The Senate Armed Services subcommittee on Strategic Forces hears testimony from Department of Defense officials regarding missile defense strategy, policies and programs in review of the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program, May 18, 2022.
Submission for the Missile Defense Agency and Missile Defense policies. In preparation for fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. The Department of Defense has submitted to the Congress a missile defense review and nuclear posture review along with the National Defense strategy. While this overall document is classified and we await an unclassified version and await gonna wait and away an unclassified version. We would like to have that by the way. Uh it continues the policy of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United States while assuring our allies through a regional missile defense strategy, I would note it also continues the policy of reliance on our nuclear deterrent to protect against large and sophisticated attacks against our homeland from intercontinental ballistic missiles, air launched ballistic missiles or sea launched ballistic missile threats from near peer adversaries such as Russia and china. Missile defense has two new aspects that we hope to examine in today’s hearing. First and foremost is the defense against hypersonic missiles which do not follow a ballistic trajectory. Second is the requirement to protect Guam against any threats that china might pose. This is a daunting task that requires integration of missile defense systems from the Army, Navy Missile Defense Agency. And when I hope we will learn more about in today’s hearing, The president’s budget submission for the Missile Defense Agency is $9.6 billion. A decrease from the fiscal year 2022 enacted level of $10.3 billion. I would like to know how the fiscal year 2023 budget request continues your effort for homeland and regional missile defense as well as defense against new threats such as hypersonic missiles. Again. Let me thank today’s witnesses for agreeing to appear after opening statements, statements will have rounds of five minute questions for the witnesses. Senator Fischer, thank you Mr. Chairman and welcome to all of our witnesses today. We appreciate you appearing before us today and we look forward to hearing from each of you. Overall, the budget request for fiscal year 2023 is a significant improvement over what the administration proposed last year and contains robust funding for the next generation interceptor program as well as for the defense of Guam. While I’m happy to see the department finalize its plan for defending Guam and dedicates significant resources to do so, I can’t help but feel that this effort is already behind the last two indo pay com commanders sought support for this project and this subcommittee proposed to begin funding it two years ago. An effort that was ultimately rejected in favor of further study in the time that’s passed. The threat has only gotten worse. Additionally, I continue to be concerned about the overall level of funding for missile defense proposed in this year’s budget proposal Compared to the FY 22 appropriation. The Missile Defense Agency’s budget would decline by over $700 million. A reduction of over 7% at a time when threats are growing and the departments purchasing power is being eroded by the effects of inflation. I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about these issues and about how the FY 23 request would impact their mission. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Our witnesses today are the honorable dr David Honey. Deputy undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering. Honorable john F. Plum. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space policy General Glenn van Herk, Commander, U. S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. Lieutenant General Daniel Carpoolers, Commanding General U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Vice Admiral john Hill. Director Missile Defense Agency. Uh Secretary Honey please. Mhm. Chairman King ranking member Fisher and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces subcommittee. Thank you for the honor to appear before you today and to provide testimony on behalf of the Department of Defense for the Senate Armed Services Committee. Hearing on Missile Defense, I am pleased and appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important topic in a rapidly evolving threat environment. Us adversaries are developing more lethal weapons by advancing technology in areas such as ballistic hypersonic and cruise missiles that threaten the safety and security of the United States and our allies in support of the National Defense Strategy priorities. The Department of Defense created the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to set the strategy for technology and innovation while addressing the needs of the Joint force directed energy. A defense specific technology is a key critical technology area. We are developing to counter a wide variety of current and emerging threats with the goal of rapid response and engagement at the speed of light. This is a joint effort that is being largely supported and carried out by the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering the missile Defense Agency, the Air Force, the Army and the Navy. The scope of the efforts spans countering cruise missiles in the near term hypersonic missiles in the near and medium term and ballistic missiles in the long term to address the threat of adversaries, cruise missiles. A number of key technologies and capabilities crucial for countering cruise missiles will be demonstrated over the next two years. The O USTR Any high energy laser scaling initiative, also known as healthy, is funding industry to develop and deliver high energy laser technology for cross domain applications across the department. The department is also developing high power microwave weapons for a wide range of missions including countering drones, cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles. There is microwave technology test bed at M. D. A. The remote electromagnetic disruption of critical advanced threat also known as Red Cat at the Navy and the countering electronic high power microwave extended range air base Air defense Xiomara at the Air Force. Lastly countering hypersonic and ballistic missiles will require substantially more laser power. Therefore, under the healthy effort, Arnie will begin scaling laser powers in fiscal year 2023 and is examining opportunities to accelerate the scaling significantly. This, combined with improved beam control systems, will allow capabilities against hypersonic and ballistic missiles to be developed by the services and the missile Defense agency. Chairman King ranking member. Fisher Members of this committee, Arnie is committed to sending the technology and innovation strategy to advance defense specific technologies such as directed energy and deliver these critical capabilities to the warfighter. We will continue to support these joint efforts to increase readiness as well as the capability capacity of fielded homeland and regional missile defense systems while investing in advanced technology that offer new ways to counter a diverse set of threats. Thank you again for the invitation testify and I look forward to answering the committee’s questions. Thank you. Dr plum Jeremy King ranking member, Fisher members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me again to testify today today on missile defense strategy policies and programs. The missile threat continues to evolve And the secretary Austin has stated, China is the department’s pacing threat. China has advanced its missile capabilities over the last 20 years to counter the US in the Indo Pacific and to intimidate and threaten its neighbors including Taiwan. Russia is developing testing and deploying new missiles that pose challenges for us missile warning and in Ukraine Russia has launched well over 1500 missiles as part of an unprovoked campaign that has caused the deaths of thousands. North Korea continues to improve, expand and diversify its missile capabilities, posing an increasing risk to the U. S. Homeland. Our forces allies and partners. North Korea has accelerated its missile