic objectives. Last year saw significant maturation for us Cyber command but our work is not done In 2023. We must continue to focus on our people, our partners and our ability to deliver decisive advantage. We must improve readiness, bolster our reliance. I’m sorry, bolster our resilience and maintain a culture of continuous improvement. We will continue to deliver war fighting advantage for the joint force and allied partners through competition crisis and conflict. We are doing so by executing our unique authorities to build and sustain campaigns in and through cyberspace and the information environment. Through these efforts, we seek to counter adversaries and competition to deter conflict and to prevail against aggression, aligning efforts of both us. Cyber Command and NSA is essential to achieving these goals and is in the best interests of the nation and national security. It all starts with people, the men and women of us, Cyber Command, working with NSA and partners here and abroad. We win with people, the men and women of the United States. Cyber Command are grateful for the support of this committee and Congress has given to our command. I look forward to answering your questions that was a very efficient opening statement. Uh We will now move into the Q and a portion of the hearing. Uh, Doctor Plum last year’s N D A A authorized a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for cyberspace policy. I’m, I’m confident that the Senate is, uh, ready to rapidly confirm a nominee. Um, have many conversations to that effect. Can you explain why we’re not seeing one?
Uh Yes, sir. So, uh, the department is, uh, has taken the language from the 23 N D A A and we are trying to make sure that we create a S D. Cyber, uh, in a deliberate, uh manner that has the most positive effect. Uh So what we are doing is following the template that was used to create, uh, my current position A S D for Space, uh, which is putting a F F R DC, uh on contract to, uh, examine what’s the proper structure. Are there different, different pieces required?
What things should be in this, uh, Cyber A S D ship and not, we’re looking at, uh, components of electronic warfare, components of information warfare, what should belong, uh, that is on contract. Now, we expect, uh, that, that study should be done, uh around September. Uh, but we are moving forward on it. We just wanna do it right. So the earliest, uh, time in which we’d see a nominee would be after the report in September, I to be totally fair. That is uh, above my pay grade, but that’s what I would anticipate. Yes, sir. Ok. Um, that’s disappointing. Um, we sat down a few weeks ago and, uh, you talked about just the, the number of reports that are, are foisted on you by Congress. Um, on one level. I, I agree. I think we, we insert far too many, uh, reporting requirements into the N D A and, um, uh, and it just sort of grows and grows without sort of cleaning out the number of reports that don’t actually get read. Um, on the other hand, we do it to draw attention to significant issues that we think are important without actually having to micromanage the department in with statutory language. Um And the best way to avoid reports is to provide us quick but comprehensive answers to the questions that we’re asking the department. Do you happen to know how many reports that are related to cyber that the Department of Defense is delinquent on right now?
I don’t have an exact number, I’d imagine. It’s around 10, it’s 15 reports, 15. So I, I just would submit, there’s gotta be a better way we can get answers to these questions and I’m happy to work with you and your team uh to come up with that uh solution because the current posture in, in my, in my uh view is unacceptable. Um And speaking of reports, we, we uh you produced the 2022 Cyber Posture review that was a congressionally mandated document to, to be produced every four years. Uh three years ago, we said that the Cyber Posture review needed to include an assessment quote and an assessment of the potential cost benefits and value of any of establishing a cyber force as a separate uniformed service. Yet, when we got the document, it did not include that assessment. Why is that?
Why did dod ignore that requirement from Congress?
Uh So first of all, no intentional uh uh ignoring of any provision of the law there at that oversight, I will uh dig into how that happened. But I will say this uh Congressman, we are working hard on answering that problem. It’s been tested in the F Y 23 N D A as part of section 15, 33 of the fourth generation study. I’ve been involved in conversations with your uh staff on making sure that that study uh what’s going forward. I think it’s a good study. I think it gives us enough time to look at. And I think it’s really important and one of the things that requires us to explore among other options for fourth generation is a cyber service. Get that. And I understand that where you stand depends on where you sit, but it’s not the prerogative of the department to decide which part of the congressional mandate you get to comply with or, hey, we’ll answer it or we’ll answer it in a different report at a different time. We wanted that assessment in the Cyber Posture review. So I would appreciate you getting back to my team on, on why that didn’t happen. Uh Just so we can improve this process of reporting and answering uh going forward. How do you think about retention?
Um It’s, it’s my understanding that uh over the last year, the office of the principal Cyber advisor has had at least seven civilians depart. That’s about 75% of the office’s total civilian roster. Is that a concern of yours?
How do you think about improving retention?
It is a concern of mine. I think uh frankly, I think creation, the S D Cyber will help uh solve some of that uh problem. But I am digging into that in my role as PC A right now and it is a issue I am determined to get after. Ok. Ok. I look forward to following up on that and the other issues that I raised and I now recognize the ranking member for five minutes. You know, when I first got to Washington, they said no one reads. Uh in Washington more than one page, the chairman is an exception to that rule, but I uh I support uh the effort to have reports and responsiveness uh because I think that’s the essence of uh democracy and oversight. So uh we’ll look forward to working with you uh on that. Uh Mr. Chairman, let me ask you Doctor Plum uh given your testimony on the C C P S cyber threats. Uh How much of a threat do you think tiktok poses to the United States?
From a cyber security perspective?
Uh Ranking member, I would, I would say that when we think about Tik Tok as a potential threat factor, the uh things that come to mind are one the scale. I mean, just a tremendous number of people in the United States use Tik Tok. Uh and to the control that uh China may have to be able to direct information through it. So there’s an in misinformation platform. Uh and then of course, the data that it can collect. So it’s the scale of it. I think that is problematic really for us. And what do you think should be done about that?
