Dana Stroul, deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, testifies about U.S. security assistance in the Middle East before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism.

Transcript

to bring this subcommittee together today for a hearing on a very important and timely topic, US Security Assistance in the Middle East. We have votes at around 11:00 today. Imagine the first vote will be held open um for a while. And so we will um continue this hearing through the beginning of votes. Other colleagues I believe will be joining us. Over the last 75 years, the majority of us arms sales worldwide have gone to the Middle East totaling more than $379 billion dollars in sales. That is a lot of weapons into a very combustible part of the world. Arms sales and other forms of security systems are an important foreign policy tool for the United States to use to exercise its influence abroad. And as with any foreign policy tool, it’s important to continually re evaluate whether that tool is actually achieving its desired policy goals when the Cold War began as a means to counteract soviet expansion, we got into the business of supporting authoritarian regimes all over the world. In the Middle East, we often relied on arms sales to cement these relationships. We also needed access to Middle East oil and this drove our security policy there as well. We wanted oil from the region. Many of those nations wanted our weapons, But it is not the 1970s any longer. The Soviets and the arab nationalists are gone Back then. The United States imported 29% of its oil from the Gulf today. That number is 12% and declining. Yet even as the foundations of our interests have changed in the Middle East are, security assistance continues to flow unabated into a region that is increasingly unstable. And the post-9-11 Global War on terror has dramatically expanded security assistance programs around the world, including the Middle East, with relatively little debate or oversight. There are plenty of good reasons, as I said, to have robust security partnerships in the Middle East, including supporting our ally Israel and countering legitimate threats from Iran, its proxies and non state actors. But there is always enormous pressure from both our partners in the region and the defense industrial complex in Washington to do more without any corresponding pressure to examine whether these sales are actually advancing our interests or actually making americans safer. So today I’d like to more closely examine some basic assumptions with our witnesses. The first assumption is this security assistance makes us partners better able to protect us interests in the Middle East. Has it? We’ve invested more than $50 billion army over the past 40 years. They did provide support to us in the Gulf War in 1991, but recently that army has been focused more on internal repression than on regional security. Saudi Arabia and the A are capable of projecting military power beyond their border in a way that they weren’t decades ago. But they often do so in ways that are contrary to U. S. Interests as we’ve seen in Yemen and Libya. The second assumption, if we don’t sell them weapons, they’ll turn to china or Russia, well, the U. S. Is the partner of choice. Not only because so much of our equipment is just far superior to anything the chinese or the Russians can sell, but also for long term training, maintenance and security cooperation that comes with those sales. It’s time to ask whether the threat that less arms from the US will cause our partners to simply abandon us and turn to Russia or china, whether that threats real or whether it’s just a red herring. And finally, the third assumption, close military relationships with these countries bring them into the club. It helps professionalize them, incentivizes these nations to become more respectful of international norms like civilian control of the military and respect for human rights as we know by and large. This has not happened, Bahrain is more repressive than it was 10 years ago. The Saudi regime’s crackdown on political speech is getting worse, not better. Egypt has 60,000 political prisoners in its jails. Now, I’m not arguing for a bright line I never have. I don’t think the U. S. Should pull out of our security relationships in the region. It can be a really effective tool. Our aid to the Lebanese armed forces has been vital, admits significant political and economic turmoil in that country. The U. S. Special forces are valuable counterterrorism partners. A. Jordan helped secure the country’s borders with Syria and Iraq when the ISIS caliphate was at its peak. But some of the resources that we provide to the region today are I would argue mismatched to our national security interests and hopefully that is what we will talk about today. I would also make the argument that the weight we put on security interests and security assistance crowds out our ability to offer other often much more effective aid. As I said, I support continued funding for the Lebanese army. But honestly that country is suffering from an economic and political crisis right now. Not a security crisis, but the bulk of the things that we have to offer Lebanon are more weapons. So again, the purpose of the hearing today is to have an honest conversation on a realistic assessment of today’s security threats in the Middle East and how we need to update our security assistance posture to best meet those threats. And with that let me turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks. Yeah, well, thank you mr chairman for holding this subcommittee hearing. First off, I want to thank members of our teams for working together to help get this hearing scheduled. We’ve had the battle of moving Senate calendar and I appreciate your team’s commitment to getting this nail down. I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the importance of our security partnerships in the Middle East outside of a time of crisis. Too often this committee only does the hard work of examining the parameters of our security assistance when things go wrong or during moments of congressional executive disagreement. But the chairman and I worked together when there have been efforts to circumvent congressional prerogatives and pursuit of an arms sale agenda that was perhaps too permissive. And now I am concerned that the pendulum maybe swinging too far in the other direction where assistance may be too restrictive. Just as the United States is withdrawing our troop presence from the region, as in most exercises of foreign policy, it’s crucial that the porridge be the right temperature. So this hearing is is I think about it. It really comes down to a question of under what conditions the US security assistance enhances regional and U. S. Security and to what extent and at what cost. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee must remain committed to the idea that the United States is engaging in a new great power competition with strategic rivals like china and Russia, acknowledging that fact in taking appropriate steps to calibrate accordingly is essential. This process requires a re evaluation of our global commitments and presence, especially in the Middle East. The historic abraham accords provide an opportunity for such reflect and action as the United States reduces its own presence. Our role in the region must change from the leader too, an active supporter and for the strategy to be successful, we will have to rely upon the governments of the partners and allies. We have not the ones we necessarily wish we have. In the last year we’ve seen our partners and allies make peace and normalise relations with our ally, Israel and those in Egypt were critical at helping stop the violent rocket attacks from Hamas into Israel. At the same time we’ve seen Iran and its proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and others rain unguided rockets down on urban centers and the tax civilian shifts in international waters with sophisticated drones. This complex security environment is one which the United States can and must continue to shape for the sake of global energy and economic markets, for the sake of our enduring counterterrorism mission and for the sake of regional stability. While denying the Middle East as an area of Russian and chinese influence, all of this is to say that this committee will not be serving the national security interests of the american people if we act as a roadblock to security assistance and arms sales to the Middle East. Security assistance is a highly imperfect tool and it carries its own degree of risk. But removing