testing in recent months, including the launch of long range missiles. And Iran maintains a large and growing inventory of regional missiles as well as uncrowded aerial systems US which it uses both directly and via proxy groups to strike its neighbors. Iran’s nascent space program could shorten its pathway to a future long range missile capability. So in light of these threats, the department reassessed its missile defense policy including inputs from inter agency stakeholders, allies and partners in the 2022 Missile Defense review. The MDR. As you’ve noted, the classified MDR was provided to Congress in late March. Missile defenses contribute to deterrence in many ways they provide resilience. They complicate adversary attack plans and reduce adversary confidence. They raise the threshold for potential conflict. They help assure our allies and partners and they limit damage from missile attacks, which in turn provides additional decision space for nationally uh senior leadership. The department’s top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks against the United States. The president’s budget request includes significant investments in homeland missile defense including 2.8 billion to develop the next generation interceptor and for the service life extension of RGB I. S. 4.7 billion to fund the transition to a resilient missile warning and missile track satellite architecture and it’s important to note that this is not part of the M. D. A. Budget. This is $4.7 billion for the Space force. 278 million for new over the horizon. Radars to enhance our ability to detect cruise missile attacks from the Homeland. And 892,000,002 field missile defense capabilities to augment the thad battery on Guam. Guam, like all US territories, is unequivocally part of the US homeland. And a missile strike against Guam is a direct attack against the United States for regional defense. The department is also strengthening our missile defenses to counter regional threats that include hypersonic threats. President, the president’s budget request invests heavily in regional ballistic cruise and hypersonic missile defenses Including three billion for army ballistic and cruise missile defense programs Including the procurement of 252 more patriot interceptors. Two billion for Aegis BMD. Including procurement of 57 more SM three missiles. 335 million for thad development procurement and testing 1.3 billion for hypersonic missile tracking in defense And 825 million for counter solutions. The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine in which Russia has used and continues to use a broad array of missiles to attack and in my opinion terrorize civilian populations, highlights the extent to which our adversaries are prepared to use missiles in a conflict. Missile defenses are critical for defending the U. S. Homeland and for defending our deployed forces and our allies and partners, the department and the administration remained committed to improving them. I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared goal and I thank you and look forward to your questions. General Van Herk Chairman King ranking member Fisher, Distinguished members of the subcommittee. It’s my honor to represent the men and women of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command as we defend Canada and the United States, I appreciate the opportunity to testify alongside Dr honey Dr plumb by several hill and Lieutenant General cobbler. North Common Nora faced the most dynamic and strategically complex environment in our respective histories, strategic competitors have openly declared their intent to hold our homeland at risk in an effort to advance their own entrance and limit our options and ability to respond. North Korea continues to test nuclear capable ballistic missiles with increased range and lethality. While Russia and china have fielded and continue to invest heavily in advanced long range cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and delivery platforms. And as we’ve seen throughout Russia’s unprovoked and irresponsible invasion of Ukraine. Russia has fielded large numbers of long range cruise missiles including hypersonic missiles that can cause enormous damage to infrastructure creates strategic effects with conventional warheads. These conventional precision strike capabilities and advanced delivery platforms are designed specifically to hold critical infrastructure in the homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold In order to disrupt and delay our ability to project power globally while attempting to undermine our will to intervene in a regional crisis overseas. In my view, missile defense of the homeland starts with a strategic deterrent to include the options and survivability provided by reliable and effective nuclear triad. But as I testified before the full committee, I’m concerned that deterrence by cost imposition does not adequately account for the conventional capabilities our competitors have already fielded. This over reliance increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation because it limits our national leaders options in crisis and conflict to account for the full range of our competitors. Nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is necessary to balance deterrence by cost imposition with deterrence by denial and integrated deterrents that employs all elements of national influence. This integrated approach leverages both military and non military capabilities. In order to provide our leaders with a wide range of timely deterrence options. To be clear, we must continually demonstrate to potential aggressors that an attack on the homeland will result in failure. We do that by demonstrating reliable and effective capabilities that cause potential adversaries to doubt their chances of an effective attack on the homeland. This is why it continues to support Vice Admiral Hills plan to field the next generation interceptor by 2028 or sooner if possible, deterrence by denial also includes demonstrating homeland readiness responsiveness and resiliency along a range of kinetic and non kinetic capabilities to defend the homeland. North camps, support to civil authorities and our security cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical to integrated deterrence as is NORAD’s mission to provide threat, warning and attack assessment and defend the approaches to North America. In this strategic environment, we cannot wait for our competitors to act. It is vital that we get ahead of our competitors decision making and provide our national leaders with timely and informed options needed to achieve favorable outcomes. With that necessity in mind, North Command NORAD are focused on four strategic principles in our homeland defense design. Starting with all domain awareness from undersea to on orbit and everything in between. To include the cyber domain. Simply put, we have to be able to see the threats in order to deter and if required, defeat them. I want to thank the subcommittee for your support of the over the horizon radars On my Fy 22 unfunded priorities list Over the horizon radar will significantly improve my ability to detect and track threats in the air, maritime and space domains. I ask for your continued support in authorizing the funding requested for over the horizon radar In the Fy 23 Presidents budget, all domain awareness is required to achieve information dominance, which is the use of advanced capabilities like machine learning and artificial intelligence to quickly analyze process and deliver data to decision makers at the speed of relevance. By doing so, we will increase senior leader decision space and enabled decisions superiority over competitors. Finally, today’s problems are global and all domain and they demand globally integrated strategies, plans and actions. Missile threats to the homeland inherently originate beyond my area of responsibility. So it is vital that we have the ability to detect potential threats and share data rapidly between commands, agencies, allies and partners around the world. These strategic priorities are vital elements of our ability to execute a layered defense in the execution of the national Defense strategy and integrated deterrence. I’ll end by thanking the committee for all you’ve done