Melissa G. Dalton, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities; Navy Adm. Charles A. Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command; and Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, speak before the House Armed Services Committee about the fiscal year 2022 budget request in regards to the overall posture of U.S. strategic forces and the stand-up of Spacecom, April 21, 2021.

Transcript

The subcommittee will return to order. Mr. Lamborn. Thanks Mr. Chairman General Dickinson. In your statement, you said quote achieving the desired effects in the space domain requires close coordination with other combatant commands. Unquote, there is currently great synergy that exists between US, Space. Com, North com NORAD and the National Space Defense Center. All being located in close proximity there in Colorado Springs on the personnel side, eight of the nine Space Force Deltas, formerly called Space wings are located in Colorado. The 9th is at Vandenberg and seven of those eight are in Colorado Springs, including all of our guardians who are focused on Space war fighting. There are over 1900 uniformed space force personnel in Colorado, with over 1500 in Colorado Springs alone And there are 32,000 total personnel who work or will work for space force in Colorado. Right now, all of these units and people benefit from working together in the same buildings with personnel from Space. Com Space Force and their intelligence community counterparts Working side by side, how does it benefit our national security to rip out the headquarters element of Space command from this concentration of national security, space and intelligence community professionals and move it someplace 1000 miles away, congressman. Your first comment about the relationship with in particular like U. S. Northern Command in NORAD. We do enjoy a great relationship, but I will offered to you that I uh enjoy a great relationship with all the other combatant commands and our ability to work closely with those combatant commands is fundamental to what we do. Each and every day. We’ve had great success over the last 20 months uh with regard to our relationships with the other combatant commands, we have developed integrated planning elements which are small groups of experts, space planners and operators who are embedded in each of the combatant commands. And we’re growing those in all of the tin combatant commands at various levels right now. And so I tell you those those integrated planning have established a great relationship with each of the combatant commands and providing critical space warfighting expertise. So something that’s working well and within the space command there side by side, thousands of people side by side, why rip it in half and send some across the country? So uh Congressman. So in terms of uh military type of operations we have seen in the past and in the president where we can actually do operations were not geographically located with each of those elements. So there is synergy, I think you’ve gained by being in the same area, but I think there’s equally synergy in terms of being able to do that in not a remote manner, but in a physically distant manner. So in terms of military type of operations, I believe you can do it in in two different locations. That wouldn’t necessarily be directly there in Colorado Springs. For example, if the military was told to put space man in a cornfield in Iowa, you know, they could do it. You know, we can do whatever we want, but why do it when it’s working so well where it is right now, I’m going to change subjects for the limited time. Would you agree with me? Um uh let me back up. It may surprise people that survivable communication networks or were not required for space. Com by the Department of Air Force when they did their what I question, a highly questionable evaluation process. So survivable communications has to be added if we started a new command up somewhere. Whereas right now there are multiple secure command centers at Peterson, Schriever and Cheyenne Mountain which provide continuity of operations for Space Command. In fact, past commanders of Air Force Space Command have said their preferred warfighting command center would either be the National Space Defense Center at Schriever or Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station The ladder which was built to survive a 30 MPT nuclear explosion. So today, what kind of continuity of operations facilities are there in Huntsville Alabama? Well, congressman, I’m not, I’m not aware of any in Huntsville Alabama, but I do know that uh in terms of the National Space Defense Center in my command, out in Vandenberg Air Force Base, that the secure uh communications that they have is satisfying the mission requirements now. And if if we are directed to move that, that type of infrastructure would be built and operable to meet my mission needs. Um, and I, we haven’t even talked about the cost that’s going to be over a billion dollars, but well maybe have a chance to talk about that at some time in the future. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Langevin. Thank thank you. Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay? Yes. Thank thank you. I want to thank our witnesses for testimony today and thank you all for your service to the country. Um in January, the Vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that before possibly uh re assigning responsibility for electromagnetic spectrum operations to a new entity. Uh we need to fix it by properly resourcing Strategic Command. Admiral Richard. What resources you need to effectively execute himself. So, congressman, thank you for that question. Uh and uh might be worth a reminder to you and the committee. My responsibilities in electromagnetic spectrum operations are to uh advocate um uh input on joint requirements. Uh and then I have some responsibility to execute the new uh electromagnetic spectrum superiority plan that diode recently rolled out. So General Hayden was correct, stratcom is not fully resourced. Um There are two aspects to this and and both of these, the department is addressing, one of which is in the headquarters element. So this is some number of personnel to execute these. Uh and it’s a small number, right? It’s on the order of 40 people to uh execute the headquarters functions and then there’ll be a larger um uh need for personnel more broadly inside the department uh to provide sufficient electromagnetic spectrum operations expertise. That second number is still being determined. Um but we have a very good way ahead to address um the deficiencies that you refer to from General heighten and Admiral whether or not. um so stay that strategic command. What authorities does it command need to effectively execute themselves, congressman? The issue is not authorities right uh stratcom and the department writ large have sufficient authorities to accomplish this mission. But what does need to happen and this is specific to m so but also applies in some other mission sets is we have gotten used to as a nation adopting processes designed for permissive environments that are designed to minimize programmatic and technical risk at the expense of operational risk. We used to not do it that way. And so one of my big functions inside em so is to bring the operational risk component back into department processes so that our programmatic and other decisions are informed by operational risk as well as programmatic and technical risk. And that is the area, one of the areas that we’re concentrating on, I have sufficient authorities to do it. We just have to go get it done. Thank you. And one other question going off of Mr Pablo calls questions I want to follow up and ask if we should conduct similar failsafe reviews of nuclear weapons and early warning systems, especially with regard to automation and implementing more ai So we are um for implementation of artificial intelligence um uh we are just at the beginning stages to explore possible applications of Ai inside Nuclear Command and control. The first place that we see uh is really on the intelligence side of the house. Right? So enabling us to go through a much broader range of information than is now humanly capable or possible to do in an effort to determine um much better situational awareness. And then the uh human processes present that to senior decision makers. The second piece that we see some immediate application for a I is in uh cyber defense, right? And it gives us a better ability to understand what’s happening on side. Our networks understand that better and make better operational decisions, again, adapting things that are beyond human capacity alone to address. Thank you. Admiral General Dickinson. How would you describe information sharing, cooperation between your command and other combatant commands? What are some of the challenges that still need to be addressed, congressman? I think we’ve got a great information sharing between the different combatant commands I mentioned earlier uh with Representative Lamborn that uh that we’ve we’ve got integration in each of the combatant commands with small planning elements right now, as well as some of their elements within my command. In particular, cyber command has a cyber integrated planning element that works each and every day within my command that provides that integration. And uh but over the course of the last 20 months with these I. P. S. Space I. P. S. We have seen a lot of synergy and bringing integration to uh those combatant commands from U. S. Space command in providing those space war fighting capabilities that they need. Gentlemen. Thank you very much. Mr. Desjarlais, thank you chairman and thank you for your service to our panelists. Um Yeah I want to associate myself with Mr. Turner’s line of questioning Admiral Richards on the no first use policy about an hour and a half ago I I got off the phone with Ambassador ville check from Poland and he’s very concerned and assures me that his neighbors uh up and down eastern Europe share the same feelings that in no first use policy would erode our extended deterrent. Could it actually have an adverse impact of putting allies in the position of needing a deterrent or increasing their own capabilities? Again sir, I think uh the commander of European command addressed this well in terms of us getting a mixed reaction out of our allies um I do think in some cases it will diminish our extended deterrence insurance commitments. Uh and if that were to be diminished that would become their own decisions as to what steps they might need to take to redress that. Okay uh staying on the topic of first used. But turning to Russia specifically, you believe there are circumstances in which Russia may opt to use nuclear weapons. 