Jennifer Walsh, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security and acting undersecretary of defense for policy; Dr. Brandi C. Vann, acting assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs; Navy Vice Adm. Timothy G. Szymanski, deputy command of U.S. Special Operations Command; and Dr. Rhys M. Williams, acting director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, testify during a subcommittee on intelligence and special operations hearing, May 4, 2021. Their testimony will include a review of the Defense Department’s strategy, policy and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction for fiscal year 2022.

Transcript

Finally I have designated committee staff members to, if necessary, unrecognized members of microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding. Mhm mouth. Great, good morning. Today we’ll be hearing testimony require the current and projected state of the defense apparatus to counter weapons of mass destruction. The witness represents represent the witnesses represent the department offense’s extensive infrastructure necessary to comprehensively plan for track and mitigate the growing threats which compromise weapons of mass destruction. Even with recent demonstrations by authoritarian regimes to deploy biological chemical weapons against their own citizens, the WMD is often understood as a high yield nuclear nation killers. However, emerging biotechnologies and illicit narcotics would be weaponized and present existential, represent existential threats to the country, synthetic biology, apartment, synthetic biological weapons, increase opportunity or less sophisticated adversaries to create chemical and biological weapons without requiring funding infrastructure or materially historically anything that’s material historic necessary Further, the 2021 annual threat assessment provided by the director of national intelligence, highlights the growing threat of development of chemical precursors to produce illicit narcotics such fentaNYL, which is already on segments of the US. population. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown just how devastating biological threats can be in this case. The novel coronavirus was not weaponized, but it could be. I’m interested in hearing what we’re doing to firmly detect and deter these amorphous threats. The threats are exasperated by the rapid proliferation of accessible technologies which are often easily accessible for commercially available, creating an omni present threat that must be considered strategically while preparing to confront threats tactically with that. Let me introduce our four witnesses who are responsible for the modernization of departments. See WMD Strategy policies and programs to reflect today’s threat environment with capability and the needs of tomorrow. We look forward to hearing their testimonies regarding this critical topics. The honourable jennifer Walsh, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, the honourable Brandy Stephen, Acting Assistant Secretary, Defense for Nuclear, chemical and Biological defense programs and Vice Admiral Timothy Lemansky, the deputy commander of U. S. Special Operations Command and Doctor Dr Reese and Williams, Acting Director, Defense threat reduction Agency. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. I look forward to. Your discussion. Will now recognize ranking member kelly for his opening remarks. Thank you Mr Chairman for your opening remarks and your leadership in organizing this morning’s posture here today. We will hear from four experts across the counter oh oh yeah a lot of people bad after about wrong North Korea and various terrorist organizations. But I look forward to hearing about during this session the continued use of chemical weapons by the assad regime, poisoner of alexei Navalny and Sergei Strip now about Russia and research of biological weapons by china are just a few highlights of this threat. A growing concern brought to the forefront from the ongoing coronavirus pandemic is the threat of biological weapons directed our military and private citizens. The risk of weaponized aerosol fentaNYL is just one example of many alarming and growing threat. I’m interested to hear from our witnesses today on what we are doing to not only identify these types of threats, but also what we are doing to mitigate the threats both from our deployed for our deployed troops and our citizens here in the homeland. I’m also interested to hear our witnesses views on the global threat posture, especially in the context of great power, competition and potential for kinetic engagement with adversaries like china. Last leg, I am deeply concerned about how the abiding administration’s budget will affect our overall counter weapons of mass destruction preparedness, the ongoing use, chemical threats coupled with the effects seen from the coronavirus illuminate the darkness of this. And it seems like failing to properly invest in these resources will have grave consequences. I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time. Today. I look forward to continuing work with our counter WMD experts during the 117th Congress to ensure we are appropriately postured to meet and defeat the threat shaped by weapons of mass destruction. Mr Chairman, I yelled back. Well if thank you. Ranking member kelly, I greatly appreciate your comments and dealing with me. Uh next uh thank you. Listen now we’re gonna move on to questions and hearing from our witnesses. Uh We’ll start with Mr mrs Walsh, you’re not recognized. Thank you. Erman Diego. Ranking member kelly and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to testify on the Department of Defense’s efforts related to countering weapons of mass destruction or C W. M. D. D O D. C W M. D. Mission is to dissuade deter and with necessary defeat actors of concern who threaten or use WMD against the United States and our interests. I work alongside the members of this panel to develop the policies, strategies, capabilities and expertise needed to accomplish this mission. My written statement describes the WMD threat landscape and I want to emphasize that the department continues to improve it’s ability to dissuade deter and defeat these threats while maintaining the ability to respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD use. We are taking action to meet WMD challenges. And as the nature of WMD threats is evolving, we know we have more work to do. The department has three lines of effort to organize our work to counter WMD threats, prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats and respond to crises to prevent acquisition or contain existing threats. The department leverages its unique tools and expertise in support of a whole of government approach to mitigate the risk of global WMD proliferation and threat actors pursuit of WMD advancements. Examples include supporting global norms under the nuclear non proliferation treaty or NPT remaining postured to conduct WMD interdiction and preparing partners to do so and implementing United Nations sanctions to prevent north korean illicit trade. Second, the department leads the cooperative threat reduction, or CTR program, which works with partner nations to secure and eliminate WMD and WMD related materials. The D O D C T. R program is active in more than 30 countries and has helped a number of these two more rapidly identify and respond to covid 19 Ctr is called the Nunn lugar program after the two visionary senators who championed its creation. and I want to thank Congress for its continued support for CTR which has made and continues to make valuable contributions to us and global security. Third, we developed the capability and capacity of the Joint force allies and partners to operate in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear or seabourn contaminated environment. As the department increases, focus on competition among great powers, developing the capabilities necessary for us to fight and win in a seabourn contested environment in those theaters becomes critical. The department also works with our allies and partners to confirm that USC burn defense capabilities are interoperable and to encourage partner nations to share the burden of seabourn defense. Achieving effects across this mission space is a department wide effort and we must make hard choices about how we prioritize our activities and investments. The D. O. D. C WmD Unity of Effort. Council brings together 20 plus stakeholders across the department to collaborate on See WMD policy and strategic goals. In 2020 the council helped create inaugural Department wide See WMD priorities approved by the Secretary of Defense In 2021, we are conducting an implementation review to assess department wide alignment with these priorities and guidance as administration officials direct and develop new national and departmental strategy reviews and guidance documents. D O D C W M. D stakeholders will be focused on addressing the dynamic see WMD threat and ensuring that it gets space in these documents, including posturing the department to mitigate biological threats more effectively and improving readiness for Seabourn challenges in europe and ASia. Chairman, Diego Ranking member kelly and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for your continued support for the C W. M. D. Mission. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you Miss Walsh. Now let’s move to dr van, mm. Good morning. Chairman Diego Ranking member kelly and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor and a privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the men and women of the Department of Defense that comprise the United States counter weapons of mass destruction enterprise. These dedicated americans worked tirelessly to defend our brave service members, the nation and our international partners and allies from the increasing threat posed by the most devastating weapons created. I would also like to thank my fellow witnesses for their dedication and commitment to our joint enterprise through which we are able to defend the nation and our war fighters from W. M. D. The Sea WmD Enterprise ensures that the United States maintains its enduring technological advantage when countering present and emerging threats. The N. C. B. Office, including the Defense threat reduction agency, is responsible for ensuring the department maintains the capability and readiness to counter WMD across the threat landscape. To that end, the N. C. B. Offices, aligning ourselves to meet the direction given by the president’s interim national security strategic guidance and the secretaries. Three priorities. Our efforts will enable us to close today’s gaps rapidly mitigate vulnerabilities, anticipate emerging threats and strengthen our domestic and international partnerships. But the pace of technology continues to move faster and faster and as a result, the players on the world stage are shifting the conflict landscape is changing and so are the hazards that we all face, making our jobs ever more complex. Overcoming these changes and the emergence and re emergence of unique CBrn threats requires the department first understand that emerging threats landscape and then develop adaptive capabilities to respond to these threats as they arise in doing so, we can ensure that the joint force can fight and when in CBrn contested environments prepare for surprise from emerging threats and reduce the risk that they pose to modernize the force. The department will work closely with Congress as we shift emphasis from legacy systems to cutting edge capabilities. We are moving to get ahead of the threat. By anticipating and understanding the convergence of novel science and technological advances and as a part of layer defense, we can deny the effects of WMD by developing and fielding a wide range of defensive equipment. Further fields such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, additive manufacturing and rapid medical countermeasure development all provide us an opportunity to adapt our defense capabilities quickly and effectively. We should embrace the technological revolution within the private sector and lead game changing technology advancements to ensure our war fighters are best prepared for the future threat. Finally, the NCB enterprise will expand our collaborations with our interagency and international partners as well as the private sector to spur innovation, deepen interoperability and leverage. Best practices are strong relationships with our allies, has brought us incredible value to our ability to protect, detect and mitigate our forces against WMD threats and have informed great strides in our ability to develop and acquire technologies for our force. The N. C. B. Enterprise remains focused on anticipating the future threat by closing capability gaps and ensuring ensuring the joint force prevails in a contaminated environment. We will continue to remain behind the warfighter and ahead of the threat to ensure our joint forces ability to survive, operate and regenerate combat power in the future. On behalf of the N. C. B Enterprise, I would like to thank the committee for its support and dedication to improving our capabilities to address the current and emerging threats. Space, Chairman, Diego ranking member kelly. Thank you again for your opportunity for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering your questions. Yeah, thank you. Dr Van uh next we’ll have Vice Admiral Semansky. Good morning Chairman, Guy ago. Ranking member kelly and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to represent the United States Special Operations Command today. On behalf of General Clark. It is my privilege to join Miss Walsh. Dr van Dr Williams at this hearing on how we work together to address some of the most critical national security challenges facing our country. 2017 Unified Command Plan directed us Socom to coordinate the C W. M. D. Mission across the department and General Clark has sustained that strategic course. The 2021 unified command plan reiterates us socom responsibility for planning the departments see WMD efforts as directed by the secretary. We conduct strategic planning, assess the department’s execution of the sea WMD campaign. Make make recommendations to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense and sustain the D. O. D. Wide functional campaign plan that enables the joint force to improve coordination encountering trans regional WMD threats. The landscape of nuclear, chemical and biological threats has continued to evolve Over this past year. We monitor and analyze progression of existing and over the horizon. WMD programs closely with essential support from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The classification level of this forum limits the detail I can provide from our vantage point, but news headlines are a good indicator of the complexity and the nature of the threat we have seen norms against the use of chemical weapons continue to erode. Following Russia’s attempted assassination of a former Russian intelligence officer with a nova chuck nerve agent in the United Kingdom in 2018. And more recently, the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny with another Novacek nerve agent in august 2020 china meanwhile, is continuing continuing the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history and intends as the Director of National Intelligence, made clear and this year’s annual threat assessment to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade and to to feel a nuclear triad. And finally, COVID-19 pandemic is a stark reminder of our collective vulnerability to biological threats. Clearly, WMD are complex trans regional challenges that demand the application of specialist expertise and authorities across our government, as well as our foreign allies and partners. The Department of Defense plays a unique and critical supporting role to our interagency colleagues, especially at the Department of Energy, State Treasury and Commerce, as well as our law enforcement entities to prevent and contain WMD threat threats. Even as we prepare to respond to WMD crises, we coordinate, therefore, costs, not only the Department of Defense but also within her agency colleagues and foreign allies and partners without whom achieving us objectives would be exceedingly difficult. We also work closely with the Joint Staff Combatant Commands and services to regularly assess the departments see WMD campaign and ensure the department’s plans appropriately address changes in the WMD threat environment. We strive to improve our methodology and ensure it provides timely, reliable, relevant and actionable information to support senior department decision making. Our aim is to better support senior leaders charged with employing our joint force today, developing and preparing it for tomorrow and helping to design a military that is ready to fight and win against both current and future WmD threats. In closing General clark and I would like to thank the members of this subcommittee for their support of this important national security mission. It is a privilege to work together with our colleagues to keep our country safe from the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological threats. We look forward to our continued partnership with them with members of Congress and with our International Interagency and International Partners to ensure our safety now and into the future. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. And now we have dr Williams german Diego ranking member kelly. Distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your continued support of Defense threat reduction agency for Detroit On behalf of the nearly 2200 members at Vitra. I’m proud to appear today alongside my fellow witnesses to talk about our unique role enabling the Department of Defense US inter agency and our many international partners to counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats. The Department of Defense established Detroit to integrate and focus the department’s expertise against the real an ever evolving threat of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. WmD under national and departmental policy and guidance and through close collaboration across the department Inter agency and our international partners and allies deter delivers innovative capabilities that ensure a strong protected and prepared joint forms. Part of detras unique value stems from our dual roles as the defense Agency into combat support agency. In our Defense Agency role. We respond to requirements from the services as well as from the D. O. D. Offices including the under secretaries of Defense for acquisition and sustainment policy and research and engineering. These lines of authority give us strategic roles in the counter WMD fight through nuclear mission assurance, treaty verification, building partnership capacity and cooperative threat reduction among many key programs in our combat support agency role. Different response to the combatant commands and joint staff requirements, offering subject matter expertise, operational analysis, material and non material solution sets and support of WMD planning and operations. These roles on behalf of both national security policy and the warfighter enable us to integrate efforts such that at home and abroad. We deliver missing success to detect deter and defeat WMD and emerging threats. I cannot overstate the people are detras most valuable resource. Our staff includes world class scientists developing therapeutics for emerging pathogens, chemical threats, technical linguists that helped find common ground and complex international engagements. Tactical specialist securing dangerous weapons and materials and subject matter experts on call 24 7 to provide real time expertise, the decision support analysis to all levels of government detras. Military personnel, ensure that we maintain a close alignment with warfighter requirements and our capabilities are further amplified by our forward presence at the combatant commands within task forces in a key interagency locales. In addition to its unparalleled workforce ditches and agency characterized by partnerships and collaboration. The Center of Excellence for Global Counter WMD expertise Director works closely with technical peers in academia and an industry. We team with inter agency partners like the departments of State Energy, homeland Security and Health and Human Services and engage equally well with international partners. This network spanning the breadth of the counter WmD and emerging threats. Enterprise allows Detroit to use its unique expertise to wide ranging effect providing integrated solutions across the spectrum of competition and conflict. There are few greater challenges to U. S. National security than those posed by WMD. And emerging threats as the globalized threat landscape evolves. Districts, uniquely skilled workforce and robust collaborative network of partners are ready to evolve with it continuing to safeguard the lives and interests of the US and our allies abroad. Thank you for time an invitation to participate today and I look forward to your questions. Thank you Dr Williams and thank you for hosting us. A couple weeks back. We’re gonna now move on to the question period. Each member will have five minutes to ask questions. We will alternate between uh minority and majority and I’ll take the first question. We can only defeat the threats from weapons of mass destruction with collective action with our allies partners as well as international bodies. I’m concerned that we are not working as closely as we should with countries such as South Korea, India and Japan. How closely working with South Korea, succeed in the sea. WMD mission? Is there anything preventing you from sharing, collaborating with our friends in South Korea? And then lastly, how prepared we’ll just go that let’s start with those two questions. And can we start with Dr van and then Miss Walsh, we could answer my first two questions and if you need me to repeat them, please just just ask. Yeah. Um yes, thank, thank you. Chairman Diego for that question. I think that it’s important to say that when when we’re developing technologies for our joint force uh we we do work with our allies and partners significantly significantly. Excuse me in order to assess and test equipment and integrate our forces specific to Republic of Korea. We have active in country engagements with our allies in in Korea that is seeking to not only partner in our readiness but also in reviews of our capabilities with our korean counterparts. Um The rest of it, I guess I will defer to miss Walsh response. Thank you. Doctor Miss Walsh, thank you very much with any of our bilateral defence relationships, the issues that we raise um and the capability or capacity development that we work together. It is a bilateral process. Um and so it’s not just about the US offering, it’s about another country being a willing partner with respect to the Republic of Korea. We have very close bilateral relationships mil to MIl across the chemical, biological and uh nuclear Cooperation. The cooperative threat reduction program has activities across the cam bio and nuclear space. We are working with our Republic of Korea allies to ensure that that we are ready for a WMD contingency regardless of what the threat is the Koreans bear responsibility. We bear responsibility um to ensure that what we have committed to each other is on track and that we can deliver those capabilities. We meet annually in a C W and D bilateral form with our Republic of Korea counterparts so that we can ensure that we have trust and confidence and then obviously US forces Korea has daily contact with their korean counterparts. These issues are definitely top of top of the list of concerns and threats and therefore these get attention to be sure that we’re prepared to work with them with. Mr I’m sorry. No, go ahead, I’m sorry, I apologize. You had also asked about um Japan with Japan, uh, discussions about WMD are handled through our bilateral relationship channels. The cooperative threat reduction program is not active in Japan. Um, but I can assure you that we speak regularly about ensuring that through um extended deterrence um and U. S. Capabilities that these conversations do happen on a bilateral basis with our Japanese counterparts with respect to India. We through in addressing biological threats. The cooperative threat reduction program facilitates attract to biosecurity dialogue. Um and then through the cooperative threat reduction program with respect to nuclear issues, we have we support a track 1.5 dialogue with our Indian counterparts. Dr Williams is probably in a better position to speak to the details since he has oversight of ctr implementation. Thank you, ma’am. Thank you. Please. No. The only thing I would answer is that uh as far as the republic of Korea goes to amplify what both Dr Van and Miss Walsh said we have very close contact with our colleagues, both on the R and D. Side of the houses and as well as in the cooperative threat reduction space. So much so that we recently, last year, just prior to Covid hosted the chairman of the Joint Chiefs from the Republic of Korea at Vitra for a full day of discussions and uh, cooperative agreements. And then we routinely have teams going back and forth. And we also have an embedded team uh, said at U. S. Forces Korea that has constant communication with our allies there in Korea. Thank you. Doctor Doctor. How prepared are U. S. Forces in Korea for C. W. M. D. Situation And how prepared are South south korean troops? And I think I was talking to yesterday, like my my WMD experience was, you know, on the way to the Syrian border, basically being handed a trophy in and telling, being totally just put this in my leg in case something goes back, which is uh, yes, sir. Yes, not optimal for sure. So our forces that are that are currently in Korea um well first let me say what what we do to focus our programs is we actually have a service board that sits on uh sits with us as we develop our d a research development and acquisition capabilities for the joint force structure. Um We use that service board to help identify capability requirements for the joint force as well as help integrate into the and across the larger force modernization efforts. So in terms of our capabilities for the Joint Force for chemical and biological defense, we have rapid, rapidly developing capabilities were delivering every single day. Last year we developed over a million pieces of protective and detection equipment for our forces. We have layered defense approaches as well. So that goes from everything from a detection, both remote and point, as well as diagnostic gear, physiological monitoring, personal protective equipment, um as well as mitigation capabilities for disinfection or decontamination of any of our equipment and personnel. Um in addition to that, we are continuing to invest in medical countermeasures for CBrn threats um to get ahead of the atra pain and and to make both vaccination or pre treatments as well as uh post exposure therapeutics more easily adaptable to new and emerging threats as well as more effective in its pursuit to mitigate the effects of chemical and biological weapons. Thank you. Dr Van uh Admiral. What were earlier we’re talking about working with our allies. Is there something in our classification process right now that doesn’t make it optimal for us to be able to share information with our allies or or even across the service in order for us to basically be ready for the C WMD threats of the future Chairman. Thanks thanks for the question. I think over the years that so calms had the coordinating authority. Um, we’ve really tried to break down the barriers to sharing information. Um, I know just in the conferences that we coordinate through the year, we always have whatever nDS WMD threat challenge that we’re examining that year. We try to have the partners as we have a day. It’s usually two or three day conference and we usually have a day where our foreign partners are are asked to join and