it from the table or conditioning it in a way that creates insurmountable barriers or creating false choices between defensive and offensive systems undermines our ability to exert our influence in the region and provides excuses to those who will seek new sources of security assistance sources like Russia, china, Turkey or Iran, which do not possess our values or possess our ability and willingness to influence how arms are used in today’s hearing and going forward. We cannot put all of our regional partners and allies into the same box. We may have a strategic and diplomatic requirement to be ambiguous about some of our relations with allies around the world, but we must be crystal clear with our support for others such as Israel. So in today’s hearing, I’m looking forward to a proactive dialogue and I hope to hear our witnesses expand upon the biden administration’s policies on the urgent requirements of Israel, How the administration’s recent conventional arms transfer policy will affect assistance to the Middle East. How the administration intends to shape the use and provision of emerging and advanced technologies to the region, how the Departments of State and Defense can best work together to ensure America’s foreign policy is being conducted holistically and in accordance with all our interests in mind and the level of importance the administration is placing on support for our partners and allies during this critical moment of rebalancing United States presence away from the Middle East. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you Senator Young. It’s now my privilege to welcome to the subcommittee. Both Mira Resnick, the deputy assistant secretary for Regional Affairs in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the State Department. Mr. Resnick previously served as the senior professional staff member covering the Middle East and North Africa for the House Foreign Affairs Committee um and also worked at the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. We also have testifying today. Miss Dana stroll, the deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. Previously she was a fellow at the Washington Institute and Senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I don’t know which order you want to do this in, but the floor is yours to be followed by questions. Good morning. Mr. Chairman. Um remember young distinguished members of the subcommittee, It’s an honor to appear before you and with does the straw to discuss us security assistance to the Middle East? I asked that my full statement be placed in the record. Let me, let me start by saying as Secretary Blinken has repeatedly said that the State Department is fully committed to partnering with Congress on these issues and we welcome the opportunity to engage Mhm. At a time when strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China is our foremost foreign policy challenge. And in an era when so many of the problems we face are global in scope, our engagement in the Middle East is all the more important, increasingly complex global challenges demand strong partnerships because we cannot act alone because we face global problems whose consequences shape security at a regional level. And because America’s leadership matters, our security assistance and arms transfers to the Middle East as to any part of the world, are a function of our foreign policy, which is why Congress has placed these authorities with the Department of State. Through security cooperation. We seek to disrupt al Qaeda and related terrorist networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence, address humanitarian crises and redouble our efforts to resolve the complex armed conflicts that threaten regional stability, including deterring Iranian aggression and supporting our partners and allies territorial defense. United States continues to maintain our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security, helping to maintain its qualitative military edge in the region consistent with us legal requirements and policy nearby in Jordan are foreign military financing helps increase cooperation on border and maritime security, cybersecurity and counterterrorism allowing Jordan to contribute to US operations that advance regional security. We’re recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia, aligning it with the administration’s approach to security assistance. The president has made clear that our interests cannot be separated from our values. At the same time we remain committed to helping the kingdom defend, defend itself from continuing cross border attacks from the Houthis in Yemen, supported by Iran from day one, this administration has worked to end the conflict in Yemen. And the first step we took towards doing so was to suspend two munition sales that the previous administration had notified to Congress. Those sales remain suspended under a policy of ending US support to offensive operations of the Saudi led coalition in Yemen. The biden Harris administration is also committed to security cooperation with the U. A. Including through the transfers of some of our most important technology. While the projected delivery dates on these sales would be several years into the future. We anticipate a robust and sustained dialogue with the U. A. To ensure that any defense transfers meet our mutual strategic objectives. To build a stronger interoperable and more capable security partnership that will protect the security of our technology and that will comport with our values just as are just as our assistance can contribute to the national stability of partners. It can also if not properly managed, imperil human security. A key part of arms transfer decisions is our efforts to ensure that U. S. Origin equipment is not used to perpetuate human rights violations and to minimize the risk of civilian casualties by our partners. As part of the arms transfer decision analysis, we closely scrutinize the human rights track record of recipients and consider whether supplementals civilian harm mitigation measures should be required as a component of an arms sale or whether the transfer should take place at all when U. S. Origin assistance or equipment is used contrary to these goals or when potential violations occur. We will evaluate the full range of consequences. For example I believe decisions about our support to Egypt security must be informed, framed and bound by our values. We have deep concerns regarding human rights violations in Egypt and we will continue to raise these concerns with Egyptian officials at the Senior Most levels as we work with Egypt to improve their ability to advance shared security interests including counterterrorism and border and maritime maritime security. Let me stress that the fundamental importance of human rights are and will remain an essential element of any arms transfer decision to Egypt to the Middle East and globally. And let me end with this. Partners are aware that security assistance in sales from the United States come with high expectations that the U. S. Review process takes time. Why is that? It’s because we press and hold accountable our allies and partners to reduce civilian casualties to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, to respect human rights, to enhance their security sector governance processes. To understand when there is no military solution to this, to a conflict to prevent military technologies from falling into the hands of bad actors. These are not strings attached to MR Chairman. These are the values we believe are inseparable from our national security and that have underpinned our own stability and prosperity and which we believe will strengthen our partnerships to build peace and security in the region. Over the long term America is unique in that respect. No other nations assistance is designed as intentionally to address the root causes of challenges facing the region. But we also realize that these values help make us safer and make our partners safer. We see these roots in our values as a benefit, not a hindrance for our foreign policy and for our security assistance. Thank you. And I look forward to taking your questions. Yeah. Chairman Murphy, ranking member Young and members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today alongside desk Resnick to discuss the Department of Defense or D. O. D. Role in U. S. Security Cooperation in the Middle East. The committee has my full opening statements submitted for the record. So in my five minutes, I’d like to emphasize some key points regarding diodes, role and security cooperation. First strategy