1st congressman, that is their doctrine. And I’ve been kind of intrigued by the argument about low yield nuclear weapons. What do you think the likelihood would be that the next nuclear attack we C. B. Of the low yield nature, the congressman. It is difficult to speculate on that. I I do say that um one it is Russian doctrine under certain conditions that they would uh contemplate on attack like that. That capability is certainly necessary for that. I think it’s also useful for us to remember the U. S. Has always had low you’ll capability uh inside its arsenal. Um The only thing that was added with the recent edition of the low you ballistic is we simply now have a weapons system that is much more likely to actually make it to the target. And uh the W. Of 76 twos of course have been deployed and critics have called this weapon destabilizing. Can you respond to these critics and explain how this weapon could deter Russia from an escalation to win strategy congressman? I’ll offer that. Um Recently within the last year stratcom started formally measuring risk of strategic deterrence failure. I can give you the details on how we do that in the classified section. But this is a formal um risk assessment that is uh designed to make sure that we are analytically rigorous in all the things that we do, acknowledging that it’s just fundamentally trying to measure a subjective process, the decision making of another country. But our assessment is is that uh deployment of the low yield improved the risk of strategic deterrence i. E. It uh lowered it because of the deterrent effect it achieved. Okay. And just in the last minute or so, if you’d like to the time expired, in the line of question from Mr. Garamendi and I was going to ask you to speak to the importance of developing the ground based strategic deterrent rather than extending the Minuteman three. So if you’d like to take a minute and further your thoughts about how uh what effect delaying or canceling development of G. BSD would have on the nuclear deterrence and our allies confidence in the U. S. Extended deterrence and frankly your ability to do your job. The way you see fit congressman the nation one has had a long standing uh can trace its lineage back to the Kennedy administration, flexible and tailored strategy for strategic deterrence. It has repeatedly through uh every nuclear posture review dating back to 1992. In that process reaffirm that the best way to accomplish that mission is with a triad that makes the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of that essential to be able to accomplish this mission. Um You need the total capability and capacity of the triad to do what the president has directed me to do. And inside that I need an I. C. B. M. That will actually work and actually make it to the target. Um It is a remarkable accomplishment that we’ve been able to extend the minuteman three as long as we have. Again, I’ll defer to the Air Force in terms of cost effectiveness. But they repeatedly reported to Congress that it’s not cost effective and I needed to be able to pace the threat. Um and so I don’t see an upside to trying to life extend the minuteman when it is time to get a modern weapons system such that I have the ability to deter the never before seen in our history condition of facing to peer nuclear cable adversaries. Thank you for your back. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Morelli. Thank you. Uh Mr. Chairman and thank you to Miss Dalton Admiral Richard and General Dickinson for being here to share your expertise and obviously for your dedication and service to our nation’s safety and security. I wanted to ask the question of Admiral Richard. Um The N. S. The N. N. S. A. S. Uh inertial confinement uh confinement fusion or I. C. F. Program maintains three world leading experimental facilities, including the omega laser facility at the University of Rochester’s Laboratory for laser energetic, which is in my district in Rochester, New York. Um As I understand that the only means for scientists to recreate the high energy density conditions found in an operating weapon without underground nuclear testing. In addition to the physical facilities, obviously they employ and use a talented workforce that’s necessary to conduct the experiments which produces valuable scientific data and deter our adversaries. I also understand that the capabilities and they’re the viability of their importance is demonstrated by large investments being made in new facilities under construction, both in Russia and in china. And I wondered, Admiral, if you could comment on the importance of US scientific capabilities in avoiding first of all technological surprise and ensuring the safety, reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without a need to resume testing. I apologize a long question, but very interested in uh, in understanding this congressman you hit on. Uh, I think the key point at the very end of your question, which is fundamentally and I will defer to in an essay for the details the way the US today maintains confidence in nuclear weapons stockpile is through the stockpile stewardship program where efforts like you describe provide the analytical and scientific basis um for us to have confidence that our weapons will meet the standards that we ask of them without having to go to explosive nuclear testing. Right? So maintaining that scientific and technical base is uh critical for us to have confidence