Q&A following NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s speech at the Körber Global Leaders Dialogue
Transcript
(audience applause)
So Mr. Secretary General, thank you very much for that truly inspirational speech and I think I speak on behalf of everyone here in the audience. And thanks also for agreeing to stick around a bit to take a couple of questions. So you laid out a full plate of issues and I thought maybe we can start with the elephant in the room. You said, “The US is not abandoning Europe, “quite the opposite.” And of course, that’s more than welcome to all of us Atlanticists, but we all know that there are also different noises coming out of D.C. NATO being obsolete, or maybe not. We’re the schmucks paying for the whole thing. Let’s send out some builds, So I was wondering do you think that if and when President Trump gets reelected next year, do you think we’ll be here to see NATO’s 80th birthday?
Yes. (audience laughing)
Can you elaborate? The thing is I think so, but then I have to add something. And that of course, there’s no guarantee. Because we are an alliance of 29 democracies. And democracies, people elect different governments, they have different opinions, and they disagree. So people who are looking for a warm message from all NATO allies of all countries, they’re looking for totally different alliance. So I grew up in Norway in the ’60s and the ’70s and there was a lot of discussion whether Norway should stay in NATO. I had some good friends who were strongly against NATO. Very close to me. So the reality is that people are– open debate, discussions, disagreements, it’s for me not a expression of weakness but of strength. Because the reality is despite all these differences and disagreements, we have always been able to unite around our core parts to be able to defend each other and always able to overcome differences. I have mentioned this many times before but I wasn’t around in 1956 but I guess the atmosphere in NATO was not very good when you have this huge crises. But I was around in 2003 and it was not easy to deal with the Iraq war. But the reality is we have always been able to stand together in NATO. My message is that it’s up to us to decide. It’s up to us to stand up and to overcome the differences and then make sure that we preserve this alliance. No one will do that for us. It’s not a force of nature that will make that happen. We have to make it happen. And that’s our responsibility. Instead of complaining, do something. And make sure that we solve the problems and issues, because there are problems and issues. I’m not denying that. They don’t disappear. But we either have to solve them or make sure that they don’t undermine our unity. Then, I forgot, I have one more thing. And that is that I’m politician. And the governments and politics, it’s very often that you have, as I say, good rhetorics and not so good substance.
[Audience] Really?
Yeah, at least in Norway. Never in Germany, never in Germany. But in NATO it’s normally the opposite. The rhetoric is not always a good habit. But the reality is that when you look at the facts, the ground, we do more together than have done for decades. Hiring the armed forces. For first time in history, combated the battle groups. Increased presence in the East. Tripled the size of the NATO response force. Increased defense spending in all NATO allied countries for five years in a row. And more US troops in Europe. So I’m not underestimating the challenges and the differences on climate change, on trade, on any other issues. But when it comes to the core task of NATO, delivering collective defense, we are actually delivering more substance than we have done for many years. And that helps. When substance is good, rhetoric may be so-so but substance counts.
That does help. And I also like– (applause) I really like the passion, Mr. Secretary General. But let me confront you with something, in fact, your predecessor said, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He said that NATO is militarily strong, in terms of the substance, but politically weak. And some people, I’m being told, call that the Stoltenberg Paradox. Is he wrong? Is Anders Fogh Rasmussen wrong?
I will never criticize a predecessor. No, no, but– I understand what he says. Because he says, with all the words, what I said now. That when it comes to substance, when you see what we actually do together, we do more, spend more, invest more, modernize more, than we’ve done for decades. And I made a list. We also adapted the command structure with you, the command here in Germany. And Germany’s spending more. So that’s substance. But then of course, yes, we have some differences. First of all, these differences are also real. The disagreements on trade are real. The disagreements on the Iran nuclear are real. But the best thing would be if we are able to solve those differences. But as long as they remain unsolved, we need to minimize negative consequences on NATO. And we’ve been quite successful in doing that. So that’s my message, my response to that. I know that there’s questions us and so on, but if you go to United States– First of all, in my first press conference with President Trump, he said, this is quote, “I used to say that NATO’s obsolete, “but NATO’s not longer obsolete.”