drives programming and resource allocation. The interim national security strategy released earlier this year, set out the broad parameters for how the United States will engage abroad to protect americans at home. In particular, it calls for doubling down on building partnerships throughout the world because our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts to address common challenges, share costs and widen the circle of cooperation. D. O. D. S. Security cooperation activities are nested within this guidance. Second, the State Department is in the lead, diplomacy is in the lead. D. O. D. Programs fall within a whole of government approach to the region. We utilize security cooperation authorities and programs to expand the capabilities of willing partners, respond to urgent security needs and invest in the institutional growth of partner forces to share the responsibility for regional security. Over time, our goal is to partner with self reliant, capable and accountable partner forces who will work alongside the United States to achieve mutual objectives based on shared threats and shared interests. This is a long term proposition. Security cooperation programs are also designed to ensure that the U. S. Maintains access to key areas and facilities to support the defense of our partners, respond to potential contingencies and to protect US personnel. Third, security cooperation encompasses more than military sales and funding for D. O. D. Security cooperation activities include exercises, education and training, operational planning, institutional capacity development efforts such as security sector reform, strategic planning and doctrine, development, Human resource management, defense budgeting, training and advising as well as the transfer of defense articles and services within each of these categories there are opportunities and requirements for the department to demonstrate and in part US values such as support for a rules based international order, respect for the rule of law and civilian control of the military and commitment to fundamental freedoms and human rights. Fourth security cooperation activities reinforce broader US objectives examples, normalization as Israel moves into the U. S. Central commander, U. S. Income area of responsibility. We can use military exercises and US convened professional education programs to provide opportunities to facilitate normalization and build upon it by encouraging relationship building between Israel and arab militaries. Cooperation to counter the threat of attack unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs drones. Given the shared regional threat of the Iran supported U. A. V. Network across the region. We can use security cooperation programs to advance shared regional defense burden sharing. While the U. S. Seeks to remain the security partner of choice in the Middle East, improved integrated regional security among partners is key as the United States right sizes its posture in the region. Strategic competition in the Middle East building the capacity of partners is critical to reducing their vulnerabilities to aggression and coercion and improving their ability to defend their sovereignty, their interests and a free and open international order. A critical tool and encountering us competitors like china and Russia is to provide superior training and equipment to meet Partners needs my fifth and final point congressional consultation and oversight is critical. Thank you for congressional bipartisan support for security cooperation authorities, programs and funding for the Middle East and in exercising robust and necessary oversight and monitoring to ensure that security cooperation resources remain aligned with US objectives and continue to be in the interests of the american people. I look forward to your questions. Thank you again. Thank you both for your testimony. I’m going to turn to Senator Shaheen for the opening round of questions. Well, thank you mr chairman and thank you to both of our witnesses for being here today. There are those who argue that with the threat from great power competition, that we ought to be reducing our interests in the Middle East um and Afghanistan, there are those that argue that one reason to withdraw troops from Afghanistan was so we could better focus on the threat from china and Russia and the future great power competition and refocus on Asia. Can you address this a little bit in your opening statement, Miss Reznick? But can you make the case for why it’s important for us to continue to be engaged in the Middle East and that security cooperation is one of the important aspects of that. Thank you for your question, senator. As I said in my opening statement, um the the uh strategic competition, We are we are clear eyed about what strategic competition means and we understand that China is the pacing threat, but china is looking to undercut our security relationships throughout the world. And um and we are only as strong as our partners and alliances uh as the strength of our partners and alliances. We’re facing global global global challenges including covid including climate change, um including uh risks of terrorism. And we need partners to be able to confront those challenges. The US remains the partner of choice in the region. And with our partners were looking to reinforce the rules based international order. China does not provide them that kind of security. And so we will continue to look to build partnerships and alliances in the Middle East to make sure that we can respond to these global challenges with our partners and allies. Thank you. Mr. One of the places where we’ve seen uh proxy war playing out is in Syria. Um I very much appreciated your leadership as co chair of the serious study group, as someone who worked on that legislation. I was really hopeful that the recommendations that the group came up with could make a difference in Syria. Can you talk about what if any of those recommendations have been um implemented by the biden administration and what you see going forward to address? Syria. Thank you for that question. Senator, first of all, one of the key recommendations of the serious study group was that we should retain our U. S. Military presence in Northeast Syria. Both because ISIS is not defeated because we made commitments to the Syrian democratic forces that they continue to fight ISIS but cannot do that without without our support training and advice. And because there are tens of thousands of ISIS detainees still under sdf custody as well as families of ISIS fighters at the whole I DP camp. We provide through security cooperation authorities and funding support and training so that there is a humane and humanitarian approach to the families and Children while we facilitate relocation to the countries of origin of those foreign fighters and facilitate long term solutions to the Syrian and Iraqi detainees. So first of all uh for retaining U. S. Military presence, the biden administration is committed to retaining US military presence in Northeast Syria. It is also committing to addressing the humanitarian crisis. That is another priority that the serious study groups sought to shine light on is the humanitarian crisis with the biden administration. We have not only increased our humanitarian aid to not just Northeast Syria, but the rest of Syrian civilians in need. And we have restored stabilization assistance. So areas that were liberated from ISIS have the opportunity to rebuild and and are not no longer vulnerable to ISIS influence. Um Mr I would encourage you to engage with the Syrian diaspora in this country which have very definite ideas about what might be helpful in Syria and um still have a lot of connections and relatives. There also has there been a detainee coordinator appointed yet. It’s one of the things that we um prescribed in the N. D. A. Several years ago, as you know, and to my knowledge, it was never done under the previous administration. It’s a critical question with respect to the coordinator for the detainee issue right now, the lead for that is the counterterrorism Bureau and the State Department. And this reflects back on what both Dads Resnick and I talked about, which is a whole of government approach when it comes to either security assistance or security cooperation. D O. D does not operate in a vacuum. Nor does the State Department in terms of engagement with the Syrian diaspora community. She and I both are in constant contact with our colleagues in the NBA Bureau across the State Department, others within the Department of Defense, as well as the National Security