Defense Officials Testify about UFOs before House Subcommittee

The House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence and Counterproliferation heard testimony on unidentified aerial phenomena, May 17, 2022. Witnesses include Ronald S. Moultrie, undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and Scott W. Bray, deputy director of Naval Intelligence.


Before we get started. I want to recognize a moment of silence for the victims of the white supremacist hate crime in buffalo New York. The subcommittee has focused intently on that threat in both open and closed hearings. It is utterly devastating to see more victims of this violence. Buffalo, our heart breaks for you. With that. I ask my colleagues to join, pardon me. We will now turn to the business of this hearing. More than 50 years ago, the US government ended project Blue Book an effort to catalog and understand sightings of objects in the air that could not otherwise be explained. For more than 20 years. That project had treated unidentified anomalies in our airspace as a national security threat to be monitored and investigated. In 2017, we learned for the first time that the Department of Defense had quietly restarted a similar organization tracking what we now call unidentified aerial phenomena or you. A. P. S. Last year. Congress rewrote the charter for that organization now called the airborne object identification and management synchronization group or aim sog for short today we will bring that organization out of the shadows. This hearing and oversight work has a simple idea at its core, unidentified aerial phenomena are a potential national security threat and they need to be treated that way for too long. The stigma associated with you. A PS has gotten in the way of good intelligence analysis pilots avoided reporting or were laughed at when they did D. O. D. Officials relegated the issue to the backroom or swept it under the rug. Entirely fearful of a skeptical national security community today. We know better. You. A. P. S. Are unexplained. It’s true but they are real. They need to be investigated and many threats they poles need to be mitigated. Undersecretary of Moultrie Mr. bray. Thank you for coming today. First we need you to update us on the status of em sock. The legislation creating it was passed in December. The deadline for implementation is fast approaching but the group does not even have a name director. We need to know sirs, the status of the organization and the obstacle to getting it up and running. Secondly, you have to convince the audience today and most especially our military and civilian aviators. The culture has changed that those who report you A P. S. Will be treated as witnesses, not as cooks. Thirdly, you need to show us congress and the American public whose imaginations you have captured. You are willing to follow the facts where they lead. You know, we fear sometimes that the D. O. D. Is focused more on emphasizing what it can explain. Not investigating what it can. I’m looking for you to assure us today that all conclusions are on the table. One final note, we are mindful today that um song is not starting from scratch. This is the third version of this task force in D. O. D. And civil society groups like the mutual UFO network. Mr. Korbel and others have been collecting data on this issue for years. I hope you’ll explain how you can leverage the knowledge and experience of our prior work on this matter to move the aim song along the last time Congress had a hearing on you, A PS was half a century ago. I hope that it does not take 50 more years for Congress to hold another because transparency is desperately needed and now turn to ranking member Crawford for comments he’d like to make. Thank you Mr. Chairman um honorable Moultrie Mr. bray. Thank you for coming here today. We appreciate it to begin the open dialogue between Congress and the executive branch on this important topic. While this topic evokes creative imaginations of many, aside from all the hype and speculation, there are important underlying issues posed by you A PS. Despite the serious nature of this topic, I have to say, I’m more interested in our understanding of Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapon development or understanding why this administration was so slow to share actionable intelligence with the Ukrainians. However, as much as this topic may help us better understand unknown activities of Russia and china. I am on board. The intelligence community has a serious duty to our taxpayers to prevent potential adversaries such as china and Russia from surprising us with unforeseen new technologies as overseers of the intelligence community. This committee has an obligation to understand what you are doing to determine whether any U a PSR new technologies or not and if they are where they’re coming from in general, the Icy spends much of its time and resources trying to understand what we call known unknowns. When it comes to foreign nations, weapons systems and sensors. Known unknowns are those features that we don’t fully understand yet. The challenge associated with you A. P is that they are completely unknown and require a more expansive collection analysis effort. The intelligence community must balance addressing known threats to our nation national security. With preventing technical surprise. We must continue to follow the facts where they lead us and ensure that there are no technical surprises. The Icy must take it seriously when there are credible observations of phenomena that seem to perform in ways that could pose a threat to safe flight operations. Or they could be signs of a foreign adversaries attempt to develop a strategic technological surprise against the United States. It’s also essential that our pilots and others feel they can report you a PS they observe without any stigma for doing so. This is the open unclassified portion of our hearing. We’ll have a closed classified part later. It’s important for the public to know that the classification of information exists to protect national security not to try to hide the truth. When we’re trying to determine if any you a PSR new technologies being developed by foreign governments. We are inevitably going to run into classified information about what new systems and technologies we do know are in the works here or abroad, but where information does not risk national security, it should be shared with our allies and the public when feasible. I hope that we can have your assurance to this in today. It’s my hope that the intelligence community will continue to try to determine the nature of you A. P. S we’ve observed and will keep Congress fully apprised of all developments. I look forward to this hearing and can you continue dialogue and oversight with the intelligence community on this topic And without a yield back, Gentleman yields back. And now we turn to our distinguished chairman Adam Schiff for any comments he wishes to make. Thank you Chairman Carson for holding this open hearing on unidentified aerial phenomenon and for your leadership on this issue. Holding a portion of our discussion today. An open session is critical to the cause of transparency and openness which was Congress’s intent in authorizing and funding this new task force. The larger effort that is being undertaken to study and characterized the AP Reports is an important step towards understanding these phenomenon. What we know and don’t know. And I look forward to hearing more during both the open session and the clothes setting about how D. O. D. And the I see are undertaking that task. You AP Reports have been around for decades and yet we haven’t had an orderly way for them to be reported without stigma and to be investigated. That needs to change you ap reports need to be understood as a national security matter and that message needs to go out across the O. D. The I. C. And the whole of the U. S. Government. When we spot something we don’t understand or can’t identify in our airspace. It’s the job of those we entrust with our national security to investigate and to report back. That is why it’s important that we hold this open hearing for the public to hear directly from the Department of Defense on the steps it’s taking to track, analyze and transparently communicate the work that is being done on this issue. It is also the responsibility of our government and this panel to share as much as we can with the American people. Since excessive secrecy only breeds distrust and speculation. I look forward to hearing how the U. Ap task forces being stood up. What challenges they still face and how this committee can make sure the task force is able to shed light on one of the world’s most enduring mysteries. I think you gentlemen for your work and I’ll be very interested to hear what you have to say to me. Among the most fascinating questions are these phenomenon that we can measure. That is uh instruments report. There is something there it is not the human eye, confusing objects in the sky. There is something there measurable my multiple instruments and yet it seems to move in directions that are inconsistent with what we know of physics or science more broadly and uh that to me poses questions of of tremendous interest and as well as potential national security significance. So we look forward to hearing what you’re able to report to us today in open session. And I want to thank Chairman Carson again for