Pentagon Official Discusses Indo-Pacific Strategy on Capitol Hill


Randall G. Schriver, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, testifies at a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing on the implementation of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and the Indo-Pacific strategy, October 16, 2019.

Subscribe to Dr. Justin Imel, Sr. by Email

Transcript

The International Cyber Security Policy in the 116th Congress. Today we will hold our third hearing in the ARIA In Action series which will examine the implementation of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and the Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. We are privileged to have three assistant secretaries from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID before us today to provide testimony. I thank Senator Markey and the Administration for the cooperation in making this hearing happen. As the Chinese Communist Party celebrates 70 years of repression at home and is increasing its malign economic and military activities abroad, the challenge before us today is to successfully adjust U.S. policy to prepare for the era of strategic competition with a totalitarian near-peer adversary that seeks to displace the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific and to challenge U.S. primacy worldwide. We must not let the CCP shape the future uncontested. This is why for the last several years Senator Markey and I worked on the bipartisan Asia Reassurance Initiative Act which was signed into law on December 31, 2018. ARIA reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and provided a generational blueprint for U.S. policy. ARIA authorizes an additional $10 billion over five years to enhance security cooperation, economic engagement, and reaffirms U.S. commitment to advance the fundamental values of human rights and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. ARIA incorporates and elaborates on the Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. A strategy as defined by the enduring United States’ commitment to uphold international law, to maintain an Indo-Pacific that is free of coercion, militarily, economic, or in violation of basic human rights and freedoms. ARIA has codified this vision of the free and open Indo-Pacific into U.S. law. Lastly, promoting democracy and human rights will be vital for the United States to succeed in the Indo-Pacific and ARIA cements that in U.S. law. These values differentiate the United States from anyone, from any of the competition around the globe. These values are just and right and they are certainly worth fighting for. The current events in Hong Kong are evidence of why ARIA is needed. As we are gathered here, millions of brave Hong Kongers have been out on the streets for month after month after month, demonstrating for freedom. Freedom from coercion, freedom from authoritarianism, and freedom to choose their future. That’s why we need to fully implement ARIA and the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Senate Appropriations Committee recently took a good step forward by recommending $2.5 billion for ARIA implementation in their fiscal year 2020 legislation that is currently pending before the full Senate. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses on the implementation of ARIA over the last 10 months since it’s been signed into law. Greatly appreciate the witnesses’ time, testimony, and service today and with that I will turn it over to Senator Markey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank you for this hearing. I also want to thank our witnesses for being here today. It’s incredibly important for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear from Administration officials, especially those responsible for implementing a wide range of key policies throughout the Indo-Pacific. Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for your partnership on the subcommittee and your work on helping to pass the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act into law, you were just speaking about it. Our primary goal with that bill was to show that there was broad congressional support for a robust Asia policy. To show that developments in the Indo-Pacific have out-sized importance for the future of the United States. To show that we as a nation oppose coercion and that we respect the sovereignty of countries. That we recognize the importance of strong alliances and partnerships across the region. That we simultaneously recognize the crucial, as it may be, we have to actually show the peoples across the Indo-Pacific should enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms to which they are entitled. And to state unequivocally that it is the role of the United States to assert leadership in those roles. Because if we don’t advocate for these ideals they won’t take hold on their own. After all, we are witnessing a resurgence of authoritarian governments around the region. We are seeing countries like China and North Korea advancing their respective weapons programs. We are concerned about violent extremism in Southeast Asia and the potential for ISIS fighters to return to the region from Syria. And we see challenges to the global rules-based order that has helped maintained peace and stability for decades. At the same time, we must resource a host of programs. Initiates that will move American Asia policy in the right direction. Failure to do so will undermine the norms, interests, and values we want to perpetuate, which is why I was shocked and disappointed to learn that President Trump abused the power of his office to urge the government of Ukraine to insert itself into our democratic process. And I was shocked and disappointed to hear President Trump tell reporters at the White House that he wants the Chinese government to influence the election in his favor. This invitation for a foreign government to interfere in the American electoral process not only violates the oath of office of the President of the United States, but it also undermines the very values for which this country stands. It is concerning enough that a sitting President would invite interference from any foreign entity, but it is especially troubling when the request is made of a government activity undermining freedoms and rights around the world. It is plausible that President Xi interpreted this request as an opening to further threaten fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and the press, whether in Tibet, in Hong Kong, or any other place beyond. And such a signal could have significant implications for the implementation of U.S. policy in Asia. It could undermine the objectives our professional diplomats, officials, and service members are working hard to achieve. We have an obligation to push back against those Chinese government policies that are inimical to our interests and to our values. We must advocate for the Uyghurs facing repression and imprisonment. We must also support the tenets of freedom in Hong Kong. And we must promote the freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas as we do all over the world. So let me be clear. Pushing back on China cannot be the rationale for everything the United States does in Asia. What makes diplomacy so difficult and so important is being able to deftly balance priorities. Pursing stronger alliances and partnerships and promoting human rights and democracy are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing. We must think of the long-term effects of abandoning our principles. So I thank you Mr. Chairman and I look forward to exploring with our witnesses how they are helping their respective departments push American Asia policy forward in the face of mounting challenges.

