Breaking Barriers: The Next Years in Strategic Deterrence Missile Defense


Top Defense Department officials discuss strategic deterrence and missile defense during a virtual conference at the Defense Tech Summit, June, 18, 2020. The speakers are Navy Vice Adm. Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, and Michael E. White, assistant director for hypersonics in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

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Transcript

Thanks. Hi. Patrick Tucker, technology editor for Defense One. Thank you all so much for joining us this morning. Being part of Tech Summit 2020. Very excited this morning to welcome our guests to talk about the future of hyper Sonics hypersonic development in the U. S. Military and countering defending hyper sonics on missile defense for the United States Homeland. Very important. Obviously, uh, roles for the two gentlemen there joining me this morning. Vice Admiral John Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, on joining us by phone. Mike White, assistant director, hyper Sonics on the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering on again, I’m Patrick Tucker. So this morning, talking about all of those different aspects of missile defense for the U. S. On with a special focus on the biggest challenge ahead for defending the US from 21st century threats, which is defending the U. S. From new hypersonic platforms that are under rapid development from competitive countries such as Russia and China. On also hypersonic development that is undergoing in the U. S. Military. Uh, of course, this refers to the development of new missile platforms that can travel five times the speed of sound. But unlike I see, the EMS highly maneuverable on, that presents a incredible challenge or the folks trying to defend really any place from these new types of weapons. Eso. That’s why, in many ways Russia, China, the United States air, all rushing to develop them. So I want to remind all of you that you can’t ask questions. I hope you do use that little tab to the side of the screen there. Send your questions in. As we get going, I typically find that we don’t have at the end of the broadcast enough time for all of the questions that come in. That’s very typically the case. Eso get yours and as soon as you can and I’ll be able to see them and will present them with our panel. And if you’re, uh, uh following along on Twitter, feel free to send me questions that way to at death. Tech Pat. That’s may love to get those in. This is a incredibly complex area of activity, also incredibly important on, and it’s also something that the U. S. Government spends a lot of money on. A swell of the Chinese government as well as the Russian government. So just a sense of how important that is. Went to hear your voices when they hear your questions. Eso with that. Let me kick it off to you, Mr White. Okay. Call you Mike. Yeah, OK. Mike White joining us on the phone, he’s gonna have to head out a little bit early. So just for the folks viewing at home, just know that he doesn’t mean t be rude to us. Has got to go. And we’re very grateful Break and spend some time with us this morning that he can, but give us a sense of what’s coming in the next 12 months in terms of testing and development of new hypersonic weapons in the U. S. Military. Thank you and good morning to everybody. It’s an honor to be here and really an honor to have the role of assistant director hypersonic to try to help the the Department of Nation moved forward aggressively to realize the transformational warfighting capabilities of hypersonic systems and then to be able to defend against adversary hyper sonics working with my teammate Admiral Hill. Um, in accomplishing that mission over the next 12 months. Really, What? What we will see is continued acceleration of the development of offensive hypersonic systems. We just completed a successful flight tests on March 19 demonstrating the common hypersonic glider body and a cooperative activity between Office of Secretary Defence. You know our office here, missile Defense Agency, the Navy and the Army, um, fully successfully demonstrating the capability toe to form intermediate range hypersonic who’s glide strike. And that that test really marked from the beginning of a very active flight test a season over the next 12 months and really over the next several years, where we’re going to take many of our concepts that have been in work for the last several years and demonstrate them through a flight flight test campaign. So a number of our programs across the portfolio will realize flight test demonstration over the next 12 months and then start the transition from weapons system concept development, actual weapons system development. I’m moving forward. What’s the difference between flight tests for glide body and slight test for something that actually performs the way we expect a real hypersonic missile to perform? It’s mainly the difference mainly revolves around the level of tactical realism for the the missile stack on bend the integration into a weapon system where you have the rest of the kill chain involved. So what we can to do is we tend to do ground test development for weapon weapon of vehicle concepts, glide body concepts, cruise missile concepts. We demonstrate those concepts in flight with usually off the shelf booster stacks to get to the representative speeds, um, and flight