to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and guardians as they defend the homeland. Thanks for the opportunity to appear and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. General and general Cobbler. I think Chairman King ranking member Fisher, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I’m honored to again testify before you representing an incredible people. First organization of more than 3000 soldiers and civilians across 10 time zones in 22 locations, these amazing professionals provide space, high altitude and missile defense forces and capabilities to army and joint war fighters and they express my sincere appreciation for your continued support of our people and their families. My role remains unchanged from previous testimony. I served as the commander of the joint functional component Command for integrated missile defense. As the army’s proponent for air and missile defense or A. M. D. I provide us Northern command the soldiers who stand ready to defend our nation from intercontinental ballistic missile attack. I serve as the Army service component Commander two, both U. S. Strategic Command and U. S. Space Command and I serve as the Army’s AMG Enterprise Integrator. We have witnessed significant changes over the past year to include the largest employment of offensive missile systems in Europe since World War two. In Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Like Russia, other potential adversaries across the globe are developing fielding and normalizing the use of increasingly diverse, robust and lethal offensive missile systems in an attempt to gain coercive power and strategic advantage over the United States and our allies and partners. It has never been more imperative that we strengthen our capabilities to deny our adversaries of benefits of using these weapons. Will accomplish this through continued investment and sustainment of combat ready integrated and lethal AMG forces space capabilities combined with our allies and partners will also prove essential in ensuring our nation’s security to address the challenges of the ever changing landscape. We continue to implement new ways of accomplishing our mission and enhancing our capabilities to briefly outline a few enhancements are space and missile defense soldiers and civilians have completed an upgrade to our joint tactical ground stations at our four global theater missile warning company locations. These upgrades, improve our missile warning, missile defense queuing and battlespace characterization and supported multi domain operations. We relocated to European based U. S. Patriot batteries to Poland and one to Slovakia. This defensive relocation reinforces our nation’s commitment to article five and proactively counters any potential threats to us and allied forces in NATO’s eastern region. During a joint March 2020 to exercise and air defense battalion under the European based 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command successfully deployed four maneuver short range air defense striker based platforms throughout NATO’s eastern region. A move of over 1500 miles which culminated in a successful live fire in Estonia. Support to testing and exercises remains a priority. Earlier this year, air defense artillery soldiers participated in third flight test 21 where two patriot advanced capability, three missile segment enhanced interceptors were integrated with thad software to successfully intercept two short range ballistic missiles. This integration enables earlier interceptor launched and results in increased defended area battlespace. Our soldiers also recently completed Phase one of the integrated Air and missile defense Battle command system. Initial operational test and evaluation in full support of the army’s number one a.m. D. Modernization effort. Let me close by again, highlighting our most important asset are people who remain committed to accomplishing our no fail national security mission. Despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic are professionals continue to provide space and missile defense capabilities that support combatant commanders. It is are people who make us strong it is are people who make winning possible. I consider it an honor and a privilege to lead and serve alongside them and request the continued support of Congress to sustain our ability to recruit, develop, retain and resource. Such a highly qualified and mission ready team. When you put people first winning happens, I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you. Thank you. General Admiral Hill. Good afternoon. Chairman King ranking member Fisher, Distinguished members of the subcommittee. Uh, it is a great honor to be here with some incredible key partnerships uh, here to testify before you today. I’d like to first start by recognizing and thanking those who operate from abroad and here at home operating the integrated missile defense system. And then of course I’m a missile defense agency team comprised of military, civilian and contractor workforces that ensure that the war fighters can operate those systems. Our Fy 23 budget was mentioned as a 9.6 billion to continue the mission of protecting the Homeland are forward deployed forces, our friends and allies, uh, a little bit back on the threat. Everyone’s mentioned it. I want to put a finer point on it when you think about advanced ballistic missiles, long range cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles. What that really means down at the warfighter levels. Heavy maneuver Large numbers at high speed with 360¬∞ attack. That is a challenge. So rather than walking through all of the elements of the integrated missile defense system that we have deployed globally and operated by our services. I want to focus in on what I see as the three top priorities for p. b. 23 priority one is the no fail mission of defend the homeland against ballistic attacks from the rogue nations. I want to thank Congress for the great support on the service life extension program. We’re making great progress. We’re on track ahead of schedule. We’ve got the first round that we refurbished back in the hole. Now number two is inbound and the rounds 34 and five are and being processed. Now that is going to extend the reliability of our in service league prefer to not use the term inbound in this room. Makes me a little nervous. Yes sir, I will I will scratch that from the script. Um then I’d like to switch on over to the next generation interceptor was mentioned earlier. We are like lightspeed working very closely with General Van Herk and his team to ensure that the two contractors that that we put in place last year about this time March of 2021 Are tracking to get the first emplacement around the 2028 timeframe Right now. Both are performing so well that they are anticipating and our team believes that we’re tracking towards 2027. So that’s incredible. That means flight testing earlier. That means ground testing earlier. That means we have a better sense of where we are as we move forward to upgrade the numbers of interceptors and the capability that will be bringing forward priority two. And the reason it’s priority to not just because it’s the territory of the U. S. Citizens living on it. It will be one of the most hard, the most difficult things we do as an agency and that is the defense of Guam. We have a current architecture with a ship station up forward and we have a bad battery on the island. We have a clear set of operational requirements from Windowpane Calm. We finalized the architecture in PB 23. Uh the department did provide funds in Fy 22 to accelerate and then congress added plus up for us to do that. Our plan is to leverage mature systems to expand so that we have emerging capabilities tied in. And I think the most important thing that will bring to the table is a single command and control structure critically important for the pacific Defense Initiative. So we’re staying very close to end up a calm as we move through this development priority three really driven by the threat and that’s the hypersonic missile defense that has been mentioned by everybody. We are leveraging our existing sensors today to get indications and warnings. So we’re not starting at zero. Our command control battle management deployed globally has the ability to pull in the