That was thanks to you?
It doesn’t matter. So that’s a good thing. And I totally agree with him. Then second, they increased their presence in Europe. But thirdly, if we look at opinion poll in United States, it’s a record high support for NATO. Hardly every quarter strongly support for NATO. then they record now. And if you go to the US Congress, they have a very strong bipartisan support for NATO. So again, in politics, in the real world, no guarantees exist. But it is absolutely political support in the United States for NATO. Also because they see that European allies are stepping up. And also because they realize that NATO’s important for them. Partly because we have 9/11, the only time we wrote Article V, was after attack on United States. They know that European allies have been together with them in Afghanistan and in other places. Second, in United States, they are concerned about the size of China. United States have always been the biggest economy, the most advanced technology, the biggest everything. Now, China’s becoming bigger. Bigger economy, big agility, increasing defense spending, and advanced when it comes to technology. So I tell the Americans, if you are concerned about size, then you should keep your friends close. Because together we are really big. So I told them it’s good to have friends and they agreed. So we are happy.
Will convey that message to my company tomorrow. Mr. Secretary General, some people say that NATO has two problems: one American and one German. So let’s move over– and I know you disagree. But let’s move over to Germany for a moment. It is rumored that you are Chancellor Merkel’s favorite social democratic. I don’t know whether this is true or not. So I wanted to ask you a bit about the debate here in Germany. The SPD is rather opposed to raising Germany’s defense budget. So what is your message to your German comrades?
I think that it’s extremely– I’m acknowledged social democratic. But I think that when I decided to become Secretary General of NATO I also decided to leave party politics. And partly to leave the weeds of party politics. And at least, leave the weeds of party politics, not to join German party politics. So I think that it will be absolutely wrong if I started to be part of the domestic debate. And that happens in almost all of the countries I visit, they’re trying to drag me into a domestic debate. I will not do that because that would undermine my task. My task is to keep the alliance together. We don’t have two problems in NATO. We have 29 allies. So again, it will not help. What I can say is that I, of course, expect all allies to deliver on the pledge we made together. We made the pledge to increase defense spending. But, you know, Germany, as Norway, as all the NATO allies, should not invest in defense to please me or to please United States. They should invest in defense because it is in the security interest of German to do so. To make sure that your armed forces can protect Germany. And if your armed forces can do that, they also help to protect the whole NATO. That’s the reason. You need ready forces, you need capable forces, you need well-equipped, well-trained forces. And I say this also, and then I can also tell you that before I became the Secretary General of NATO, I was for some years, in the 1990s I was Minister of Finance in Norway. And then I cut defense budgets. That was one of my specialties. (audience laughter)
[Moderator] But that’s not a policy recommendation.
No, no, no. But then the things is that we all did that. Because in the 1990s, this was few years after the end of the Cold War, the came down of the Berlin Wall. We all thought we were moving towards a less uncertain world, more safe world, a partnership with Russia. So I was not the only Minister of Finance that was reducing defense budgets. We all did that. Because when tensions are going down it’s possible to reduce defense budgets. But now, tensions are going up. So if you cut budgets when tensions are going down, you have to be able to increase budgets when they’re going up. And then for us to start to increase defense budgets as Prime Minister of Norway some years later. So I understand that it’s not easy to increase defense budget but that’s just something we have to do when we live in a more unpredictable world.
On that note, and to be a bit even-handed when it comes to domestic politics in Germany, I also wanted to ask you about our Minister of Defense’s proposal for a security zone in Northern Syria. I understand your initial response was cautiously positive? Do you think that the proposal will make it to the agenda of the Leader’s Summit in London in early December or will it end up somewhere in the annals of NATO?