Council. I am confident that that engagement is taking place, but I will take that recommendation back and when it comes to the detainee coordinator right now, we have not only flagged your interest in this and the fact that there is pending legislation right now, the lead for that is in the Counterterrorism Bureau and they are actively involved in the diplomacy of getting countries of origin to take back both their fighters and the families and D. O. D. Facilitates that one requested to do so well. The legislation isn’t actually pending, it’s been passed. And so I would hope that that coordinator gets appointed to help with that issue, which is very real. As you know, Mr Chairman, Can I ask one more question? Um The chairman mentioned in his opening comments, the Lebanese armed forces and the situation in Lebanon, which is um sadly close to a failed state at this point. Um, but one of the things that we know we need to do is continue to support the Lebanese armed forces. I was very distressed recently to hear from someone in the Middle East that in fact, they’re having trouble getting food in the L. A. F. That they need given the current crisis. So, can you talk about why it’s important for us to continue to support them, even though I would agree with the chairman that security may not be their number one challenge at this point, but certainly making sure that the institution of the L. A. F remains strong is really critical for the future of the country. Thank you senator for the question and for your leadership on this on this issue, The L A. F. Is one of our most capable partners in the Middle East. Um The our support for the L. A. F supports our broader policy on pushing back on ISIS and promoting stability. Lebanon has has faced multiple crises um in the last year, as we all have, but but it is particularly acute in Lebanon between covid political paralysis, economic collapse, societal distress. Um Of course, the port explosion, which exacerbated everything. Um The L A. F. Is really the sole legitimate defender of Lebanese sovereignty, um the sole legitimate defender of the Lebanese people, and they serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah, which continues to put Israelis and Lebanese at risk with their irresponsible rocket attacks, which we condemn wholeheartedly. Um the they continue to jeopardize Hezbollah continues to jeopardize Lebanese stability and sovereignty without the L. A. F. Hezbollah fills the void. And that is exactly the opposite of what we would like to see in Lebanon. Thank you both very much. Thank you. Mr Chairman for the additional time. Thank you Senator Young. Right. Thank you. Mr Chairman. So as the United States reduces its troop presence in the Middle East and we re posture focusing more on the end of pacific um it’s really important that we continue uh Miss Reznick to evaluate the security dynamics on a regular basis. And you agree with that. Um and this in turn will inform how we provide security assistance to partners in the region. Can you speak to how the inter agency evaluates our partners security requirements, the methodology and then um how that those those conclusions are then operationalized. Thank you for your question, Senator. Um We are always looking to make sure that we can provide advanced capabilities to do for our partners to be able to defend themselves, um to be able to enhance regional stability. Um and at the same time we we are looking to make sure that our partners will uh will protect civilians and advanced human rights. We look at everything on a case by case basis. Um We will cooperate with allies and partners where our priorities align and we will not shy away from from defending us interests in american values where they do not. Um We continue to consult with Congress closely on transfers and on security cooperation. We again, we welcome your input as the secretary. Craig Lincoln has said at the take off and not at the land so respectfully. It’s it’s not particularly formulaic right? There’s multiple factors that have to be looked at and multiple dynamics and uh so forth. Are are there any based on your current analysis? Are there any current security needs of our gulf partners that are not being met? Uh and um that need to be addressed? Um Thank you for that question. I’m happy to to speak to that more in a in a different environment. Um We are constantly um surveying the landscape there and making sure that our partners do have what they need. Um and uh and we want to make sure that they’re able to defend themselves. Uh I will accept that invitation to uh discuss that in an open and are in a different environment if indeed uh that conversation will actually result in some rich material. Uh and I think my colleagues can identify with that. So um Miss Resnick, um can you speak to whether the department has all the authorities? It requires to increase I met two partners and allies and how this will benefit the professionalism and reduce civilian risks during time of conflict. We we we do implement that I Met program um and we are always looking to make sure that our partners can can learn from our military um be able to um to take their lessons, the lessons back to their to their home countries and implement them. Um and uh to my knowledge we have all of the authorities we need, although I will um I will continue to I’ll take that back. Um I do understand that there has been a special congressional interest in making sure that women are trained through our imet program and um and we continue to implement that is a priority of of the State Department as well. I see I have a roughly 90 seconds left missed roll. Uh You touched on both the U. S. A. And Yemen and I will be asking questions about it. I’ll just begin with you a uh of course last year there was a sale of the f 35 fighters after some discussion up here on the hill and within the administration. Uh This was the first of its kind in the Middle East to any partner other than Israel. Uh and um I thought it was an encouraging step forward with respect to having future interoperability capabilities and uh trying to ensure that some of our partners didn’t look elsewhere for their armaments. But it also brings, the point brings up the point that our advanced technology technologies have to be provided in some manner. That ensures there is a security around those technologies. So what steps do the department does the department take to ensure that these advanced technologies and cutting edge platforms remain secure when they’re in their hands of our trusted partners. Thank you for that critical question, Senator, with respect to the U. A. E. The agreement to sell the F 35 system is an opportunity to enhance the interoperability with the emirati military for one of our most capable military partners in the region. With the agreement to sell the F 35 platform comes the expectation that the U. S. Government will protect the sensitive defense technology. There are both security requirements within the paperwork that we complete between the two governments when we agreed to the transfer, There are ongoing dialogues throughout any year with the emirati military where we will discuss issues uh and it’s also part of the broader relationship. So one thing that I would like to highlight here since we were talking about strategic competition before this is not unique to the U. A. E. With any partner globally, but specifically in the Middle East because it is a theater for competition, great power competition and strategic competition. What we discussed with our partners is we understand that there will be an economic or trade relationship with china, just like the United States has. But there are certain categories of activities or engagement that our partners may be considering with china that if they do will pose risk to U. S. Defense technology, other kinds of technology. And ultimately force protection. Force protection is the highest priority of the entire U. S. Government. So we have an ongoing consultation. It is not specific to the F. 35 but that is certainly part of it. And if I may take the opportunity just to speak about I met, it is incredible when I travel throughout the region to meet officers in any partner government who remember finally their years at our war college, at our different training institutes, we can always use more. I met dad stressed it’s not going to ask for it. I think this is one of the most critical things we can do because we can demonstrate not just in words, but through programs, what civilian control of the military rule of law doctrine, development, human resource