John Hill, performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for space policy, and others testify before a House of Representatives subcommittee regarding the fiscal year 2022 budget request for the Space Force, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency national security space programs. The Government Accountability Office also testifies on their recent independent assessments completed across the space acquisition enterprise.

Other witnesses include: Space Force Gen. David Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the Space Force; Christopher Scolese, director of the National Reconnaissance Office; Army Maj. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the associate director of operations for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; and Jon Ludwigson, the director of Contracting and National Security Acquisitions.

Transcript

witnesses first performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space policy. Mr john Hill, the vice Chief of Space operations. General David Thompson, the director of the National Reconnaissance office. Dr Christopher Scalise. Associate director of operations for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Major general Charles Cleveland and G. A. O. Director of contracting and national security acquisitions. Mr john Ludwig person. We’re honored to have General David Thompson of the director of the National Reconnaissance Office. Dr Christopher Scalise. Associate director of operations for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Major General Charles Cleveland and G. A. O. Director of contracting and National Security acquisitions. Mr john luke Robertson. We’re honored to have this level of expertise within the department and intelligence community and to have them testify today at the hearing. It’s been two years since the subcommittee has had a hearing on space acquisition and in my opinion, hardly any topic and D. O. D. Is more important than this one. We’ve seen the overdue establishment of Space Force, the reestablishment of Space Command and public acknowledgement of the many threats we face from abroad. Um I’m hopeful that the department will use this opportunity to accelerate and improve space acquisition within the Space force. Uh General Haydn, vice chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out that the next generation of O. P. I. R. Is still planning on giving us, as he calls it, quote big juicy targets to orbit. Uh Instead of the more distributed, less vulnerable architecture that we could be choosing. He personally has encountered numerous articles and E. O. D. To having new and improved architecture. So if the Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff has difficulties, I’ve got difficulties. We’ve got to make sure this works. Um I’ll turn now to my ranking member of Mr. Turner for any opening remarks he’s got. I would like to take a point of personal privilege. I’m wearing my predators type. We went in double overtime last night. So it’s an amazing thing for a Nashville based hockey team to be doing so well again. Mr turner. Yeah. Sherman thank you so much and thank you for holding this important hearing. Uh, I agree with you. This is one of the most important topics perhaps besides nuclear modernization that that we’re dealing with. We continually hear from General Raymond. Uh the issue of the provocative actions that china and Russia are taking in space. We know that it’s going to take not only are working defensively but also in the manner in which we deploy and design or architecture forward to hearing from the witnesses today as to how they see that evolving also since the bite administration is delivering its budget late May. Um we’re gonna be dealing most likely with the Cr and I’d love to hear from the witnesses as to how this may affect their operations knowing that in space so many of the things that we do are are single projects and that they may be more particularly impacted by CRS than than other uh functions with that. I will submit my written statement for the record. The chairman, thank you. The the gentleman’s comments are well taken. Um without objection. Any opening statement is accepted for the record. Let’s now hear from our first witness, Mr Hill. Okay. Chairman cooper ranking member Turner. Distinguished members of the subcommittee. It’s an honor to testify before you today along with my distinguished colleagues. Uh you have my written statement, I will summarize it and with your permission haven’t placed in the record without objection so ordered. Thank you. This subcommittee well understands the importance of space based capabilities to our national security. In this era of destabilizing challenges from Russia and undeniable strategic competition with china. Increasing threats to those capabilities are also well known as Secretary Austin has testified. The growth of chinese and Russian counter space capabilities presents the most immediate and serious threats to us. Allied and partner space activities moreover, Russia and china view space as critical to modern warfare and consider the use of counter space capabilities as both a means of reducing U. S. Military effectiveness and winning future wars. As these developments portend the United States must now be prepared for conflict to extend to or even originate in space. But to be clear such a conflict would not be a space war distinct from terrestrial war but would rather represent the extension of traditional armed conflict into the space domain of human endeavor. Within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, we are focused on the integration of strategy policy plans and appropriate capabilities to develop a space posture that contributes to integrated cross domain deterrence by conveying clearly to competitors and any potential adversary the in advisability of military aggression, including attacks on U. S. Space capabilities or those of our allies and partners. The 2020 defense based strategy, which my office prepared addresses these challenges of deterrence as well as the challenges of crisis de escalation and warfare extending to space along four lines of effort. First, we are building comprehensive military advantages in space. Second, we are integrating space into national joint and combined operations. 3rd, we are shaping the strategic environment to enhance domain stability and reduce the potential for miscalculation. And fourth, we are enhancing space cooperation with our international partners are commercial entities and our interagency partners. Finally, in support of the National Security strategic guidelines. My office also leads DVDS participation in the U. S. Government space diplomatic initiatives, which currently center on establishing voluntary non binding standards of responsible behavior and on exposing the disingenuous space arms control initiatives of Russia and china. Mr. Chairman. I’m honored to have played a part in the collaborative and bipartisan efforts of the executive and legislative branches over the past several years to strengthen our national security space posture. I look forward to continuing to work with Congress with our interagency colleagues, U. S. Industry and our international allies and partners to secure the advantages of space for our national interests. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you sir. Now, General Thompson, Sure. Chairman Cooper ranking member turner and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today in my capacity as Vice Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force on behalf of the Chief of Space Operations, General J. Raymond and joined by these outstanding national Security space leaders on the panel. It’s a pleasure to provide you details today on the stand up of the new newest US military service and inform you of our plans for the coming year. I’d like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Congress for its bipartisan support in establishing the US Space Force On 20 December 2019 and your leadership in addressing the threats and challenges the nation faces in space Year one of the Space forces existence has been focused on standing up this new service with purposeful outreach to and the collaboration of Congress. Us based force has made tremendous strides in the first year establishing and resourcing the organizational blueprint for the service moving aggressively in the areas of human capital, forced design, acquisition integration and providing the foundations to establish a truly difficult digital service, all while executing our critical space missions around the clock and without fail. Yeah. General Raymond Direction for Year two is the integration of the space force into the joint force, the inter agency and with our allies and partners. Even as we continue to build out the service. While we have completed the congressional requirement to establish a service within 18 months built out of the Space Force continues and will take several more years. We have established the first Field Command. Space Operations Command and completed the organizational design of the remaining few Space Systems Command and Space Training and Readiness Command. With anticipated stand up of those two commands. Later this year, Space Operations Command is responsible for preparing and presenting forces two U. S. Space Command and Other Combatant Commands. Space Systems Command will develop and field world class space capability abilities for our Space forces and drive agility and speed into the acquisition process and Space training and Readiness Command will recruit develop and trained guardians to protect the high ground of space As part of your 2’s integration activities. The Space Force will place increasing evidence emphasis on strengthening relationships with existing partners and establishing relationships with new partners. This starts with the organizations represented here today. It extends to the other services Combatant commands um and our allies and other international partners, the United States as a whole and the US based force in particular are much stronger when these relationships are strong. Next General Raymond and the entire leadership of the department, the Air Force remain committed an adamant that we must increase the pace of space acquisition, maintaining program delivery, timelines of the recent past will not outpace the threat. We must go faster. The Space force will continue to smartly leverage the 801 I’m sorry, the 804 authorities granted by Congress and we will partner with industry and academia to leverage technology and innovation of the commercial sector. Our adversaries have recognized the importance of such an approach to national security space. In my opinion, the creativity, ingenuity and innovation of the american mind is one of our greatest assets. We must leverage that fully in this endeavor. Our people are guardians are critical to the excess excessive space force. We are adopting new and innovative human capital and talent management approaches for both civilians and military members alike under the authorities granted by Congress and with your system. In addition, the recent release of the Vision for Digital Service seeks to build the fluency of that workforce and prepare and posture them in the service to be more agile and innovative in the future. Finally, the US Space Force will continue to partner with other agencies in the executive branch and Congress to promote responsible behavior in space and a secure, stable domain accessible to all for peaceful purposes. Our service, our services inception is an unprecedented opportunity. Our success today could not have been possible without a passionate and energy granite. I’m sorry, energetic group of guardians, a fully committed partnership with the Department of the Air Force and Defense and the support account on behalf of General Raymond. Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to your questions and concerns. Thank you so much. General. Now we’ll hear from dr Scalise Morning Chairman cooper, ranking member turner and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I’m glad to be here with strong partners. General G. T Thompson. Mr Hill. Major General Cleveland. Mr Ludwig person is a great honor to represent the people of the National Reconnaissance office. Our agency proudly develops, acquires launches and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites as a member of both the intelligence community and Department of Defense. Mr Chairman, please allow me to share a reflection on the past year while addressing the covid health and safety protocols to protect our workforce and families. Monroe ensured the mission continued to meet our commitments. two intelligence analysts, warfighters and policymakers due to the incredible efforts of our people and partners I’m pleased to report and R. O. systems maintain 100% of their capabilities throughout the pandemic. During a challenging time. We accomplished six successful launches delivering 12 payloads to orbit, many with first ever capabilities, The most Nro launches in a single year since 1984. On the business side, we achieved our 12th consecutive clean financial audit, a feat of financial management excellence, unrivaled in the I. C. Last year we also began R. N. R. O. Kadre internship program establishing a key recruitment element in our workforce strategy. Turning to today we are bridging the innovative legacies of our past with cutting edge vision for our future as we celebrate our 60th anniversary Since its inception in 1961 in a row has taken quantum leaps in the evolution of overhead reconnaissance, space and ground systems. Our success can be traced to N. R. O. S and and mission responsibility, developing, acquiring launching and operating mission systems. We are a streamlined flat organization that has a diverse workforce with an exceptional mix of skills, perspectives and backgrounds. This enables us to deliver on acquisitions while developing next generation capabilities and systems adversaries are moving quickly and so must. We in row stays up front by developing advanced technologies, leveraging commercial solutions, strengthening government and international partnerships, adapting processes to innovate faster and baking in resilience from our assets on the ground to our systems on orbit. Our work with I C. E. O. D. Civil industry and academic partners enables the US to maintain strategic advantage. Amro sensors, give analysts and policymakers insights about activities and hard to reach and denied areas and enable indications and warnings. We have close relationships with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency who tasked our satellites to provide vital geospatial and signals intelligence that underpins the full spectrum of all source analysis across the national and military intelligence communities. Since the stand up of the US Space Force and U. S. Space Command reports strong new relationships to mutually coordinated activities that ensure that space based systems that the nation and our allies rely on can operate without disruption in an increasingly contested and congested space. To me, our relationships are important to us. For example, neuro Deputy director major General Michael got line and I I have just returned from a two week visit to the US indo pacific command in Hawaii and U. S. Forces Korea and South Korea. We met with our embedded in our field representatives and end up a calm US forces Korea and component command. Senior leaders to listen to and understand their needs, priorities and requirements of our customers. During the trip we gathered actionable feedback, watch the N. R. O. Data systems and tools are used in theater and address future capabilities and collaborative opportunities. This engagement hit the mark and we are already arranging follow on directorate level engagements by far the most important asset is its people, our people make all the difference and will lead us to a future where we can, as we like to say, with a nod to one of our founders, Edwin Land. See it all, see it well, see it now and innovate faster. Chairman Cooper Ranking member Turner and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss an ERos unique value and capabilities. I look forward to your questions. Yeah, thank you very much. Doctor. We’ll hear from Major General Clayton. Good morning. Mr. Chairman Ranking Member Turner and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to share a little bit about Nga’s mission in the space domain. Nga and our predecessor organizations have a long history of supporting our nation’s space activities and as an organization reliant upon airborne and satellite imagery, we have always made a priority