That depends very much on the developments in Norther Syria and in Syria in general. The main message is that what has happened in Syria and North Syria over the last weeks just underscores the importance of trying to find a political solution. And we have seen some progress, some new initiatives, and at least since the initial uptick in fighting, we’ve also seen a reduction in violence in North Syria. And we have to build on that to try to create the conditions for a politics solution. And therefore, I welcomed proposals, initiatives, that can help that happen. But, of course, at the end of the day, this has to be negotiated, agreed, not only among NATO allies but among different actors which are operating in the region on the ground. And therefore, no one can dictate the solution. No one can dictate any kind of international presence. It has to be something which is negotiated. And it’s too early, too hard to tell the outcome and whether there’s some kind of international military presence in North Syria will be part of such a solution.
And you didn’t think it was a bit too late, now that Russia and Turkey are already carving up Syria amongst themselves?
But again, that depends. And I think it’s extremely hard to predict. We have to realize that United States, publicly, but also in NATO meetings, they urged NATO allies, not NATO as NATO necessarily, but NATO allies, to increase their presence in North Syria. That was something a year ago that was publicly expressed from the US. It was not a big rush from NATO allies to join them there. And then they decided to withdraw. And then we had all the events that happened after that. We can discuss how it happened, why it happened, but I think now we have to face the realities on the ground. And then do whatever we can do then to support the efforts to find a politics solution.
Right. Mr. Secretary General, I have one last question to you before I open it up for our guests. And that question is about public opinion, pretty much. When you were still the Prime Minister of Norway, I think you once spent an afternoon practically working as a cab driver incognito. And it must have been very funny because you could have put on sunglasses and the cab driver’s uniform. So if you were to do that same thing in Brussels today, what would you expect people to ask you or to hear about NATO and what would be your response to that?
To be honest, I don’t know what they would ask me about. But you should go and watch me being taxi driver in Oslo on YouTube. Then you understand that I had to go back to politics. Because that was not a great success and the passengers, they didn’t want to pay actually, because they regarded it as such a lousy driving. No, but I think that one of the challenges we are faced with is that we should never want to go back to the Cold War. But at least in the Cold War it was a very well-defined world order. We had in a way the East against the West, the Warsaw Pact against NATO. And we had one threat, that was the Soviet Union and nuclear war. Now, one of the challenges we face, and I think because of that is reflected in many of the conversations and meeting I have with people, is that it’s much more confused. It’s much more unpredictable. And for instance, the whole situation in Syria describes that. It’s really not easy for anyone. And also there are so many different threats and challenges. We still have more issues to Russia. They have nuclear weapons, they have annexed a part of a neighbor, Ukraine, Crimea. But we have cyber, we have terrorism, and we have also, of course, what you started with, the internal divisions. So I think people, I don’t know exactly what they would ask, but I think the conversation I have with people reflects this confusion, the very complexity of threats and challenges we are faced with.
Thanks so much for now. Ladies and gentleman, it’s up to you now. Let me just say that you should please be very concise, very crisp. Please remember that every question should really end with a question mark. And please briefly introduce yourselves. I think, as almost always, I’m temped to say, Johannes van Alaves was first.
Johannes van Alaves, political advisor to German social democrats in Parliament. Secretary General, the Defense Minister’s come up with the proposal of setting up a National Security Council in Germany too. I ask you, with a view to your experience in Norway, do you have that kind of thing or are there other ways of arriving at a kind of whole-of-government approach effectively when it comes to security?
I’m afraid that I’m not going to give you a very good answer. Because I really mean that this is for every nation to decide, every government to decide. And different government organize their work in very different ways. You know, some governments there are quite few ministers, a small cabinet. And then actually the cabinet is, in reality, the security council. Then other governments that have many ministers and many junior ministers and then they form smaller groups which are addressing security issues. In the Norwegian government, I know this because I’ve had my own experiences, most of the security issues are discussed among all ministers around the table. But we also have a smaller group, I don’t know exactly the English translation, but a kind of security council, security committee, of the Norwegian government. We meet– they meet, not we meet, when they did and they address partly defense issues but also security related to resilience. For instance, the consequences of the Paris attacks back in 2011. So I think it would be absolutely wrong, when you have 29 different allies, to try to standardize the way they organize their government. As long as Germany delivers credible contributions to NATO missions and operations, as long as Germany’s a larger ally, how to organization the work in the government is not for me to decide.