space assets they’re available. The land based assets, the C based assets to get us track on hypersonic when they fly through the field of view. Our commanding control Battle management systems C two. BMC is running a prototype today that provides indications and warning to end up a com where we’re going in Fy 23 is we will have our first two hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensors, H B T s s uh in space operating in an inclination to where we can collect data from testing. We do in the indo pecan region. We are going to get fire control data that we where we can leverage our weapons. What we have deployed today for hypersonic defense with the sea bass is the sea based terminal capability mentioned that already that’s been deployed for a while. We’re an increment to that capability and moving out towards increment three. When I say that, that means we’re expanding threats set to take on a larger number of those hypersonic threats where we need to go is away from the terminal area, you have to defend their but it’s the most difficult place to to engage because you really don’t know where terminal is going to be because it is maneuvering and it is high speed. So we’re moving to get to a layered defense capability in PB 23 we’re going forward with the glide phase interceptor. We have three companies on board now and we’ll be down selecting 2 2 later this year. So Chairman King ranking member fish are members of the subcommittee NBA continues to increase readiness resiliency and cybersecurity and the capability and capacity of homeland and regional defenses while investing in advanced technology. We are committed to attracting and building a strong, talented future workforce and our capabilities, capabilities based approach and unique acquisition authorities enable. MD. A. To deliver by through and with the services to the combatant commands to meet the requirements. I appreciate your continued support for the missile defense agency, the people and the missile defense mission. Look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. Thank you Admiral. And thanks for your all of you for your extraordinary service and work. Um I want to start with some budget questions and um I don’t think we’re seeing the full picture when we talk about the missile defense agency budget doctor Plum. Aren’t there? There are other missile related expenditures and other parts of the budget. I think you touched on this. I want apples to apples from last year. This year on the whole missile defense enterprise. Yes, sir. I I don’t think I could give you the specific numbers. I will say at least for the $4.7 billion the first the first piece of funding to transition to a robust proliferated low earth orbit missile warning and missile track architecture including an architecture that can Observe Hypersonic weapons. That’s $4.7 million dollars more than it was in the budget previous year. That’s a new, that’s a new thing. Uh My colleague here Secretary Honey is uh I was just talking about the directed energy funding that that funding is no longer part of India’s budget. At least most of it is now with R and D. So there’s a bucket of money there. It would be it would be helpful for me to dr Honey if for the record not right now but for the record of this hearing. If you could give us a sort of apples to apples with all the pieces um that of the budget last year and this year. But can you can you supply that? Yes, we’ll take that for the record sir. Thank you. I appreciate that. Um hypersonic defense. Well I guess let me just back up. I am disturbed by the fact that we’re that the president’s budget proposes a cut at a time when we all know that we’re facing a new threat and an important one. And so perhaps what you’re telling me is that there’s money in other places to deal with the threat by things like directed energy. Is that is that correct? Yes Senator, that is correct. We do have funds elsewhere that are developing directed energy solutions for that particular threat. Okay, well that’s what I hope you can supply that for the record as you said suggested you would um what have we learned from Ukraine. I’ll direct this to any of the any of the witnesses but I would think that the guys with the uniforms on might have some thoughts General carl, what have we learned? So a couple of lessons that I’ve taken personally from Ukraine and that we’re applying uh, within the air missile defense community. First, As I said in my opening statement, we see adversaries normalizing use of ballistic missiles if if you went back about 10 years forced unforced ballistic missile use just was not as prevalent. And now we see Russia as well as other adversaries using ballistic missiles and conventional air defense doesn’t work. No sir, you need ballistic missile defense in order to be able to counter that. And and with that we recognize also that it can’t just be an active defense solution. We’ve got to be able to integrate offensive capabilities to take out those missiles were on a tell or when the aircraft is on a runway or in a hangar. So the offensive defensive integration is is key as well as then that the layered missile defense. So everything from thad to Patriot too. Isn’t it true that most of the damage done in Ukraine has been done by artillery and missiles, not by conventional aircraft dropping bombs. Yes, sir. And so so that layer defense would allow us uh, you know, from army capabilities, thad and Patriot to uh, to counter ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles and even our counter rocket artillery, mortar, R. R. C. Ram systems that we have to to get after those particular artillery question I’ve gotten from a variety of people is why haven’t we provided the Ukrainians with iron dome or something like iron dome? The uh the reason that we put a Patriot battery into Slovakia Was because the Slovakians provided an S- 300 system into Ukraine. Um and that’s a rough equivalent. It’s a rough equivalent to patriot. Um as far as the US providing the iron dome uh, into Ukraine. You know, any any involvement of of any U. S. Air defense forces in Ukraine would have to be a policy discussion. Um General manager of the arctic. give me 30 seconds on the importance of the arctic in terms of this process, it seems to me that’s opened up a whole new level of strategic competition. Senator. That’s that’s exactly right. So environmental change in the arctic is creating opportunities and vulnerabilities access to resources that didn’t exist years ago, longer shipping seasons, economic prosperity. But what we’re seeing is those norms and rules and international laws that have served us well since the end of World War two are under challenge in the arctic and elsewhere around the globe. Would it help if we uh acceded to the U. N. Uh The 1-1 class senator. I support these succession to unclos as soon as we can if we can make that happen. Thank you very much. General Senator fishermen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman Admiral Hill. I understand the missile defense agency plans to deploy two satellites equipped with the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor. What is the department’s plan for this capability beyond these two prototypes. Senator thank you. A great question. Just to kind of go back what hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor does. Its really two functions. The B stands for ballistic targets. And that handles some of the changes that we’re seeing in the ballistic flights today and kind of think of changes in propulsion which challenge our sensors today. So we’re going to meet that challenge of the H. B. T. S. S. But what it really does is it gives us fire control quality data on hyper glide vehicles. And when I say fire control, I’m not talking about putting out fires. What I’m talking about is very discreet positional and velocity differences so that we can get a very firm track and put a weapon on it. So the weapons are very sensitive to having a very firm track. And we get that fire control data from H. B. T. S. S. Now. To your larger question of how does it fit into the broader architecture? Were very close with the space force. They’re working that architecture is not complete yet. What we will do in 23 by having those first two in air, they’re built by two different