of being aware of activities in space and near space at Nga. Our efforts are spurred by the same sense of urgency that spurred the stand up of U. S. Space Command namely the Earth’s orbit is no longer a benign environment and the threat to us national security interest from foreign space powers is real and growing. Last year we ruled out the Moonshot initiative in Nga, a whole of agency effort to maintain and expand our geo an advantage in all realms including space. We’ve developed a four pillar strategy based on people partnerships and preparation for the missions of today and tomorrow. The first pillar is people. NGS workforce has been thriving in the space domain for decades. In fact, we helped map the moon for the Nasa moon landings in the 19 sixties and the 19 seventies to maintain a competitive edge. We’re increasing our investments in developing our trade craft and training our workforce for the space domain and to support our people. Were training our officers in big data management and analysis and growing our artificial intelligence expertise over time. This will provide a cadre of experts who can execute, execute the warfighter and I see requirements and develop the next generation of space geo and professionals. The second pillar is partnerships. NgA continues to strengthen our strategic partnerships while building new relationships with civilian components of government with industry and with our allied partners within the space domain. NRO is our lead partner in advancing space joint capabilities, including new commercial sources. And our partnership with the US Space Force is deepening every day through information sharing and collaboration. We are working with these partners to ensure no duplication of effort and to create efficiencies. We also maintain embedded personnel through our NGA support teens or N. S. T. S. At DEA headquarters, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in Ohio and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Alabama. And in 2019, Nga established a Space. Com NST and we are continuing to grow the NST a Space. Com becomes fully operational. The third pillar is mission today. Space is vitally important to Nga’s mission. It is the environment in which the sensors that provide most of our day to operate. We recognize that our adversaries and near peer competitors have the means to deny us that resource. And so N. G. Extends the same level of commitment to our war fighters in space and the recently established based Communist E. Has embedded in G. S. Unique capabilities in the command. The final pillar is mission Tomorrow. Based on Earth and in space. One of the most critical missions NGA performs for the nation is assured positioning, navigation and timing, what we call assured P and T. This is the foundation for our foundation. Everything that depends on knowing exactly where and when something is on or about the earth uses this unique form of Geo and NJ is the global leader in providing the geosciences that enable the accuracy and precision of D. O. D. Weapon systems of safety and navigation efforts and of economic and civil applications that use capabilities like GPS and precision timing assured PMT is a mission imperative for us and Nga plans to invest additional resources to ensure the integrity and resiliency of these capabilities. Finally, I’d like to say thanks to this committee for its support of Nga safety of navigation mission. Your support helped modernize NGS authorities and addressed our shift from paper to a digital and secure electronic delivery to support electronic based navigation in all domains. In conclusion, Nga has reacted aggressively to support space and is making progress in the domain. We’re realigning to protect us national security interests in the space domain to deter protect and defeat our adversaries in space. Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much. General. Now. We’ll hear from Mr Ludwig son. I’ll summarize my written statement submitted for the record. Do these space systems are important to our national security facilitating communications providing real time global disability as well, serving other key roles for decades. These systems provided the US with unparalleled advantages. Our past work has highlighted problems with D. O. D. Space acquisitions, including multibillion dollar cost overruns, multiyear displays and deferred capabilities. Fortunately, many of the programs that led up to these findings are now nearing completion. My written statement highlights the status of several programs. As you may have noted. Many of the traditional programs are over budget and delayed, but some are not. Our recent reports also provide some insight. For example, our GPS report earlier this year highlighted that despite having satellites capable Of broadcasting a jam resistant gps signal for military users since 2005 duty remains years away from widespread use of it. Similar disconnect between space and non space elements that happened for other space systems. I want to emphasize that while D. O. D. Has already deployed numerous space based system that face elements do not last forever and systems require periodic updates to continue to meet mission needs. In addition, some potential adversaries now the means and intentions of holding our space based capabilities at risk. As a result, we face important questions about how to mitigate the risks to current space systems, recapitalize their existing capabilities and potentially add new ones. Congress and judy have taken steps aimed at improving acquisitions and oversight of space program. In particular, there have been efforts to change acquisition authorities, including the creation of middle tier acquisition, Which aimed to produce a usable product within five years and provide administrative relief. To do this by written statement highlights five of these programs, including two in the next gen O. P. R. Effort, which we issued a non public report on earlier this year. There are also efforts to provide acquisition authorities specific to space programs. We shared our views on a draft Air Force proposal earlier this year and expect to do the same for a forthcoming diode proposal. In addition, you D. Has taken undertaken a dramatic restructuring aimed at consolidating space oversight. The creation of the Space forces captured headlines but the reorganization moved multiple organizations into the Space Force and created new ones. Key among these are the new Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid Capabilities office, both tasks with quickly developing new systems. Also, the stand up of U. S. Space Command is designed to provide unified control over space operations. Looking ahead Beauty faces several broad challenges. First, the stand up of the new Space Force and the related reorganization may streamline the D. O. D. Space Enterprise and sharpen the focus on the development and operations of space systems but brings with it a variety of challenges. Only two years ago, we reported that jodi was unsure how many acquisitions staff were working on the space program. Moving people and organizations in establishing new lines of authority may bring growing pains. Could distract from their mission if not managed well. Second paying for cost overruns for older systems while attempting to recapitalize and replace Some or all of those systems could be challenging, notably beauty is developing or planning at least 10 space programs in nearly every mission area, including communication, missile warning, command and control, launch and position, navigation and timing. Finally, balancing efforts to enhance acquisition authorities with ensuring opportunities for effective oversight will be important. The record on diodes, space acquisitions is replete with examples of cost overruns and miss schedules. Oftentimes people point to the ubiquitous paperwork as the cause of the process. However, I urged the sub committee to consider what I call the first principles behind the paperwork. I’d argue that we need agreement on a few things. These are the first principles to build strong programs and the ability to oversee them. It’s not a given that jodI were repeating past mistakes, we have identified and shared leading practices to improve acquisition outcomes, including building strong oversight into programs using data and demonstrable knowledge to anchor