conditions for those glide bodies to demonstrate them in flight. And then we we validate and verify our design for the hypersonic vehicle itself. And then once we do that, like we’ve just done with the common person glide body, we transition that over to service acquisition programs and weapons system development programs, where they integrate a tactical rocket motor boost system with that glide body, a cruise missile, and they integrated with a launch platform. And then they integrated with a weapon system capability to close the kill chain. Okay. Ah, and the services, all of them have some hypersonic activity that’s that’s going forward. It’s kind of a key aspect of the future of multi domain operations is that everybody be able to, you know, hit both the army, the Navy, the Air Force. Uh uh, that’s what the Marines with hyper sonics, but, uh, that every part of the U. S. Military be able to hit almost any target so that commanders can select among a variety of tools to do different things. Eso I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the unique challenge, though, that the U. S military bases compared to, say, Russia and China, because the our competitors, they’re developing hypersonic weapons. Ah, little bit ahead of schedule than us in many ways. But what they’re looking to do is outfit thes with nuclear weapons, and that relieves them of the burden of of precision. Because you can aim that in, uh, a lot of different ways and have a huge impact because it’s armed with a nuclear weapon. Us is developing hyper sonics that have to be more precise that are intended to, uh, carry conventional payloads so they can carry, uh, nuclear weapons if we decide to. But they’re being designed or a precision strike. Eso Can you talk a little bit about that? The burden of that challenge of trying to on the one hand race against China and Russia and developing these things, but also trying to do so with a special burden of making them much more precise than what our competitors are doing. Um, boy, there’s a lot there. Uh, so let me start off was saying, I haven’t given up on the Marines yet. You know, the Army, the Navy and the air Force air moving out aggressively with hypersonic systems. But we are. We are. So oh, we are also talking to the Marines about possible applications of ground launched high percentage capabilities. That’s one area you discussed relative of the technical challenges. Really, the technical challenges are driven mainly by the physics, and so we all have the same technical challenges to overcome primarily associated with the thermal protection. When you fly fast, do the friction of the air against the body surface, things get very hot, and the faster you apply, How did they get? And so we’re designing systems to comply anywhere between Mark five and not 20 and there’s various systems, have different challenges and different magnitudes of challenges associate with thermal protection and the other key element of of technical challenges for the cruise missiles designing a propulsion system that is thermally balanced has the proper thermal protection and can accelerate and power hypersonic cruise missiles. So those technical challenges are are there for what us as well as they are for others who potentially would be developing hypersonic weapons. I think you know, our adversaries are developing capabilities that are that are intended to be both conventional and nuclear. So they have similar kinds of accuracy requirements for their conventional strength weapon applications. And we are only looking at conventional systems and looking at the tactical tactical fight, trying to bring advanced capabilities to the fight for a conventional exchange. So four of the conventional weapons again, the requirements are the same we’re looking to develop as you mention a family of weapons that integrate with multiple platforms sea bass platforms both under underwater and and on the sea surface, laying based platforms and airbase platforms because we want diversity in our ability to deliver capability, and we’re looking at a portfolio that that that addresses a wide range of targets and really the accuracy and the guidance in control in the terminal sensor requirements, I’m are all driven by the target type, so if you’re going after a relatively small target, but it’s fixed, you know you have high precision necessary. If it’s moving, you have to be able to handle a moving target in the end game, and that drives you more towards the secret kind of capability. So, really, the requirements are driven by target tight, Um, and the missile type that you that you decide to field. And I think that’s requirements are pretty consistent whether it’s us doing it or somebody else, Right? Uh, I spoke earlier, but when, Um if Russia and China are developing a missile that can be outfitted both of the conventional warhead and nuclear warhead that you just outfitted with a nuclear warhead and it turns out that your guidance work was not particularly good, no one notices the faulty guidance work is much. When you have created a weapon, they will work. How do you say close is only good enough in horseshoes and nuclear nuclear weapon warheads? Right. But before we get to admiral Hell talk, because this was something I hadn’t heard talk a little bit more about that development or that conversation that you’re having with the Marines in terms of how they would feel the hypersonic weapon