participate in the conference. Now they’re always our security classification challenges that we continue to try to overcome. Um, I think a good example is really what we’ve been doing to help NATO both in their biological and chemical uh preparedness and response as as well as their ally tactical publication uh, that allows for more information sharing. Um but information sharing outside of WMD has always been one of those obstacles to uh collaboration that really needs to be examined in the moment. For the problem you’re trying to solve at hand. Okay? Yeah. Thank you. Yield to wreck member kelly. I’m chairman. Thank you witnesses here. I think I went way more than five minutes. So please take whatever time you may need, it won’t take movement. Uh This shift is between city be. Uh Huh. 1 2nd. Is it just my connection? But you’re you’re breaking up. Can you hear me? It’s hard to hear ranking member kelly uh here in the in the house hearing room. Okay, look, all right. How about nail? Yeah, that’s better. Alright. As the department balances the shift in resources between Stevie uh with GPC, what are the most significant capability or resources vulnerabilities to the counter weapons of mass destruction mission? And I’ll start with you, vice admiral and then the others can chime in. Okay. So the resource and challenges, I think in general Clark’s statement a few few weeks back, he talked about the balance between readiness and modernization and as we um shift to take on strategic competition, uh the C W. M. D. Problem set. The way we look at the CWD problem set. It’s robust and it’s complex and it’s trans regional and there’s really as we think about balance of those resources across all the threat vectors from the most the video with the most rudimentary uh applications or developments of see WMD problem to the strategic competitors who have advanced capabilities across the biological, chemical and nuclear um threat spectrum. So from a from a Socom perspective and from I think through the department’s perspective, we look at the C. W. M. D. Cup uh challenge doesn’t really shift across. We have to still look at that challenge across all those threat vectors. So the shift did not really hasn’t really changed the way we we attack or going after and try and fight the challenge of the C. W. M. D. Uh problems that are uh anybody else I’d like to join and add that. One of the reasons that the Unity of effort Council undertook a diode wide see WMD prioritization effort was because we recognize this spectrum of threats is crowded and that resources are always going to be more limited than the threats will will bear. And so by prioritizing the greatest WmD threats and associating moves with where the Department of Defense has the exclusive mission to counter. So a leading versus a supporting other U. S. Government departments and agencies, it’s going to help all of our C. W. M. D. Stakeholder components focus their investment activities and efforts toward those priorities. It does not mean that we are taking our eye off the entirety of the threat spectrum, but it is helping us make smart investments. And one of the things that we are we continue to look at is where we can get investment return multiple returns on the same investments whether it’s nuclear, chemical or biological threats that were countering. Thank you. Thank you. And I spoke with three of the four of you yesterday and one of my biggest concerns we shift to global power and That this is a zero ah zero sum game when we talk about this arena. And it’s important that we not only focused on global power but we also look at violent and homegrown terrorist organizations which can do as much much damage. 2nd This is for you Dr Williams. Uh, we’ve been tracking the SARS covid to origins and D. O. D. D Tra uh, funding to the Wuhan Institute of Urology through his grantee Eco health alliance. I’m interested if and how did Yeah. And uh shoot okay. A choice government agency given his size to the P. L. A. So I’m afraid you cut out from the middle of that question. So if you could repeat it please over. I’m talking about the Wuhan Institute of Biology and tracking the stars Kobe too. And I’m wondering what kind of risk assessment a risk analysis we conducted and how Institute of Urology became the popular choice for dress government agency giving is tied to the PLF. Sir. Thank you for your question. So, uh as we have looked at this extensively, as you know sir, there was a request from the Congress of the Department a year, two years ago to look at this funding level as well as again, most recently we have done a throw look at all of our programmatic activities to ensure that at least the defense start reduction agencies funding uh to this NGO was not provided to the best of our knowledge into the Wuhan Institute of neurology on top of it. So, our expertise, both on programmatic as well as kind of our technical expertise, looks at all of our activities that we invest in for these types of energy goes to make sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized and in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the federal acquisition process, but equally as importantly policy as well, I think Dr Van, did you want to add anything to this? Um I don’t have much to add to that. I think that that’s a good uh, you know, good review. But I would like to add that. We also across the N. C. V. Did a thorough review to identify any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory. And we have not identified any. Um, it is uh, something that we continue to to watch to ensure that our investments are not going to to places where they should not be Tillman. I’m gonna ask the last question but I’m going to ask if they submit backward. Well, we don’t follow the bring, but I just want to ask how confident you are, full appreciation of chemical and biological capabilities of our adversaries. And if there are gas, please, in writing, let us know what we can do to close some of those gaps. And with that Mr chairman, I go back, thank you much. Now you have time to representing cars. Uh thank you Mr Chair. I hope your dog stays off of you this this time. Um, so uh, my question is really about legacy and I might have difficulty asking this because I have legacy thinking myself, I have to switch my brain a little bit and trying to craft this question. I think it’s for Vice Admiral Szymanski and director Williams. And given what we know what you’ve testified to regarding synthetic biology Regarding three Deep Printing Advancements Factoring. Uh, these these different technologies that both have uses uh, good and evil. Um who’s in charge of the department for ensuring that the women and men in our military understand their uses of these technologies and generally and then understanding the uses of these technologies in the field. I can think of a many three D printing manufacturing, advanced manufacturing plant being deployed with a group of women and men in our military. In the field for use for certain purposes, is in charge of educating and up skilling these women and men for the uses of these technologies. So thank you for the question congressman Larson. The it’s like really there’s a there’s a service requirement, responsibility largely uh for the fourth generation and how um forces are equipped man equipment training from a coordinating authority from Socom. Our responsibility is really about the planning, helping the geographical baton commands plan against how to counter WMD. Then annually we look and assess against that plan. The changing conditions on the ground, the changing threat actors, the changing situation and assess if that campaign plan. That framework is adequate and needs to be adapt well. But I think that the collaboration between what Socom does as the coordinating authority and then Detroit does. I think more importantly to your question is that digital really gets after the unique solution of those gaps that we identify and that plant against those changing conditions. For instance, we we may see a new uh new biological threat. Do we have to diagnostic? Uh I think DR Van was pretty articulate in their opening statement about the things that they’re doing across the spectrum of being prepared as well as to maintain consequence as well as protective equipment capabilities. But largely the men training equipment aspects uh for our individuals for men and women are a responsibility that geographic combatant commanders, responsibility for how we incorporate the plan as it relates to the threat in there for a reason. So do we have to rely on the services then to generate that requirement? If we see it otherwise? If we see that they aren’t giving that? No. No, sir. Often we will help generate that requirement for the for them. In fact, this year, this is the first year it’s so common. Has done a comprehensive from a coordinating authority lenses has submitted a for the requirements, uh, broad based requirements piece for D. O. D two and each of the geographic combatant commanders to determine DR one, sir. So is the Admiral said, sir? Yes, we we we ingest that requirements from the services as well as from the geographic combatant commanders. On a routine basis. We actually get four star requirements that come in. We rack and stack those against the available resources. Again, keeping with policy to make sure it’s there. Admiral just said, I literally