decisions, empowering program managers to make decisions that holding them accountable for their choices and cancelling unsuccessful programs. Adopting these leading practices could help achieve faster delivery of new capabilities, especially if you d balances new streamline acquisition processes with sufficient oversight to help ensure program success. Chairman Cooper Frankie member Turner, this concludes my statement, I would be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee members may have. Thank you very much. It’s always good to hear from G. A. O. We will now question the witnesses and try to limit every member to five minutes so that we can distribute the questions as much as possible. Let me begin with Mr Ludwig’s and I think it was in 2016. Uh there was a report from G. O. That said there was some 60 people within D. O. D. Who had the power to say no over then. Air Force Space Programs and most members of the Armed Services Committee thought that was way too many naysayers and could be one reason for the delay. You mentioned that the new Space Force is somewhat streamline. How many naysayers are there today? Are there still 60, the number’s gone up or down? We haven’t updated that work at this point. But as you know, the stand up of Space Force is an ongoing process components have been moved around. Uh I’m not sure that uh the Space Force itself is in its final form. I suspect as you may recall from that fragmentation report, there were a wide number of agencies who were involved in the decision making process that went into states acquisitions and not all of those have been moved into Space force. Even if the entities who are not going to move into space force remain independent, it’s going to be important for the entity to coordinate their activities because space is so connected as a couple of the speakers mentioned, especially in the context of multi domain operations. So much of it is connected to one another, both at the service level and space force and sorrow. For example, that’s a relationship that’s going to have to remain very strong. I think you and Geo have pointed out that there is some 8000 people involved in 50 different organizations. It’s been kind of hard to even keep up with that, that part of things. But I think the overall thrust here is we need to be able to field systems that work and feel them faster. Um, I personally would love to see them under budget, but it’s even more important that they be working systems, Not like the 2005 disaster. We have the capability we haven’t been able to use, even though the satellite’s been up there ready to use it all that time. Sometimes it’s a satellite, sometimes it’s ground station, sometimes it’s people don’t even know what it is, but in the effort to get things to move faster, I couldn’t help but be impressed by the NRA’s announcement. Even during COVID, they were able to have six successful launches with 12 major payloads. That’s pretty impressive. And I know that’s a mature organization but that’s the organization that I think most members of the Armed Services Committee had in mind when we were thinking about how the Space Force should be run streamline flat, plenty of diversity and get the job done advertised with little fanfare. So I know that General Raymond is working hard on this general Thompson others, but and I know they’re going to be inevitable birthing pains, but And there aren’t there something like 1084 programs going on right now? And I hope they all yield great results because I’m certainly feeling the pressure from of the foreign threats. Uh huh. Um Mr Hill, your excellent report mentioned that you’ve come up with two theories of deterrence, deterrence by denial and also deterrence by cost. Could you flush those out a little bit more? To me, it sounds like one is absolute deterrence and the other is more like of situational deterrence. How would you describe those? Chairman trooper? Yes, that was the report that we submitted last year to Congress. Um So long standing deterrence theory, you have always had deterrence by denying the benefits of attack, as well as deterrence by the potential imposition of uh unacceptable costs. What we’re describing in the in that report is with respect to the space domain. And the focus was, the report was supposed to be space deterrence. We said in the space domain, the reliance of the United States on space um means adversaries see a potential benefit in attacking us in space. And so we have two very much focused on the mission assurance uh that will reduce the benefits of attack, and what you’re focused on is deterring military aggression overall. You don’t want your adversary to see military aggression as an option as a viable option for pursuing their political objectives. Um so we think that uh there may be costing position in other domains. There may always there may certainly be reason to deny someone’s use of a particularly threatening space capability. But for the most part, the the balance on deterrence with respect to space focuses on assuring our capabilities, which I think is exactly where you’re going with your focus on getting our acquisition to move faster. Well, it sounds like in plain english our first choice is deterrence by denial. And then if we can’t get that then we impose costs. So that’s second best or third best of deterrence. When we might not necessarily be able to eliminate any benefit they might get. Yes. The the point though, I think on imposing costs is it’s always there. It just might be in a different domain. This gets to the sense of the cross domain and integrated deterrence. Well, certainly modern warfare reaches many domains and it was certainly always includes space I guess. Let me turn now to the ranking member. See what questions he’s got. Thank you. Mr Chairman. Um I want to share your affinity for joo. Uh There’s been a tremendous amount of important legislation and policy changes that have come out of jail reports. I don’t have a question for Mr Ludwig son. I just want to comment that um he had the best summation I’ve ever heard from jay. Oh they have some programs that are late and over budget. Some are not the good news part of that. Some are not. Was the was the addition that I appreciate it. Um So uh two questions for general Thompson and general Cleveland gonna start with you? General Thompson. Um General Cleveland states in his opening statement that Earth’s orbit is no longer benign environment. We have threats from foreign nations. It’s basically the understanding that space is now becoming a war fighting domain. Mr Hill talked about deterrence um which of course is a more difficult um thing to accomplish because you’re it’s not just operational that’s affecting the assessment by your adversary. Um but when you talk about deterrence, we talk about redundancy, we talk about resiliency. Uh we now see um threats to space from the ground, threats to space in space. We think we see in the future maybe threats from the ground from space. So clearly we we must change. We’re looking two ways in which we can also rely on commercial access. What are the things that you think that we need to be doing immediately and uh and how fast, how quickly can we do them Charles Thompson? So uh Representative Turner thanks so much for that. I’m going there are a whole host of answers to that question, but certainly in the interest of time, I’ll just limit myself to do the first is, and probably the most significant uh gaps and limitations. We’ve had our specifically related to the fact that space has only recently become a war fighting debate First is we don’t have a truly operational uh operational Intelligence enterprise for space. We’ve we’ve for years done great work. Foundational e um, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center is one of those senators that Senate foundation early, but extending that to our tactical units are operational units, a deep understanding of the capabilities of our adversaries in the domain. What their tactics are, training intelligence professionals in that regard to be able to do that. That’s one of the limitations we have. Um But we’re moving out very rapidly, I think, as you’re aware here in January, we became an 18, the 18 member of the intelligence community. We’ve put together a plan to establish a National Space Intelligence Center were rapidly ability the capability to