in our deterrent. But I will go on and point out I mentioned human talent bases earlier. Um, the it takes a considerable amount of subject matter expertise to take that test data that I’m describing and then um work it back to a confidence assessment as to whether or not the weapons are meeting standards. This is not like uh, you know, putting your car front end and checking the alignment and a green light comes out of the box. Right. And so that’s one of the perishable skill sets that if we don’t maintain that talent base and we lose it, it may take us 5-10 years to recreate it, sir. Over. Yeah. And I wonder general if you have any thoughts or advice that you can give us on how to continue to maintain it and make sure that we have a competitive advantage here in that regard? Is there is there any advice you can give us on things that we should be thinking about in that in that space? So I would encourage in an essay through the Department of Energy to ask for the necessary level of resources to maintain that particular program to do the weapons programs that the Department of Defense asked for as well as maintain their infrastructure. The ultimate authority on what is necessary there, at least in the budget submission is the Secretary of Energy. Um But I would encourage N. S. A. To ask for the full measure of what they think they need, not just what they think they can get. Very good. Well, thank you again, Admiral for for your leadership and for your service as well as the General Dickinson and Miss Dalton. And with that I yield back the balance of my tenants chair. The gentleman yields fact, Miss Cheney, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Thank you to all of our witnesses. Uh Admiral Richard. I wanted to follow up on something. One of my colleagues was asking you about, there’s a an idea from some on this committee and more broadly that even though we’re facing adversaries as you’ve described historic, unprecedented situation with respect to china and Russia, both of whom are undertaking massive modernization, build up and expansion programs. That somehow the solution is for us to risk our own security to tie our own hands with no first use to reduce our own capabilities uh to delay yet again modernization, I wanted to remind the committee generally of something that President Truman said in NSC 68 which is timeless. He said, no people in history have preserved their freedom who have thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves, they might prove inoffensive to their enemies. And I’d like to ask you Admiral Richard, if you could describe, give you a chance to describe in a little bit more detail what we are seeing from the Chinese in particular. I don’t think the American people fully recognize and understand the nature and the expanded nature of that threat and also what it means. When we say the Minuteman three is so old, what does that mean in terms of what’s, what’s available, what’s not available, what it would really mean if we were to ask you simply to extend the life of that program? Once again, congresswoman, thank you for the question. Um so I ran through it very quickly in my opening statement, but I’ll elaborate that we are seeing uh, this very rapid expansion of Chinese capabilities. I’ll give you the specific numbers in the closed session. But this is a rapid expansion of the road mobile capability. And this is an intercontinental ballistic missile that’s on a very large truck, Russia and china have them. We do not. Those are very large countries and they simply drive the missile around. It is a challenging thing to keep up with them. So they have this new capability expanding rapidly. They have many new solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile sidelines. This is the same I C. B. M. S by the way that we’re talking about either life extending otherwise trying to use ourselves. A solid fuel rocket is very responsive. Um and that couple with their new nuclear command and control gives them a launch under warning or launch under attack capability that right now only the US uh and the and the Russians possess. They’re about to complete a triad. Um and so they have a uh strategic bomber with an air launched ballistic missile capability on that. So for the first time they have a complete triad. They have six second generation ballistic missile submarines. So they can do continuous at sea deterrent patrols. Iaea Survivable second strike capability and a missile that can arrange continental United States from protected bastion in the south china sea. Uh And you add all of this together and they can do any plausible nuclear employment strategy Regionally, this will backstop their conventional capability um and will constrain potentially constrain our options. That will be the ones that are getting deterred. Uh If I don’t have the capability to, similar to deter them. And the key point is, this is about to become additive to what the Russians can do. So that that’s the threat more detail in the closed session. But this is a breathtaking expand. I just gave an order at stratcom that if you have a china brief that is more than a month old, take it back to the intel people and get it updated because it is out of date. That’s how rapidly they’re moving. And remember, stratcom is not the source of this intelligence. The intelligence comes from the intelligence community were simply the ones that interpreted