management, maintenance, sustainment. We teach these skills and we build relationships that last over the long term because these partner militaries and officers are engaging with our officers. They go to dinner at our officers houses the families form relationships. It’s absolutely critical as a tool not only for strategic competition, but ultimately, for regional security. Thank you. Uh, thank you Senator Young. I’ll take my first round of questioning now. So if you believe that we are in and entering an era of great power, competition is also an era in which the future of the world is going to depend on the outcome of contest between american style democracy and Russian and chinese modeled autocracy. And so the world is going to be watching when it comes to the way in which we talk about democracy and human rights and whether we’re actually willing to back up that talk with action. Um And so I appreciate Mr President your um opening remarks with respect to Egypt. Um but this is a country that is receiving significant usa $1.3 billion a year. And in the midst of a dizzying crackdown on political dissent, Mohamed Sultan was a U. S. Uh citizen who was locked up in an Egyptian jail for years. They would throw sick prisoners into his cell, dying sick prisoners, let them die there um and let the corpse sit and rot inside his solitary confinement cell as a means to try to break him. Um that’s the kind of behavior that we empower when we continue to send $1.3 billion dollars to that regime, not to say there aren’t legitimate reasons why we should align ourselves from security perspective with Egypt. But isn’t there a risk at some point? Uh that if there’s no consequence for a country like Egypt to continuing this crackdown on political dissent and speech that it compromises our ability to lead the world when it comes to the advancement of democracy and human rights. I heard what you said in your opening remarks, but um what do you have to say about the worry that ultimately our talk on human rights um doesn’t match up to our actions. Thank you for this very important question, Senator. We share your concerns about about Egypt, about civil society, crackdown, about restrictions on expression on the treatment of american citizens, on the risk of civilian harm during military operations, on recent allegations about what happened in the Sinai. We have raised these issues at the highest level and we continue to do so. We want them to understand, we want Egyptian officials to understand that this is a priority for the United States. The president himself has underscored the importance of a constructive dialogue on human rights with the government of Egypt, and we will continue to pursue this even as we pursue shared security goals on on maritime security, on border security, on counterterrorism. Um, we understand that Egypt remains an important security partner, as evidenced by their leadership in achieving the ceasefire in Gaza. Um Their leadership and their partnership remains critical today, but we will continue to raise human rights at the highest levels to make sure that the Egyptian government understands that this is a priority. Um My opening comments were designed to sort of provoked this conversation about whether our assumptions about the reasons for our aid are matched to current realities. And either one of you can take this question, but let me ask that question relative to Egypt, um is our aid necessary today in order to continue to prompt Egypt to achieve a detente with Israel? Or is it now in their own security interested? They get something out of that relationship on its own independent of our security assistance. Are they going to cut off our access to the Canal if we withdraw a portion of our security uh assistance? Um isn’t there a case to be made that some of the things we used to purchase with aid to Egypt? Egypt will do without that aid or without the exact amount of aid that we provide today? Having circumstances changed since we began this $1.3 billion 1987. I’ll take the question for us, give death Resnick a break. Uh So so the bottom line for President biden is that he values the relationship with Egypt. He believes they are an important security partner. He discussed in his phone call with President Sisi in May, the U. S. Intent for constructive dialogue on human rights. But we also believe and support that Egypt has legitimate security concerns and believe that security assistance to Egypt is a critical tool and supporting those needs. Whether it’s border security, maritime security. We did see early in the administration when the evergreen was stuck in the Suez International maritime traffic, Both commercial and military was stuck. Egypt matters both pursue s transit for us. Military overflight cooperation with Egypt for Red Sea security, Maritime security. The current view of the administration that is that Egypt is playing a constructive role when it comes to border security, uh Libya GERD, obviously the conflict in Gaza etcetera. In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for us to work with Egypt and making sure that they have US origin defense articles oriented towards what we assessed to be shared security threats, whether it’s counter terrorism, maritime security, border security. And I would note here um that Egypt is interested in continuing this relationship with us. They recently agreed to upgrade their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing not just US security assistance, but also Egyptian national funds. This is an indicator that they for us and they believe this as well. After extensive negotiations between the two governments that they are interested in putting their resources to bear, not just US forces as they upgrade their U. S. Defense articles. And the question I’m simply asking is for us to assess the cost of altering our relationship versus the cost of continuing as it unmodified. The cost of continuing unmodified is to send a signal of endorsement to this behavior. My question is, we should really get our heads wrapped around what the cost of altering the relationship is. My case is that there would not be a significant alteration because the things that you just laid out are in Egypt’s security interest separate and aside from the exact nature of our security relationship, but uh interested in continuing this dialogue. One last question before I turn to Senator Van Hollen, um and that is on the issue of uh end use monitoring. Um I know this is something the administration cares deeply about. We obviously had some disturbing revelations during the last four years about the way in which the USA was transferring some of our equipment to uh salafist aligned militias in Yemen, um admittedly it’s difficult to track how every single weapon is going to be ultimately used. Um but are there ways in which we can have a tougher and stricter and use monitoring program that allows us to have more visibility than we do today on the ways that our equipment and weapons are used. Is there a better way to do this? Thanks for your question. We take those issues of end use monitoring very, very seriously. We take all credible allegations of any authorized transfer or end uses of us or of US origin equipment very seriously. We investigate them um, consistent with applicable law when there is a violation. We have several different options that we can pursue, um to address misuse or end use concerns. Um, We want to make sure that every transfer advances our foreign policy, the way that we look at at each transfer. We’re looking at history of misuse. Um, we’re looking at history of end use abuse. Um, so, uh, so we do understand that these that these issues um, are are complicated, but we are we are always looking to do better. Great Senator Bonnell, thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank both of you for your testimony and for your service. Uh, and I agree with the comments that have been made by my colleagues regarding the importance of security assistance to US interests, national security interests as well as that of Our partners. In fact, back in the 19 eighties, I served a short stint, sort of an extended internship at the pentagon and what was then called the Defense Security Assistance Agency. And my job was to write the justifications that came to Congress for various security assistance program. So, um, I understand the importance I also from that experience, realized that when I started for the next fiscal year justification, I just took the previous year justification and made some edits. And so part of the lesson there, though, is something the chairman’s breaking ringing