[Audience Member] (muffled) member of Parliament for the best party. (muffled) that whole Germany became member of NATO and there were debates afterwards to have maybe a perspective of a partly European security system. But then, as you know, in ’97, ’98, the decision was made mainly in the US to expand NATO to the East. And there were very critical voices like the Ambassador George Cannon. And if you look to the events since 2013, 2014, in Ukraine, Crimea, it seems for me a bit a fulfillment of this critic. He said that Russia will react and will be forced to react in the way they reacted. What do you think, now looking back to this development, is it still a perspective of having a pan-European security system or will it be a step in, let’s say, in the new Cold War.
Thank you for the question.
I’m thankful for the question. I think, first of all, we have to reflect a bit on the way we phrase this. Because you said that it was a decision was made in Washington to expand NATO to the East. In one way, I disagree with that. It was not Washington that decided, it was the people of Poland, the people of Latvia, the people of Estonia, the people of Hungary, who wanted to join. They begged for membership. As I remember in Norway we had a debate whether we would like to have them. But it was no doubt that this was democratic, strong wishes, from the people in these countries. So the question was not whether we in a way were going to expand in an aggressive way eastwards. It was a question of whether we would like to welcome people who really begged for membership in NATO. And just to think about the possibility that we should have told the people of Latvia, the people of Estonia, that, oh, you are neighbors of Russia and Russia don’t like that you join NATO so you are not allowed into this club. What kind of message is that? Because then we say that we’ve turned back to the old world, where you have spheres of influences, where big powers have the right to decide what neighbors can do and not do. I don’t want to live in that world. Where because Russia don’t like Latvia to join NATO, we tell Latvia you cannot join. Where’s the sovereignty, where’s the respect for the people of Latvia? (audience applause) But then I also say this because I respect the Swedes and their friends. They don’t want to join NATO. Fine. The thing is that it is for the people of individual countries to decide. So I totally respect Sweden. Also they’re– (laughs) they ruled us for 100 years so that’s– in Norway we say that the most important thing is not the win, as when it comes to sports, but to beat the Swedes. (audience laughter) But I respect the Swedes, and Finland, and Austria, and Switzerland, and Serbia. Countries in Europe that have decided to stay outside NATO. I would never force them into NATO. But I also respect the people of North Macedonia who want to join NATO. And then we allow them to join. And again, sometimes I refer to Norway– they say that is a provocation that these countries join NATO because they’re neighbors of Russia. Norway’s a neighbor of Russia. Stalin didn’t like that we joined in 1949. I’m very glad that Clement Attlee and Truman said Stalin should not decide what Norway can do. Norway decide what Norway should do. So they’re a member of NATO. So the whole idea of that Washington decided? No. That’s wrong. And second, it was unfortunate, it was actually 16 members of NATO in ’89 that decided our door is open. So the concept, first of all, the concept is wrong. And it’s signed as part of the Helsinki Treaty, the final act, part of the Budapest Agreement, which Russia signed, says every nation is allowed to decide it’s own path, including what kind of security relations they want to be part of. And therefore it is wrong to say that it is a provocation against me that you join NATO. And the reality is that NATO has provided stability, security. We are defensive alliance. We have social democrats, we have left socialists in governments, in NATO countries. I was in the government for eight years with left socialists. That’s NATO. Not dangerous but safe. (audience applause)
Swedish questions, anyone? No? Okay. Claudia Mayor is next.
Claudia Mayor from the Think Tank here in Berlin. We have an increasing Chinese presence in Europe. They’re owning physical infrastructure like ports, they have the question of digital infrastructure like WiFi, we have Russian Chinese exercises in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. So what do you think should NATO’s answer be also knowing that allies have different approaches on how to deal with that? Thank you.