operationally like other commands. Thank you, Admiral. And I think it’s important to to just reaffirm uh the words that you’ve used that the Chinese are at an inflection point. This is a breathtaking expansion accelerating rapidly. Uh and we are asking uh you uh to be able to deter both China and Russia simultaneously. And I think from the perspective of this committee and our obligation to ensure that you have the resources you need. The notion that we’re asking you simply to life extend one more time. Technology from the 1970s is completely irresponsible and and I think we need to face the consequences of that choice. If if that’s the path we choose to go down congressman. If I could just add um and again I’ll defer to the U. S. Air Force and the Secretary of Defense as to whether or not minuteman three can be life extended. They provide me the system. Here’s why I say I uh I’m just not sure it can be done. They have a long list of parts that are in very short supply. For example right now there’s only two of these launch switches that go into every launch control centers, only two in supply. You gotta have 45 of them for each launch control center. Nobody makes the inside of the switch anymore. No company is going to make, the inside of the switch is like asking a company and make a dial up modem, right? There’s no profit in doing something like that. Air force has been consistently pulling rabbits out of the hat to solve these problems. Um, there’s just, I’m afraid there’s a point where they won’t be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat in the system won’t work. Thank you. Ladies, time is expired. Mr. Panetta. Mhm. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and thank you Secretary Dalton. And gentlemen, thank you for your time today. And also thank you to both of uh Admiral Richard and the general for stopping by my office and having the personal time that we did. I truly appreciate that Admiral Richard, you were in my office this morning and I appreciate our brief uh, conversation. but you also yesterday and today, um today you’ve extent you’ve testified extensively and in the past regarding the dangers reliance is solely on the submarine leg of the nuclear triad, which on a day to day basis is actually a diet between the seat and the ground legs. And if we were to choose to delay modernization of the ground based leg or not move forward with the ground based strategic deterrent, especially especially in the midst of ongoing modernization of the LRS. So we would be essentially fully reliant on the sea based leg of the triad. Yesterday, you testified to the Senate that you would request reactivation of bombers on alert if the ground leg were to be removed. You yourself are, as we talked about today, a career submariner and I’m sure are much more familiar than anyone else in the room today with the survivability and effectiveness of our submarine force and submarine launched ballistic missiles, arguments against moving forward with the ground based strategic deterrent are largely based on the premise that the sea laid of the triad can maintain an effective deterrent now and into the future. Now. You’ve also testified that Russia is currently approximately 80 complete with nuclear modernization and recapitalization. While China is considered the department’s overall pacing threat, you stated that Russia is the pacing nuclear threat. Russia. Russian modernization innovation span hypersonic weapons, I C. B. M. S and nuclear power torpedoes. Now yesterday, you called the nuclear threat you expect the United States to face in 2030 as unprecedented. And you focused on the fact that the United States has never before had to deter too nuclear adversaries was separate interests at the same time. Now, in 2017 and 2018, there was reporting that identified Chinese efforts to develop a new satellite which will detect submarines using lasers uh and looking at disturbances in the water. And they have also reported uh reportedly developed new magnetic detection devices and are actively pursuing new technology to be able to detect and neutralize neutralize our nuclear summer submarine forces. Regardless of the success of these individual Chinese efforts, it’s clear that our adversaries are working extremely hard to degrade the survivability of R. C. Leg. So apart from the inherent risks of the reliance on one leg of the trial triad, are you aware of the specific modernization efforts being made by Russia and china to more effectively identify and neutralize our nuclear submarines in the future? Congressman? Thank you for that question. Uh, I’ll try to address all the pieces of that first, I remind respectfully, there’s a fundamental design criteria inside the triad that we assume that we could lose any leg of the triad and still meet all presidential objectives, albeit with reduced flexibility. So it um, without getting into the individual risk. That was just a basic design assumption. And I should point out, yes, I said that yesterday that if all we uh we did not have an intercontinental ballistic missile leg, I would request to re alert the bombers. I would do that. That would only get us through the day today issue. Right. There would still be an overall capacity issue um that I would need to address in order to do all the things the president via the Secretary of Defense has asked me to do as to the survivability of submarines. Yes, there are