sent last night to general clark general response on that requirements letter that came in earlier this spring. Uh, So what we end up doing is also as part of our engagement with the services and equipment train aspect of things. We make sure we bring that cutting edge technology knowledge back into their training courses. A specific example of that. Sir. We actually run the defense happens school which trains all the nuclear aspects of that. I don’t want anything more please for the record and I want questions for dr thomas Walsh regarding your definition of legacy as well as more on the privatization efforts of the Unity of Effort. Council would think we’re probably going to be interested in the outcomes of that. So with that I’ll develop for the record. MR Chair. Now you’re back, You’re back. None of the time I have, I have left. Thank you, represent Larson. Uh, now we have represents scott. Next. Thank you. Mr Chairman. Uh, ladies and gentlemen, thanks for being with us today. The the topic kind of really better discussed, I think behind closed doors, but we want to encourage my colleagues to get up to speed if you’re not on the A BMS system. And um some of the potential gaps are not potential, but the very real gaps that we have in the ability to pick up uh weapons that could and would be used against the United States. Uh if they were uh if we were to find ourselves in a conflict with Russia or china, the systems are smaller, they’re significantly faster. And that means we’ve got to pick them up with systems that we use in space. And I’ll mention a couple of my concerns with that is that a few years ago we were dependent on rockets from Russia actually launched satellites uh as the United States. And I’m I’m happy to use the private sector to help us launch satellites, but I do think that we need to be uh self reliant and not depending on on the public sector to do that. And so that’s one thing that I hope that the that the agency, the Defense Department will continue to look at is making sure that uh while while publicly traded companies are fine to use during times when we’re not in conflict, what would happen to our ability to launch if we were dependent on publicly traded companies? Um during uh an all out war with Russia and china. Uh as we talk about a B. M. S. First legacy systems and Admiral, this is this is predominantly for you because you’ve been one of the guys on the ground as a special operator. Uh I’m very concerned about the communications aspect of the new systems and as we as we move to space, uh are you confident that uh, that we can handle the communications from space and and not necessarily from uh aircraft for our special operators? Yeah, Congressman, thank you. Thank you for the question. Um, space and and communications as we think about strategic competition. I think it’s a problem that we think about often, uh, you’re right as special operations has historically been dependent on robust tactical communications. Um, and and a lot of that’s based on on space architecture. I would also say you’re right that this would be a better discussion and another setting in another time. Uh But let me let me say this. I think it’s important that we want scenarios. In fact, uh, we just run a scenario down at Socom not related to see WmD uh, on a day without calms. Um, and so how so how do we plan for everything from our tactical to our strategic calms to take and survive a a hit. So and good military planning is, you know, we do most likely courses of action scenarios and we do most dangerous. And so what do we need to where the gaps in things like quantum computing, uh, communications at the edge. Uh, and so we’re kind of going through that analysis now and how resilient and and uh how resilient does that calm infrastructure have to be? Obviously our communications, our our our space communications are important. And I think we’re taking a hard look at how we will be able to fight and win in a contested or denied calm environment. Space is going to be contested as well. And I understand there have to won’t get too much into it actually like the concept. Um, but I I do want to make sure that, you know, if we did end up in scenario where we needed to be doing, um, um, a lot of launches that we would not be totally dependent on, uh, publicly traded companies to do that. And we got ourselves in a bind a couple of years ago where we were dependent on Russian rockets to actually launch our satellites. And I hope that that’s something that um, um, we just pay attention to its a mistake we made in the past we don’t need to make in the future. I’ll mention one last thing for my colleagues on the democratic side in the President’s speech. He mentioned a darker like program in the National Institute of Health. Um, I’m not so sure that it would be better served to the general public if we did a National Institute of Health type program under DARPA. Uh, so that we did exactly the same thing president asking for. But the model and the leadership of Darkness seems to work very well. And I I don’t see why we can’t uh increase that funding over there with a with a specific focus on health with that. My time is up as you just heard. And so I appreciate all of you. And I look forward to continue the discussion. Thank you. Represent scott. Impressive that you keep your own timer. Uh, now let’s move on to representative keating. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank our witnesses. Public reports, including a very recent one with the National Academy of Science that has the details right behind directed radio frequency energy, a weapon. How that can be used. You doing any research involvement in that in terms of this public? Your work. So I had trouble hearing the question understanding the question. I’ll try again. Public reports, including the National Academy of Sciences have talked about uh directed radio frequency microwaves on kind of weapons energy weapon were used. Are you after he’s dealing with that matter? So what kind of research are methodology do you have? Insurance? Yeah. So were you able to understand that question? I believe so. Thank you. The Department of Defense is aware in supporting a whole of government effort looking into uh those those issues. Um This is another topic that would be happy to to discuss in a different setting. There are however, national publications done, for instance, the National Academy of Sciences. So, can you just comment generally on whether they present a real bink? Um but the National Academy of Sciences report assessed is definitely something that we are continuing to look at. It was directed at the request, I believe, of the Department of State. Um, and so we were taking that report and its findings seriously. And it’s part of what we are looking into in cooperation with the State Department and other parts of the U. S. Government. All right. I I realized that we probably will have to deal with more of this in a classified setting. But thank you very much. I yield back. Mr. Thank you represent keating and I now actually lost track. Who’s next? Give me one second. Please represented Bacon europe. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chair. Thank you. All of our panelists appreciate your leadership. My first question is to Miss Van is Iran your number one threat for nuclear proliferation. Thank you. Yeah. Yeah. Um actually I think for for that conversation I would defer to my colleague from policy. Thank you very much when it comes to proliferation. We we have great concerns about about china china has lacks export controls. It is not a country that exercises and great transparency in reporting to international bodies that has has signed up to report to but also just in the good stewards of public information sharing. Um so we do have concerns about china the proliferation that could support WMD activities across the board of items coming out of china and china, not responsibly monitoring what is what is going where obviously we look at any number of proliferation concerns when it comes to uh nuclear. This could include just a fissile material. Radiological material. Iran is not is not on my it’s not my number one proliferation threat. Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. Um so there but there are other nuclear weapons. But I think I was going to do is, you know, I think you answered it. Mhm. I believe likely recipient of of their for instance. So that was the intent of a ton of my question frame that way. Instead of concern, Iran working with china, I would want to take that conversation into uh into a classified conversation. Sir. We do know unclassified documents that china did hold. Fan Pakistan held out north Korea. So I am concerned about what we’re potentially with Iran as well. Just this week, D I said that Al Qaeda is being safeguarded in Iran an unclassified report from DEA. Are we concerned about Iran colluding with al Qaeda and other forms of WMD. Sir? We have great concerns about any number of WMD threat actors from state, based through non state actors and violent extremist organizations. We rely on the intelligence community, DEA leading member of that to help inform our policy considerations of where are the threats? Who has the intent and where these these are colliding so Well, I can’t speak specifically to the D. I. A report you were referencing. I can’t say that we are mindful of and watching where there are these alignments of videos and state actors of concern. Mm. Yeah. Yeah. Mhm. Cathy calvert, I’m sorry. It’s not. And I ran a patrolling out from Iran that’s a concern and I want to go there. Maybe it would follow up question for dr Williams. It’s a little off topic. What is the status of the open skies Treaty? Uh The administration has given mixed signals on this. The OC 1 35 aircraft are being taken to the bone yard. And yet the administration is saying that open skies may not gun, sir. Thank you for that question. I would really differ that one to miss Walsh from a policy perspective on the future of open skies. Thank you. I think this is this is one that is under review right now and so I’m not in a position to speak to that but I’d be happy to consult with my colleagues who have the lead for the open skies treaty and circle back with you and your teams are thank you. I’ll just uh saying your own nerve. It seems to be making a statement there. But then to say that you maybe if not abandoned open skies it’s mixed signals. I surely would like to know where we’re going with that. So thank you very much. Not go back. Thank you. Mr Bacon and cherry gallego had to step away for a moment so I will be standing in for him And it just so happens. I’m next on the list so I’ll yield to myself um to ask some questions here. Um I just want to thank the witnesses. Um, you know, the od any annual threat assessment has said that china and you all set it in your opening that they’re undertaking one of the most rapid expansions and platform diversification of its nuclear nuclear arsenal in history and has pretty much indicated they’re not interested in any arms control agreements. Also, mrs Walsh mr Walsh, you just mentioned that it’s been difficult to work with them um due to lack of transparency and other such things. While I recognize the conversation about their nuclear arsenal might be better suited for classified, um setting. What I do want to ask about is an area where they exhibit some of the exact same behavior of lack of transparency, lack of cooperation and that’s in um the area of uh their fentaNYL production. And I just hosted a panel featuring witnesses from the D. E. A. And UNDCP regarding china’s role in America’s opioid crisis. They’ve been sending precursor chemicals to countries like Mexico where they’re made into fentaNYL at labs and then mixed with other illicit drugs before they make their way to our homeland, where they kill americans and are destroying communities all across this country. So, um and I think the threat assessment also highlights that Mexico will certainly make progress this year producing high quality fentaNYL using these very chemical precursors from china. So the question is to miss Walsh and dr van, you know, how is the department modernizing its capabilities to track the production and shipment of such chemical precursors from Asia to the Western Hemisphere? There any number? Thank you very much, congresswoman, there any number of communities across D. O. D. That are looking at this issue just from different perspectives are counter narcotics, global threats organization. Even the D. O. D. C. W. And the Unity of Effort. Council took up the issue of fentaNYL. Uh, I believe it was two years ago now. Um and so across many threads, we we are looking at what are the precursors, where are they coming from? Um We have bilateral conversations, multilateral conversations to make sure that countries that are the source and origin of these are aware of what’s going on underneath their nose, giving them the opportunity and uh trying to persuade them to take action to regulate curtail. Being more aware if not cease entirely what it’s doing. Part of the challenge is that there are very legitimate uses of fentaNYL. Um, and so this is the this is the space between the legitimate and then the illicit use with that and I’ll defer to dr van, it’s more of an expert. Yes. Uh, thank you, ma’am. The fennel is as miss Walsh. That is an interesting space because it it highlights some of the dual use nature of and dual use dilemma that we now face where we have a legitimate use as well as a potential for nefarious use. Um in terms of capability development that we have against things like the fentaNYL classes. Um we have a very robust R. D. A. Activity to ensure that our joint forces have the right detection equipment to identify both, detect and identify any potential fentaNYL in the environment as well as a diagnostic capability. So that you can see when there is a potential human exposure to two classes, uh sentinels as well as personal protection equipment, as well as our ability to treat any potential exposure. So focusing specifically on delivering man portable medical countermeasures that could be utilized by the force if if exposed to those agents. Thank you. This is to the Admiral, you know, it strikes me that when we talk about C. W. M. D. Or countering violent extremists, or countering transnational organizations that deal in sort of the illegal substances. There are a lot of similarities, sometimes their state actors nefariously involved. There are networks of people who are moving illegal money, drugs and other illegal substances. Are there lessons that can be learned from our decades of working in counterterrorism that can be applied in, uh, see WMD or countering no products? Gosh, woman, thank thanks for that question. Yes, there absolutely lessons learned from the countering violent extremist organizations and the things we’ve done to uh to build networks to defeat a network. And I think what you’ve really just described is the basis of our functional campaign plan, which is about pathway to feed as as a pathway pathway, whether it’s I’m sorry, did you have question? We’re just out of time and just to be mindful of everybody else’s time. I’m sorry to interrupt you. I’d love to get your response through a question for the record and uh that’s a conversation I would like to continue at a different time with that. I yield to the next speaker. Mr franklin. Okay, Yes, thank you. Represented Murphy. I’m on the road and I apologize, I do have some questions, just submitting those two. Want to drive, try to ask questions and saying great, well travel safely and um we’ll look forward to your questions for the record. Um Next I have Mr Larson. Mhm. Think are we going back to the 2nd round chair? Yeah, I think it appears that we must be so, I’ll circle back to some ideas for questions for the record. But for Miss uh Miss Walsh, can you speak more particularly to the prioritization efforts and the Unity of Effort Council? What can you share with us about which legacies you’re looking at, which are going to survive, which aren’t and honestly, what new technologies that we need to put more time into which would require us to not put time into other other systems. Mhm. Our department priorities started with an intelligence assessment of looking at what are the WMD threats to U. S. Interests um and the US homeland in particular where those threats coming from looking at threat actors who has the capability, who is trying to get more or different capability, Who is modernizing whatever capabilities they already have. The top of the intelligence analysis. We looked at policy considerations as well. It blended these two to assess what are the threats more than a specific technology. It’s about the threat actor because it’s the actor who will use any given technology, your capability and that’s what we have to counter. So while I’m not able in this environment to walk you through what those priorities are, we could certainly be happy to have a follow up conversation with you uh and share those those priorities um there and they differentiate because it could be that one actor has a is further along in the type of posing one type of impunity threat than another. Um And so we do look at these by WMD threat and actor. Break them together. And that’s how we that’s how we’ve come up with our priority list. Can you answer the question in this environment about relative D. O. D. Or other agency investment is going to require us to move money around and not spend as much time X to do to do why? Or is our priority process? Did not tease out that level of decision. What I will expect is that as we go through an implementation review this year of looking at how our components, um applying these priorities into uh, into their particular areas of responsibility. I think that’s where we will start to determine if we have uh more fewer or different investments to make. But this is also where we’re going to look at. Can we get multiple returns on similar or same investment? Yeah. So I have a definition of a legacy investments in the D. O. D. after 20 years in Congress. A legacy investment is something that the D. O. D. Doesn’t want to do that. Congress won’t let them get rid of. So just just a heads up to maybe bring us along as you’ve done this uh set of priorities so that we aren’t surprised as as uh the oversight folks. Um That would just be my one precaution on this. I’m open I’m open to despite people of the D. O. D. Looking at looking at this. Obviously it’s just sometimes you run into a buzz saw called Congress because because sometimes we don’t want to get rid of something or sometimes we’re surprised by the results. So I think it’s important that especially if it comes down to making not just a