Thank you, Senator Markey and to our witnesses today thank you again for being here. I would ask that you kindly limit your testimony to five minutes. I’m going to be asking the members of the panel to do the same thing, to keep their questions within the five-minute timeframe. We have a vote coming up at 4:15 and I want to make sure that we can get as many questions and as much back and forth as possible throughout that time. Our first witness is The Honorable David Stilwell, who currently serves as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary on June 20, just a couple months ago, he served in the Air Force for 35 years, beginning as an enlisted Korean linguist in 1980 and retiring in 2015 in the rank of Brigadier General as the Asia advisor to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs. Secretary Stilwell, thank you very much for your service, honored to welcome you to the subcommittee. Our next witness will be The Honorable Randall Schriver, Randy Schriver who currently serves as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Previously, Mr. Schriver served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was responsible for China, Taiwan, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State. And Secretary Schriver testified before this subcommittee in the 115th Congress on May 15, 2018 at our third hearing dedicated to developing the ARIA legislation. Delighted to have you back, thank you very much for being here. And our final witness today is The Honorable Gloria Steele, who serves as Acting Administrator for Asia at the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID. In this capacity, she oversees USAID’s operations in 30 countries in Asia, which in 2018 had an annual budget of over $1.3 billion. Prior to this assignment, she served as USAID’s Mission Director for the Philippines, the Pacific Islands, and Mongolia, with a program budget of over $500 million from 2010 to 2015. Secretary Steele previously testified before this subcommittee on December 4, 2018 in our third hearing on the China Challenge series dedicated to democracy and human rights. So welcome back to you as well. I look forward to hearing from all of you. Mr. Stilwell, excuse me, Secretary Stilwell, you may begin.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Gardner, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific region and the implementation of ARIA. I’d like to thank Senator Gardner and Senator Markey for championing ARIA and the whole subcommittee for its work to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Pleased to be here today with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Randy Schriver, and Assistant Administrator Steele, who are crucial partners and who we coordinate with extensively. AIRA advances comprehensive and principled implementation of our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. It reaffirms our long-standing commitment to support our allies and partners and to deter adversaries in the region. It advances U.S. leadership in promoting peace and security, economic prosperity, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. With the support of ARIA, our Indo-Pacific approach recognizes the region’s central role in American foreign policy as highlighted in the President’s national security strategy. A free and open Indo-Pacific means a region built on common principles that have benefited all countries in the region, including respect for the sovereignty and independence of all nations regardless of size. In fiscal ’18, State Department and USAID allocated over $2.5 billion in foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement funds toward the Indo-Pacific region. Consistent with ARIA, our programs seek to unlock private sector investment, improve defense capacity and resiliency of partners, promote regular bilateral and multilateral engagement, support good governance, and encourage responsible natural resource management. AIRA mandated executive branch reports on a range of important issues. EAP is proud to have submitted to Congress, on time, the reports assigned to it, including reports on North Korea, ASEAN, and the Lower Mekong Initiative. I recently returned from a productive trip to the UNGA. While there, U.S., Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom co-hosted a panel on human rights crisis in Xinjiang. We underlined our continuing demand that Beijing reverse its highly repressive policies in Xinjiang and we listened to brave Ughyer survivors of detention and other abuses as they shared their deeply painful experiences. On October 7, the Commerce Department placed export restrictions on 28 PRC entities for ties to repression in Xinjiang. And on October 8, the State Department announced visa restrictions on responsible Chinese government and Communist party officials. Next visit to the region, coming up in a week, will include Indo-Pacific Business Forum on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Bangkok on November 4. Shortly thereafter, we’ll be at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, working with partners to break down trade barriers for companies to boost exports and support job growth. We have seized on ARIA’s call to advance U.S. economic interests in the Indo-Pacific. We’re advancing high standards and transparency in all investments and projects, advancing free, fair, reciprocal trade. Our inter-agency Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, ITAN, optimizes U.S. development, finance, and assistance tools to catalyze private sector investment. The new U.S. Development Finance Corporation will further these efforts thanks to the 2018 BUILD Act. Asia EDGE is our whole-of-government approach to support private investment in energy markets. In August, we announced our intent to provide initial $29.5 million to support Mekong countries energy security and access to the U.S.-Japan Mekong Power Partnership. The digital connectivity and cyber-security partnership supports secure and reliable internet and ICT development, enabling nations to realize the tremendous economic benefits of the digital economy. This month, we completed the U.S-Japan Digital Trade Agreement which will boost the already approximately $40 billion worth of digital trade between the U.S. and Japan. On the security front, in line with ARIA’s objectives, we seek to build a flexible, robust network of like-minded security partners. Secretary Pompeo committed an additional $300 million of security assistance in 2018. In the South China Sea, Beijing is bullying its neighbors in a manner consistent with the statement of Beijing’s then-foreign minister in the 2020 ASEAN Summit that said, “China is a big country and all other countries “are small countries and that’s just a fact.” This notion that ‘might make right’ is a threat to sovereignty, peace, dignity, and prosperity in the world’s most dynamic region. PRC maritime claims in the South China Sea exemplified by the preposterous nine-dash line are both unlawful and unreasonable. And these claims which are without historic, legal, or geographic merit impose real costs on other countries. With respect to Taiwan, we have repeatedly expressed our concern over Beijing’s bullying actions, economic pressure, constraints on Taiwan’s international space, and poaching of its diplomatic partners. These actions undermine the cross-strait status quo that has benefited both sides of the strait for decades. Through the American Institute of Taiwan we recently held the inaugural Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific. On October 7 in Taipei, the United States and Taiwan launched a new U.S.