companies but they will be interoperable. There are interoperable on the ground today. We will track different flight tests that we do and we will prove that we have that data so we have the confidence to them proliferate. So we’ll work that closely with the Space Force over the next year to determine where they go. And there’s flexibility in the sensor. It doesn’t have to be limited to leo constellation. We can go with Meo and so there’s lots of flexibility lower and medium earth orbit. So we’re working that with the Space force and will be part of that broader architecture. Thank you. And I know that there there are other programs under development that are related to the missile warning and tracking but are but are any of these other capabilities comparable in terms of being able to provide that um fire control quality data that you need. Man it’s a it really is unique to H. P. T. S. S. For the hyper glides. Um So space capabilities. So important not just because we’re gonna catch the global maneuver but we use it for indications of warning. What it’s what kicks off an engagement today. General carter talked a little bit about that. When we see the flash it’s then it will go through the face of a radar and that’s how we get a track if we can see the track on the ground for hypersonic. Since they’re very hard to see them normally maneuver outside the field of view of a ground based radar or a sea based radar. So you need that sort of constellation in place to get to the fire control data when I look at the capabilities that are in the architecture today, they’re they’re very complementary. So the wide field of view kind of think of that as surveillance. So when we say track with the wide field of view that’s going to contain those tracks and then they cue the H B T s s to go and get that very fine precision track that we need to place a weapon on target. How long do you think you’re gonna be collecting all this data on these prototypes before? Before we’re ever going to see any kind of plan for what the future is going to be for, what we’re going to need in the future. Yes, ma’am. If we if we get this right in terms of defining the architecture based on the data, we have, we can make decisions as early as possible. What does that mean early as possible? You know, I get really nervous when I hear dates like 2028 for something and And we’re pleased that it’s 2027. So what so what how are we gonna how are we going to condense the time period and maybe have to accept more risk? Um, Perhaps, but I think right now we’re not starting from zero, you know, in the storytelling of putting two up in uh in March of 23, there’s work that’s being done now in that architecture, so decisions can be made early for that proliferation and planning for that and making sure that we have the the industry lined up to execute At at the hearing last year, I asked about the status of implementing section 1684 of the Fy 2017 N. D. A. Which requires the department to designate a single entity as the lead acquisition organization for defending the homeland from cruise missiles. General Van Herk and Admiral Hill. You both made clear at the time your support from making this designation dr plum, Welcome back again. When can we expect the department to finally resolve this? Thank you. Senator Fischer. As you are probably aware of both the secretary and the deputy secretary have committed to moving this forward. I’m hesitant to give you a specific date, but I think it’s in the near future. And the joint staff is working on on that is my understanding and I would just like to note another thing I’m worried about is lack of action. So it would be nice to see um things move forward at a, at a quicker pace. I am pushing on it. Thank you. General Ben hurt in your unfunded priorities list. It includes $50 million dollars for a cruise missile defense demonstration in involving an elevated sensor. Can you describe that project and how it would contribute to pacing the growing cruise missile threat to the homeland Senator. That’s an opportunity to basically go all the way from the domain awareness sensor through a joint The tactical fire control system. Admiral Hill talked about that earlier to the actual execution and demonstration from a sea-based missile system to engage a cruise missile. It would help us reduce risk and move forward in the near term. If we got that, $50 million dollars to demonstrate three separate engagements of capability. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman Senator Tuberville. Mhm. Thank you very much. Thanks for being here. I want to follow up a little bit on what Senator King was saying earlier. Uh, General carver, my former job of coaching. I used to watch teams on the field on film. Sometimes you think a lot more of them, sometimes you think less than all of a sudden you get them in a in a real game, you found out what they were Russia’s missiles. Uh, in the last 90 days we’ve we’ve seen them in action. Can you give a coach’s perspective and evaluation of of of what they’ve done, how they’ve done it? Has it been good, bad, indifferent sir? I’ll give you a coach’s perspective. So the offensive line is not coordinated with the quarterback who’s not handing the ball off to the running back. Um, and the wide receivers are jumping offsides. So what do I mean by that? So we’ve seen him employ his missile systems and artillery disconnected from any kind of ground maneuver, anybody that understands combined arms maneuver, know that you need to employ both and concert each other to accomplish uh, whatever your campaign objectives are. And we see we see him not doing that, which is uh, yeah, whether it’s the missile efficacy, whether it’s the incompetence of the ground forces, inability to move with logistics, challenges, etcetera. So from a coach’s perspective, none, none of the players on the offensive side have come together to move the ball down the field. What is the their missiles that they’ve launched? Uh, What percentage of them have worked that we have any idea I can talk about that? I probably shouldn’t talk about that in a unclassified session. But I will tell you originally, we thought they weren’t working. Um All right. At a rate that was as good as ours. But what what I would say is they’re on par with our capabilities, not all of them specifically their cruise missiles. They’ve had challenges with some of their hypersonic missiles as far as accuracy. But I would not take away from a strategic perspective that Russia’s cruise missiles and hypersonic missile. Their strategic capabilities have severely underperformed. Okay. I just want to make that clear. They make their own my understanding is they internally not the military makes them, but they have companies contractors within Russia that make them as well. You may know more john yes, sir. I think that explains it pretty well. Yeah. Thank you. General General Van Herk. Um you talked about the homeland, we’ve got a lot of work to do defending the homeland with hypersonic from china and ballistic missiles. Uh, my understanding is we have a majority of our F 22 S and 30 fives in Alaska. Do we have a defense system up there that will protect them? Senator depends on what we’re protecting them from. So I’m confident in the ground based interceptors that are there. So from ballistic missiles. Yes, we do have that capability with regards to to cruise missiles. Hypersonic cruise missiles that are actually currently uh coastal defense cruise missiles in Russia. I have significant concerns about my ability to defend those assets. Not only F 22 senator, you have significant portions of our ballistic missile and our threat warning capabilities in Alaska Cobra Dane is out there at clearer station. We have the radar and we’re building our long range discriminating radar as well. I was just there by the way. Very, very impressive. Thank you. Uh, this isn’t anybody you know where fixed interceptor sites. We’re talking about trucking missiles in Guam 42 trucks carrying missiles around and that, you know that it doesn’t seem logical to me. The mm Dia is the lead architect and it looks like that. We’re gonna have to find somebody demand and train them, anybody talk about that about Guam and the missile system that we’re putting on Guam. Yes, sir. I can I can give you some