because, uh, it seems like one of the big advantages of these platforms is that if it’s traveling that fast, you can launch them from, ah, wide variety of places. But you need not necessarily be that close to the area that you’re looking to get into. And, you know, the point of the Marines is that they’re supposed to be the first through that, into that area and onto that beach. So tell us a little bit about how they’re what you’re talking about with the Marines on what sort of special hypersonic ability they might need. Well, the Marines bring agility to the to the land campaign, right? So they are a natural force. They can. They can be in certain places with a relatively small footprint relatively quickly, and so that agility and flexibility allows for a number of different advantages. And so there’s some conversations happening between DARPA and the Marines in particular, to talk about, you know, the potential transition of ah, land based, um, hypersonic capability to the Marines and and it’s just being discussed is part of the opportunity space for future application of hypersonic weapons. All right. Uh, well, thank you very much. And we come back to you in a second, is Ah, we get in some questions, but let me turn to you. Admiral Hill can call you John. Is that okay? Absolutely. That’s just fine. Okay, Uh, I just asked because so far have been calling. I’ve been asking every officer if I could address them by their civilian name. So I want to make sure that were consistent, because that’s the best way to do it. I think the administration is asking for, ah, 20 billion for missile defense programs in fiscal 2021 which is actually down a little bit from from last year on. And a zai understand it. The amount that is being asked for specifically for the development of future hypersonic defenses About is that about three billion? Yeah. I, uh, first all Patrick, thanks for having me here this morning. And I do love death tech, Pat. Pretty awesome. My name there, but, uh, yeah, when it comes to the budget, I’m glad you brought it up because it’s it’s a holistic of you. So when you when you quote the $20 billion figure or you picked a $3 billion figure. You know, that’s not all Missile Defense Agency funding, because is my quite, uh and for a long time kind of laid out for you. You know, it’s it’s an all service campaign, gets its multiple different strategies. You know, from a defensive perspective, from from where I work, you know, it’s it’s under the assumption that we’re not a first strike country, so you need to have a defensive cable bility. And those defenses can emerge from whether it’s a sea based platform like a ship. Or it’s a battery protecting some critical acid, those sorts of things. So investment streams are a lot of different areas when it comes to missile defense. You know, my bread and butter is a ballistic missile defense. We’ve been named as the executive agent for hypersonic missile defense. We’re also doing work up for Northern Command in a cruise missile too fast world, You know the day when you when you’re on the receiving end, right, they all start to look the same, right? So we’re not yours to defending against the hypersonic speeds because ballistic missiles air coming in at hypersonic speeds and I grew up on destroyers where cruise missiles coming on the deck were at hypersonic speeds. We know how to go defend. We just have to pick most vulnerable pyre. I’m most wonderful portion of that flight profile, right? Eso India’s budget of that 20 billion is specifically about 9.2 billion Aziz. The request? I think so. It is significantly smaller than the entirety of the missile defense request. So in living Teoh Mike White and talking about these new platforms, uh, tell us a little bit about, uh, how you have to now create an entire new architecture to try encounter these incredibly useful and terrifying new weapons and that new architecture folks that follow the space are very familiar with some aspects of it, Like the new space sensor layer that we’re fielding low earth orbit satellites that can, uh, identify and track. Hypersonic says they’re moving into the space and also new interceptors. So tell us a little bit about that architecture, what you needed to do, and over the next few years, couple big milestone timelines that you’re shooting for. Yeah, a great great things thinks that dream. And I’m glad you mentioned are electrical because that’s really what it is all about. We can certainly leverage a lot of what we have or a ballistic missile capability. What we have for cruise missile capability, what the services have deployed and four deployed. So it does start with the sensing, so we haven’t talked specifics about the threat yet, but I’ll kind of walk you through kind of a very simple way to think of it. So these could be land launched silo launched. They can be air launched and they can certainly just be ballistically watched. So all three of those cases challenge our current sensor architecture, right? So we have to work on the sensor and then because they do maneuver and they are global, you have to be able to track them worldwide and globally. So it does drive you towards a space architecture, which is where we’re going. We’re working a sensor system called the Hypersonic and Ballistic Missile Tracking System. And what that is is as ballistic missiles increasing their complexity typically like dem targets, very hard to see very hard to track from a