up, which is we get in these ruts. I mean, it’s very easy just to continue in the same course that you’re already on and we do need to step back and reevaluate lots of these issues. Uh, you would both agree. I believe that it’s not in our security interests when a recipient of US weapons or other forms, security assistance uses them as a tool of repression or to crack down on human rights. Would you both agree with that? But yes. Yes. Okay. So to pick up on Senator Murphy’s question on end use and taking credible allegations of violations of end use requirements seriously, can each of you give us a recent example of of pursuing a credible report of the violation of what we thought was an end use requirements? So I think that there are there are two ways to look at this. Um, there is the violation of end use meaning um when the intended recipient is not the one who is, who is doing it and um and uh Senator Murphy mentioned mentioned one of those um those cases then there is the misuse of of of US origin equipment and um you will you will understand that that that that is the consideration that we used when we decided to suspend the two munition sales to Saudi Arabia that we saw that we did a risk assessment and that is what we are we are implementing. Now we are we are implementing risk assessments for each of these transfers on a case by case basis. Um and we our risk assessment told us that those munitions could be used more likely than not to be used to result in civilian harm. And so that is why we suspended those those two munition sales. Thank you. Now there’s also the leahy law and that’s a different set of requirements. Um could you speak and I let me ask you this when you get credible reports of violation of the leahy was do you also pursue those? Investigate those? Yes, we do that with our partners uh at the embassies. We also do that with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the Defense Department oversees the different sometimes different sets of programs. But you also pursue credible reports of violations leahy law. Absolutely. When I see them, whether it comes from outside communities, press social media or reports that come directly to me, I make a point of asking my staff to work with the different implementing agencies and in the field to investigate, raise it directly and then I raised it myself. And have either of you received credible reports of violations leahy laws since you’ve been in your positions? Um We have several different threads of that that we are looking into. Um I don’t think that we have made any determinations at this point. Um and when we do or if we do then we would come to Congress. So if you fine, there’s been a violation of a lady law, you would inform the Congress, is that right? Yes sir. Yes, sir. And can you also provide the Congress with the results of your investigations into violations of the leahy law? Even if you don’t make a determination, as you can imagine, they’re going to be cases where uh different people could reach different conclusions. Would you have any objection with sharing your investigation? Incredible reports uh of leahy law with the Congress? We always make sure to engage with Congress on on these issues. Okay. I I would just ask in closing Mr Chairman if if you could provide um us uh with you’re you know, any investigations of leahy law violations that you pursued within the last year? That would be where the last since january. Would that be okay? Yes sir. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Great uh Senator Young Uh thank you Chairman. I’m going to go a bit off script. I know we’re discussing foreign arms sales right now but I’d like to discuss the arms that are finding their way from Iran into the Houthis hands in Yemen. Of course we have a real interest. Our partners and allies have an interest in ensuring that key weapons and technology do not continue to flow there in a manner that further destabilizes the country and perpetuates the civil war. It’s been it’s been reported that the recent attack on the Mercer Street tanker in the gulf of Oman originated from Yemen with Iranian produced drones. Can you confirm those public reports? Thank you very much for that question, Senator. Yes, I can confirm the reports and a few comments if you if you would allow me to, First of all, last friday, U. S. Central Command released its assessment based on the exploitation of the wreckage and and what we were able to recover from the Mercer Street and what U. S. Central Command did in cooperation with the office of the Secretary of Defense the Joint Staff and now absent is look at the different components that were we recovered, compare them to other known Iranian uh supported U. A. V. S. That we have exploited and were able to match and see similarities which is why centcom was able to conclude and put out its press release that yes This was an Iran backed one way drone attack on the Mercer Street. And secondly in addition to that D. O. D. Investigation, there was also a multilateral G seven statement where we worked diplomacy first to work with the members of the G seven to put out a statement condemning Iran for the one way attack. U. A. V. On the Mercer Street. Okay, is there any uh, that’s incredibly helpful and answered some of my, my next question, which is whether you can shed some light on how you determine by working with partners in the region, um, uh, how you might interdict the trafficking of arms out of Iran into the hands of the houthis or other militant groups? Absolutely, you’ve seen the administration do some of this. A good example is a few months ago, there was the introduction of the of the Monterrey ship, which also was carrying a lot of weapons, which we assessed were Iranian supplied for the Houthis. We have seen, uh, let me take a step back. What we see across the region is Iranian arming training and funding of terrorist groups, non state actors and militias across the region, all of which aim to undermine the governments and the partners that we want to work with terrorized civilians and prevent them from achieving stability in the Yemen context. We have seen more attacks from the Houthis launched at Saudi Arabia in the first half of this year than we have for several prior years. Iran is increasing the lethality and complexity of both the equipment and the knowledge it transfers to the Houthis so that they can attack Saudi territory. Saudi civilians. And there’s also a very sizable US population in Saudi Arabia. That is under risk because of the Iran backed Houthi attacks. Us forces are experiencing the Iran backed U. A. V. Network in the force protection issues we are experiencing in Iraq and even Israel has publicly spoken about the drones from Iran that it has downed in defense of its own territory. This is a regional wide threat. All of our partners are concerned about it. And this is actually where security cooperation programs can be very effective. Uh Thank you. I I look forward to continued vigilance on that front and I get the sense that uh that’s a real point of vince this, so that’s great. Um during the recent attacks from Hamas, Israel used the iron dome rocket defense system to defend itself uh and and save countless lives from uh indiscriminate rocket fire. President biden has committed to re supplying Israel with the iron dome interceptors that were expended over the course of that fighting despite the legitimate legitimate security needs. More than a dozen democratic members of Congress sought to block such a resupply and even introduced a resolution in both chambers to do so to block this resupply. Uh this resupplies crucial. So mistral what’s the status of the administration’s efforts to fulfill the President’s commitment and assist Israel’s resupply of the Iron Dome. Thank you so much for that question. President Biden was clear in his statement of support for replenishing the iron dome defense system. Secretary Austin, also in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee affirmed his support for replenishing and expanding the iron dome defense system. We agree with your assessment that it was uh notably effective in responding to the attacks from Gaza. I’m sorry, my times, what’s the status of it? We have unequivocally stated our support for emergency or for supplemental appropriations in support of replenishing and expanding the system. We have consulted extensively with Congress and provided information uh paperwork to you all to support how you choose to proceed in funding the request. So you need you need a supplemental emergency appropriations. That’s the only route to uh to achieve that