priority choice but also then it gets to where does the money go to invest in that priority? I think it just just a word of advice on that and with that chair Murphy. Yeah I’ll yell back thank you thank you Mr Larson. And next I yield to ranking member kelly. Oh thank you. Just given the increased use of chemical weapons in Syria, Patrick, can we do our use of chemical or biological weapons? What are we doing to ensure international informs again, to use of these weapons is not eroded or to develop new standards to deal with the emergence kIM and bio threats. All of your question, Please circle back. You did break up a little bit in there. But what I think I heard you say is you’re interested in knowing what we are doing to help preserve international norms, prevent further erosion of them. On the chemical and biological side, I will say it starts with starts with our own behavior and being a leader through international fora and through our bilateral relationships. In response to Russia’s 2018 use of the Nova Chalk the United States, along with like minded countries, worked through the OPcW to add the NOva talks to the Chemical weapons Convention schedule or the list of prohibited items that countries signatories agree that that will not be used. Um, We have continued to speak out when we have seen international norms either eroded or flagrantly violated. We do not want any any nation to be able to think that they are going to get away with this. And so diplomacy is our first course of action. The Department of Defense stands in support of the Department of State. We work hard to maintain bilateral relationships so that other countries are speaking out when they are outraged by Russia and other nations behavior as well. We continue to encourage bilateral and multilateral public dialogues about um biological agents through biological surveillance detection investments that we’re making in partner countries. We are helping to build others capacity um to not only be able to detect but also then to diagnose and contain biological outbreaks that are naturally occurring. We are asking and calling on our partners and like minded allies to speak out on these issues. Covid has certainly put a premium on that in the last year. That we need to take this seriously. This is not a niche issue. And this is one that can have devastating consequences to security, economic, and just a general public health as well. Very quickly, I asked a question earlier and I still would like more a lot of this is going to be classified, but I would like to follow. It’s just popped up. Are we that we have the full appreciation of the chemical and biological capabilities of our emissaries? Think uh huh. At an unclassified level, I can tell you that we do have concerns because of Russia and china’s lack of transparency, um, in uh, meeting its obligations to notify through the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, um, that lack of transparency behaviour we have observed over the last year of of intentional misinformation about US capabilities, us investments, um, and Partner Nation biological laboratories that are serving public health and public good. But Russia and china continue to put out propaganda that that’s giving false information about what what those facilities are and what our partner nations are doing. So I do not have trust and confidence that we know everything. Um, they are not living up to their end of the bargain. Very, very good. And uh, just very quickly, I’m starting out there. We’re talking a few witnesses before your testimony here and for what you do read out to keep this patient safe. But I’m starting up. I’m trying to protest, but I’m sure one of my Republican. Uh huh. Thank you Representative Kelly. And then uh I will uh assuming Roseanne scott will act as rank ranking member after you leave. Okay. Excellent. Next we have on my list. Thank you for bearing with me. I actually jumped off to attend another hearing. Uh Representative keating I have Next on my list for second round. Mr. Chairman. I’ll yield back. Excellent. Then after that we have Representative scott. I don’t I don’t have any further questions. Mr Chairman. I just again, would love to have the subcommittee come to Robins Air Force Base, look at the A. BMS system. And uh you know, just making sure that we’re uh again our dependency on on foreign sources, for rocket fuel and our dependency on on the private sector. I just want to make sure that we work through those issues in that while while uh we can we can always count on the private sector in times of peace, you know, what would we do in a time of war uh with regard to our ability to launch? Uh, and with that, I yield after thanking the members for their service, the panel for their service. Thank you represent scott. I have representative Murphy next. If you have a second round, um thank you mr Chair. Actually, I would just like to let Admiral finish the answer to the previous question I had regarding the lessons off of C. T. And whether or not we’re applying them um in this area of counter narcotics as well as counter WMD congresswoman Murphy. We absolutely are applying those lessons. I think you’re aware that Socom is also the coordinating authority for violent extremist organizations. We’ve been obviously in that in that fight for almost two decades. As I was saying, I was starting to say earlier, you know, all this is really about pathway to feet. And so when we look at whether it’s transnational criminal organizations, counter violent extremist organizations, other bad actors, all are dependent on certain pathways and we call those trans trans trans regional enablers. So it’s things like calms finances and those things. So understanding the network, uh, regardless of what the, what the illicit aspects of what is being transferred. Um, there are absolutely lessons learned from what we’ve done over the years and with great participation of our partners as well as the intelligence community on being able to understand networks. Uh, really then try to understand their activities on how they use those trans uh, trans regional enablers and how we get after those enablers to actually prevent and, and or counter whatever the illicit cargo is or whatever the high value leaders that we need to get after. So as a member who represents florida, I’m always very concerned with what’s going on in latin America and the caribbean. And that’s an area where there’s quite a bit of transnational criminal organization activity. Are you aware of any traditional WMD threats to the United States from state or non state actors emanating from latin America or the caribbean. Thanks for the question. I would prefer to take that question for the record and do it in a more classified setting. Great thank you. And then final question for you, Admiral there, with the US preparing to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan in september of this year. Um there are a lot of national security risks that are involved with this decision, as we all know, and I know you’re working through a lot of those to mitigate and prepare for them. Can you discuss how you think withdrawal might affect America’s counter WMD efforts in Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, especially if the Taliban gain strength and um if Afghan Afghanistan once again becomes a haven for terrorist groups that have an interest in using WMD, how how can we and our allies combat this threat without a significant permanent force presence on the ground? Congresswoman? Again, I’d like to take that that one for the record, but I think there will be a significant partner and ally piece. Uh there’s a lot going into right now from the State Department with diplomacy with a number of the neighboring countries in the gulf coalition uh countries. Um there’s a recent a couple recent intelligence assessments on after withdrawal and would prefer to talk about those in a classified setting on on where there’s a lot of hope for also where the Taliban will be for recognized wanting to be recognized as an international order. So we understand uh it’s a very uncertain time at the moment. We’re really focused on the safe and deliberate retrograde of all the troops and all the other US and foreign personnel that are currently deployed in Afghanistan. Great, I understand the need to move this conversation to a different classification level and look forward to the opportunity to do that. Thank you to the witnesses today and I yield back my time. Thank you. Mr Chairman. Thank you. Represent Vice chair Murphy. Uh now like to move to represent vaults. Yeah, thank you. Mr Chairman. I just like to associate myself with representative Murphy’s remarks and questions, particularly in the wake of the withdrawal. I think one of the things that’s being lost in the conversation is that even if all of our, all of our best hopes bear out and the taliban has had a change of heart decides to be a responsible international actor. No one has been able to explain to me to date, including General Miller, uh what capability they have to enforce any agreement against al Qaeda and half the world’s terrorist organizations on what capability do they have? That 300,000 Afghan army soldiers and 40 Western nations have struggled to do over the last 40 years, but along those lines, so I would I would certainly welcome if she would have me if we have a following classified