Uh That’s a great question. I know everyone is considering it. I think we need to be aware of these various threats uh and be able to quantify them and be able to take action against them. I know that’s somewhat of a vague answer, sir, but I don’t know if I have the exact answer for you right now. I might ask uh general if he has thoughts on that ranking member. Coming back to your question, if you consider one third of the adult population receives their news from this app. 1/6 of our Children are saying they’re constantly on this app. If you consider that there’s 150 million people every single day that are obviously touching this app. This provides a foreign nation, a platform for information operations, a platform for surveillance and a concern we have with regards to who controls that data. The department has already as you know, banned the use of that application on our phones. I think the broader discussion obviously rests with the policy makers now, but certainly this is, this is a piece that our nation has to consider. There’s going to be other applications like this. And we’re going to have to have some type of policy that protects both our ability to obviously to see materials but also protects us from an adversary’s ability to conduct surveillance and information operations against us. It would be fair to say you view that tiktok as a different order of threat than an American company on social media. I do. I mean, if you consider the fact that the difference between an American company and our government, there’s a clear separation in terms of what goes on there. If you take a look at an application like this, that uh a nation has already said that they’re going to be able to touch the data at any time. They want to touch this data. This concerns, this concerns me. I’m certainly concerns uh most people as they look at this. When we, we spoke, you had an interesting idea about scholarship specifically uh in stem fields or in fields that uh uh uh could be of use in A I and quantum computing for the services. Uh Could you speak to that and uh provide maybe some suggestions of what we could do as a committee on that. One of the things that uh this committee and the broader congress has done is create programs like scholarship for service that has been tremendously helpful for organizations like uh us cyber command, but broader organizations within our government, Artificial intelligence, machine learning, as many as many members have looked at and talked about is the future for our nation. It’s a future for our economy. It’s a future for our national defense. So any type of scholarship that would obviously focus young people on this growing importance of this field where they’re able to study it and then perhaps give back to any part of the government, I think is something that’s honorable. And I think that’s something that our government and certainly organizations like us, Cyber Command could benefit from. Thank you, Doctor Pal. My final question is uh how would you assess both our offensive and defensive cyber capabilities uh compared to uh China or Russia?
I, I think we are uh uh a premier cyber power. I think that the United States is uh under general nasons leadership in particular uh is developing uh exquisite capabilities. And I think uh one of our goals looking forward is how do we make sure that we can as uh I think the chairman said in his opening remarks, work to integrate these with maneuver uh to be able to prevail and win the nation’s wars back Mr. Latrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman um general and doctor. Thank you for your service and your continued service doctor. I understand that you’re a sub mariner. I was indeed sir. That’s um you’re a special breed of human being, sir. God God bless you for doing that. Um My first question goes to you, doctor, uh senior intelligence leaders from Cyber Command have been vocal recently about efforts and need to establish a foundational intelligence center for cyberspace. Uh no different from the National Intelligence Center for the Army and Office of Naval Intelligence for the Navy. And in fact, there’s a foundational intelligence center for just about every war fighting domain. Can you, what actions have you taken in the Pentagon have specifically pushed for this center if any?
Thank, thank you for that question, Congressman. I, I do think that it will be important for us to make sure that we are able to provide our operators with the right uh foundational intelligence to conduct. I mean, General Axon obviously has a tremendous part of this. Uh We are struggling with this question both in the cyber security strategy, which is hopefully uh be published in the near future. Uh It’s, it’s not quite through the secretary yet, but it’s on its way. Uh And then uh we are also looking at this from a, from A S N T standpoint as well. So we’re kind of approaching from two pieces. We don’t, we’re not there yet. I think it’s pretty clear that there is uh there is a signal that this is a thing we need to be working on Anderson. If there’s a roadblock that we can assist with, it seems to make sense and be advantageous for something like this to be stood up. So please let us know. Yes, sir. Uh General, do you think T C two, the joint all Domain command and control two should be a part or under the purview of Cyber comm?
Well, certainly Congressman, this is under the purview of the Department of Defense right now where we add to it is obviously the cyber security piece of what gets done. This is a broader element of command and control and ability to fuse intelligence and operations that extends even beyond us. Cyber cramp, we have a significant role ensuring that what we develop as a department is secure and is able to function in the future, seem like there’s redundancy. Does it seem like if it was to split or come together, would it be more effective and efficient in your opinion?
So as we move forward, I think as we move from design to actually the operational piece that I think the question is where does it reside?
Uh right now in the design phase, I think it’s, it’s appropriate within the Department of Defense and uh within the office of Secretary of Defense and certainly within the joint off as they move this forward. So migration would be beneficial in the future. It likely will. And I think we’ll learn a lot as we start to implement this in, in different places like the Shriver War games and blue flag and, and the National Training Center. Uh, but we’ll have a better feel for where it actually needs to reside in the future. I think congressman. Ok. Mm. Can you tell me how much China Russia North Korea Iran individually spend on cybersecurity, cyber infrastructure in this past year. I’d have to take that for the record congressman. But I would tell you that one of the things that we do see is a rise in both the scope and sophistication of our adversaries both in terms of their ability to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks and their ability to defend their data. It, it seems to me. Um And both of you can appreciate this as well as the other uniformed men and women in the room. And my colleagues on the on the panel with me is that the cyberspace is the next frontier of warfare. No more bombs, planes and guns. Uh The it’ll be a push of a button. Um In my opinion is how we will be fighting these fronts. I think China is projected to spend 31 billion by 26. And yet, I think what are we spending 13?