objective. The accurate the miss. Yes. The missile defense funding that we provide to Israel $500 million $500 million dollars a year. We support their request for supplemental appropriations and have provided information to Congress in support of that request. Thank you. Uh thank you, Senator Young, just continuing on that line of inquiry uh missed role. I have heard some people um True question whether going forward iron dome as it is currently constituted will provide significant enough security against rocket attacks emanating from Hamas. Understanding it is still um an incredibly effective system. Are we also in dialogue with the Israelis as to enhancements or as to other protective measures that we can engage in with them to protect them from future attacks. Thank you for that question. Yes, we are, we are in constant and consistent dialogue with the Israelis on a variety of issues related to their security needs, including the Iron Dome defense system. Their assessment and our assessment is that it was exceptionally effective in protecting Israeli civilians during Operation Guardian of the walls. They are seeking this supplemental funding because they support and believe that it saves lives. We also have a variety of other missile defense programs, as well as other programs to support Israel’s security needs. Let me turn to the question of china because I do want to make sure um you know, we right size china’s ambitions in the region. Um there’s no doubt china has an intent to grow their security partnerships in the region, but I also think that they benefit from a world in which the United States has the primary um security obligation for a region that right now is much more essential to the delivery of oil to china than to the United States. Um and so I’d love for one of you to talk a little bit more about what china’s real interests in the region are, whether they are actually willing to take over from the United States as the primary security guarantor for especially gulf nations that export oil to the world, or whether they are sort of looking to use their security assistance as a means to grow political partnerships with countries there. Well, frankly hoping to maintain a U. S. Security umbrella under which they live and benefit. Thank you for that question. It truly is the question of the day. Um The china has shown no interest in Nora capability to contribute to regional security and stability. And we ask our partners to consider that um we know that China and our Middle Eastern partners will have a commercial relationship. We have a commercial relationship with china. Um The secretary secretary Blinken has said our relationship with china will be competitive when it should be collaborative, when it can be an adversarial, when it must be. The common denominator here is that we need to engage china from a position of strength and security cooperation will undoubtedly play a role there in our response to strategic competition in the Middle East, but also beyond the Middle East globally. Um it requires us to work with allies and partners not denigrate them because our combined weight is much harder for china to ignore. Um So as as industrial mentioned, there are certain categories of um of cooperation with uh with the PRC that um that we that we can’t um that we cannot live with. And we have made that we’ve made that clear Well towards that end, um according to The Wall Street Journal, some defense officials say they believe China hopes to Build a base in the Middle East, perhaps in the U. A on a scale of 1-10. How problematic would it be if China were to establish a base in a country like the United Arab Emirates that is about to get some of our most sensitive defense equipment. Thank you for that question. Uh The current assessment is that China has a global strategy pursuing military installations all over including in the Middle East. It seeks to build installations and in the Middle East is one example so that ultimately can serve its own interests, not provider, enhanced regional stability and security. So in any country with with which we have a deep partnership, we talk about the risks uh to US defence technology to U. S. Forces of a chinese military installation. And I’ll just add in terms of whether or not china seeks to take over for the U. S. S. The security guarantor of choice what we actually view in a demonstrated pattern of how chinese engage china engages with countries across the world. And we warn and discuss with our partners in the Middle East that ultimately chinese engagement in certain categories will violate their sovereignty, which they prioritize. And then I would know when we were talking before about the Iran supported U. A. V. Network or the Mercer Street. China was silent both at the Security Council and in signing onto any statement. This is not a country Beijing that is going to support our partners partners in their legitimate security and defence concerns and needs. And we remind them of that. I hope our partners noticed that silence um final two questions first on the missile technology control regime. This is a voluntary agreement, but one that we perceive to be very important to our global security interests. Prior to the trump administration, we had interpreted that agreement as preventing us from selling certain armed drone technology to countries outside are very closest partners. Uh, thus far the by administration is not reversed. The trump administration’s reinterpretation of that treaty. And as you said at the outset, are pursuing the sale of reaper drones to the United arab Emirates. Um, do you expect other members of the MtcR to issue their own reinterpretations? And are we concerned about the proliferation of advanced arm drums to the Middle East? It sort of feels like we’ve just sort of given up on this one. We’ve just said there’s so many countries selling so many advanced drones that we might as well just be in the business as well. I’m not convinced that that’s the right argument here. We still are a moral pacesetter around the world. Um, so a minute or two on sort of how you perceive the health of MtCR today, um and what you perceive to be the ways in which we can still try to lead a global conversation about the danger of the proliferation of armed drones. I think we have frankly lost a lot of our moral authority through the reinterpretation of that regime. Thank you for that question, Senator, the biden Harris administration conducted a review of our U. S. Export policy determined um that we would maintain the decision to invoke national discretion on the implementation of our commitment to the MTCR, but that does not mean that the United States will automatically approve a U. S. Export. We will still conduct a case by case review the nonproliferation factors that are identified and MtcR guidelines will continue to play a really important role. Will consider the transfers effect on U. S. National security interests, including human rights and other foreign policy objectives as well as the recipients, the recipient countries capability and their willingness to effectively responsibly use this technology. And of course to safeguard us origin technology. And uh finally just a question on the sort of merits of escalatory versus de escalatory policy. This town loves military escalation, makes a lot of people rich here. De escalation is not as lucrative. I over the years of meeting with the Iranian Foreign Ministry, one of the few here that does take everything they say with a giant shaker of salt. But I think there’s some truth to one of the things they consistently say, which is that, you know, our missiles are primarily pointed at the Saudis And every time you sell them more, every time you give them in the Emirates more equipment and more lethality, more capability, we invest more in our own. What’s our sort of overall thinking about if our interest is in ultimately getting the Iranians to give up their ballistic missile program. Um, how do we defend a continued build up of arms on the other side of that contest for regional hegemony? What’s our current thinking on the benefits of arms escalation versus arms de escalation? Thank you for that question. It gives us an opportunity to reflect, as does the entire hearing on some of the bigger picture issues. Um, Security cooperation plays a really important role in in in our Middle East partnerships, but it is not the only answer. Um, and uh, and so I would stress that our arms transfers, our security cooperation are not going to be the the answer, the magical the magic bullet to um to as you said to Saudi and security. Um They’re not