-Pacific Islands Dialogue to better coordinate aid and help prevent Taiwan’s diplomatic allies from falling victim to Beijing’s debt-trap development inducements. In Hong Kong, we believe that freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly must be vigorously protected. We continue to urge Beijing to uphold its commitments and as President Trump said at the United Nations, “The world fully expects that the Chinese government “will honor its binding treaty, made with the British and “registered with the United Nations, in which China commits “to protect Hong Kong’s freedom, legal system, “and democratic ways of life.” We strongly concur with ARIA’s finding that promotion of human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific is the United States national interest. Our Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative, with more than 200 programs worth over $600 million since the beginning of the Trump Administration focuses on fiscal transparency, anti-corruption, democracy assistance, youth development, and fundamental freedoms and human rights. Thank you for offering this opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions. [Gardner] Well done, Secretary Stilwell. Thank you. And your extensive comments will be made a part of the record, thank you very much for that. Secretary Schriver.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Markey, Senator Coons. Thank you for allowing DoD to participate in this hearing and talk about our approach to the Indo-Pacific and how we are pursuing implementation of our strategy and ARIA. As we work to develop and implement a strategy to secure free and open Indo-Pacific, we are certainly aided by the strong bipartisan support of Congress, including the passage of ARIA. ARIA provides a comprehensive set of national security and economic policies to achieve our interests, and does indeed reassure our allies while helping to deter our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific. And DoD’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, or IPSR, we state clearly, quote “The Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s “priority theater. We have an enduring commitment “to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which “all nations, large and small, are secure “in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth “consistent with international rules, norms, “and principles of fair competition.” This free and open Indo-Pacific vision that is also enshrined in ARIA is based on enduring and widely shared principles, including respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations, no matter their size, peaceful resolution of disputes, free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment, and adherence to international rules and norms including freedom of navigation and overflight. The Department is making this vision a reality along with our inter-agency colleagues by focusing on our investments on preparedness, strengthening our allies and partnerships, and empowering a regional security network. First, when we talk about preparedness, we mean investing in a more lethal, resilient, agile, and combat-effective Indo-Pacific force posture appropriate for great power competition. Thus, we are increasing investments in contested domains like space and cyber, while preserving our advantages in undersea warfare, tactical aircraft, C4ISR, and missile defense. Second, with respect to our alliances and partnerships, we are both reinforcing established alliances such as those with Japan and Australia, as well as expanding relationships with new and emerging partners such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. We are also enhancing our engagement in areas where China is seeking to compete more vigorously, such as in the Pacific Islands. And third, the Department is taking steps to promote, strengthen, and evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. Augmenting our system of bilateral alliances with a more interconnected region among countries that seek a free and open Indo-Pacific enhances our ability to compete effectively. Finally, our approach to the region and our strategy to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region accounts for our relationship with China. Although the United States will continue to pursue a constructive results-oriented relationship with China, we will not accept policies or actions that threaten to undermine the international rules-based order. ARIA is a significant tool for us and it allows us to stand up for and defend that order. And although we are committed to cooperating with China where our interests align, we will compete vigorously where our interests diverge. China’s approach under the leadership of Chairman Xi and the CPC, demonstrated by both words and deeds, stands in contrast to our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and some of its activities seek to undermine principles that have benefited all nations. We’re competing with China because CPC leaders have themselves assessed they are in competition with us, both our ideas and our capabilities, and they are developing their own capabilities designed to erode our advantages. Globally, Chairman Xi and the CPC seek to shape a world consistent with its authoritarian model and national goals. We see the CPC using its growing clout to change the behavior of other countries, realigning them with Chinese preferences through persuasion and, at times, coercion. All of this does matter, because if the CPC were to be successful in its authoritarian approach were to be come ascendent, the world could look quite different. Indo-Pacific states will find that they have less control of their futures and their economies. Regional institutions may become less independent and therefore less effective. Freedom of seas and overflights in the Indo-Pacific may no longer be free. And we could also see a diminished respect for individual and human rights as the CPC would seek to normalize its domestic repression and protection of human rights violators elsewhere, such as in Burma. All of this portends a less free and less open and more unstable Indo-Pacific and high potential for these trends to manifest on a global scale. A competitive strategy with China is not meant to lead to conflict. While we compete vigorously with China, our military-to-military contacts are aimed at reducing risk and promoting international norms and standards. We remain committed to this vital region. We are encouraged by the leadership of this Congress and the bipartisan support of ARIA and we look forward to continuing to work with you on the implementation of our Indo-Pacific strategy. Thank you and I look to your questions.