And I think my, my statement for the record would be we need to be spending more on cyber risk, cyber threat, cyber control on our side. Given the advancements of the nefarious actors around the globe. Would you agree with that statement?
So congressman uh as a combatant commander, I would probably never disagree with uh more resources. Uh But what I would say is that um as we take a look at the future and you highlighted this, this is the future of where we need to be able to operate in all domains. We’re seeing this in Russia, Ukraine right now. How do you combine what we do non kinetically with what goes on kinetically, there will always be a fight on the ground or the air or the sea, but there also is going to be a fight that’s going to take place in cyberspace and space. And that’s one of the things that I think Russia Ukraine has demonstrated to us, ok?
I I appreciate you saying that and I, and I hope you’re well aware that if inevitably with something clacks off, it’ll be you all, they most likely will be on the front lines. So again, thank you, sir, Mr. Lolo, chairman. Uh Thanks so much, uh Gentlemen, thanks so much for being here and for your staff uh for participating today. Uh Gentlemen, as you both know, in 2018 the US. Cyber command was elevated to a unified combatant command having been previously operating under us Strategic Command since 2009. Uh Cyber is a fairly recent complex and critical strength and vulnerability uh for the US and Space Force is also a very recent addition as well, having been established in 2019. And while I understand the complexities of establishing and ironing out the nuances of these new commands. Uh Doctor Plum and prior statements made to our colleagues in the senate. You heard and personally spoke to the criticality of legislation for Space Force specifically, section 16 oh two of the fiscal year 20 22 National Defense Authorization Act which designates the Chief of Space Operations as the Quote force design architect and quote for space. Uh So my question, Doctor is, should such a designation be considered for cyberspace as a war fighting domain on par with space?
Uh Congressman to make sure I understand the question you’re asking if we need a, uh, cyber warfare architect. I guess I’d have to think through what that would mean. Uh I feel like it would be General Nakai and his head is cyber command. Uh I, I guess I just, uh, that’s a new question for me. I’d be happy to take that for, uh, for a look up. I’m not, I think the fundamental question would be, would it change anything or would we already be doing it?
And then we are we on the right track right now, I think we are on the right track. We’re investing in our joint cyber warfare architecture uh in this budget and have continued to do so and making sure that’s modernized. And I, I I feel like we are on the right track. The general may have some pieces to add, but I, I think we’re going in the right direction. I’m not sure that that designation would change that at all. So Congressman, you had a very important day 2018. We not only the fact that us, Cyber command is elevated a strategic or to combatant command, but the fact that authorities policies and capability come together in 18, we demonstrate that in the defense of the 2018 midterm elections and then as you see everything afterwards, whether or not it was ransomware, whether or not it was actions against other adversaries, whether or not it’s election security. This is the key starting point. And the one of the big things that we were, the beneficiaries was this committee’s decision in the FY 2019 NDA to call Cyber a traditional military activity that allowed us to conduct operations like hunt for operations. This tremendously important. I think what you’re also talking about is that the work isn’t done. And so when you think about Cyber, we need to make sure that a simulation capability much in the same way we have in other domains is re resonant within cyber to, to include and to reinforce the advances we’ve already made. Thank you and, and, and following up on organizationally how we’re proceeding. Uh Doctor Plum to you, the, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and low intensity conflict is responsible for information operations. But the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is responsible for cyberspace operations. So my question is, can you explain the logic as to why these two separate chains are established for operations within the same informational environment?
Uh Yes, thanks, Congressman. First of all, uh military operations, uh the chain of command, of course is through uh or through the secretary uh the policy oversight piece. And then sometimes so for instance, A S D so has some secretary like authorities over SOCOM, but information operations are not just the purview of Cyber. Cyber is one vector for information operations. It’s certainly not the whole piece. Uh So I actually think that the split does, does make sense when you take that into account. Thank you. I appreciate that. And uh my last question is for the uh for the general uh general. How do you envision the um cyber mission force and the Cyber operations force maturing over the next 3 to 5 years, Congressman. Uh We began with the 433 teams. Uh The secretary in the summer of 2020 authorized 14 new teams to be uh to be built. Uh Congress has authorized the funding for that. So we’re in the, the build of 14 more teams. So I, I think the first part of his greater capacity, uh we are on a road to have more teams to be able to do more missions. Secondly, is clearly uh being able to play to our strengths. What’s our competitive advantage?
Our competitive advantage is information. So being able to further leverage artificial intelligence, machine learning. And the third piece is, it’s all about our partnerships. This is what we’ve learned. It’s not only the partnerships with the national security agency but broadly. How do we partner with the FBI and CIA?
How do we look at a of international partners that provide our nation greater capacity and most importantly, perhaps, how do we partner with the private sector?
This is what we’ve learned in Russia, Ukraine. The power of partnering with the private sector provides our nation a tremendous advantage that no other nation has. Thank you. And uh I’ll just close by saying I joined with my colleague from Texas in uh the thought that you were on the front lines of our next biggest battle and we appreciate the work that you’re doing. I yield, Mr. Chairman, Doctor Marine Soldier McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman in medicine. We talk about a Keto as being a blind spot and business. When you talk about it could be something that you just get used to and, and you forget that it’s there and only the new guy coming in can see it. Uh And, and when we talk about the military and it prepared preparedness. One of the things that concerns me is that especially in this arena because so quick moving and we’re watching China in, in so many other ways, go after our resources, go after our critical alliances, um their outpace and, and port production and, and valuable resources, we’re not gonna be able to get to pretty soon. What do you think that they’re going to do to try to cut us off?