brief, I’d certainly love to participate in that. My question is operationally when it comes to IEDs, uh DR Williams Detroit I think has done a great job over the years of training. Our Afghan partners are partners in the Afghan army and counter I. E. D detection and defeat. Uh, my understanding is those trainers and those assets are being withdrawal withdrawn. What leave behind capability through the Afghan security forces fund? Whether it’s I. D. Detection kits, nitrate kits, what leave behind capability or we’re providing the afghan security forces through your programs and understand there’s a State department. I co signed a letter for the State Department through its program to also provide funding so that we don’t have to go back, Which I sadly fear that we’re going to have to do but bolster the Afghan security forces ability to deal with I. E. DS, which by the statistics, I’m seeing account for 75 of their casualties. Uh Sir, thank you for your question. Uh at one point of clarification, as you know, sir, the former counter IED activities that were done through the fence right reduction agency are actually transitioning at the end of this fiscal year into the army for continuing use for that. In terms of your answer our question about leave behind, sir. As the Admiral said, I think I would like to prefer to take that in a classified setting so we can have a little more fulsome discussion on that server. Okay. Um I’ll just say, I hope that we’re not taking that for the record because there’s not really a plan yet. I know that I’m sure you’re working on it. Um And I struggle to understand why it’s classified if we’re handing it over to the afghans, but that’s fine. We’ll take that to a different setting. The other piece that I’d like to talk to the would imagine would be a settings. I know there’s a number of classified programs dealing with Pakistan’s nuclear program and assuring the security of those assets so that I would like to request in a classified setting uh and and the status of those programs with no presence in Afghanistan. And then finally, again, probably also classified. So MR Chairman. My questions will be pretty brief, but I’m incredibly concerned and I’ve asked this question in the past. If we move to any type of conflict on the korean peninsula, I understand there’s a number of programs with so calm Detroit and others to secure North Korea’s uh nuclear assets. My concern is what type of deconfliction if any that we’ve had with china who would obviously also um uh I want to assure that those assets are secured. So so that would be, I guess it in three requests for you in a classified setting and Mr chair. If I could just one more before I close. I’m still not clear if when we have that, why elite behind capability with the afghans so that they can detect diabetes, I’m not sure why that would be classified. I mean that should be I think will not be possible to yourself and so that so that we can assure everyone that they have that capability. But I’ll just take that for the record and and I yield. Thank you. Chairman. Thank you. Representative waltz and I think I believe it is my turn now. Yes it is. Okay. Great. Uh Department defense. Recently in 2017 transfer the countering weapons of mass destruction mission lead from U. S. Strategic Command to a special operations command. Signalling a shift in strategy that places greater emphasis on identifying and preventing threats before they missed miss status ties into a crisis. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security seven. See WMD office consolidating numerous offices and functions across the department. How does coordination work at the national level to ensure the CWM. D. Activity authority policy planning and expertise are operating cohesively effectively and officially. And what progress has so calm made to develop the infrastructure, partnerships, expertise, strategy and tactics needed to address this mission successfully. Let’s start advice uh with the Admiral Children. Thank you for the question. So for the years that Socom has had the function, excuse me, the coordinating authority for C. W. M. D. It’s really the basis of the the whole effort is built well in the functional campaign plan and building the helping the combatant commanders with their campaign plans. The geographic combatant commanders uh as I kind of mentioned it in one of the opening questions with the threat vectors and the threat actors in their regions. How we plan together in coordination with the geographical that commander. How we assess that plan against the changes to the threat against the changes to the actors as well as the environment and then make recommendations on any material gaps, training deficiencies, etcetera. But what we do in the meantime, back back here in D. C. Or or in Kaunas is we hold a couple of seminars a year uh called the our coordination center uh coordination seminars, our senior leaders seminars. We bring together a number of folks from partners and allies inter agency, too many members largely from the Unity of Effort Council across joint staff and D. O. D. Uh and and look at a very specific problem. And then we tried to bring in a whole of government approach to how we might answer that identify not only the gaps in the department’s uh dip apartment offenses um capabilities but also potentially think more more use of what Department of Energy Department, State Order of Commerce could apply to that problem center but that’s from a socom coordinating authority that’s really a planning and assessing and recommending. I think I would differ miss Walsh on the unity of effort council and how they use the existing processes to pull the other things that you talked about in the beginning of your question. Thank you very much. Admiral, thank you Miss Welch. The Unity of effort Council was created after we recognize that we had a lot a lot of cooks in the kitchen but we weren’t working off of the same recipe and so through the Unity of Effort Council, we have convened 20 different stakeholder organizations across the office of the Secretary of Defense, various joint staff components, all of the services, so Kamisar coordinating authority and then all of our combatant commands so that we can raise awareness among these components of what their roles and missions are, what issues that have been stuck or or are emerging and where we need to work together to make sure that these issues can rise to the surface so that senior leaders are aware of threats, opportunities, capabilities we have, but also areas where we need to develop further capabilities or make different investments. And over the course of the last several years, I would argue that we have built, not just awareness, but we have built connective tissue that didn’t exist previously. And so now we are, we are uh we have a phrase of the consolidated buying power of the C. W. M. D community and D O. D is yielding benefits. Our plans, our strategy documents are resource requirements, our understanding of threats, our understanding of, of where we can have crossed pollination, but also our understanding that some components don’t necessarily sit in all of the meetings where resource decisions are made or requirements are decided or prioritized and then where the strategy documents are. So through the Unity of Effort Council, we have taken both a bottom up, but also a top down approach in identifying what are those issues that do not get resolved in other existing diode fora. Um and through this we have uh we have given rise to a community that is now speaking um that is understanding more, but is also speaking with with more one voice. We expect that we will continue to see dividends from the Unity of Effort Council as the department goes through the Strategic review and guidance development efforts this year, whether it’s the global posture review, the next National Defense Strategy, um and then any number of other reviews that the department is conducting. I am confident that our unity of effort. Council members will be able to bring WMD issues more into the forefront. Thank you. Thank you. Uh, miss Walsh, just a general statement, you know, I feel like the across the federal government there is really good unity and conversations happening about countering WMD measures. I worry, uh, when it needs to come across down to your local Police and state government, one of the things I think we saw from 911 was that the as much as the federal government is important, it’s also your local government. That’s important in terms of prevention and deterrence. And even unfortunately sometimes reactions are just going to kind of remind that we keep that in mind going to the future. I have on my list for a second question. If if he wants it. Representive waltz, uh, do is there anybody else that has another question I don’t want to represent scott. Do you have any ranking member that anybody from your side? Okay. Great. Excellent. Well, thank you so much for your time to all of our presenters. I didn’t know that there was a lot of, uh, things that were said that we’re gonna have to go for the record or a classified setting. Please make sure to follow up with our staff to actually, uh, you know, fulfill that. I think there’s a lot of things that we want to follow up and there’s no need for us to leave things hanging up in the air. Thank you for your time. And I hope to see also.