terrestrial based sensor, you’re gonna be able to look down from cold space under that warmer and be able to see those and then as hyper sonics come up and look ballistic initially have been turned into something else, you have to be able to track that maintain track In order for us to transition from indications of mourning into a fire control solution, we have to have a firm track and you really can’t handle the global maneuver problem without space. So RHB TSS system working within the space that development agency SDA, also within the undersecretary for research and Engineering, were were sync up together. We’re going Teoh Timelines for that is Teoh in the early 27 will be putting up a couple of demo, uh, birds t demonstrate our tracking. We’ve had a prototyping and demo version of those satellites in space for a while. Now we’re collecting data, and the most important thing you should build after architecture is really understanding the threat. And we have leveraged our current sensors that are sea based or terrestrial along with space sensors we have today and we know how to travel. So the question is, can you proliferate that Leo arc texture? Get those specific sensors in the air to do that. So I think the battle problem only has always as detect control. Engage. Right. So centres are one thing, then there is getting to that fire control solution and then finally to that interceptor world. So where we’re at today is we do have a deployed terminal capability that we’re continuing to evolve. We started off. Really? It was about protecting the aircraft carrier against that. What you’ve seen as carrier killers in the news. Those air holding maneuver Hi G very fast at threats, they look and smell like a hypersonic missile because they are eso right now, we have a fleet equipped to protect the aircraft carrier against that kind of threat. But you don’t want to limit yourself to that terminal part of the engagement. So if you back up to terminal, where most of maneuver that happening in the atmosphere and you go to the glide phase where they’re skipping along the atmosphere, that is probably the most vulnerable space for a hypersonic inbound missile to operate. And that is sweet spot to engage. And so right now we’re coming through our technology programs and gonna leverage are the evolution of systems we have to go after that black. That’s the next step for us. About 2023 is what I’ve been reading recently is kind of a timeline for space based hypersonic tracking eyes. That sound we’re on target to you were part of the national less space architecture working with SDA and that that is our target timeline to get the first set of capabilities. Okay, uh, and want to stick with us for just a second in terms of what these new satellites were would look at. Like I spent a lot of time talking to satellite makers, commercial satellite makers, which the U. S military has been spending a lot more time engaging with mostly for calms and band, with reasons they want to make sure that there’s band within all of the places where, uh, the US might have to operate in the years ahead. These satellites, they’re going to be charged with tracking hyper sonics. There’s no possibility of using something like a small mini sets that of the sort that looked like starling satellites or other satellites that might have a dual commercial purpose. You have to build these from scratch very specifically for this purpose is that right? There is potential for smaller satellites, a part of the overall constellation, but yes, there there are some specific requirements. And again, it’s about going from indications and morning. You’re just seeing a flash just isn’t good enough. We have to actually build a track. So there are some specific requirements in terms of labeling in the amount of the radiance that that she’d be able to pick up and remember this things moving really, really fast. So if you look at our radars today, just the way they filter information that coming through because they assume that the track is moving at a certain speed, ballistic missiles tender move slow, so constant hits and you can build the track. But something moves very quickly. Point A to point B. It’s viewed as clutter, and it’s dropped. So one of the things that we’re doing today is we’re incorporating, too filter changes within our radars that we have to pulling today so that they can maintain and holding process hypersonic tracks. So that’s that’s That’s just part about what we’re doing. And so yeah, there there there are uses for smaller satellites and those sorts of things But you do have stamp a purpose built capabilities to go after that. Specific A radiance when it’s ah globally deployed. Okay, I want to turn back for a second in a minute because I want to get a sense in my head. Uh, what radiance looks like depending on different missiles, there’s probably that in time you can tell me maybe just a little bit. But before my quite has to go and do what he needs to dio, I wanted to bring him a question about the supply chain or hyper Sonics. There’s been port up from JV any recently, talking a little bit about that supply chain. And you know, of course, we live in a world of globalised supply chains. It’s a issue that we’re gonna be talking about for years. There’s a lot of benefits to that. In terms of costs. There are some risks inherent in that, uh, is convening report talks about the possibility that, uh, different elements