In other words, what would see, what should we be looking at as a blind spot in preparedness uh to, to outpace the Chinese and the Russians when it comes to preparing for the next battle in Cyber, I’ll take that. So Congressman, I think it’s all about information. I think this is, this is where our competitive advantage is today and our competitive advantage in the future needs to be information. How do we take the information from our most sensitive sources?
How do we take the information from the private sector?
How do we take information from a series of partners?
This is what we have done for many, many years. This is what we’ve demonstrated as a, as a kinetic force. This is the same power that we need to continue to demo demonstrate as a non-kinetic force. When I think about China and Russia, you know, our ability to stay ahead of them in areas like artificial intelligence, machine learning in a series of partnerships and being able to leverage the private sector. This is what we must continue to do that. That’s the blind spot we never can look away from. We have to make sure that we’re watching this very carefully. So one of the things I noticed when we talk about investing in the future, and I was looking at colleges, for example, and how much money we as the government put in about half versus the civilian, which I, I really appreciate your, your comment on combining civilian with military resources to advance our technologies. Uh But one of the things that concerns me is we have a lot of foreign students over here that we’re paying the bill on uh both through the civilian and government agencies to educate. And then some of them are returning back to China. Some of them are staying here from China in America. And we’ve had problems with this in the past as far as giving up our data to other countries, they’re pilfering, they’re putting a tremendous amount just like uh uh Congressman Latrell said, they’re putting a tremendous amount of assets to develop their own. And then they’re coming over here in, in my, in my opinion, they’re stealing our information and sometimes we’re just giving it to them uh in our highest educated universities. Uh I, I was a professor at Georgia Tech and we, I participated in an investigation in somebody who got put in jail over that same exact thing. How do we protect our information from, uh, being stolen when we, when we do education like that?
And I, I’ll leave that for Doctor Bloom. Uh, well, sir, I guess I would say that one. I’m in certainly no position to come in on, uh, university hiring practices. But I will say that, uh, it comes to classified information or the information of our defense industrial base. We need to make sure we have proper vetting for anyone uh to make sure that they are not uh some type of a threat. And it doesn’t really matter where they’re from for that situation. It really depends on if we’re doing a proper vetting. And then the second part would be to make sure that the information we are trying to protect that we’re doing the most modern things to do. So moving towards zero trust, making sure we have two factor authentication or whatever the latest requirements are, but just a lot of cyber hygiene uh is democratized all the way down to the lowest level. And it’s a hard problem. It’s one of the things the government is trying to get after by sharing more information with uh private industry and with universities on how to protect this information to make sure these things don’t happen at the scale you’re, you’re suggesting?
Ok, thanks. Uh My final was just organizationally. I had somebody stop by my office and talk about a department and, and cyber and I know this has been brought up already. Uh, but do you think it would be better if it had to be folded under a department kind of like you have the Department of Navy and Marine Corps?
Uh, do you think it’d be better folded under an army or, or under space because, uh, just given its intellectual capacity is application to outer space. Now, would it be better to be folded under or a separate stand-alone department?
Uh Congressman, I think you’re asking uh about whether we should form a cyber service and if we did where it would nest, I guess I would say that. I think, you know, first of all, we are taking a hard look at whether she would form a cyber service to provide the best uh effective cyber operations. I think our focus should be, how do we get after the threat most effectively with these taxpayer dollars and that threat in particular is that of China?
So I think that’s really how we should focus these uh our, our thoughts and our and our and our approach. So stand alone or, or fold under a certain department that already exist. I would not want to get ahead of any decision that really rests with the secretary. Just a recommendation. I was just curious. Ok. Thank you for that yield gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Uh, thank you very much for being here this morning. Uh General NACA, uh, last year. Uh, you briefed us about, uh, your hunt forward efforts in Ukraine, uh in advance of the Russian invasion. And now looking back, uh, having a little period of time to look back. How successful do you think those efforts have been to date?
And how do you gauge the success in Russia countering, uh, what you’re doing in that respect?
And is there anything at all that surprised you?
Uh, with this experience, Congressman, if I might just take a step back, hunt for operations began in 2018 as we started to think about how do we secure our nation’s elections?
And one of the bright ideas from a young captain said, hey, why don’t we send a team of 8 to 10 military members to a country at their request, hunt on their networks with them and share all that information, not only with the country but broadly with industry. So industry can see what’s going on. Well, since that time, we have conducted 47 missions in 22 countries on 70 different networks. Four of them, four of them have been in Ukraine, those four operations to include the operation that took place 70 days prior to the invasion, I think were extremely successful. Not only were able to identify the trade craft, not only we were able to identify some of the malware, but we were able to reassure a partner that we were going to provide support. And I think that amongst all of the different things that has occurred in incredibly important, nothing did anything surprise you would jump out at you in that experience. So, uh I would say just in general, surprises, uh, surprises with regards to our hunt for operations is just how impactful they have become and how popular they are with a series of different nations, every country that that I meet with says, hey, can we do a hunt for operation with you?
And so I think to, to the congressman’s point about the future structure and what does the US cyber look like uh in the years to come?