his extraordinary leadership on this issue and I yield back the chairman yields back thank you. With that we will start our hearing undersecretary Moultrie. The floor is yours sir. Thank you. Chairman Schiff committee Chairman Carson ranking member Crawford. Distinguished members of the subcommittee. It’s a privilege to be here with you today to address your questions regarding unidentified aerial phenomenon or you ap I’m pleased to be joined by Mr. Scott bray, the deputy director of Naval Intelligence will speak to the Navy’s unidentified aerial phenomenon Task force which laid the foundation for the efforts we will discuss today. First I’d like to thank Congress for supporting the department’s you ap efforts. The N. D. A. For fiscal year 2022 has helped us to establish a dedicated office to oversee processes and procedures for the timely collection, processing analysis and reporting of U. Ap related data. What are you a p. Put simply you ap or airborne objects that when encountered cannot be immediately identified. However, it is the department’s contention that by combining appropriately structured collected data with rigorous scientific analysis. Any object that we encounter can likely be isolated, characterized, identified and if necessary, mitigated. We know that our service members have encountered unidentified aerial phenomenon and because you A. P. S. Pose potential flight safety and general security risk. We are committed to a focused effort to determine their origins. Our effort will include the thorough examination of adversarial platforms and potential breakthrough technologies, U. S. Government or commercial platforms, allied or partner systems and other natural phenomenon. We also understand that there has been a cultural stigma surrounding you. Ap Our goal is to eliminate the stigma by fully incorporating our operators and mission personnel into a standardized data gathering process. We believe that making you ap reporting a mission imperative will be instrumental to the effort’s success. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise provides real time support to our war fighters and mission personnel across all domains. To optimize the department’s you ap work, we are establishing an office within the office of the Secretary of Defense. That offices function is clear to facilitate the identification of previously unknown or unidentified airborne objects in a methodical, logical and standardized manner. These goals will ensure that we are working closely with operational personnel on training and reporting requirements, developing data and intelligence requirements, standardizing and integrating processes and procedures for collection, operational surveillance analysis and reporting, leveraging our research and development capabilities to improve detection, characterization and identification of you. A ps developing mitigating solutions and procedures and identifying strategy and policy solutions. This effort will maximize collaboration and build upon already existing relationships with the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the F. A. A. DHS and the FBI. We are also committed to strong partnerships with the Department of Energy, Noah, the D. E. A. Nasa and the national labs and just as importantly, our international partners and allies with regard to the importance of transparency. The department is fully committed to the principle of openness and accountability to the American people. However, we are also mindful of our obligation to protect sensitive sources and methods. Our goal is to strike that delicate balance, one that enables us to maintain the public’s trust while preserving those capabilities that are vital to the support of our service personnel in closing the department is committed to this effort and welcomes the challenge. We thank you for your committed support and look forward to your questions. Mhm. Chairman Schiff Chairman, Carson ranking member Crawford and committee members. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to highlight the ongoing work of the Department of Defense regarding unidentified aerial phenomena. Since the early 2000’s. Uh we have seen an increasing number of unauthorized and or unidentified aircraft or objects in military controlled training areas and training ranges and other designated airspace. Reports of sightings are frequent and continuing. We attribute this increase in reporting to a number of factors, including our work to de stigmatize reporting an increase in the number of new systems such as quad copters and unmanned aerial systems that are in our airspace identification of what we can classify as clutter mylar balloons and other types of their trash. And improvements in the capabilities of our various sensors to detect things in our airspace. Almost two years ago, in august of 2020 Deputy Secretary Defense Norquist directed the establishment of the unidentified aerial phenomena task force within the Department of the Navy. The AP Task force was built on the foundation of the Navy’s initial efforts to respond to the reports from our aviators on unidentified objects observed in our training ranges. The basic issues then and now are twofold. First incursions in our training ranges by unidentified objects represent serious hazards to safety of flight. In every aspect of naval aviation, safety of our aircrews is paramount. Second intrusions by unknown aircraft or objects pose potential threats to the security of our operations. Our aviators train as they would fight so. Any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations by revealing our capabilities are tactics techniques and procedures are of great concern to the Navy and the Department of Defense. From the very beginning, we took these reports very seriously. We instituted a data driven approach to the investigations where we could collect as much data as possible and use all available resources to analyze and make informed decisions on the best ways to address our findings. Our main objective was to transition you ap efforts from an anecdotal or narrative based approach to a rigorous science and technology engineering focus. Study this data driven approach requires input from a wide variety of sources. In the early stages the task force worked to standardize the reporting mechanisms and processes to make it as easy as possible for personnel to report any engagement so that we were getting that wide range of reporting that we needed. We also spent considerable efforts engaging directly with our naval aviators and building relationships to help de stigmatize the act of reporting sightings or encounters. And we worked with naval aviation leadership to provide additional equipment to record any encounter. Navy and Air Force crews now have step by step procedures for reporting on the U. Ap on their knee board uh in there in the cockpit and in their post flight debrief procedures. The direct result of those efforts has been increased reporting with increased opportunities to focus a number of sensors on any objects. The message is now clear. If you see something you need to report it. And the message has been received. In fact recently I received a call from a senior naval aviator with over 2000 flight hours. He called me personally from the flight line after landing to talk about an encounter that he had just experienced. Those were just the initial steps. We also made a concerted effort to assemble subject matter experts from across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community and other U. S. Government agencies and departments. We forged partnerships with the research development and acquisition communities with industry partners and with academic research labs and we brought many allies and international partners into our discussions on you. Ap Additionally subject matter experts from a wide variety of fields including physics, optics, metallurgy, meteorology. Just to name a few have been brought into uh to expand our understanding in areas where meet we may not have organic expertise. In short we have endeavored to bring an all hands on deck approach to the to better understand this phenomenon. So what have we learned so far any given observation may be fleeting Or longer it may be recorded or not. It may be observable by one or multiple assets. In short there’s rarely an easy answer. For example, let me share with you the first video that we have here today which shows an observation in real time there it was. That’s in many cases that’s all that report may include and in many other cases we have far less than this as we detailed in both the unclassified and classified versions of the preliminary assessment released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence last June this often limited amount of high quality data uh and reporting hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of you ap as detailed in the O. D. N. I. Report. If and when individual you ap incidents are resolved, they likely fall into one of five potential explanatory categories. Airborne clutter natural atmospheric phenomena, US government or U. S. Industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems or a other bin that allows for a holding bin of difficult cases and for the possibility of surprise and potential scientific discovery. We stand by those initial results. Since the release of that preliminary report. You ap Task Force database has now grown to contain approximately 