extensive efforts underway by Russia china and others to improve their anti-submarine warfare capability. This is historic. This has been the case. It’s a classic haider finder competition undersea like in other domains, we have equivalent efforts underway to attempt to find there’s we have extensive programs designed to ensure the survivability of our um submarine force in general ballistic submarines specifically. So I have full confidence in our ability to maintain the survivability of the submarine leg. However, that’s not the only reason or risk. There are also operational and technical things that have nothing to do with the opponent that have to be accounted for an independent of that. We have always assumed that if we we could still lose a leg of the triad and still meet presidential objectives. Outstanding. Thank you. Admiral Mr. Chairman, I yield back thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. It looks like Mr. waltz is no longer here. Mr. brooks. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I’ve got some questions that also revolve around the Space Command Headquarters being located at Redstone arsenal in Tennessee Valley and I want you to think about things in two different contexts. One is merit, the other is non merit or political. And let me run through the merit just for a moment With respect to merit. As I understand the criteria or minimum requirements, there were three one. You have to be within 150 Mile. Excuse me, have to be within the top 150 largest metropolitan statistical areas. You have to be within 25 miles of a military base and you have to score in the top 50 or above on the AARP S Public Policy Institute livability index. Quite clearly, I think everyone agree that Redstone arsenal the Tennessee Valley met those minimum criteria. So once you get past those minimum criteria, then you had a competition of sorts amongst other locales that met those minimum criteria. An evaluation of each site score based on four criteria. 40 points was based on mission related criteria. Sub part of that was workforce by way of emphasis. Tennessee Valley. Redstone arsenal has one of the highest concentration of engineers in the world and certainly in the United States of America, we have mathematicians, scientists, physicists, highly qualified workforce. We have a second subpart mutually supporting space entities. Well, certainly as General Dickinson knows, we’ve got a plethora a space related to military activities on Redstone arsenal. We’re also the home of the Marshall Space Flight Center, which is the birthplace of America’s space program. Very hard for anyone else to compete with the attributes that we have there. So in the 40 points mission-related criteria, I submit that Redstone Arsenal did very, very well as evidenced by what we provide in the Tennessee Valley and and the Redstone Arsenal. Second criteria was infrastructure criteria, parking, land, communications. Some of you are familiar with what we provide at Redstone arsenal. Certainly General Dickinson is a family of military personnel, housing, healthcare. I would submit that we also score very, very well in That second criteria. So that’s 70 of the points. Then you’ve got The third criteria, which is community support, which is 15 points schools. We’ve got excellent schools in the Tennessee Valley. You’ve got a lot of gifted parents and of course they demand High quality schools for their Children, cost of living a plus score. In my judgment, there were one of the lesser expensive places to operate in the United States of America community support. Then, criteria, those 15 points. I submit Redstone arsenal in the Tennessee Valley score very well. Then the fourth criteria, the costs, The Department of the Air Force granted that there is an initial startup cost and at Redstone arsenal that may be higher than at other places. However, there is also the long term operational costs given the lower cost of living. The other things that we offer at Redstone arsenal in Tennessee valley, I would submit that. We also score well according to the cost of the Department of the Air Force criteria. So all that merit based stuff being cited very very quickly. Now I get to my question. This is with respect to each of you. And I’ll start with General Dickinson. Are you aware personal or direct knowledge of any political, non merit influence on the Space Command headquarters? Redstone arsenal location decision, anything other than merit? General Dickinson. Are you any personal direct knowledge? I am not have no personal direct knowledge. Admiral Richard. Are you aware personal direct knowledge of anything that would suggest that the decision to locate base? Command headquarters at Redstone arsenal in the Tennessee valley of Alabama was based on political or non merit influence as opposed to merit congressman? No, I am not Miss Dalton. I know this might be outside your normal ballpark, but same question to you. Are you with personal or direct knowledge? Aware of any political or non merit influences on the space Command headquarters? Redstone arsenal location. Decision. Anything other than merit? No, I’m not. No further questions. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. The gentleman yields back. That is the last question for open session. We will declare a brief recess so that we can make the last vote And then we will return not to this room but 20-12 for the closed session.