I think there is going to be a large component that’s going to be doing, doing these type of operation. Yeah, I I’ve been very impressed just from my vantage point because that was one of our greatest concerns entering this. Uh just what you know, Russia might do and what efforts would be available to Ukraine to counter it. And I think that work uh that you described is, is critical and will continue to be critical in that regard. Congressman. Can I, can I just add one comment to that?
You asked me about surprises?
Uh And I think I, I’m not sure if this fits in that category, but one of the things that’s communicated to me by the young men and women that lead these teams to include the marine major who uh led the team into Kiev is the fact that she told me that when I got on the ground, I was meeting with three and four star generals, sometimes the Minister of Defense, sometimes, uh you know, significant players in the uh in the government that were well above my pay grade. And uh it just goes to speak to the, to the leadership and the capabilities of the people that lead these teams and how, how they really first foresaw the difficulty that Russia could have imposed there. Uh I’m just following up on an earlier theme that I’ve had. Um uh Doctor Craig Martel, who’s the dod s first chief, Digital Art, uh Artificial Intelligence Officer, uh briefed us uh earlier this year uh about workforce issues. Uh and how we’re currently leveraging or planning to leverage aspects of artificial intelligence as a core competency of the cyber mission force to help them execute their offensive and defensive missions. Uh You know, if you aren’t already, how are you integrating A I and, and this kind of training pipeline into the cyber force?
Is it, are you engaging because some of the uh existing relationships and partnerships have have in the private side, has that been something that’s been helpful, Congressman?
Let me, let me uh tackle that in a, a couple of different ways. First of all that, uh to better understand where the talent exists, you have to go to where the talent is, you know, is, is, you know, oc- occupying space right now and that’s in our academic institution. So us Cyber command a little over a year ago, started the academic network to reach out to a series of 100 plus universities within the United States to talk about what we do and encourage people to consider government service. The second piece is we’ve taken a very, very hard look at artificial intelligence and machine learning to look at the, you know, the defense of the dod information network every single day as Mr. Martel noted out, talked about was the fact that, you know, we have to have an ability to defend our networks, our data and our weapon systems. A I and M L is doing that in some part today. And the third part is that uh we need a broader base of this expertise to the Chairman’s point. Uh A number of different uh um measures have been passed in the N D A s for this command. One of the ones that uh that has been very, very helpful is cyber accepted service which is 97% now of our civilian population uh are utilizing, it provides us extra uh pays and uh and uh abilities to attract top talent. And the other one that we’re looking at very, very carefully was passed in the 21 N D A A which is section 17 oh eight to look at a series of very high tech personnel that can come into our command. We are now targeting four that we anticipate to hire off that those are with increased pays that allow us to, to go after the talent that’s necessary to bring that to our command. Well, thank you. And, uh, uh, in my own district, uh, with the Navy, uh, an undersea warfare institute and the University of Massachusetts, they have models and curriculum that are right there. So, uh, I’d like to see that continue. I yield back the pride of Texas path, Allen. I think it was German Mr. Plum, which branch of the military is in charge of maritime domain, uh, the United States Navy. Ok. How about land?
Your army Air Air Force, Cyber. Uh I mean, that’s, that’s what I’m talking about. We’re here today and we’re talking about Cyber being the fastest growing domain and, and, and it’s, uh, it bothers me that, uh, not only do we not know who’s in charge it seems. But, uh, I don’t, I don’t know, we, we need a leader uh for this because as we just said, we, I heard my colleague say next frontier and it’s gonna be the front lines of, of the next conflict. And when you think about the, how inexpensive it is relative to the potential impact and damage that Cyber can do today, it, it kind of harkens for me. Billy Mitchell comes to mind uh General Billy Mitchell who rang the alarm in the 19 twenties about the importance of air and got court martialed for it. Uh because he saw the future. We can’t fight the war today. We gotta fight the war tomorrow and prepare for that. And it seems to me, you know, when I look at cyber comms mission statement, it includes one defend the Department of Defense Information Network, two, strengthen the nation’s ability to withstand and respond to cyber-attacks. And then three conduct full spectrum cyber operations to assist combat commanders and the joint force. And that reads well on paper. But the third one is the one that concerns me because, you know, the navy is gonna be concerned about uh the sea with a side of Cyber and the Air force, you know, air with a side of Cyber army, land side of Cyber. Uh And you know, I I would really, I strongly feel that we should be creating 1/7 branch and making Cyber uh Cyber service and general, I know that you don’t talk, uh particularly policy is, you know, our job and here’s just one to implement it. But uh would you accept command of a Cyber servicer?
So congressman, uh I I would offer that, you know, that is obviously, as you said, a policy decision. But, but let me just uh provide a thought on this in terms of how we, how we model ourselves. And uh I think as you asked, a number of different uh who is, who’s in charge of special operations. Special operations is not in, not run by any specific service yet. It is the lead service and capability that our nation has. That’s what we have modeled ourselves at us. Cyber command. This idea of having special and unique authorities that we’re able to train and man and equip our force and agility to maneuver. Uh And I think that that’s uh from my perspective of having uh commanded now for five years, that’s a really good uh place where we’re emulating towards and making sure that our focus is on doing operations against our adversaries and continuing to build our capability. Well, you know, general, you seen earlier that there are always going to be a land and there’s air and then space and, you know, we made a space service uh because it’s ever changing and, and evolving. And I was, I’m glad we did because of that importance, but I, I really would argue that we should consider, strongly consider, we didn’t get a report for it. Uh But strongly consider cyber is its own service and we have 800 over $800 billion budget and 13.5 billion is going to cyber less than 2%. So it’s one thing that I, I really want to ring the alarm bells and I think that’s something that we should be seriously considering. Thank you, Mr. Jerry Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um Thank you to the two of you for coming on out here and, and talking to us about this uh general, I wanted to start with you. Um over the last couple of months, I’ve been engaged with a lot of ambassadors and other interlocutors from partner nations of ours in the Indo Pacific. Talking about what are some areas of cooperation we can focus on?