First of all, it’s not, per se, or in a way, by itself a problem that other countries own infrastructure in our countries. And it’s not, by itself, a problem that China owns a port or whatever it is in a NATO-allied country. That’s the case. The challenge is that if foreign ownership weakens our resilience and undermines the security and the safety of the infrastructure. And that has been a discussion, for instance, related to 5G. And therefore NATO has developed, we have just agreed at the defense ministry meeting a couple week ago, new, updated, basic requirements for infrastructure for telecommunications including 5G. And these requirements are very, as I say, important because they state clearly that all allies need to conduct thorough risk assessments, mitigate risks, including also analyze the risks related to foreign ownership, foreign investments, to make sure that when we invest in 5G, we have secure and safe systems. Because these systems, 5G, will be extremely important for our societies. For the civilian society. For health, for industry, for communications, for everything. But also for military operations. So we don’t have specific names, we’re not naming any specific country or company. But we have to make sure that all allies meet these requirements. Because when you get the resilient and safe and secure infrastructure including 5G.
So I think we have probably time for two more questions. I had a lady in the back over there. And then we’ll move over to the last one.
[Achafem] Thank you very much. I’m Achafem from Executive Intelligence Review. You spoke about President Trump. President Trump in recently attacked the military industrial complex and to refer to General Eisenhower when he left office as a president. And he made that comment in the context of his wish to stop the regime change was. And I’m wondering what you think about that. And he also has accused in the world debate on the Russia-gate, which we all know, the Five Eyes countries to be involved in that to stop his presidency. So this is very fundamental, it speaks challenges. And I’m wondering if his wish to really establish better cooperation with Russia to solve problems, terrorism, Syria, whatever, and is not a good platform to really go in that direction for cooperation in new ways of alliances instead of the old paradigm. Thank you.
I strongly believe in dialogue with Russia. And I believe that we need to strive for better relationship with Russia. And therefore one of the things I am glad that we have achieved in NATO over the last year is to, again, have meetings in the NATO-Russia council. We don’t solve all the problems, but at least that’s an institution where Russia-NATO allies meet. We have discussed Ukraine, Afghanistan, arms control, INF, many other issues. We would brief each other in exercises and military posture. So I strongly believe in dialogue with Russia. Partly they’re trying to improve our relationship with Russia because Russia’s a neighbor. Russia’s here to stay. We need to try to improve relationship with Russia. But even if we are not able to improve the relationship with Russia, we need dialogue with Russia. Especially when the tensions are high, we need to talk to them. Because we have more forces, more exercises, more military presence along our borders. And we have to make sure that we don’t stumble into a conflict. So any incidence, accidents, we have to do the maximum to prevent them. And if they happen, we have to prevent them from spiraling out of control. So I’m a strong advocate of dialogue with Russia. And of course, arms control, INF, New START, whatever it is, we need to talk to Russia. But then, for me, there is no contradiction between NATO and stronger terms of defense and dialogue with Russia. Actually, for me, that’s the precondition. Because we had to be united and we had to be firm in our dialogue with Russia. If not, we risk that they interpret it as weakness. And that can be dangerous. And I say this also because I have long experience as a Norwegian politician. It started, actually, when I was State Secretary for Environment in 1990. I started to work with Russia on environmental issues up in the north. We had agreed on a borderline, the Bering Sea, the Polar Sea. On energy, on fishing, actually which military forces have regular meetings and contacts with Russian forces up in the north. This, as I said, cooperation, dialogue with Russia north, was something we developed even during the coldest period of the Cold War not despite NATO but because of NATO. Because NATO provided the path for it, the strength that we needed to engage with Russia. So for me, there is no contradiction. But I strongly believe that we have to work. And to be honest, for me, this is one of the areas where I really feel that Germany has shown the way. Over years Germany has been an important ally for many reasons but also because Germany has always been aware of this importance of dialogue, open line to Moscow, dating back to the Cold War. And you started to ask me about social democrats? For me, Helmut Schmidt and Willy Brandt were people conveying that message. So it’s not– this is kind of bipartisan approach that we need credible defense of defense which then also enables a credible dialogue with Russia. So I strongly hope that we can improve the relationship with Russia. I’m extremely in favor of arms control. And we convey that message to Russia all the time.