of the hypersonic supply chain for the U. S. Have vulnerability to the Chinese. Um, how first of all, can you comment on that directly on the possibility that the Chinese government may have some portion of the supply chain for U. S hypersonic development. Um, and can you talk a little bit about the supply chain in general for these? Because they’re incredibly complex pieces of equipment, and that means bringing it alive, different players, And increasingly, bringing in more players means potentially drawing from a globalised supply chain. So, first, can you talk to that specific point of, uh, uh, Chinese industry being in any way involved in the supply chain for U. S hypersonic? I did see that report on Duh. Basically, that’s always a concern. And, you know, any of our weapons systems. The integrity of the supply chain is a critical a critical concern of, uh, what we do across the department. So I will say that we are looking at supply chain pretty actively. You know, we are right now in a state of development and maturity where we’re building of these systems and relatively small numbers. But we’re looking to accelerate our our production rate very, very quickly and to significant production numbers over the next couple of years. Um, and we’ve established a war room between research and engineering side of LSD and the acquisition sustainment side of USD as we transition from a research environment to an acquisition environment. Aan dat War Room is designed to assess the help of the US supply chain for the key tears of acquisition within within three acquisition industrial base, and part of that assessment will be the integrity of that of that supply chain. So we’re looking both that capacity and capability as well as integrity of that supply chain through this war room process. And based on that assessment, will be making the necessary investments, too, to ensure that it’s a robust, secure supply chain moving forward in particular as we get into the acquisition side of the strategy. So it sounds like right now it’s ah, it’s a valid concern. But when you get to acquisition, we get time. Teoh, start scaling up these efforts. By then, you think that you’ll have this this issue solved, and so it won’t be part of the acquisition and production cycle went kind of really counts. I don’t know the validity of the concern because I haven’t seen the data and the specifics of what the concern addresses. I’ve just read the report, so I don’t know the validity of the specific concern with respect the hyper Sonics. I just can say that it’s a valid concern and all that we do in weapons system development. So whenever we develop a weapon in general, we spend a lot of time ensuring the integrity of the supply chain and and that, you know, sometimes you just are you have no choice but to buy foreign source parts from. And when we do that for critical weapons systems, we go through a process to tear down those parts and assess integrity. And make sure that that supply chain is is, ah, reasonable supply chain for the application. And we drive down the risk of that supply chain being compromised. So that won’t be any different for hyper Sonics as we move forward a swell. So okay, don’t know the ability, The report. I just know what the report said. I know it’s a general concern. OK, great. Uh, and one more before you go, this is a concern that has been brought to me a couple of different venues, mostly by military research and development leaders, something that they bring up in Congress and something that they bring up the American people uh, in one of the big challenges in developing these hyper sonics in the past. And maybe it’s something that we’re beginning to get on top of now has been inadequate ranges eso test ranges. This is something that we had a long time ago. We had adequate ranges to test new types of missiles and things like that during the Cold War they fell out of utility is we, uh, arguably prevailed in the Cold War. And now between China and Russia. We, uh, weren’t having this sort of test ranges that we needed. Teoh speed up our development. There’s been some movement to increase capacity of test rangers. Uh, think at the time, we just have, uh, when we were beginning this conversation about hypersonic test in 2017 I think there’s only one asked, uh, one aims. I think there’s been some movement to build a couple more test ranges in Texas, for instance. Where are we on this issue of test rangers? Are we adequately up to the challenge now? And what is the future of that look like? Yeah, So I in the way You just asked that question? I’m assuming you mean ranges in terms of ground and flight tests. Yeah, um, so the infrastructure And so we have a key element of our strategy we have. You know, our strategy is multiple elements that span across workforce and university Consorcio on. And, uh, testing evaluation is a big element of that strategy. We have been making significant investment over the last several years to increase hypersonic test infrastructure. And in fact, an example of that is the the high pressure are mid mid pressure Arquette at Arnold Engineering and Development Center in Tennessee. That is a very, very high demand facility protesting our temperature materials for applications to hypersonic systems. And so the keeper goes have been put in place. I can tell you the demand signal is pretty steep for those capabilities because they apply hypersonic systems as