I think coalition building is so critical, especially given the challenges we face there. And one thing that keeps coming up over and over and over again is their concerns about their capabilities when it comes cyber security and whether or not that is at the level that is needed. This is something that I feel like would not only help them in terms of their capabilities and their ability to prevent vulnerabilities, but also in terms of our ability to work with them and engage whether that’s intel sharing or other capacities there. But you see, you know, major partners of ours like Japan having significant challenges across their society when it comes to this, a lot of the ASEAN nations and others. So I I guess I just wanted to ask you if you would support or if you think it would be a good thing for us to do to, to try to increase our engagement, our efforts to be able to lift up their baseline of cyber security capabilities in the in the Indo Pacific. Is that something that you think would be valuable here?
I certainly do think it would be a value. And we’re doing that right now. I just returned from, uh, an 11 day tour of uh many nations to include several of them in the, in the Indo Pacific region. And you’re right, the number one topic that they, they talk about is how do we work together with cyber security?
This is the way that we’re doing a US. Cyber command. First of all, uh through a series of exercises. So Cyber flag is our major exercise that takes place every summer. This summer, we will have over 30 nations from around the world to participate with us. Secondly, is through bilateral arrangements where we go and work with the force to ensure that they develop the capacity and capability to defend their own networks. And the last piece, which is, I think just a, a uh incredible success story for the Department of Defense is the State Partnership program that the National Guard runs, that provides a continuous ability for us within the department to have relationships, to have exercises, to have an exchange of ideas with, with the nation. The state Partnership program that was run by California and, and it was run by California with Ukraine is a great example of this. This is the platform that we’ve been using. Do you feel like there’s so that, that’s really good to hear about the different facets in which this is happening. Do you think that there’s room to scale this up and room to be able to increase this capability and this kind of engagement?
I do and I I’m seeing get already through our operations with hunt forward where we’ve had a number of different nations within the Pacific have, have asked us, uh, and the department has agreed for us to deploy to those uh areas to do that. Doctor Plum, what are, what are your thoughts on this right now?
Uh Congressman fully uh agree with your concerns and with general statements, we are working on this. Uh And your point is exactly right, which is that the more we can build the capacity of our allies and partners to defend themselves, then the more capacity we have to get after the adversary uh under the theory of a fixed number of resources, even if that number keeps going up. So it’s, it’s a strategic advantage to us to be able to do this. And the other part is, and this is really important, sir. It doesn’t just unlock cyber cooperation. It unlocks all sorts of other parts of deeper cooperation. Uh The foundation of which is decent cyber security processes so that information can be protected, so we can share more information with those parts. Absolutely essential. I I just think this could be such a good win, win. It could really help us build just these deeper lateral horizontal connections uh while also sort of hardening uh some of the, again, the vulnerabilities that we face in that uh in that region which we know are, are immense there. And, and in general, I, I appreciate that you talked about some of those different facets because, you know, that reserve components, you know, specifically our, our National Guard members, they build incredible cyber capabilities, you know, in my, uh and, and one of those Guard programs that State Partnership program, uh that’s something that’s been incredibly fruitful. You know, we have the 140th Air National Guard Cyber Operations Squadron at joint base Maguire, Lakehurst in my district. And, you know, looking at their ability to be able to partner with these nations, it seems like that’s essential. So I know you kind of raised that earlier, but it sounds like that’s something as well that we can continue to, to push on in terms of thinking about how to surge up these types of efforts. Is that right?
Congressman, the uh Minister of Defense from Albania came to visit us Cyber Command. And one of the first things that he did was to recognize the New Jersey National Guard for the work that was done on a hunt for operation. He told us that he knew that he knew the captain and the lieutenant colonel that was leading those teams to, to help his nation as, as they came under cyberattack. This is a really good example. Of building partnerships in a way that we should be doing in the future. Well, I look forward to work with you. Thank you, Mr. Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh It’s good to see you again. General Xi. I remember back in the nineties when President Bill Clinton said that we were at risk of a space arms race and our country put a bit of a pause on some of our space work And the governing theory was, if we paused, we could slow down and make space more of a safe domain and not a contested domain. And the reality we know as we sit here now is while we may have paused during some years. In the 90s, our adversaries did not Russia, China, Iran, they all became more capable in this regard. And so I just wanted to get your initial take on a similar call for a pause regarding A I. Right now, we’ve seen some of the largest tech leaders including Elon Musk sign this letter saying that the advancement of A I is such that we ought to take a pause and determine how to frame those capabilities. What’s your assessment of whether or not America’s adversaries would follow the lead of principally us tech companies. My sense congressman is that uh artificial intelligence, machine learning is, is something that uh is resonant today and is, is something that our adversaries are gonna continue to uh look to exploit and, and moving forward. Do you worry that if us companies take a pause that that could constrain some of the um, capability development that you testified earlier is so necessary in getting people interested and engaged in a I so congressman. I, I guess I really haven’t, uh, haven’t thought about that. That’s uh a piece of policy that uh that I’m, I’m sure will be discussed in the future. But uh what I am focused on is how do we build a bigger pool of people that have this capability and capacity to work it?