to train our own space focused uh intelligence professionals. And so we’re moving out aggressively in that regard. But we have a lot of ground to cover. The second area I’ll talk about is what I call the test and evaluation enterprise. And that is uh we know how to test our systems to operate effectively in space against natural hazards and for a long period of time we’ve never had to design and field and operate them in the face of threats and so building out a test and evaluation. What evaluation enterprise that allows us to both in modeling and simulation and other means understand that our systems will perform effectively and respond effectively in the face of attack and threat is another area that we have to move out quickly. And I think uh we have work to do now and in the future, which is something I’ve had this conversation. General Raymond, as you um, indicated intel being one of the most important aspects. One of things we don’t want to do is cannibalize our existing systems as we expand our operations are capabilities and expertise. We certainly don’t want to weaken those that we have. So I’m very concerned as uh, the opportunity for stove piping that might come as we expand those intel operations. So I’ll certainly be looking at that very closely and and having that conversation with you Jill Thompson, General Cleveland joe. Raymond has done a great job in making certain that the information that we do have about what our adversaries are doing is declassified. This is incredibly important for policymakers to better have open discussion, but also the general public and our allies can see what our adversaries are doing. Um, I always point out that our allies legislative bodies do not have access to intelligence information, or even a congressional research service, like we do. Getting information out in the public domain, actually puts information in the hands of those parliaments and legislatures. Um I’d like each of you to talk about the importance of making certain we declassify this information. We’re always so worried about means, methods and techniques, but I think we also need to worry about ends. And that is what what are our adversaries are attempting to do uh and by identifying that we can then empower you to fashion responses. General Thompson. General Cleveland. If you can talk about the issue of declassification, Representative Turner, just a few comments and I’ll pass it to General Cleveland. You’re absolutely right in that regard. I think uh are over classification and tendency to over classify is still a little bit of the vestige of the Cold War mindset and the fact that we had such an incredible and exquisite capabilities that others didn’t. Um Because of the fact that we now need to operate more broadly in coalitions. We need to make sure that our leaders and the public are aware of our capabilities are threats and what we’re doing about. It really does drive the need to be classified. I will also say that we’ve made some some significant stuff in that regard more to go. But I would also say that uh both the National Air and Space Intelligence Center and D. I. A recently published some very very good unclassified uh products on the threats we face. And they have been more forthcoming in those products that we’ve seen in many years. And I would start there as a great means to operate our friends, our allies, the public and others in terms of the threats of the face. I’ll pass the Cleveland. Mhm, sir. Good morning again. And uh and thank you for the question. I absolutely agree with the need to be publishing at an unclassified level or being prepared to declassify as needed. Uh I think whether it’s in space or whether it is uh in the broader efforts that we’re doing as an agency, it’s clear that we are as a nation competing in the information environment on a daily basis. And we think that at Nga, we have a huge role and quite a bit to contribute to that in some instances. I think it is an effort to declassify, but I think we also need to be focused on how can we publish at a level that can be released immediately and enable both policymakers and decision makers to to share that information is needed. Uh In terms of our partners, of course, we maintain both strong relationships with a number of allied partners and the vast majority of the production that we provide is at a releasable level uh are five eye level and that some of the other levels. And so every step we take is a recognition that what competing in the information environment and we think that we do have a huge role and not only being prepared to declassify as needed, but also to produce and to collect at an unclassified level to support our policy makers last question. Um continuing resolutions have a tremendous effect on D. O. D. And all of our operations across our agencies. Um, sadly, the the fiscal year it’s statutorily set. Uh Congress could move it to december 31st, which I think every year would save, dut, about three months of backlog. I’ve been an advocate for that. I always wanted to take an opportunity because I think that the area of space is probably even more particularly impacted by resolutions to give anyone who’s on our panel and opportunity to chime in and to give us some additional fodder on the, the evils and the effects to your operations in your area of continuing resolutions. Uh Representative Attorney General Thompson just briefly, I would say on from the aspect of space and and primarily speaking for the Space Force, there is an additional effect for a couple of reasons. One is, there has been mention of uh some of the programs we have ongoing, the authorities were using, but also we are in the process of starting new programs. I will tell you that um while certainly we want folks to maintain their oversight and uh of those programs right now, we’re in pretty good stead in terms of the performance of the program, but because we are trying to start new programs with new capabilities specifically focused on defending and protecting and other things. Um and because in fact some of the changes, we need to make some of the mission transfers and some of the establishment of new authorities um do require passage of law were probably more affected than others in a general sense, just because of the critical need to begin those programs focused on the shortfall of defending and protecting in because we need to continue to build out the organizations and the capabilities required to to act as a service focused on the war fighting domain of space, anyone else? Yeah, I uh had to what general Thompson said in in saying that it does delay the start of new programs, but it also has an impact on on what we’re doing with continuing programs that that may delay. Also, some of our ability to continue those programs on the other pace that we had and may require some degree of reprogramming before we can go forward. Chairman. I saw Mr Hill reach for the microphone. I don’t know if we have any time remaining. Um Just to underscore what Colonel Thompson said and what really rank ranking member, turn of what you said as well about the problems of continuing resolutions. Thank you. Sherman. I go back. I think the ranking member points well taken before I yield to first Mr Carvajal, then Mr Wilson mr horse furred and mr Lamborn. Let me point out the obvious that all the growing pains of the Space Force, various tasks that need to be done were apparently things that the Air Force was not doing when they were in charge of this domain. So I’m thankful that Space Force of doing it, but I’m sorry that we’re having to rebuild, which probably should have been built before. Um Mr Carvajal. Thank you. Mr Chair and good morning to everyone. At least it’s good morning in California. I know it’s about to be lunch out there. Uh General Thompson, Vandenberg Air Force Base is located in my district In the fiscal year 2021. A National Defense Authorization Act. I requested a report outlining the requirements for sustaining and improving the physical infrastructure of space launch ranges. The report noted that the diversity of launch providers, payload customers and weapons systems testers are at an all time high, which often requires infrastructure modifications, enhancements and modernization to meet the mission needs of the customers. My office has been trying to get additional information from the Space Force on a