insight there first. It was a pretty extensive department wide study, we did look at a number of fixed site options. Um, and then in the end, uh just given uh the kind of capability that we need on the island and the flexibility there, We did go with mobile across the board. Um so the sensors will be mobile, the command control, there’s an option to be mobile. We’re working very closely with the Admiral Aquilino now and when it comes to the launching systems, those are mobile. Um, so I think the goodness that comes out of that is the investments that we make there. It’s not a big engineering leap to to get to that. We have the existing army mobile launchers, but the launchers that carry SM three and SM six. The work that needs to be done to to move those or have them in a mobile launcher is pretty straightforward. And so we think we can accomplish that and it does give the combatant commander options on where he can move those downstream so well initially sight them in an area and then if we need to move them, we’ll move them. And then we once had an iron dome in Guam, we don’t anymore, is that correct? I’ll turn that over to Jenna carver. So we exercised iron dome, we have two iron dome batteries, we sent one out to Guam to exercise to make sure it was deployable and that the soldiers could operate it. But iron dome is not the is not our ultimate solution for a cruise missile defense. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Send around. Thank you. Mr. Chairman gentlemen, thank you all for your service to our country. Dr plumb it seems like this is the 11th or perhaps the 12th time that you’ve appeared before, either the full committee or subcommittee over the last few weeks and it’s been mainly been concerning nuclear weapons in space. You’re also the D. O. D. Principal cyber adviser. So I’d like to ask you how challenging it is to serve as the OsD lead for space policy. Nuclear weapons countering the WMDS missile defense, electromagnetic warfare and cybersecurity Which are six significant roles. Do you have sufficient resources to execute your responsibilities? So thanks for that question senator. Uh it is a a sizable portfolio. It is uh pretty fun frankly. It’s a good it’s a good Swedish strategic capabilities and I think they marry up quite well. Space layers through all of them, cyber through all of them and they’re all what I would consider strategic layers to integrated deterrence. As far as the resources needed. The office is far more than just me. I have my dad’s the ships, I have the office of the principal cyber adviser. Um but since you’ve given the opportunity here, I would just say policy in general uh could use more manpower or I guess I should just say uh civilians, we need more manpower resources. Um I think the growth in space. The growth in cyber those two alone. And when you think that for instance the cyber officers are still basically staffed at the level they were 5 6 years ago. That seems like the wrong answer. Can you talk a little bit about the cyber security element of the both space and missile defense responsibilities and describe what you and your cybersecurity team bring to the table in this particular area. That’s a very important question cybersecurity of our own forces. I think sometimes it’s confused with just cybersecurity for instance of the sipper net or of jay weeks or even maybe the nipper net but for the weapons systems themselves absolutely essential. Making sure we bake that into our space systems defense in depth is the thing I like to say these hearings is really important. Not just a perimeter. I’ve had several discussions with Admiral Hill here on missile defense cybersecurity as well and all of these things are an ongoing issue that nothing is going to be solved overnight and it’s never going to be fully solved. You have to keep improving and keep looking forward. The adversary could possibly do and and figure out ways to keep that in check. A number of us on this committee have fought very hard to maintain key areas of the D. O. D. Spectrum as the lead for electromagnetic warfare. Can you tell this committee how important it is to be closely involved in the decision making process when the federal government decides to conduct auctions for key D. O. D. Spectrum bands. Absolutely essential. I actually, my PhD involved global positioning system and so that specific issue, which I think you’re referencing is absolutely essential for D. O. D. To be able to protect its ability to operate abroad. So when one agency or department of the federal government arbitrarily decides to auction spectrum it would appear that D. O. D. Should be directly involved in the discussions specifically to those areas of sale. Fair enough to say, I agree sir, thank you. Admiral Hill, the United States has consistently provided missile defense capabilities in conjunction with Israel. It’s been a good partnership both ways. Can you explain to this committee the importance of our relationship with Israel specifically when it comes to missile defense for the United States and our allies and partners? Yes sir, senator, thanks thanks for that question. We have a very strong partnership documented in an mou and you know that half a billion dollars of the M. D. A budget goes to Israel. Um we work the full set of layered defense with Israel from iron dome up to David’s sling up to the variance of arrow to include their latest elevated sensor of the work that they do um connecting all those and the networking of that. We also work with them on their target systems and we sit side by side and help them engineer through what they need to do to execute a test. Fair enough to say it’s a good partnership with information flowing both ways. It’s a strong partnership and I would say it’s beyond what you would normally see because we are side by side. So there is not just the flow of information and the learning. Uh, there’s definitely, you know, our people um, that that just walk away from that, having a better sense of tiered layered defense in a really constrained area with very short reaction times. Thank you. I have, I’m about out of time but I’m gonna try to get in one more question. This for general cobbler, you mentioned relocating to patriot batteries to Poland in March. It was it was a necessary move in our opinion. And I think you did the right thing. The question I have is how much more flexibility do you have to relocate missile defense capabilities when needed? What flexibility should you have? And what is the state, the industrial base should we need to surge missile defense capabilities? Yes, senator. So the army air missile defense forces are the highest operational tempo of any army forces that we have. So any deployment of them does stress the force and so we are constantly looking at our air missile defense posture globally. We have battalions out into opaque com, we’ve got the battalion in Germany and then we’ve got battalions that support centcom. So it does stress the force and in talking with the Chief of Staff of the Army about this just last week. He understands it. And the Secretary of the Army as well. Um they’ve committed to 1/16 patriot battalion as well as a third battery and for additional maneuver shore at battalion. So so we are growing the air defense force in recognition of the up-tempo stretches. Put on our soldiers senator with respect to the industrial based capability. Um I’ve really had to defer that to the PTO missiles and space the acquisition side. But but I would tell you from my experience if I went back to Desert storm when we had very very few patriot interceptors to do ballistic missile defense and the industry ramped up very quickly and was able to get those patriot interceptors out to the patriot. I was in Israel to the patriot units in Israel as well as the patriot units that were in Saudi Arabia. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you. We’ll have a second round of questions for those who who who have additional questions. Um, I think it was Admiral Hill, you used the term fire control data with regard to hypersonic. I wrote in my notes, fire what what are we firing? That? I as you know, we’ve talked about this. I I I am gravely concerned about the strategic change in the hole in the whole scene of battle that’s hypersonic represent. And I know we’re working on it and we’re talking about it. I don’t get I want a sense of urgency to tell me if your admiral, you’re the commander of a of an aircraft carrier 800 miles from China and they send a hypersonic missile your way you’ve got about nine minutes to figure out what to do. I want to know how close we are to having a defense. And I guess the second question is is north Korea developing hypersonic capability? Because if they are, that’s where we need to be focusing not on hitting a bullet with a bullet over the north pole. Yes, sir. Senator. Thanks thanks for that question. We often talk about hypersonic and assume we’re at zero. We’re not at zero. Mentioned earlier that we have a command controlled battle management capability that takes the space sensors that we have today. The land based sensors and the sea based sensors. And what’s really key about sea bass is that is where the defensive capability resides today. So when a carrier strike group goes forward to use your example, uh They have some number of destroyers with him and on those destroyers today. The sea based terminal capability is on those ships. We did that based on a request from the Cno because he was concerned about the carrier killer missile. You’ve heard plenty about that in the white press Looking ballistic. So we have a an ability with SM three and the upper tier to take out that threat. Uh and then we have in the lower tier C based terminal which is really a capability that we insert into the Sm six missile that the Navy produces. So the Navy is producing those in number M. D. A. Is providing the software package and the work in the combat system to control that missile. So we have the capability to take on the advanced maneuvering threat. And terminal I will say Terminal is not sufficient. As I mentioned earlier it is the most difficult place to engage. Um Hi maneuver high speed and again you don’t know where terminal is generally in the sea bass, it’s gonna be after the carrier. Uh So the destroyers will operate in close quarters and ensure that they provide that protection now because it’s not good enough. The investments we’re making in PB 23 is towards the glide phase interceptors. So when you think of having a layered defense against the glide vehicle that then dips down and comes in and does the maneuver, we have the ability to stop that at the glide phase the most vulnerable place where we want the ability we have, we have three contractors in play right now to deliver that capability. We’re moving towards a demo over the next few years. So we’ll down select this year to two and we’ll continue to move through and then we’ll deliver that demo conduct and exercise with that is north Korea developing hypersonic. They claim to have developed hypersonic. If you go look at the outer mold line, you might be fooled and think that it is. But in terms of what we’ve seen in terms of data, I’m not entirely confident that they have that capability today. But the fact that they’re testing it ought to be of concern Director Honey. You mentioned directed energy in in your, in your testimony I believe um that strikes me as a as a promising and I know there are technical problems but give me give me an update on where we are in developing directed energy, microwave or laser. Both classes of directed energy systems, lasers and high powered microwaves have seen significant developments and achievements over the past several years. And what I’m most impressed with is the fact that we now have High energy laser systems 130 kilowatt class systems that are being deployed on ships for operational testing and we have a modular package that will be able to be deployed on army ground vehicles as well as ships. These will be going into uh operational testing around the world in this coming year. And out of that we will be able to gain tremendous insights on lethality data to see how those systems will be useful in the future. Is mainly aimed at dazzling as well as cruise missile defense. And we also have significant developments and higher power systems and lasers that we think will be very important in the upcoming few years. Do you have sufficient resources to accelerate this process? We have a sufficient resources and also the folks leading the efforts have much better insights today than they did in the past. And just through understanding where to smartly take risks, they’ve been able to accelerate developments significantly. Admiral, if you were the commander of that aircraft carrier, I want this guy to be supplying you with some weapons. Yes sir. I would want everything that’s available and we’ll take the power you have now and put it on the ships if we could. Thank you. Senator Fischer, Admiral Hill. It’s my understanding that the department intends to award a production contract for 20 next generation interceptor rounds following the critical design review and these interceptors will be deployed to the unoccupied silos at Fort Greely. But what’s the plan to modernize the current fleet of 44 ground based interceptors? Yes, ma’am, Thank thanks for the question. I think the best way to answer it is to just kind of clarify that we have about three classes of the ground based interceptors that are in service today. You have the oldest part of the fleet. You’ve got the mid grade fleet and you’ve got the newest ones. So I know that General Van Herk takes that into account when he’s working his shot doctrine. Um, so we’re not really concerned about the new ones. They have a long life and their reliability will carry them into the twenties thirties. Our plan is to reach a decision in production around the 24 time frame when you get to the preliminary design review and start thinking about production? Uh There are options there because we do have the missile field that’s ready to take those. Those 1st 20 will likely make a decision to fill those 1st 20 but the nation has the option to start replacing some of the older ones. Uh And that’s why I think it’s very important to have the two contractors and play. That’s the other option we have here. You can keep them beyond CDR and you can have a double production house depending on where the threat goes. And if you need numbers we can build the numbers by having to contractors carried through critical design review. You said you’re likely to have a decision made soon. When when would you expect? Yes, Ma’am. I I couldn’t remember where the actual place on the chart was but it’s in 2024 we will make a production decision and part of that discussion would be, are you gonna fill the missile fields or you’re going to replace what you have? Are you just going to keep building so that you can fully replace existing inventory? Those are decisions that we have to make within the and are you comfortable with that? I am comfortable that we have to contractors in play and that those options will be there to build out, fill that missile field and then replace if we make a decision to do so. Okay. Is this something that you’re discussing with the N. G. I teams? Yes ma’am. Yes ma’am. Absolutely. And mentioned a little bit earlier actually, General Van Herk mentioned the 28 2028 timeframe for for the contractors. And we are moving ahead of that schedule right now. We’re gonna learn a lot more as we come through. Development will come through ground testing. We’ll do individual component level tests and work our way to a flight test. This is a flight before you buy a program. So we’re going to do an intercept in salvo test before we go to full production. General Van Hurt. Given the What you’ve seen of the threat that’s out there. Do you believe that 20 interceptors are going to be sufficient or do you need some sort of capability to replace the 44 G. B. I. S that are deployed currently Senator. My assessment is when you factor in service life extension which will give us significant reliability and data and information. That will help me with my shot doctor and give me additional capacity when you factor in the next generation interceptor and its capabilities along with long range discriminating radar. All of that. I will be comfortable ah When it’s delivered in the 27-28 timeframe it’s a policy question going forward do we need to continue to develop and field additional capability and capacity as the threat develops additional