How do we engage with academic institutions to encourage young people to study A I and machine learning. How do we get them interested in governance service?
How do we continue to to utilize this in the future?
I I fully share that vision and I think the future of the country literally may depend on it. Um But you know, and I am not an expert in A I, I’m just starting to use and understand the techno technology uh intentionally. And uh it seems to me if you’ve got some of the big tech influencers in our country saying whoa whoa pause, uh don’t expand commercial vectors in A I that could be counterproductive to the goals. You just stated about enhanced engagement in our country. Do you, do you share that concern?
So again, Congressman, you know, my my focus right now is being able to develop the talent and the techniques and the and the trade craft as we look forward to, to utilizing this, you know, this important advantage our nation has. And, and as you look at the A I domain right now, we would, we would certainly have to concede. There are scenarios where China is ahead, right?
I, I think right now as we take a look at the A I and machine learning domain, what we need to be focused on is how do we look at it in a way that we can use it responsibly?
Uh not only for our national defense, but also for our economy at us, cyber command, we are very, very interested in, in the use of large language models and the ability. But who’s ahead?
My question is who’s ahead right now, the United States is ahead. You think we’re ahead, we’re ahead of China and A I do. And, and what’s your basis for that belief?
Uh again, uh discussions with experts. But I, but I think that this is a tenuous place that we’re at as well. This is being developed in the United States. This is being developed by a, you know, a series of entrepreneurs and those that are, are working it. But this isn’t, we should not take this for granted that this is going to be the way of the uh in the future. And so we need to continue to uh to invest in it and work it and continue to, to utilize it. Take care, you’re back. Thank you. Uh We don’t have the classified room until 10 AM. It’s not my intention to filibuster until 10 AM, but I do want to entertain a second round of question. If any members have, have one, I will uh start with myself. Um So, um I want you to imagine you’re talking to, let’s say my grandma who’s a great lady, she’s extremely smart, but it’s fair to say she’s more concerned about her great granddaughters than she is about China and cyber in terms that she could understand, explain the threat that the Chinese Communist Party poses in cyberspace. Mrs. Gallagher. Good morning. I’m generally Virginia Justice is her name, Mrs. Justice. Good morning. I’m General Nason. As we think about our nation. One of the things that uh I think that we should consider is the fact that our nation is a nation that has been able to have a strong economy and a strong national defense. Our strong economy is based upon the fact that we’re able to develop ideas and bring those ideas to uh a number of different people and be able to uh to have business thrive on that. It’s based on this idea of, you know, an idea, being able to be patented and, and then being able to be sold to a broader government. What happens if a foreign nation takes those secrets as they’re being developed doesn’t have to do. The research doesn’t have to pay for it, in fact, can get it to the market place before we can, that affects our economy and that affects our jobs. That’s what we’re seeing today in many of our industries where the Chinese have had ability to steal our intellectual property to repurpose it and then to bring it to the market at a much lower cost than we can. The other thing I would say, Mr. Justice is the fact that national security is important in the sense of being able to take information and secure it. One of the powers of our nation is the fact that we may not have the largest army, Navy, air Force and marines, but we have the best army, navy, air Force and marines because we can really do one thing and that’s fuse information and operations. We have to be able to secure that information. And when a foreign power like China can get into our networks, our data and our weapons systems that puts our nation at risk. Now, I’m I’m asking you something even more difficult. I want you to hop into the DeLorean and I want you to go into the future. And I want you to talk to my daughter who’s currently 2.5 and consider her as a, a high school senior. And I want you to sort of explain two things to her. One. What is your pitch for her?
Serving the country in some sort of cyber capacity going to work for NSA or cyber com make, make the pitch to her. And two, what is the basic uh set of, of cyber hygiene practices that she and all her friends in high school should follow Miss Gallagher. Good morning. Uh I’d like to talk to you a little bit about the future and indeed, it will be Miss Gallagher for a long time, not Mrs. Uh The future is one where I would tell you that the jobs that you see today may not exist in the jobs in the future. Uh the areas that uh that our nation is going to produce, work in the future will likely be tied to our ability to work in this domain of cyberspace. The domain that you know, very well from operating on your smartphone two decades ago, the smartphones didn’t even exist and yet today, they are accounting for a good portion of our economy. So as you think about the future, one of the things that will not change is the importance of science, technology, engineering and mathematics. And as you look to the future, being able to, to specialize in one of those areas, opens up a broad opportunity for you to, to think about jobs that may not exist today. But being able to think about jobs that don’t exist today also means the fact that you have to be able to be responsible to operate in the domain of cyberspace today and being able to do that is understanding the fact that what you say on your phone or text on your phone or share images on your phone. Some are shared, not only with the the person that receives them, but other people that have access to it and being able to understand that, that securing that information is very important. The second piece is, is that you should also understand that um what you say in cyberspace uh perhaps may not be uh only viewed and, and heard by one person. So be very careful about what you record and what you, what you say. And I think the last piece is understanding that what you see on the internet and what you read today uh may or may not be actually uh true. And so being a discerning uh being a discerning viewer of, of what you’re reading and what you’re seeing is part of being a responsible person. Now, I would say the last piece of my advice is thinking about government service. There is honor in government service as your father has served, I would offer that he would probably communicate to you that the ability to give back to your nation is something that will stay with you for the rest of your life. Thank you. The good news is in this future tiktok no longer exists because we will have taken bipartisan action against it, perhaps that we were in the second administration in this future. But uh if anyone, do you have a second round of questions, Doctor Plum and uh General uh Nason, what role have tech companies played in Ukraine?