point in the report that states a challenge the that states a challenge the rangers face is the limitation of commercial investment of mutually beneficial projects. The report says that the Space forces seeking to address this challenge through changes to the commercial space launch cooperation statute. Can you elaborate what changes are you considering in this area? Yes. Representative car car ball. Yes, I can. And sir, if I may make a minor point of correction for you as of May 14 of Annenberg Space Force Base is now part of your district. Um, we were we were able to rename that that based on on 14 May. Yes, sir, as you stated. Um, uh, so we believe that launch and absolutely, I think most believe that launch is a national security asset, but it’s not just a matter of a national security asset for for launching national security payloads. Um, the economic and commercial aspects of launch also have important national security implications. Um um but the launch enterprise, as we understand it today, is in a period of growth and evolution and we need to adapt some of our policies and procedures and processes to um to adjust among them is what we call a range of the future initiative and what we’re doing in that regard is working hard to ensure that our Space force processes for safety, for range operations, for support uh for to protect the public are not inhibitors first in the way that uh launch uh providers need to produce or provide their operations and also to reduce the costs that they incur when they come to our national launch ranges. So the launch range of the Future initiative seeks to do that. And as you said, part of that effort is to find ways to be able to partner with um those commercial activities to share the cost and also if they have specific desires and needs to help upgrade the infrastructure to let them do that, we’ll work with your office and with LSD staff to provide you additional uh details in that regard. But it is a request to make some adjustments to the way costs are shared, costs are incurred and investments are allowed with the commercial sector. Great. I would appreciate it if your team can follow up with my staff general Thompson. Just to continue building off my previous question. I understand that ranges annually compete for facility sustainment restoration modernization funds to sustain, repair and construct projects. The focus on these efforts is to sustain existing infrastructure rather than growing capability to meet the diverse user base of the line for changes to the extent the focus to growing capabilities. In addition to sustainment, does the space force require additional funds or would it require a policy change? Mhm. Uh representative, I think I’d refer back to to the previous question. Um certainly uh modernization and sustainment of our infrastructure is a challenge not just on the ranges but across the space enterprise. Uh we have locations and we have 134 locations worldwide, all with their own unique challenges. We seek to uh budget sustainment funds at the appropriate level to cover, cover all and and attack those challenges where their priorities lie. Um As with all activities, more resources to help us work on those infrastructure challenges. Never hurt. Um I would say uh adequate resourcing exists, but additional resourcing is is never uh there’s always used for additional resources but that coupled with some of the potential policy changes, we talked about the last uh question would definitely be helped. Great. And lastly, no response is needed, but I would be remiss if I didn’t take this opportunity to urge you to consider Vanderburgh, space for space to be the future home of Starcom. Some with that. Mr Sarajevo back. Thank you gentlemen. Now, Mr Wilson, Thank you. Chairman Jim Cooper and ranking member Mike Turner for coordinating this very important hearing today and we are so grateful uh as to the dedicated personnel that were here who are speaking and thank you so much for your service to our country. As a 31 year veteran of the Army National Guard myself and a grateful dad of three members of the National Guard. I strongly supported Space Force National Guard and I’m encouraged by reports that the forces working towards this creation National Guard units have conducted space operations for the past 25 years and can provide the same surge support to our space operations than it does to other domains with that general Thompson. The fiscal year 2021 National Defense authorization Act requires the Department to submit a draft plan to the House and Senate Armed Services committees. What is the status of the plan and what do you need from this committee? Uh Representative thanks so much for that question. I will tell you that today, before we even talk about the future um in the past and today, both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve have been critical members and and critical part of the space mission for decades. As you noted without them, we could not execute our full suite of missions. Today there are an incredibly valuable part. We have taken this opportunity, however, to look at the Guard Reserve and regular construct, um, and and assess whether or not there are an approach that we could take that adjust that for the future. We’ve been working closely with the Office of Secretary Defense. I think we’re close to approval of that report from the Secretary Defense and submission to Congress. I think it it does two things. First of all. It it relies on tried and true and proven capabilities that we’ve used in the past and structures that we’ve used in the past to great effect and we believe will be useful in the future. There’s also an aspect of it. I think you’ll see that increases our flexibility increases are permeability and allows us to both address for structure issues for the space force, but the needs of our guardians over time as well. That report is is in final stage of coordination and I believe close to delivery. And we’ll look, we’ll look forward to working with uh Congress on the implementation of that report when when it’s still. And thank you very much general. And and again, the capabilities of uh citizen soldiers can be so positive as you know. Uh and then general, you highlight the importance of multi national space war games and creating integrated deterrence and identifying our our capabilities, complement those of our allies and vice versa. These exercises common in other warfighting domains require partners with developed operational concepts and commitment to force designs for their own space forces. What is the current maturity of our allies? Space capabilities. And are we doing everything we can to coordinate them in war gaming and experimentation? Uh Yes or so. Over the last, I’m gonna say, over the last decade, our allies and partners have made tremendous strength or tremendous games, uh, tremendous progress. One of the things that we’ve done is uh, the Schriever war game that has been in place since uh, Around the turn of the century, around 2000, we have greatly expanded to include Allied participation. We include participation at the policy level at the ministerial level and also in terms of operational capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures that has done a tremendous amount for them to open up their eyes in terms of the threats, in terms of the challenges and specifically the capabilities that they need to provide and bring to the table uh, to help us operate more effectively as a coalition uh, and and a set of nations. We continue that activity today. And uh, we’re looking at increased investment from our Five Eyes partners, the UK Canada Australia, the new Zealand, but also the french. The Germans, the japanese all are looking to increase their investment is paying capability and encouraging also Korea uh, and Secretary Hill. Uh, commercial satellite companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin are poised to introduce thousands of new satellites over the next decade, ensuring appropriate oversight of the partnerships with our innovative private industry is a careful consideration of the committee. What is department doing to reduce cost by embracing the military, commercial, public, private hybrid acquisition approaches to national space security challenges. Thank you congressman, both in the Defense Department and I think our colleagues from the intelligence community would say is that we are focusing on using both the services, the new services that commercial space provides. Launch area, space based earth imaging satellite communications and of course the broadband capabilities that you spoke about some of the people providing. We’re also seeing so much innovation in the way they designed their architectures and that is being brought into the way we think about how to design our own architecture, Giving a lot of new opportunities to diversify, add resilience and reduce costs. Thank you very much for your back. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr Horse Road. Well, thank you. Chairman Cooper. It’s great to be here. This is my first meeting for the Strategic Forces subcommittee and as one of the newest members on asked, I’m looking forward to working with all of my colleagues on these important issues. Um thank you also to our witnesses for testifying today as we know the purpose of today’s hearing is to explore national Security, space activities for the Department of Defense, including within the US Space Force. I actually had the honor of joining Acting Secretary of the Air Force john Roth two months ago when he visited NEllis Air Force Base located in my district. During Secretary ross visit, we were both briefed on our nation’s defense and training capabilities, including the advanced battle management system and red flag exercises. Warfighters at NEllis Air Force Base are helping the Air Force build a more integrated and lethal force through advanced battle management system development the Air Force’s network solution to enable rapid decision making that powers joint All Domain command and Control. So as we modernize our Air Force, we must also find ways to process and share data faster than our adversaries. A B. M. S will allow the Air Force to transition its legacy command and Control infrastructure into joint virtual systems that enable all equipment to communicate seamlessly, creating more agile and mobile warfighters. So general Thompson, you stated in your testimony that the Joint all Domain command and Control and a B. M. S are the most important efforts to Joint force uh to undertake to prepare for future conflicts. Can you elaborate on that for us? Just a briefly for a moment? Uh Yes sir. Absolutely. Uh as you describe, the future of conflict, we believe is the ability to sense rapidly. Um take the data that you need formulated, collated fuse it, put it in the proper place and format so that either through machine learning and artificial intelligence or the decision of commanders and warfighters that the appropriate action can be taken and we need to be able to do that rapidly on the matter of seconds and minutes and we need to be able to do it um from sensors that are in space, in the air, on CNN and on the ground and then apply the appropriate action, whether it includes weapons or other capabilities that the Joint Force has brings to bear. And as you said, the way the foundational capability to do that is the connectivity between all of uh those sensors and shooters, the ability to share data, the ability to understand what the data is and understand who’s using it. And as you said, A B M. S is a key part of that. A large part of that relay will need to occur through space. Um and in addition, as part of our contribution to both A BMS and joint all domain community control the space forces contra primary contribution at this point is through our unified Data Live. That is the data repository. That will be the access point in the distribution point and the availability point of that sensor data, the ability connected to those shooters and then apply machine learning, artificial intelligence and human intervention to connect the the information with the right decision maker, the right action arm at the right. Thank you very much. Also, I just wanted to ask briefly about the D. O. D. Space acquisition workforce. Mr Ludwig person, you noted that the G. O. G. AO, which issued a report in 2000 and 19 examined the acquisition workforce focused on space programs and there were some troubling findings. Can you elaborate on that? And Mr Hill or general Thompson, what steps has the D. O. D. Taken to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are needed for Space Force? Thank you. Uh We did that work. We actually initiated that work before the standing up of Space Force was formalized and planned and we did it to understand whether the department understood the range of locations and numbers of personnel working on space acquisitions. As you noted, the findings were that there wasn’t good understanding of all of the locations and all of the personnel. In fact, the department wasn’t able to provide that answer. We developed our own methodology and came up with the number of believe it was 80, 100 couple more. Uh and that was probably a low estimate. I think it was very helpful that we’ve done that work with the stand up of space force. It became important two as they start to pull together the personnel, they need to make decisions and and so hopefully our work was helpful to the department as they as they move down that path. There’s general Thompson, I’ll add to that. Um Absolutely. The work done by the G A. O and Mr Ludwig, concern regarding identifying some of those factors and concerns has helped, first of all in our design of the acquisition organizations and the acquisition approach to Space force. Also, in ensuring that we add adequately captured our resource needs as we can as we complete the build out associated with that design. The second thing I’ll add is not just in terms of the acquisition workforce framework that the overall Department of Defense is using to increase the flexibility of managing its workforce today. Um We have already also applied uh some of the special authorities of Congress through the acquisition demonstration program is longstanding to adjust the means by which we manage that workforce that we have found both in terms of uh our own analysis, but others that the members that are under this management program find that it’s more rewarding. They feel like they’re more appropriately recognized for their work and their uh their attitudes toward the work they do in the organization are in our strong, stronger than others across the force. So all of those have combined I think to put us in, build us a good foundation for our acquisition organizations and our acquisition workforce going forward. Thank you. MR Chairman. I’ll yield back. We welcome the gentleman to the subcommittee and to the full committee. Appreciate your excellent questions. Thank you Mr Lamborn. Forget it. There. Is that better? Okay, thank you. Thanks for having this uh, hearing. MR Chairman. I want to say if both of our hockey teams and the colorado avalanche and the predators continue to advance, we might have to place a bet on the outcome if they face each other. And uh, dr Scalise. I want to congratulate Innaro on its 60th birthday. Uh, sorrow has come a long way in 60 years from dropping film from a satellite to be caught by a parachute, buy an airplane. You’ve come a long way since those days. My first question dr Scalise is we have heard concerns about the number of delivery on orbit and delivery in orbit launches that the NRA has purchased outside of the National Security space launch program. Can you walk us through why that is? Yes, sir. Uh, we typically and principally used the national launch services as, as our principal means of going into uh, into space and whenever we don’t, we coordinate with the Air Force and now the Space Force to determine what the best means for delivery is. Typically when we have not used the, the national Launch services. Uh, it’s because it’s a typically a small research payload, um, that we want to get up either in a unique orbit or um, on a short time frame. But as I, uh, as you’ll look and see principally we use the National Law Services for our missions. Okay, thank you. Changing gears dr Scalise. There’s a tremendous natural symmetry which exists in Colorado Springs between Space Command and our uniformed space warfighters on the one hand, and the many intelligence and three letter agencies on the other hand, this is particularly true in the National Space Defense Center. There in Colorado Springs where the Joint Task Force Space Defense conducts can’t