[Moderator] Think this is last question. I saw a question on this side. Yes, sir, please.
[Abdul Jaberari] My name is Abdul Jaberari, I’m in charge of the Afghanistan Embassy. Your excellency say that key issuing challenges to fight against the international terrorism. What will be the great challenge to fight that international terrorism? And also, with the international community involvement in Afghanistan in the past 18 years and the peace process and your involvement as well, what will be the new approach of the European Union and NATO after the cooled off peace process by President Trump? Thank you.
The challenges that we speak about international terrorism, we speak about many different things. And we speak about many different tools. We have to remember that many of the terrorist attacks we have seen in our countries the last years have been homegrown. They came from people, committed by people, who are born and raised in our own countries. And it’s also very important to remember that some of this is terrorism committed by people who misuse religion but not always Islam. We have the terrorist attack in New Zealand now. We had the terrorist attack in Norway in 9/11/2011. These are people who are misusing other religions than Islam in trying to defend their use of violence. And to address this kind of terrorism, to be honest, the answer’s not NATO. Because that’s about everything we can do to improve the neighborhoods, to fight extremism, education, social workers, domestic police, all those issues. And that’s extremely important but it’s not a NATO task because it’s not about military tools that we have. Then part of the fight against terrorism is also what we have to do with military means. As, for instance, our presence in Afghanistan. And then I will share with you one challenge that we have is that, of course, NATO has been and is able to deploy in big combat operations when needed. We did that in the Balkans to help end the atrocities there. And in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo. We have done so in Afghanistan. We have more than 140 troops. But the challenge is that in the long run there is a limit for how long NATO allies are able, willing to be part of big combat operations far away from their own countries. And therefore I think that the best answer we have is to train local forces. Enable forces in their own country to fight terrorism and stabilize their own countries. And that’s exactly what we’re now doing in Afghanistan. We were 140,000 NATO troops at the top. Now we are at roughly 16,000. And what we’re doing in Afghanistan is to train, assist, and advise the native Afghan forces to stability their own country. And we have made huge progress, there are many problems, many challenges in Afghanistan, but the big difference is that now the Afghan forces do what 140,000 NATO forces did not so many years ago. So we are committed to train, assist, and advise Afghans to enable them to fight terrorism in their own country. As we also do in Iraq, train Iraqis. We do that because we think that the best way to create the conditions for peaceful negotiated solution in Afghanistan is to send the clear message to Taliban that they will not win on the battlefield. And as long as Taliban understands they will not win on the battlefield, they have to sit down and engage in real peace talks and make real compromises. So the paradox is the more we convey a message, we are willing to stay in Afghanistan, and we are sending that message, the more likely it is that Taliban won’t ever understand that they have to make real compromises and agree to a peace deal. I cannot tell you when that will happen. But the good news is that NATO allies, and also Germany, is committed to staying in Afghanistan to create the conditions for a political solution. And then we very often in NATO say that we went into Afghanistan together, we’ll make decisions about our posture or our presence together, and when the time is right, we also leave together. And that’s the message we send to also all allies.
Mr. Secretary General, ladies and gentleman, time is up, unfortunately. There are still loads and loads of issues to be discussed which means you have to come back to Korber Foundation. And next time we will get some good breakfast, I promise. (laughs) Thank you very much for being here, thank you all for actively listening, for your good questions. Let me also add, Mr. Secretary General, that today you really rocked the crocodile of Middle East. In April, I think, you rocked Congress. So I really believe, next time you’re in town, you should also rock the German Bundestag. Thank you very much. (audience applause)