I know there’s starlink. Are there other examples of tech companies that have played a role in Ukraine that you’re aware of?
I, I think that you’ve, you’ve highlighted one of the, the major lessons learned from Russia. Ukraine is the power of the private sector. Uh whether or not it’s been Starlink, being able to provide satellite communications, whether or not it’s been a, a series of different us companies that have been able to provide cyber security support such as Microsoft and Palo Alto and others. Uh This is uh this is an for us to scale. That’s the lesson learned is that bringing the private sector is the opportunity for us to get to not tens of thousands, it’s tens of millions if not billions of people with the information that’s readily important and, and assisting Ukraine today. I so I would just add. Uh Thanks. Uh Sir, the uh one of the issues and Mr. Keating uh actually spoke to it earlier about surprise or, or lessons. I think uh it’s been clear that uh Ukraine has been much more resilient uh from a cyber security standpoint than I think Russia might have anticipated. A lot of that is due to help from private sector. One way of making yourself resilient is to make sure that your data can be protected and one way to do that is to move to the cloud. Uh and so individual attacks have not had perhaps the effect that Russia anticipated. Appreciate it. The reason I ask is it’s become somewhat fashionable on both the far left and far right to be criticizing Silicon Valley. And I share some of the criticisms of privacy and uh issues about protecting people from kids from social media. But I also represent the area. And I fundamentally believe that it’s going to be critical in our national security. I’m that uh Chairman Gallagher, his uh in his other role as chairman, he’s chairman of every committee around here, chairman of the uh China committee is leading a delegation to Silicon Valley and will be engaging uh with some of these tech leaders. If you could. Just my last final question here is talk about how you see the importance of that collaboration. Uh And what you’d like to see for a 21st century national security strategy. I think the collaboration is essential. I do think uh that there is one piece that we could use your help with, which is communicating uh that technology like any other system can be used for good or for bad and making sure that as uh our, our, our brilliant men and women working in uh the tech quarter in Silicon Valley, for example, understand that they’re also downsize technology and try to build and safeguards as they go, I think that would benefit us all going forward. Uh We uh you know, Congressman, I would just say that as we think about the the future here, this is, this is where we need to have the, the partnerships that are so strong, not only the partnerships of the technology that’s being developed, but the talent that exists there. I’m very interested for um young people and, and even mid-career people to, to come and join our force for a period of time. This is perhaps something that uh is a unique part of us. Cyber command that you would come in at the at the mid-career. But that’s the type of talent that we need. That’s the type of engineering, know how that would uh really assist us. And so again, I think it’s both the technology and the talent that exists there that, that we want to make sure is clearly partnered with us in the future. Thank you. Uh Thank the ranking member. I am very excited to visit uh his district and uh I might need your advice on how to fit in. If you, if there’s any extra sort of like hoodies or all birds or ironic t-shirts I could wear, I appreciate it, Mr. Latrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When, when asked a question from my district to my constituents, ask me a question like is our military the most formidable force on the planet?
It’s easy for me. To say yes, even when they talk about how aggressive Russia is and how large China is. I say, well, we’re an all-volunteer force and we’re terrifying. Uh But I can quantify that by showing them the, the Special forces community or a handful of marines. And generally you said that um the US is leading in the cyber space. No, I think it was 16 or 17 when we were the, we had the fifth fastest computer in the world titan over at uh one of the national laboratories. Are you familiar with that?
Uh I am OK. And so then right in that same time frame, we fired up summit. And if I remember correctly, summit went from petaflop to extra scale computing speeds, which pushed us into the next phase of evolution when it comes to our processing abilities, moving us closer to A I M L or quantum, which I think one of the most brilliant men in the world. So 15 years ago, we said in 15 years, we’re gonna be at quantum computing. And they said it again the day that I was standing there, right?
So my question is, which would this may be a classified setting question is how do I see?
How do you confirm to me because you said you talked to the subject matter experts in the space. But what does that, what does that mean?
What are they telling you?
Because to me, if China given the the time frame from them when we fired up summit should have on board or online, another computer that would have trumped us and pushed us back some. So the amount of money they’re spending in that space as compared to us would make me think that they’re ahead of us. So can you give me some amplifying information?
Do we need to wait till 10 if I might uh uh provide a bit of information and take also uh a portion of this in the, in the close classified spending money, doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re the best in what you do. And being able to integrate that kind of capability is what really matters. So being able to take, you know, the intelligence, integrate it with and maneuver force to have an outcome is where I clearly see the United States has the lead and it is, you know, not only in the fact that we can do it in the air on the ground, but also in the sea, being able to bring disparate parts of information together that mind for data that provide that key piece of information uh to a to a soldier, sailor, airman, marine on the point is what we do so well, congressman, and that’s the difference in terms of what our nation can do. Yeah, but that’s our military presenting a defensive posture where the Chinese government is reaching out and touching my civilians. And that’s a problem. Does that make sense. Again, I think perhaps more of this we can discuss in, in closed session if you’d like fair enough. Hey, you, Baxter. Any other members?
Ok. With that, we, we will adjourn the open session and we’ll reconvene, uh, the classified portion upstairs subcommittee is adjourned at 10:00. OK. Give him, come for a break.