capability and capacity? I remain concerned about my ability to to stay up with that capacity. Especially thank you, Admiral Hill, the general, just I think made an argument there um against some of some of what we hear sometimes that we don’t need to replace systems so we just need to continue to do life extension programs. And I I know that seems to be the current plan, likely to be the plan for the future. Um but but do you, how long do you think that can continue to have same concerns that the general expressed? Ii do we read the same intelligence estimates and they’re always, you know, low confidence, medium competent. But but you can kind of get a sense based on their testing and how they’ve progressed over the years. I would say there’s there’s a big difference between the G B I s that we have in service today versus what the next generation interceptor brings and in the sun class environment. I will tell you that a unitary missile think of that as a singular kill vehicle versus a next generation interceptor with multiple kill vehicles on it. Um That that’s a huge lift in terms of how we take on the threat because the threat will continue to evolve to have maneuvering warheads and multiple maneuvering warheads. So we we we need the next generation interceptor. We can slept all day long, those unitary missiles and we can drive their lifetime to the right pretty far. But at the end of the day, you really need the upgrade that next generation interceptor brings because it’s going to operate in a really tough space. But it does have multiple kill vehicles which gives us a lot more flexibility. And we have to have the resources that meet that meet the threats that are coming to that we get from intelligence, correct? Yes, ma’am. Thank you. Thank you. Senator Tuberville. You’re all set. Thank you. Secretary Honey. You talked about high energy lasers. I’ve had the unfortunately I’ve watched one work on the ground from an mrap low energy. It wasn’t really high energy but works pretty good. Eventually, you know, you start putting them on ships and possibly in satellites in the world. We’re going to uh find the energy for for a high energy laser, you know, to really function ah the way we really want it have we are we on the R and D. How’s the R. And D on that as we speak. It’s the R. And D. Has come along a long ways And that’s a very good question about these particular systems because of the history behind them where we’ve seen the biggest improvements has been in the conversion efficiency of energy to actually useful output from the lasers as well as improvements in the beam control so that we don’t have to have such a massive blast in order to have the weapons effects that we want. There’s been just a tremendous amount of work that’s been done by the department in these areas and we’re now seeing the payoff of those results today. You ever you see nuclear being used? Yeah. Energy. I’m sorry to be nuclear to power higher energy possibly. Uh No, I don’t I don’t see that as right now as as as necessary. Uh there could be uh you know, always the possibility I’m talking about for the future. You know, we’re talking about Star trek and all that satellites that have these long beams, you know, right now, at least for the systems that we’re looking at the conventional power sources that we have looked to be sufficient. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Turn around, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to follow up on on Senator Tuberville’s line of question because it seems to me that, you know, we’re talking here about what a lot of people and that would watch this would say they’re talking about something really close to Star Wars or Star trek in terms of uh Basically shooting one missile with another missile Hitting one missile that’s capable of 5000 plus miles an hour with another missile or an interceptor that can do the same thing or using a weapon of directed energy, like a phaser or a laser in the future. We’re talking about that right now being being deployed in some in some specific areas today. And yet at the same time, I think back, I just received a note that uh General Van hurt your team has actually been looking at, at cold weather and the fact that you’ve got teams that have to survive in cold weather and we’ve got arctic issues and so forth. We need the basic research. I know South Coast School of mines and technology has been doing work on cold weather operations and so forth. And I looked back, we’ve got a part of the world right now that is going to become very active in terms of protecting our country. And that’s the arctic. I’m just curious. Uh General Van Herk, what what do you see in terms of the challenges of operating in the arctic and what are the things that we’re not thinking about right now that we’ve just assumed we’ve been doing all along and yet we’ve got equipment, we’ve got material, manpower and so forth. What what do we have to expect that we should be doing right now to make sure that that within the arctic, we’ve done our due diligence and we haven’t taken anything for granted in terms of being being able to operate. That’s a great question, Senator, we just completed an exercise in the arctic arctic edge where we brought joint and even combined with the other countries to the arctic to operate. I’ll tell you there’s significant lessons learned about the harsh environment where our equipment, I won’t go into details, But let’s just say some strategic equipment that we place into the arctic does not function because We haven’t equipped it to operate. And over the last 20 years we’ve been focused on a different environment as we developed equipment. So research and development is crucial to continuing to ensure we buy down risk to potential future operations in the arctic. It doesn’t just go to weapons systems as well. It goes to human performance factors, medical capabilities, medical equipment as you sustain yourself in a harsh environment like that long term, we have to look at the equipment we wear and the capabilities That we’re gonna utilize to sustain life in that environment. What we find is that you can operate in that environment. Less than about 50% of what you would in another environment. So appreciate what your school of mines is doing, advancing a lot of the research and capabilities to look at that. That’s something I’m asking for in our defense planning guidance is to at least move the ball down the field and continue that research and and development uh for ensuring the capabilities are there, but also capabilities that support the human life as we sustain in the arctic environment. Thank you sir. Thank you Mr. Chairman to follow up on your question. Senator rounds I recently learned that two thirds of the ice in the Arctic Ocean has disappeared in the last 40 years, stunning a stunning fact. I want to ask one more question. If I may say if I could and yet at the same time you have a problem in that unless you’ve got the right kind of oil, you’re not going to operate very well in the arctic conditions anyway because your machinery doesn’t work because it freezes just because it freezes and it’s it’s the liberal city isn’t there? Like I’d say Maine and South Dakota rather than Alabama might be able to work on. That has a lot to do with it. Mr. Chairman, uh a question from Senator Hirono ah General Van Herk For fiscal year 2023. The administration has not funded the development of long range radar in Hawaii to detect incoming threats from North Korea or China. Do our current radar and ground-based interceptors provide adequate protection of Hawaii Senator. I’m comfortable with my capability to defend Hawaii against ballistic missiles from a rogue actors such as North Korea. Today as capabilities continue to develop as capacity increases by potential rogue actors then I maybe potentially challenged to defend Hawaii. What we’re really talking about is a Hawaii radar would contribute to an under layer significantly that that would give additional capability and capacity. That’s a policy decision that we go down there. But today I’m comfortable where we are. Thank you. Thank you all very much for your responses today for your testimony and for your service has been a very illuminating hearing. I appreciate your joining us. The hearing is adjourned.