fail missions 24 hours a day, seven days a week and N. R. O. Has an even greater presence on buckley Air Force Base, which is an hour away by car. So we know from the previous missile defense agencies relocation from the capital region to Alabama That it suffered an 80% attrition from individuals who did not want to make that move uh well, in roby, requiring any of its employees to move Two if the space command relocation proceeds to Alabama. And if so, what would an 80% attrition due to your workforce and your mission? Uh Sir we were located as you said on buckley Air Force Base which is uh a uh an intro facility there. Um but then I wouldn’t expect to be impacted. I would have to see what the changes would be. We do co co staff the N. S. D. C. As you said, but I would have to see what what that impact would be. Okay. Thank you. We’ll follow up on that general Thompson. We know that china is pursuing counter space technologies such as satellite jammers, directed energy and direct ascent kinetic weapons. These developments will certainly further facilitate the militarization of space and could deny the U. S. And our allies access to space during a conflict or crisis. So from an organized train and equip perspective, general Thompson, where should investments be made to our space based capabilities to ensure that we can prevail in a conflict against china? Yeah. Representative Land more uh three. Quick answer to that question. First of all, the first is uh we have tremendous capabilities up there today. In many cases they weren’t designed to operate in a contested environment under threat like this, but we’re in the process now, we’ve had a multiyear effort now to build into them a limited set of features that allow them to be defensible to help in their own defense. But also we’re in the process right now of developing capabilities to be to be able to defend them against these threats. And that’s what I’ll call. Step number one, step number two is as we move forward, both as part of our design activity. The force design activity we’re establishing under our new Space war fighting An analysis center is by the design of the architecture and the integration of those systems and capabilities. Make them more resilient, make them more robust, make them less susceptible to attack and single axis attack and make it less of a of a of an interesting target for the for the adversary in china to pursue. And then the third piece of that and the foundational piece really in both cases is a much deeper understanding of the capabilities of those adversaries in the in the domain where they are, what their capabilities are, what their tactics are and both in terms of defensive, active defensive capabilities and design. How do we best approach them to make sure they are ineffective in response. Thank you. Mr Chairman. I’ll yield back thanks to gentlemen. Mr Garamendi. Thank you. Mr Chairman. I have a very bad connection here but Greg’s I’m gonna turn my video off and hopefully he better. Okay gentlemen thank you very much appreciate your work and the complexity of the issues before us. I want to go to an area which has been much talked about and that is the utilization of commercial satellites of many different kinds. How those commercial operations might be integrated into the work that you do uh considering in this discussion. Please consider both the classified and the unclassified work. So let’s start with general thomas and we’ll go from there. Garamendi. Two answers to that question. If I if I made the first is we need to understand the services and capabilities that commercial providers can give to them in and of themselves. Whether it’s communications, data relay, remote sensing and understand how we can most effectively use those services in the data they provide. Um We have a a commercial commercial partnership office today at both Los Angeles Air Force Base as part of the Space and Missile System Center, soon to be Space Systems Command as well as a commercial Set. Com office at Fort Meade in Maryland. They are expanding their scope not just to look at satellite communications but all commercial services. And so using that and incorporating that into our force design activities is step one. Step two is understanding the technologies of those commercial companies and how we might adapt them to the specific military needs and constellations of the future. And one of the best approaches and techniques and using that is through the Space Development Agency as they pursue their initial capabilities to provide a layer that does space data transport associated with the Advanced battle Management system. Um as they do that for tracking, working with a integrated missile warning, missile tracking layer, they take military missions, look at these new commercial capabilities, the technologies and operating concepts and see how, how we can adapt the technology and the approach to specific military purposes. Thank you. Mr. Certainly. Uh in addition to what general Thompson said, I would say that the N. R. O. Architecture already incorporates the commercial capabilities into it. It’s either replace capabilities so that we can focus on those things that only the government can or should do or it supplements those capabilities to provide additional resilience and and coverage. Uh further, as as general Thompson said, we found great value in the commercial capabilities to speed the delivery of systems as they have developed some very capable spacecraft that we can go off and use and perhaps adapt to to the needs that we may have. Uh And then finally, as was mentioned earlier, uh they played an incredible role in communications and launch for us. So, commercial is baked into our current architecture and it’s a fundamental portion of our future architecture and to assure that we continue to work with the commercial providers across all domains to see how we can work together. We do that in cooperation with our partners in Guia en esa space force to ensure that we’re working together. Thank you very much. General Cleveland, sir. Good morning. We really do view commercial imagery as well as services, is absolutely critical to the future of the agency as we move forward. We worked out, of course, very closely within our own uh and Director Scalise’s team, but we really believe right now that this explosion and commercial capability first off really provides us access that we may not otherwise have. So it allows us to look at more areas. It also does provide to some large degree resiliency as well. In the event there are issues or challenges. Oftentimes we can revert to a commercial capability, we think it will provide us more persistence again, as we’re able to work with the commercial industry to have more of these capabilities up, we think that we’ll be able to have persistence over a broader number of targets. And then finally, that drives for us speak and the ability to rapidly get that information into the hands of our decision makers as well as our war fighters. And so as we look at the broader fabric of sources of information and data really coming into our agency, we do think the commercial is going to play a significant role and it already does play a significant role for us today. Very good. My final comment would be for G. 0. 2 investigate this and make sure that we have all of the opportunities available to us. Mr Chairman. I yield beck. I thank the gentleman and I thank all the members for participating. I know the zoom conferences are not the easiest things to arrange, but and most of all I want to thank our distinguished witnesses and the important work you’re doing for our national security. I know space isn’t sometimes easy to understand or to explain. It’s absolutely vital to our national security. So I’m grateful for your patriotism. Thank you. Ranking member, appreciate the opportunity to work with you. Uh, let’s try to keep the committee focused on these important issues and hopefully we can have improve space acquisition. That would be a great, a great thing. Unless there’s another urgent question from members that they’re unable to submit in writing for the record, then this hearing is about to be adjourned. But I don’t want to cut anybody off who can’t signal me any other way other than the video screen. They have an urgent question. It looks like we’re fine, so the hearing is adjourned. Thanks.