well as systems being developed for nuclear modernization and missile defense. And so round test facilities are continually assessed. The demand signals continually assessed that we’ve got significant investment going into enhancing our ground test facilities primarily for high temperature materials testing, and were air breathing, propulsion testing for the cruise missiles. As I mentioned earlier, we have a very aggressive flight test campaign that we’re I’m about to embark on or have embarked on and that will that will place demand signal on our flight test ranges. We have a number of flight test ranges now that we use Point Magoo and the California ranges, um, the Pacific Missile Range facility out in Kauai, Hawaii, and those ranges are useful for our applications. And then we look at all the Senate ranges as well. There’s, Ah, there’s a range in rumor and Australia. That’s a very attractive range. Riper Sonics. We have done a flight test range study to assess what our demand signal is. I’m looking at, you know, in Atlantic Range going off while it’s island off cape. Um, And look, look, we’re looking at other options for overland ranged as well. So we’ve got a pretty comprehensive look that that we’ve made at the are taken at the at the flight test range, capacity and capability. And we’re working at investment strategy for for this upcoming accelerate flight test campaign as well. Okay. Right. Thank you, sir. Was that something to talk? Thank you for the invitation has been a has been a pleasure interacting. And I’ll leave you to the good services of Admiral Hill to close out the discussion. Okay. Thank you, Mr White. Appreciate it, Mike. So, uh, want to turn back? If I can Teoh this question of the future architect that you just described John looking at future interceptors, it’s something that no covering the space. For a long time, there have been some successes. And, um, with the new redesigned kill vehicle, there have been some, uh, some backward steps, very hard to make, something that can, like a bullet that can hit a bullet in a low earth orbit or anywhere else, tell us about the current progress of developing interceptors that can potentially take out a hypersonic weapon because it seems like it’s destroying a conventional warhead is already pretty hard than the very nature of these weapons is, of course, to defy interception. Sure. Absolutely. Let me I’ll walk up from that terminal to the client base again. So in the terminal, military operating in the atmosphere. Right. So you you’ll be the incoming threats gonna have patrol surfaces. It’s gonna be maneuvering. It’s gonna be pointing towards more than likely even there may be corkscrewing toward some intended targets so that that in itself is it’s own problems were you can’t do. That, of course, is with a highly maneuverable missile that has, ah, delete it to do high G’s. And, you know, Nana maneuvering world like that that were it to kill may not be necessary. You might be just fine just to throw it off course with someone’s explosive type of warhead eso so that that’s the one problem a zoo walk up into the glide days again, where it’s not maneuvering as much. It may be, you know, doing turns and maybe leading off heat and those sorts of things so it’s inspected, vulnerable in that, you know, skipping over the atmosphere faces display. So really, what it comes down to is getting up to that that range and then being able to divert over. So some of the technologies that we’ve been investing in over the last couple of years, as since being decimated as the executive Asian for defense, has been on in the Seeker area secret windows and materials. It’s been on the high divert capability and Gilbert knees, you know, to be able to course corrections at the 11th hour for that sort of hit to kill we’ve had last. The base internally over is hit to kill necessary. There’s a lot of benefits on imparting kinetic energy on an incoming missile. When it’s eventually nuclear, you tend to have just a mess destruction that you get it if they know that that force that imparts step, that momentum and kinetic energy into it. But if trying to just get it off of that blank face, um, you know, you could probably get away with less than kids kill. So we were into precision guidance because we always want to assume that’s where we’re going to go, and we’ll continue to work with precision guidance aspects of glide phase. But there will be some relief in that era budget if we decide to go with some sort of conventional type warhead as opposed to a hit to kill. Okay, so this space to sense earlier that you’re making these satellites does this new interceptor? Is it necessary that it be able to collect targeting data from those satellites? Because this is a new thing for interceptors they don’t usually keep big data from satellites never been done before. Is that a necessary requirement for this interceptor. There is just a desired requirement. It’s so, so well, most sensors or most interceptors are gonna be agnostic is to where the data cover. So I can tell you it will depend on where you’re at. In some areas of the globe, you know, we have lots of sensor coverage, and we’ll be speeding that sensor data into the combat system that will then drive intercept where it goes. Enough places, large expanses, say, like in the Pacific right, that that’s where space becomes very, very useful and that the concept of the architecture of that is to fuse