going to be the answer to instability in the region that will come through diplomacy and through a political solution to the region’s unfortunately many military conflicts. Um The the as I said in my opening statement, we rely on our partners to understand when there is no military solution to a conflict um and we will continue to stress that to them. And that is why you saw in the first days of the biden Harris administration um that the president made sure to reinvigorate our diplomacy with with Yemen to appoint a special envoy, tim lender king um to be able to um to reinvest in um in our diplomatic efforts, his resident. Um I’m gonna I’m gonna follow up with the chairman’s indulgence on on his line of questioning. So it seems as though what we’re seeking to do is to establish or reestablish deterrence and that should be the objective. Um I’m being normative here. You tell me if the biden administer biden Harris administration disagrees. But um so we want to re establish deterrence. We don’t currently have that. We we have these Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. We have the enrichment of uranium, we have the bombing of of tankers in the gulf of Oman through, you know, functionaries that have provided weaponry to these proxies. So all manner development of sophisticated missiles. So we we need to re establish deterrence and foreign arms sales can be one tool that assists in that overall endeavour. We’re not seeking overmatch uh that uh that could indeed be provocative and and um I think catalyzed the Iranians to uh to seek deterrents on their own parts. So um let’s say you about my line of analysis of course. And that is why I opened with with my answers saying that the security cooperation plays a critical role. It’s just not it’s not the only answer to to the to our relationships in the Middle East. If I may, senator, I would respond also that the U. S. Military does have conventional overmatch vis a vis Iran, which is why, you see Iran investing in other kinds of capabilities, not its conventional military capabilities. This is why we have seen or we can understand why. You see Iran investing in support for regional terrorism networks, one way attack waves and its ballistic missile program, because it views those as its way to threaten the United States and our partners because of that convention. So the United States has overmatch conventional conventional overmatch, is it our objective for our partners in the region to have conventional overmatch vis a vis Iran. Our objective for partners in the region is to ensure that they have the capabilities and resources to defend themselves. While we invest in diplomacy and political processes to wind down conflicts. Because there is no military solution to the conflicts of the region nor to Iranian aggression. So that sounds like deterrence uh in parallel with diplomatic efforts. When the been in administration came into office, it inherited an aggressive Iranian uh strategy throughout the region. In reaction to a maximum pressure campaign that did not bring Iran back to the negotiating table, nor did it tamped down or deter Iranian aggression. Our forces are experiencing that Iranian aggression every day through Iran backed militias in Iraq. Saudis are experiencing it every day from Iran backed Houthis as our other partners who are concerned both about the air defense threat and the proliferation of armed U. A. V. S. Which are going to non state actors across the Middle East. What we are seeking to do while we invest in diplomacy and political processes is respond to our partners. Legitimate defense needs much of that derives from Iranian fingerprints of terror training, arming and funding of groups all over the region as well as guidance and direction to them to attack U. S. Forces and US partners to sow division and tensions between the US and its partners. While we are working to reassure partners that we will have their back in confronting Iranian aggression. Very good. Why? Thank you. Um If I could I’ve got one final line of inquiry and it pertains to the expiration last october of the of the U. N. Uh conventional arms embargo against Iran against the strenuous objections and and uh extensive efforts of the trump administration. two primary sources of arms Russia and China succeeded and ensuring that the regime in Tehran had access to some of the most sophisticated weapons. Yeah. And um I just am looking I think Miss Resnick perhaps you can speak to how Iran has capitalized on both the import and export dynamics of the embargo which is lapsing. Especially as it concerns Russia and china. If I may senator What we’ve seen is China signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement with Iran. We’ve seen the Russians that work to negotiate arms transfers agreements with Iran as well. It is yet another reason why our partners need to be reminded that the U. S. Is the security partner of choice who will responsibly work with them to respond to their legitimate defensive needs and turning toward china or Russia will not support their security or stability. Especially when both of those governments are looking to embolden and enhanced Tehran’s conventional military capabilities has has has the lapsing of the embargo. The winding down of the embargo help facilitate some of this transfer of arms from Russia and china into Iran. We’ve certainly seen reinvigorated interest by Beijing in Moscow after the end of the embargo in working on deals for weapons transfers and sales to Tehran. We of course have other tools at our disposal in the U. S. Government, whether it’s sanctions, our alliances and partnerships, our transatlantic partnerships and our security partnerships in the Middle East which can reinforce our security and attempt to push back on those weapons sales. But certainly it puts us in a position we’re going to have to double down on both our diplomacy, our security partnerships and explore other tools to make sure that Tehran does not gain conventional military capabilities, especially when it is outside of the J. C. P. O. A. Making advances on its nuclear program and ramping up its regional aggression. It sounds like it’s really aggravated the situation and would I be right to infer that it’s also this receipt of conventional arms from Russia and china in Iran as as uh has aggravated the situation with respect to the vast network of Iranian proxies as they continue to provide conventional arms to these Iranian proxies. Let me respond by saying, I certainly don’t see any actions whether diplomacy or otherwise from Moscow or Beijing to impress upon Iran that continuing to support militias and terrorist organizations across the region is not in their interest, that it somehow undermines Russian or chinese security. These are not governments that are pushing Iran to take steps that would restore regional security and stability, wind down conflicts or move towards political processes. There’s no doubt in my mind that there are who these are members of Hezbollah, carrying around Russian and chinese conventional armaments that they’ve received from the Iranians as that embargo has been wound down. So thank you. It’s another reason why we need to remind our partners that these are not partners, that these are not governments in Beijing or Moscow that are actually working to do things that are in their security interests. Thank you. One final question occurs to me just to sort of cap off the dialogue we were having in that center, Young continued on the effect of uh escalation and de escalation on deterrence. Um the GPO a did not nor was intended to solve all of our outstanding issues with Iran but as a mechanism to discuss and promote the ways that you can affect Iranian behavior other than through the sale of arms to their competitors. Um During the time that the J. C. P. O. A. Was in effect, um we did not see the level of attacks on US forces in Iraq from Iranian proxies as we have since the J. C. P. A. Expired. Is that correct? That is correct. And so the question for this committee is whether that is coincidental or whether having an ability to have a diplomatic conversation with an enemy actually does affect their behavior vis a vis our security interests in the region. Um uh I want to thank you both for your testimony today. Um We appreciate your recommendations and your insight look forward to continuing this conversation For any members of the committee wishing to submit questions for the record. The hearing is going to remain open until the close of business on Friday, which happens to be Friday the 13th. Uh and with that this hearing is adjourned. Mhm