400 reports. The stigma has been reduced. We’ve also made progress in resolving the character of a limited number of U. AP encounters. For example, let me show you a couple of another video and image taken years apart in different areas. In this video, US Navy personnel recorded what appears to be triangle, some flashing recorded several years ago off the coast of the United States. This was recorded while the U. S. Navy ship observed a number of small unmanned aerial systems in the area. And importantly, the video was taken through night vision goggles with a single lens reflex camera. These remained unresolved for several years. Several years later and off a different coast. Us Navy personnel again in a swarm of unmanned aerial systems and again through night vision goggles and an SLR camera recorded this image. But this time, other U. S. Navy assets also observed unmanned aerial systems nearby and we’re now reasonably confident that these triangles correlate the unmanned aerial systems in the area. The triangular appearance is a result of light passing through the night vision goggles and then being recorded by an SLR camera. I don’t mean to suggest that everything that we observe is identifiable, but um, the uh it but this is a great example of how it takes considerable effort to understand what we’re seeing uh in the examples that we are able to collect. Um, in this example, we accumulate sufficient data from two similar encounters from two different time periods in two different geographic areas To help us draw the these conclusions. That’s not always the case though. We recognize that that can be unsatisfying or insufficient in the eyes of many. There’s a popular topic in our nation with various theories as to what these objects may be and where they originate by nature. We’re all curious and we seek to understand the unknown. And as a lifelong intelligence professional, I’m impatient. I want immediate explanations for this as much as anyone else. However understanding can take significant time and effort. It’s why we’ve endeavored to concentrate on this data driven process to dr fact based results. And given the nature of our business, national Defense, we’ve had to sometimes be less forthcoming with information in open forums than many would hope if you ap do indeed represent a potential threat to our security. Then the capabilities, systems, processes and sources. We used to observe, recorded study or analyze these phenomena need to be classified at appropriate levels. We do not want, we do not want potential adversaries to know exactly what we’re able to see or understand or how we come to the conclusions we make. Therefore public disclosures must be carefully considered on a case by case basis. So what’s next? We’re concentrating on a seamless transition to the new organization and future analysis of complicated issues of you ap issues will greatly benefit from the infrastructure of the process and the procedures that we’ve developed to date. I’m confident that the task force under Navy leadership has forged a path forward that will allow us to anchor assessments in science and engineering. Vice anecdotal evidence. We remain committed to that goal as I know the U. S. D. I. The organization does as well. So thank you very much for your interest in continuing support for the U. AP task force. The team has made a lot of progress but we really are just establishing the foundation for the more detailed analysis that’s yet to be done. And with your continued support we can sustain that momentum necessary to produce data centric analysis and understanding the phenomena. Look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you Mr. bray. This is the third version of this task force and to be frank. One of congress’s concerns is that the executive branch an administration both parties has been sweeping concerns about you a PS under the rug by focusing on events that can be explained and avoiding events that cannot be explained. What can you what what what what what what can you say to give the American people confidence that you aren’t just focusing our attention on low hanging fruit with easy explanations. Congressman. I’ll start and then Mr. bray. Um please feel free to uh to weigh in. So the way that we’re approaching us is with more thorough standardized methodology and what we have in the past. First and foremost, the Secretary of Defense is chartering this effort. This is not someone lower in the Department of Defense and he has assigned that task to the Office of Secretary of Defense. Uh the undersecretary for Intelligence and Security. That’s me because I’m responsible for looking at intelligence matters. I’m responsible for security matters. This is potentially both. So when you start um concerning the ourselves with the safety of our personnel, the safety of our installations and bases, there is no other higher priority than what we have than actually getting after this. And and as you have stated, we have been assigned that task to actually stand up in office the aim song which I believe the name server will likely change but we have moved forward in terms of moving to establish that office we have as of this week um take the director for that effort very established and and uh accomplished individual. We’ve identified spaces, we’ve worked with personnel across the Department of Defense with the services and we’ve worked with the I. C. Which is on board and helping us work through this standardized methodology for now bringing in data, analyzing that data and reporting that data in the appropriate method appropriate means. So we can either get it to our service personnel to ensure their safety or get it to you in the Congress and to the public to ensure that you have oversight to what we’re doing so chartered by the Secretary of Defense Standardize and really a methodical approach. It’s something that we’re doing that has not been done before. Can we get some kinds of assurances that your analysts will follow the facts where they lead and assess all hypotheses? Absolutely. So we’re open to all hypotheses were open to any conclusions that that we may encounter quickly before I pass it to the ranking member and and Chairman Schiff. I want to thank you both for taking the time and I had a good time meeting with you last week. Director Moultrie Undersecretary Moultrie. Um It’s fair to say that you are a science fiction fan, is that correct? It’s fair to say that I am an inquisitive mind who has uh spent 40 years in the intelligence field and has focused on both science and science fiction. That is fair. Could you tell us about it? Yeah, well look, my generation grew up uh looking at space Sagas and and the Apollo program. So all of us who grew up in the sixties were we’re just thrilled by watching um our first astronaut land on the moon. That was a momentous occasion to people who we’re of different generations. Uh Some of them didn’t believe that happened. I still have relatives and friends who don’t believe it happened, right, Science fiction to them. But to us it was no, that’s the progress that we’ve made. And so I was enthralled by that and I’ve taken that to heart. I enjoy um uh the challenge of what may be out there. I have mentioned to you that yes, I have followed science fiction. I have gone to conventions even. I’ll say it on the record. Uh uh I got to break the ice somehow, but you know, I have done that right, but there’s nothing wrong with that. Um don’t necessarily dress up, but I do uh you know, I do believe that it’s important to show that the Department of Defense has um you know, we have character and we’re people just like you just like the American people, we have our we have our our inquisitiveness, we have our questions, we want to know what’s out there as much as you want to know what’s out there. We get the questions, not just from you, we get it from family members and we get them night and day. Uh not just in committee hearings. So finding what’s out there is important, but first and foremost it’s important for us to do that so that we can ensure that our people, our personnel, our aviators are bases and installations are safe. Um and then that curiosity factor is something else that that we just want to know because that’s the human race, it’s just you know, that insatiable desire to know. Thank you sir, Ranking member Crawford Mr. Walter. You said you don’t necessarily dress up. That wasn’t a real strong statement, gentlemen, thank you for being here today. We appreciate it. Um and thank you Mr. Mulder for breaking the Dennis. The way you did appreciate that the inability to understand objects and are sensitive operating areas is tantamount to an intelligence failure that we certainly want to avoid is not about finding alien spacecraft but about delivering dominant intelligence across the tactical operational and strategic spectrum. So my question is how can aim sog lead to prevention of intelligence surprises? Sure, I’ll start with that. So the goal of our effort is to integrate it into what we already do on a normal basis, which is look for the unknown unknowns congressman as you stated in your opening remarks across all domains. So we’ve been doing this for decades. We’ve been looking at the space domain, looking at space objects, looking at space, weather, looking at space phenomenon. We’ve been looking at things in the air domain and we as you know, we um and I’ll talk more about this and