that data and bring it to the firing unit, whether it’s a ship or land based battery on, then that allows that to to use that as the fire control solution, so really agnostic to it. You want to take what data have I mentioned earlier that for indications Morning today we’re using existence based sensors, existing terrestrial based and sea based sensors, and we can corn tracks, Uh, in the future. I think it’s and oh, by the way, just a little correction. We have done launched and engage on data from space assets already so we know how to. Okay, uh, it sounds like it’s something that you would want if there was a era of proliferated potential hypersonic weapons. But if we’re talking about something on a single now track from the ground, an intercept from the ground that it is a possibility and show yes, absolutely way take. And in fact, every flight tests we do. We have space sensor data that we bring down and form fire partial solutions. And sometimes we’ll use that for the test. Or sometimes we’ll take it offline and run it against different scenarios. Ensure that we can close our Children. You know one important things, though. Patrick, I just want to get out here as a defense time. Um, our biggest challenge is not only developing systems to defend, but we also have to develop the targets that we shoot against. And so when we go in and build a threat represented target shoot against, you know that that’s that’s a challenge, because you want to get it right on. And that’s one of reasons why were part of the memorandum of understanding with services and their hypersonic development, because as they develop crawl offensive capability. Uh, we’re looking at that same production line for targets. So it just all Mary’s together. We’re leveraging what we’re doing on that. That’s aside a lot of the range capacity that we have such brought that up earlier. Particularly might cuss range sensors, data collection, telemetry collection were leveraging that in the offensive world today. So it is team ball on both the offensive. Indecent. Okay, um, so just a couple more here and I want to remind everybody there’s a little bit of time for questions. I’m getting one or two in from Twitter when I ask you one got from Kingston Reef. Ah, good friend of mine. Over Arms control center. Uh, big fan of your work. What is your reaction to Japan’s decision announced this week? To suspend fielding of to a genius Assure systems. What are the implications for co development of the sm Three to a. So that’s certainly a big been a big surprise for a lot of folks in the missile defense community. Japan’s decision to spend fielding to a genius, a short systems Is that something that’s gonna be a big problem? Where what do you what’s your reaction? Well, so might my reaction is it’s not related. I present defense that right now I would say that the government of Japan issue today. We’re working very closely with them to resolve concerns and issues. It’s really suffering this stain from the S and three cooperative development. That’s a separate foreign military sales case. That development is complete. We’re going to production. Yes, and three black to a missile separate, distinct. It would be leveraged. Buy aegis ashore. We just have some work to do with Japan. Teoh live this suspension subsidy. But I would defer questions to the government. Japan’s That is a very recent session. Yeah, in terms of the intercept capability that provides are your level of concern or worry about that on a scale of 1 to 5, because I too, I’m curious about it. Five Very concerned about it. One being I sleep fine and I’m not worried at all. I think that there are other options in the near term for the government of Japan for the national missile defense, and again it’s a suspension. So obviously some concerns and some work that will do which a panda to bring those systems that bear okay, US protection perspective. Hey, like I said, it really well, leverage every sensor on every weapon out there. So whether they build those or not, if there there were using it or not, and we have other options. Okay, Uh, that city, what is your sense of the effect of hypersonic technology on nuclear deterrence? We’ll have a great effect or a little effect. So someone of a philosophical question, but your sense of hyper sonics and the rolling deterrence. Yeah, I am. I I sort of, ah, group defense as part of the trance. So if you don’t have the ability to defend, then you’re really dependent on other options. And I think it’s, ah, it’s gonna be very country dependent on the threat. Okay, um, a question that I have after listening to this and that. I know that shows to talk about for a long time based on what you’re describing. The challenges, the primary challenges and hypersonic missile defense are kind of just more much more complex and difficult versions of the same challenges that are in conventional missile defense. The closer it is to the target, that’s where things become tricky. But just let lifting off the launch pad. That boost phase, That’s the area where you know targeting and destruction is gonna be easiest and potentially have the most of the least amount of risk. Uh, based on what you’re talking about, it sounds like the best way to do that remains a some point hitting that boost phase portion of that of that lunch. You need to be able to do that either with a plane that is within the airspace already, which seems very difficult or from