classified session, but we have a very concerted effort to understand adversarial platforms and adversarial developmental programs and we do that also on the ground domain. And of course we’re very interested in what happens in the in the underwater or C domain if you will subsurface domain. So if there are objects that are aviators or air crews are encountering in this air domain and their sensors are are discovering or detecting some of these objects, we want to just bring that in to the normal process that we have for identifying unknown unknowns. We want to make sure we have the intelligence requirements that allow us not only to look at that event from the time that occurs forward, but maybe retrospectively we want to go back and see if we can get to the left of that event to say was there some developmental program that we to get to your technical surprise issue sir that we should have known about? And if so, how do we put that intelligence requirement in place to ensure that we are following an adversarial development or any other development that may be out there. So that’s what we we want to do in terms of normalizing this and bring it into the normal process of how we identify unknown unknowns. So you mentioned Fidelity and I think it’s important to talk about the relationship from the navy is the lead agency on this. How do you interact with um Space Force Air Force to create that degree of fidelity? We’re talking about sensors and so on. And I guess where I have some concerns that many of the images that we see commonly um in this committee and even an open source, the resolution and the clarity um that would allow a robust technical intelligence analysis is challenging. So is um Sog prepared to address the quality and quantity of data collected on you ap to advance intelligence collection. And do you have the adequate sensors? You need to collect that high quality data? One of the lines of effort that we have is looking at our sensor capabilities and to understand whether or not as the video showed that Mr. bray um displayed. Sometimes it’s very fleeting data that we have on some of these objects. And we want to make sure that one our systems are calibrated uh to actually be able to collect on the objects. You know, our sensors today or they’re calibrated for specific things. We want to make sure that calibrated for things of this nature, things of this size, things of this philosophy. If I can use that term, we want to make sure that once we have that that that data is stored in some standardized methods that we can then extract and that we can feed into our system real time. So we do not want this to take some uh prolonged period of time for us to get that data. But our goal is absolutely to have that high fidelity information that we get from all sensors and we want to be able to integrate that with what we may have off of ground based center. So whatever you may have on the platform, whatever you may have on the ground, whatever we may have from other sensors that we may have in different domains. We wanna be able to integrate that all and get this integrated picture as we would as I said with any other unidentified objects or things that we’re tracking um as a part of our normal intelligence responsibilities. Thank you. Last question. Mr. bray. If you would uh I’m a Navy pilot, I’ve encountered Au AP walked me through the reporting protocol. Um Once I see something that I think needs reported. Uh The first thing that aviator would do after landing is a part of their normal debriefing is they would contact their intelligence officer. Their intelligence officer would then walk them through first filing a first actually data preservation to ensure that that whatever sensor data uh maybe on the aircraft that we preserve that so that it’s available for for later analysis. Um Second they would actually fill out a form that that includes details like where they were operating altitudes they were operating speeds what they observed whatever since the data sensor data they may have recorded from that And then that report is filed it goes to places one it goes through through the operational uh chain of command so that operational units are aware of what what’s being observed and also uh to the U. Ap task force so that they can take that data database. It uh and quite often have individuals from the task force uh contact the aviator uh and asked them additional questions if there were things that weren’t clear in the in the report. That thing goes into a into a database where we begin to compare it with other observations that we have. Again comparing for locations, comparing for altitude speeds, shapes. Uh If any are f emissions were detected from the platform all of that so that we can try to reach some conclusions on that. Thank you. You’re back Gentleman yields back. Chairmanship. Thanks chairman. Um Mr. Break can you rerun that first image that looked like it was outside of a plane window And if you wouldn’t mind going up to the screen and tell us what we’re what we’re seeing. Not that you can necessarily tell us what we’re seeing but explain what we should be looking at in that first image? Absolutely. And Alexey, what I’ll ask is if you can stop it at a certain point And are we looking outside of a civilian aircraft window? Is that what we’re looking at? Okay. What were one you’re is that it right there. Can you point to the screen again what we’re supposed to be looking at? It is right okay if you could stop that frame, that’s nothing. All right Alexa just push play. Let’s see it. Here’s what you’ll see coming up right here is a tier one. Now, back in spherical object right here zooms by the window, right in this area. Right here we go. Good to see that part right there again, Going by, I think we’re having a hard time stopping in the right spot. Okay, so as you can see it’s difficult. Um the laptop we’re working with is not as easy for us stopping that video in the right spot. We’ll describe what what we have seen in that. What are we observing? What you see here is uh aircraft that is operating in a uh in the U. S. Navy training range that has observed spherical object uh in that area. And as they fly by it, they take a video. You see a um it looks reflective in this video, somewhat reflective and it quickly passes by the cockpit of the of the aircraft. And is this one of the phenomenon that we can’t explain? I do not have an explanation for what this this specific object is. And is this one of the situations where it is? That’s that’s the object that we’re looking at right there. Thank you. Um And is this a situation where it was observed by the pilot and it was also recorded by the aircraft’s instruments. We’ll talk about the multi center part in a later session. Mhm. But in this case, uh we have at least that um in, in the Director of National Intelligence 2021 unclassified report, Um the Ot and I reported 140 for you, a peace between 2004 and 2021, 80% of which were recorded on multiple instruments. Um and I take it with respect to some of those You had the pilot, a pilot seeing them, it was observed by a pilot and you had multiple instruments recording it. So you really have three sensors, the human sensor and two technical sensors detecting the object. Is that for the majority of uh incidents that we had in the last year’s report, the majority had multi sensor data. When I talk about the 400 reports that we have now, uh that number will certainly go down because a lot of those uh new reports that we have are actually historic reports that our narrative based. So that percentage will go down just as a factor of the fact that the that the de stigmatization has resulted in more narrative reports. And that’s the object we’re looking at right there. Now, that’s it right there. Okay. Um Last year’s report also said that of the 144, 18 of them reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics appear to demonstrate advanced technology. Uh and some of them appear to remain stationary and winds aloft move against the wind, maneuver abruptly or move at considerable speed without discernible means of propulsion. Um, that’s pretty intriguing and and if you’re able to answer this in this setting, are we aware of any foreign adversary capable of moving objects without any discernible means of propulsion? Um, I think I would, without discernible means of propulsion. I would say that we’re not aware of any adversary that can move an object without discernible means of propulsion. The question then becomes in many of these cases where we don’t have a discernible means of propulsion in the data that we have, um in some cases, uh um there is likely sensor artifacts that that may be hiding some of that. Uh, there’s certainly some degree of uh of something that looks like signature management that we have seen from some of these. Uh, you a p but I would I would caution, I would simply say that there are a number of uh of events in which we do not have an explanation in which then there are a small handful in which there are flight characteristics or signature management, um that we can’t explain with the data that we have. Um, we’ll continue those are obviously the ones that are of most interest to us earlier When we asked about how you avoid technological surprise, the biggest way you avoid technological surprises by collecting this type of data and by importantly um calibrating the assumptions that you go into with how you do that analysis, I’ll tell you within the U. Ap task Force. We have one basic assumption and that is that generally speaking, generally speaking are sensors operate as designed. Um and we make that assumption because many times these are multi sensor collections, we make no assumptions about the origin of this or that there may or may not be some sort of technology that we don’t understand. That’s I think the key to avoiding technological surprises by calibrating those assumptions. And finally um with respect to the second two videos showing the small triangles. Um the hypothesis is that those are uh commercial drones that because of the use of night vision goggles appear like triangles, is that the operating assessment, some type of drone, some type of unmanned aerial system. Uh And it is simply that that light source resolves itself through the through the night vision goggles onto the SLR camera as a triangle. And have we in order to prove that hypothesis, flown a drone uh and observed it with that same technology to see whether we can reproduce the effect. The task force is aware of studies that have done that. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Gentleman yields back dr Lindstrom. Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you all for being here. Um My first question is throughout this process where there’s been sightings, have the sightings been stationary or have they always been sighted from a moving object from a plane or a ship that may be moving? Have these reports ever come from a stationary object being observed in the sky. The task Force does have reports from stationary, from state reports from a stationary observer because there’s a difference observing something when you’re moving as well. It’s it’s physics, right? That’s why I asked that question. Are we capable or have we made any breakthroughs or anyone made any breakthroughs to be able to cite something and make some determination at all of its composition whether it’s a solid or a gas. Do. Is there any such capability? Um, from not asking what I’ve just from from some of the returns. I mean, it’s clear that, uh, that the majority, but it’s clear that many of the observations we have, our physical objects from the sensor data that we have. Well, gas is physical, is a physical object, it can be. And so, and you see where I’m going with this, I’m trying to determine what it is we’re looking at. So, if we can decide if something is a solid or gas and if there had been any conclusion on its capabilities like its capabilities of movement of turning, going, you know, 180 degrees or 90 degree turn anything along that line that we’ve been able to determine within the and again, I should point out that, you know, that there is not a single explanation for you. A p they make up, there are a lot of different things that are unidentified aerial phenomena basically we really don’t know much on. That’s that’s all I’m trying to get it and I’m pleased that you have protocol right now for our military. But are there any non military reports coming forward of similar events or is it all coming from military? The task force has a very good working relationship with the FAA. They have very good working relationship with other parts of the U. S. Government so that we can ingest reports from. Do we have any reports? Nonmilitary? Yes. Thank you. That’s that’s that’s my question. Um And do we need to put out protocol for civilians that may be in that arena? Like through FAA. Do you think that would be appropriate and helpful? I think standardized reporting without a doubt is key to helping us get to the to ascertain what some of these are. I think it would be important as well. Do we um There are other people besides the U. S. That have had these experiences and reported them. Is that correct? There are that’s correct. Is it all of our allies or is it allies and adversaries? What have we learned publicly? So some of that? I think sir will save for closed session. Well that goes my next question publicly. Have others that made anything which would not have to be considered closed. I don’t want you to answer what they’ve said necessarily allies have have seen these china has established its own version of a U. AP task force. So clearly a number of countries have observations of of things in the air space that they can identify. And do we share data with some with all are they sharing with us? We share data with some and some share data with us but not necessarily all that have publicly reported something. That’s correct. Okay. Um and I think that’s an important thing and for the other session actually that we we don’t discuss that now um because you know obviously something like this can be a national security challenge for us. No doubt about it. If they’re developed by an adversary um through some breakthrough technology they can be very disruptive to our military actions or at least serve as the destruction. And so my caution would be uh be careful who we share our data with and don’t necessarily trust some of the data we may get from someone else. And with that I yield back Gentleman yields back. Mr. Himes. Okay thank you Mr. Chairman. One of the objectives of this open hearing is to um try to erode some of the stigma that attaches to in particular our military men and women reporting this. It’s obviously really very serious because should one of our adversaries have developed a technology that we don’t know about it. We need to know about it yesterday and obviously any sort of stigma that prevents our military from reporting this data as comprehensively as possible as a national security threat. So I really just have two questions in the service of that goal. Uh The first is um the chairman asked that we run that video again, most people when they see a video, we’re all used to seeing things from a car, Seeing things from a sidewalk. Very few people have the experience of observing something through night vision goggles at Mach 1.5. So just talk for a minute about if you would, uh, whichever of you is most appropriate. How radically different observation is at high speed and three dimensions than it is for most of us who walk around and drive cars. Um, so the first thing I think it’s important to note about this is there are lots of things when you are moving very fast and an object is between you and a stationary reference point, like the ground. Uh it gives a lot of different impressions about how quickly something is or isn’t moving. And it actually um means that it is a challenge, especially with narrative based data to get a lot of information on that. That’s why the sensor data is so important because things do happen very quickly as you see there. Um, and sometimes things that happen very quickly, something maybe moving very slow. That aircraft is moving quite fast. How fast that object is moving that goes by is probably very slow. So I guess I guess my point is that an observation. Either a visual observation or a electronic observation infrared or whatever looks radically different than it does to most people. Um Even instruments uh instruments are on gimbals and that sort of thing. So that creates a very unusual view to again those of us who are used to seeing things on in two dimensions largely. Um The second question um I think Mr. bray you said something that I want to unpack a little bit of a number of these U. A. P. S. You said we can’t explain again in the service of sort of reducing speculation and conspiracy theories we can’t explain can range from a visual observation that was distant on a foggy night. We don’t know what it is to we found an organic material that we can identify. Right, those are radically different worlds worlds. So when you say we can’t explain. Give the public a little bit better sense of where on that spectrum of we can’t explain. We are are we holding materials organic or inorganic that we don’t know about? Are we you know, picking up emanations that are something other than light or infrared that could be deemed to be communications. Give us a sense for what you mean when you say we can’t explain. Sure. When I say we can’t explain I mean exactly as you described there that there is a lot of information like the video that we showed in which there’s simply too little data to create a reasonable explanation. There are a small handful of cases in which we have more data um that our analysis simply hasn’t been able to uh to fully pull together a picture of what happened. Um The uh and those are the cases where we talk about where we see some indications of flight characteristics or signature management that are not what we had expected when it comes to material that we have we have no material. We have detected no emanations within the task force that that is uh that would suggest it’s anything non terrestrial in origin. So there’s when I say unexplained, I mean everything from too little too little data to we simply the data that we have doesn’t point us towards an explanation but we’ll go wherever the data takes us. Again, we’ve made no assumptions about what this is or isn’t we’re committed to understanding these and so we’ll go wherever that data takes us. Thank thank you. That’s that’s very helpful. And so I think it bears emphasis when you say we can’t explain. Everything that you can’t explain is in a bucket called data. Is that correct? And that would mean data collected by sensors, visual observations, everything that we can’t explain, quote unquote is in a bucket called data write a narrative report from from the early 2000s if it just had a little bit of information on it would be in our database and it would be unresolved, I would add to that. It’s insufficient data. I mean that’s one of the challenges. We have insufficient data either on the event itself, the object itself or insufficient data or plug in with some other organization or agency that may have had something in that space at that time. So it’s a data issue that we’re that we’re facing in many of these instances congressman understood. Thank you very much. Field back gentleman yields back. Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Mr. Chairman thank you for allowing me to join this hearing. Um I really appreciate the witness’s testimony. Um Mr. Moultrie as the chairman mentioned uh duty had initiative to study UFOs in the 19 sixties called Project Blue Book. It’s also been well reported, you know, briefing and in other places that we have more have more recent projects, specifically a tip. Could you describe any other initiatives that the D O. D. Or D. O. D. Contractors have managed after? Project Blue Book ended and prior to a tip beginning. Did anything also predate Project Blue Book. So I I can’t speak to what may have predated Project Blue Book. I mean of course there’s Roswell and all these other things that people have talked about over the years. Um I’m familiar with Blue Book, I’m familiar with with a tip. I haven’t seen other documented studies that have been done by D. O. D. In that regard. So you’re not aware of anything in between Project Blue Book and a tip. I’m not aware of anything that’s official that was done in between those two hasn’t been brought to my attention. Okay. Additionally are you aware of any other D. O. D. Or D. O. D. Contract programs focused on you? A ps from a technological engineering perspective. And by that, I mean are you aware of any technology initiatives focused on this topic other than initiatives focused on the individual case investigations? I’m not aware of any contractual programs that are focused on any anything related to this other than what we are doing in the Navy Task force and what we’re about to launch in terms of our effort. Same question for you. Mr. Brown. The same answer. Not aware of anything outside what we are doing in the U. AP task force. So just to confirm, you’re not aware of any technology or engineering resources that have been focused on these efforts. Besides what we’ve mentioned today, once again I’ll say no contractual uh or programmatic efforts that are involved in the reason why I I qualify. Yeah. Let me qualify it that way. I I can’t speak to what people may be looking at in the department. Somebody says I’m looking at something. I’m looking at something that may be unidentified and I can’t speak to that. Speak to official programs that we have on the record. It’s also been reported that there have been um p observed and interacting with and flying over sensitive military facilities, particularly not just ranges but uh some facilities housing our strategic Nuclear Forces. One such incident allegedly occurred uh at Malmstrom Air Force Base in which 10 of our nuclear I. C. B. M. S were rendered inoperable. At the same time glowing red orb was observed overhead. I’m not commenting on the accuracy of this. I’m simply asking you whether you’re aware of it and whether you have any comment on the accuracy of that report that to Mr. bray, if you’ve been looking at the last three years, that data is not within the holdings of the Ap task force. Okay. But are you aware of the report? But that the data exists somewhere? I have I have heard stories, I have not seen the official data on that. So you’ve just seen informal stories, no official assessment that you’ve done or exist within D. O. D. That you’re aware of regarding the Malmstrom incident. All I can speak to is, you know, what’s within my cognizance. The U. AP task force. And we have not looked at that incident. Well, I would say it’s a pretty high profile incident. I don’t claim to be an expert on this but that’s out there in the ether. You’re you’re the guys investigating it. I mean who else is doing it. If something was officially brought to our attention, we would look at it. There are many things that are out there in the ether that aren’t officially brought to our attention, How would it have to be officially brought to you? I’m bringing it to your attention. This is pretty official. So we’ll go back and take a look at it. But generally there is some authoritative figure that says there is an incident that occurred. We’d like you to look at this, but in terms of just tracking what may be in the media that says that something occurred at this time at this place. Um there’s probably a lot of leads that we would have to follow up on. I don’t think we have resources to do that right now. Well, I don’t claim to be an authoritative figure, but for what it’s worth, I would like you to look into it. And for another reason you could dismiss it and say this is not worth wasting resources on. And then finally, are are you aware of a document that appeared around 2019 sometimes called the Admiral Wilson memo or E. W. Notes memo? I am, I am, I’m not I’m not personally aware of that. Okay, this is a document in which again, I’m not commenting on the veracity. I was hoping you would help me with that in which the former Head of Dia claims to have had a conversation with the doctor, eric Wilson and claims to have sort of been made aware of certain um contractors or duty programs um that he tried to get a fuller access to and was denied access to. Um so you’re not aware of that. Delaware congressman in my 10 seconds remaining then I guess I just would ask Mr. Chairman unanimous consent to enter that memo into the record without objection. Thank you. Mr. Chairman appreciate it. Mr. Krishnamurthy, thank you Mr. Chair and thank you to both of you for appearing today and for your public service. First question is uh there have been no collisions between any US assets and one of these you A. P. S. Correct? We have not had a collision. We’ve had at least 11 near misses though. And Maybe we’ll talk about those 11 near misses or any place where there’s close proximity. Um, I assume tell me if I’m wrong, there’s been no attempt, there’s no communications or any kind of uh communication signals that emanate from those objects that we’ve detected, correct? That’s correct. And have we attempted to communicate with those objects and No, so we don’t we don’t even put out alerts saying you know us um identity, you know, identify yourself, you are you know within our flight path or something like that. We we haven’t said anything like that. We have not put anything out like that. Generally speaking what, you know, for example, in the video that we showed earlier. Uh it appears to be something that is unmanned appears to be something that may or may not be in controlled flight. And so we have not attempted any communication with that. Okay. So um and I assume we’ve never discharged any armaments against you. Ap correct. That’s correct. Um How about wreckage? Have we come across any wreckage of any kind of um object that has now been examined by you? The U. Ap Task force doesn’t have any wreckage that isn’t explainable that that isn’t consistent with being of terrestrial origin. Do we have any sensors underwater to um detect on submerged U. A. P. S. Anything that is in the ocean or in the seas? So I think that would be more appropriate addressed in closed session. Um I think one of the biggest questions that that I have is um We say with a lot of probability we say they quote unquote probably do represent physical objects. Close quote. Um When we say probably is that because we cannot conclusively say that they are physical objects in the task force report. When when I say probably represent physical objects uh Most of them represent physical objects. There could be some that are more of a of a meteorological phenomena. Something like that. That may not. Maybe a physical object in the In the sense that most people think of something you would go up and touch. But the ones where you say most of them represent physical objects. Can you say that they are definitely like with 100% certainty that they are physical objects. I can say with certainty that a number of these are physical objects. Okay so there we can’t rule out that some of them may not be physical objects. That some certainly could be a sensor anomaly or something like that. Some could be. Now. How about with regard to U. A. P. S. We’ve talked about you I PS. On training areas but obviously um there’s some sensor bias I would think we we put sensors and training areas. Um How about with regards to non training areas, do we track what’s an open source um and what civilians and others have tracked? And have we found similarities to um what they’ve observed in terms of you a PS. And non training areas to the ones that are in training areas. Uh The um the task force has worked very hard to to make sure the data set that we’re working with is a is a data set that we have very good control over that data. So we have some partnerships with FAA. So that we get some of that so we get that reporting in. Um But if it comes to just you know open source reports or someone says that they saw something that generally does not make it into our database. So basically it sounds like we have a good partnership with F. A. A. Um But apart from FAA. We don’t have partnerships with other agencies or other entities that might be tracking so that we could enlarge our data set to make comparison. We will, so that’s the goal of this next effort will be to expand that relationship with the rest of government in the inter agency so we can understand what they’re seeing, what we’re seeing. We can correlate on each other’s holdings. Sorry to interrupt. But I think that we’re we might have a bias right now going on with regards to just reporting on you a PS being in training areas when we don’t really track what’s happening elsewhere. Last question. Have our encounters with you a PS altered the development of our either our offense or offensive or defensive capabilities or even our sensor capabilities? It would say that for the closed session? Okay. Great. Thank you. Mr. LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Obviously this topic of you A PS has attracted a lot of interest in people that are um curious about this this hearing today as we talk about. Um And I would say there’s a lot of what I would call uh amateur interest groups that are involved in the U. AP field. My question is when um there are unsubstantiated claims or manufactured claims of you A PS or kind of false information that’s put out there. What are the consequences for people that are involved with that or groups that are involved with that. So one of the concerns that we have is that there are a lot of uh individuals and groups that are are putting information out there. That that could be considered to be somewhat self serving. We’re trying to do what’s in the, what’s in the best interests of one, the Department of Defense and then to what’s in the best interests of the public to ensure that we can put factual based information back into the mainstream and back into the bloodstream of the reporting media that we have. So people understand what’s there. It’s important because we are attempting um as this hearing as has drawn out to understand One what may just be natural phenomenon to what may be censored phenomenology or things that were happening with sensors three. What may be legitimate counterintelligence threats to places that we have our bases or installations or security threats to our platforms and anything that diverts us off of what we have with the resources that have been allocated to us send us off in the spurious chases and hunts that are just not helpful. And they also helped whether they also contribute to the undermining of the confidence that the congress and the American people have that we are trying to get to the root cause of what’s happening here, report on that and then feed that back into our national security apparatus. So we are able to protect the American people and our allies. So it is harmful. It is hurtful. But hopefully if we get more information out there will start to lessen the impact of some of those spurious reports. So just taking that a step further. So those that misinformation, false narratives manufactured. So what are the consequences? Are there legal consequences? Are there examples that you can give us where people have been held accountable by this misinformation or disinformation? I can’t give you any examples where somebody has been legally held liable for putting something out there. But well I guess what’s the deterrent from people engaging in this activity? Yeah. I don’t I don’t know why I don’t have that answer. I that’s something that, you know, welcome to dialogue with Congress to talk about that with the members who uh you know, help legislate those laws to say what should be the legal ramifications that we could use to potentially hold individuals accountable whether it be citizens or information that might be injected into our media by other other forces or other countries if you will. And in terms of D. O. D. S. And uh you know, review and analysis in this field? I mean, is there is there a standard in place when it comes to you? A P. S. I mean, is there any guidance you look too that’s codified in law or otherwise within D. O. D. That that kind of sets out the standards for you A PS and what to look for. I think that’s part of what the group that we’re standing up now will be charted to do. We’re actually from my organization, will be looking at policy and standards that we have to um come to you and work with you to actually put in place and promulgate across our government. Thank you. I yield back. Gentleman yields back. Mr. Welch, thank you. I’m gonna I’m gonna follow on the the line of questions from Mr. LaHood. Uh Gentlemen, what seems incredibly difficult for you is that there’s two almost competing but different uh narratives. One is it’s no one knows whether there’s extraterrestrial life. It’s a big universe and it would be pretty presumptuous to have a hard and fast conclusion. And then if there is uh it’s not beyond the realm of possibility that there is some exploration coming here. Uh and that underlies a lot of the reports you get. I think Mr. LaHood was asking about that. People think there must be extraterrestrial life and it’s not at all beyond the pale that there would be a visit here on the other hand, as the D. O. D. You have the responsibility to make sure uh that our national security is protected and that if there are surveillance drones or active drones that can disable our systems that has to be analyzed has to be stopped. So how do you divide the these how do you separate your responsibilities where you get all these reports from folks who may be in good faith. Maybe not. I believe that you should be investigating every possible report of a extraterrestrial incident? I’ll start with you Mr. Moultrie. Sure indeed, congressman and thank you for the question. Um, it’s important that we um, as a part of this effort um really build out the relationship that we have with feathers including Nasa and and for the reason that you just pointed out. So there are elements in our government that are engaged in looking for life and other places and they have been doing that for decades. They’ve been searching for extraterrestrial life. Uh, there are astrobiologists who have been doing this too, were part of that same government. And so our goal is not to um potentially cover up something. If we were to find something, it’s to understand what may be out there, um, examine what um, what it may mean for us, if there are any, from a defense perspective, any national security implications or ramifications. But then the work with organizations as appropriate if it’s a weather phenomenology with no if it’s uh potential for extraterrestrial life or an indication of extreme to life with someone like NASA transparency, transparency actually is very important completely for public consumption. We’re gonna have a classified briefing and without going into the details of what kinds of secrets that we can’t share here. Uh what is it, what are we protecting? I don’t know if you can answer this question in this open forum, but in fact uh your perception of what it is, we have to quote. So I think right now what’s really important for us to protect is how we know certain things. So there are a lot of things that we know whether it be about um the thinking of other leaders around the world, the weapons systems are being developed or how we detect things that may be threats to us. Many of those things are the result of some of our most sensitive sources and methods and we’ll use those things, not just for this effort, but those same sources and methods are used to help protect us from adversaries and from others who might mean to do us harm. There aren’t separate you ap sensors. There’s not a a separate u ap processing computer is not a separate you ap dissemination chain or whatever. So it’s the same process. It’s it’s the same system that we have that helps us do all that we need to protect that because this is something that that we’re looking at. But we’re sure there’s gonna be other things that we’ll look at in the future that will need those same censors. We’ll need those same sources and methods to help us do. So we’re protecting the fact of the that this nation has developed capabilities that enable us to know what may be threats to us and to counter those threats before they become something of a national issue. Thank you very much. I want to thank both you. Mr. Brown and you Mr. military for your parents. Today I yield back Denman yields back. Gentlemen. Beyond videos. Is there a range of other information um that the executive branch has that would be valuable to the American people while protecting sources and methods? Obviously the details of individual encounters including the time place and details of an encounter. And does the aim song have a clear and repeatable process for considering public release as part of the process? Chairman Carson, do you commit to building that process if it’s not in place? The U. AP task force uh you know the security classification guide that that the task force has been operating under that I approved really was meant to protect those sources and methods and meant to protect any knowledge that an adversary intelligence entity may gain from under from understanding what we’re tracking how we track it or um when we’re tracking it or if we’re not. Um And so that has been an important piece in the balance between transparency uh and preserving our warfighting advantage because the U. S. Military does train as it would fight. Um what I will commit to is at least for that material that’s under my authority as the deputy director of Naval Intelligence um for information that we have when it does not involve sources and methods or and when we can with a reasonable degree of confidence determined that it does not pose a foreign intelligence or national security threat and it’s within my authority to do so, I commit to declassifying that. So I I believe very much in the transparency of this. Uh and we work very hard to balance that with our national security needs and I’ll just add congressman um just over the last 34 months I think that the The intelligence community and the national defense apparatus have disclosed more information on various events than it has and probably see the previous 10 years. Um you have our commitment to work closely with the Director of National Intelligence and uh others in the declassification and downgrading of intel apparatus to ensure that we can get whatever information that we can out to the American people and to the public at large greatly appreciate it. Sir. Ranking member Crawford. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Um Representative Stefanik is en route I believe just real quickly. But in the interim, if I could, if you’ll indulge me, I just have one a couple of real small questions. One is uh do we have an example, Can you cite a specific example of an object that can’t be explained as having been human made or natural? So I mean the the The example that that I would say that we that is still unresolved that I think everyone understands quite well as the 2004 incident from from Nimitz. Uh we have data on that and it simply remains unresolved, uh does not mean it resolves to being something right that is easily explainable or difficulty or well obviously it resolved to being something that is difficult to explain. But I I can’t point to something that definitively was not man made, but I can point to a number of examples in which remain unresolved. Gotcha with regard to videos that have appeared in open source channels. For example, the Tok-tok video does EMC maintain control of videos. And how do you prevent leaks of potentially classified videos or other material? Yeah. So the aim slogans, we established an organization, we will have a a process for classified and compartmented holdings and we will find a way of getting positive control over those. We have um are sensitive access programs and special access programs that allow us to put what we call saps around things. And then there’s controlled access programs that allow us to put caps around things. So we’ll have that in place. Our goal will be um ensuring that we’re sharing that with the appropriate analysts and the appropriate exploiters. If you will, who can look at that data to what we don’t want to do is bring something into a D O D database for a D O D holding and then have so many rapids around. It’s not available to those who really need to look at it and to exploit it. And that’s one of the reasons that we’re establishing relationships with the inter agency with the I. C. And others to be able to do that sir. But we will do our best to maintain positive control of the materials that we have within our holdings. Thank you. Chairmanship. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Just going back to the 2021 report um you know under the category of You ap appeared to demonstrate advanced technology. Those 18 incidents uh in which uh some of the U. I. P. Appear to remain stationary winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly or move at considerable speed without discernible means of propulsion. It goes on to say in a small number of cases military aircraft systems processed radio frequency energy associated with U. AP sightings. Um I couldn’t tell from that whether that small number of cases was a part of the subset of 18. That is Among the 18 which appeared to move with unusual pattern of flight characteristics to some of those. Um Also emit radio frequency energy. I would have to check with Ru aP task force on that I I believe without getting into specifics that we can do in the in the closed session at least some that we have detected our f emissions from were not behaving oddly otherwise. And and the significance of uh measuring that radio frequency energy is what that we suspect that this was some form of aircraft in which there were radio transmissions. The biggest thing that you’re looking for. There is any indication of of an effort to jam uh whatever sensors that we may have looking at it. But I would also add to that that radio frequency, as you know, congressman is used to control various platforms too. So the fact of uh emanations coming off of any platform, whether it be a U. A. V. Or another platform could be radio frequency activity related to that entity transmitting out or something transmitting to that platform. And of course we have a sensitivity with our airborne platforms of picking it up. Which is one of the reasons that we try to prevent people from using your cell phones on airplanes and things like that. It’s very sensitive to our f emanation. So that’s a part of what we’ll be looking at in the aim song. What is this? Is this something that we can collect on and can we start to characterize the signaling environment around the emanations that may be coming off of some of these you A. P. S. So that that energy then um that was recorded could be either an effort to jam or it could be an effort to control U. A. V. Um or any other communication with that craft, I would say. That’s accurate. Right. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Chairman. Um as the OD and I report makes clear one possible explanation for you a. P. S. Is that we are detecting us aircraft. Either secret air programs or even test prototypes. Okay. I won’t ask you in this setting obviously to describe any secret D. O. D. Programs that said, I do want to make sure the U. S. Government isn’t chasing its own tail firstly. Do you have a clear and repeatable process to check with compartmented programs about whether au ap citing is attributable to a U. S. Aircraft? Secondly, do does the aim song staff have the clearances and read on that. They need to investigate all of these incidents. And and and and thirdly when your staff cannot be read on ah are your questions to those who are red on even being answered? So I’ll start and then I’ll pass that to to Mr. bray. So we’re very conscious of the potential blue on blue issue or us on us. And so we’ve established relationships with organizations and entities that that are uh potentially flying or developing platforms for their own interests if you will. And our goal is to continue and we have a repeatable process. I think we’ve had that process for some time to deconflict activities that we may have to ensure that we are not potentially reporting on something that may be a developmental platform or a U. S. Operational platform that is performing either testing or performing a mission. So we will have that in place. We’ve already had those discussions with organizations and entities. We want to ensure that we’re protecting their equities. We want to ensure that we’re protecting their sources and methods while also getting at what we have here and we want to be able to deconflict those Absolutely. You ap task forces had a process in place to work with other elements of Department Defense and other elements of the government to ensure that uh that that there is an uh as simple a way as possible to deconflict those. And when we reference that in the in the report, I should say that we were um simply accounting for the fact that there could possibly be one or two data points that had that had leaked through. But we were quite confident that was not the explanation. Um how how how are you all liaison ng with um Space Command specifically? How are you partnering with the parts of the U. S. Space Command responsible for Space domain awareness. And how if at all you partnering with the Space Force to analyze you? A. P. S. The U. Ap Task force has uh has a very good relationship with Space Force as it does with the rest of the Department of Defense. We have pulled analysts in from Space Force to ensure that uh that were availing ourselves of that expertise as well as uh any any other material they may have that would be helpful and congressman as you know um uh Space Force and Space Command, they have responsibility for Space domain awareness. So what we’ve done, we coordinated with with Space Force, we coordinate with your J. Two and um she is on board in terms of helping us plug into what they have and for us to have this interactive exchange of information and data. And we’re doing that with all the services, not just with Space Force. Space Command. Thank you sir, frank remember any additional question. Alright. Chairmanship. Alright with that. I want to thank you all for for taking the time out. I also want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for participating in this very historical and important hearing. I think it’s one of the few times we can demonstrate some degree of bipartisanship around you A PS and UFOs. So I love it. I appreciate it. Thank you. And we will see you all. We will recess this hearing for the moment and return in a closed session at noon.

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