space. So does this mean that the course you’re not in charge of policy for whether or not we should have space based kinetic weapons but in terms of how useful they would be where hypersonic defense is that the place where, uh, defending against these missiles is going to be? We will get the most bang for our buck. Yet for as long as I’ve been in the job, I’ve been director for a year now, and I was the deputy for a couple years. There’s been a lot of discussion on boost days. It’s really difficult, Um, and you talk about maybe being lower risk. I viewed his high risk, and in the reason I say this is you know, just the way a typical ballistic missile attack works is you will see the flash protections from space that missile flag through the field of view multiple radar as we develop the track and way shoot the interceptor. So if you want to move from terminal to mid course into the Bruce face looking, you have to have very exquisite indications of morning and be able to form a track. And you have to be there with a weapon and the aircraft, right? So if you look at where most of the trajectories fly, you know, for a boost facing, let’s just pick a country like like North Korea, you know, ask yourself based on those trajectories to the U. S. Where the aircraft need to be the constable operations on that or not really so eventually that takes you to that discussion about whether or not you should be in space. I personally believe that if the country decides to make that decision and go to space, that’s probably the most effective way todo Bruce phase. The problem is, it’s gonna be policy rules of engagement and other issues because you’re right on the edge of a strike mission if you’re doing space, right. So I don’t believe that that is a ballot defensive move for first strike. You know, it’s in Texas after the war has begun. If you’re gonna go do that, cause now you’re flying over the country, you’re over other countries. You’re okay, miss out, like there. There’s gonna be a rules of engagement and philosophical discussion about with Yeah, I wonder if you could in the little time we have left. This is, um you were talking about contrast the rules of engagement for traditional intercept versus something space based because with traditional intercept, I read about this all the time. You potentially have to blow up something coming out of North Korea over Russia, which is potentially problematic. Whereas if you’re operating from space, contrast the rules of engagement for those two different interests and which was easier. Right? Says so. I’m probably not the right guy to answer that question because it really is a policy issue. It is something for the command commands to debate. We be war, game it with our command commands on regular basis. And I would tell you it is a high tempo conversation cause there’s so many pluses and minuses to that question. It’s a difficult question. I’m really not. It’s a little bit out of my wheel. House Patrick as a defender. Okay. Understood. Uh, but if you’re talking about space based interceptors, well, I mean, how many combatant commands would be involved in figuring out if you should do boost phase, space based intercept? That would just be like one, right? Well, e, I would assume it’s the same model we operate under today. Strategic Command is when I say support the war fire that is the primary warfighter because they provide me requirements. OK, account north North com for Conus protection into pay com from civic. And so, But generally I believe, you know, unless things change. You know, when you get to that world of rocks space based intercept, which again is not program a record not funded, not not something we’re working on actively today. I assume the same sort of structure, which is a very effective structure today on one of the challenges and fielding and funding. That sort of thing someone has been watching this for several years is of course, technical challenge of putting something in space that can do that sort of thing. Uh, the Undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, Mike Griffin, has said that before anything like that becomes even feasible. They’re not looking at QinetiQ intercept. I don’t think, Uh, so you’re looking at directed energy, uh, on an onboard space platform. He’s for test that you know you about a megawatt, which seems like a lot to lunch put into space. Uh, what’s your You have a rough estimate. Kind of back of envelope for when it might be possible to put a megawatt in space for a potential space based intercept. And first of all, the yeah, I work for Dr Griffin. He I are total saint kind of slow. They’re just ton of policy issues, but mostly tackle issues to get two megawatt level power. We couldn’t do that. And I think, you know, industry is showing that they can the government feel activities. Labs have road maps to get there, but to get into in scale. And I’m talking waiting power, which is much tougher than it is today, is gonna take a long time. So whether rides on an aircraft Oh, our satellite. I think we’re years away from But we do have an investment stream to get to this power levels, and it is important to be at this power levels. I would say, if you are an aircraft operating above the atmosphere, uh, you’re gonna need a megawatt of power if you’re gonna burn through a, uh, ballistic missiles up case. I think we round time because

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