[Gardner] Thank you Secretary Schriver. Secretary Steele.

Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Markey, Senator Coons. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. As ARIA underscores, strong American leadership is needed to ensure that an international system rooted in the rule of law endures. In fiscal year 2018, USAID programmed roughly $1.2 billion in assistance funds to the Indo-Pacific region. This assistance helps USAID to advance Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It is also key to the USAID’s ability to project strong American leadership and development priorities that advance U.S. economic and national security interests which are at the heart of ARIA. To advance Indo-Pacific strategy, USAID focuses on three objectives. One, strengthening democratic systems. Two, fostering private-sector led economic growth. And three, improving natural resources management. The President’s fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $534 million for USAID to drive this objective forward. A 114% increase over his fiscal year 2019 request. USAID’s objectives to advance the Indo-Pacific strategy go hand-in-hand with our efforts to improve the lives and well-being of the people across Asia by increasing their self-reliance. These efforts include our health and education programming, which are foundational to the creation of a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, the fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $230 million for health, education, and food assistance in the Indo-Pacific region. Within USAID’s three Indo-Pacific objectives, we are sharply focused on countering the immediate and medium-term effects of malign influences that contest our progress towards a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region. To maximize our impact, we are closely monitoring and evaluating our development programs, taking a leading role in the whole of U.S. government initiatives, coordinating with like-minded donor partners including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, and exploring potential collaboration with Taiwan. In line with our ARIA, USAID is also contributing to efforts to strengthen the United States strategic partnerships with India, an emerging regional and global leader in development. On our first objective of strengthening democratic systems, we’ve achieved some notable progress to date. In Indonesia, for example, thanks to USAID’s advocacy and assistance, the number of people from marginalized communities who have been able to seek legal aid have increased tenfold from 2017 to 2018. This contributed to expanding access to justice for the most vulnerable. On fostering economic growth in Vietnam, we are building upon our past successes in improving and enabling an environment for trade. We recently launched a new program that will help reduce the time and cost of trading with Vietnam, and increase Vietnam’s ability to mitigate the inappropriate trans-shipment of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid U.S. tariffs. On improving natural resources management, we are promoting the application of international environmental and social safeguards for infrastructure development. In the lower Mekong region, for example, we are gearing up to launch an interactive website that will enable decision-makers and advocates to visually map the negative impacts of subpar infrastructure approaches. We are also combating transnational environmental crimes. In partnership with Interpol, USAID is helping to dismantle cross-continental syndicates that traffic in elephant ivory and pangolin. We are accelerating the region’s energy transformation through a number of activities, including a recently launched partnership with Asian Development Bank, which aims to mobilize $7 billion in energy investments in Asia. At USAID, our ultimate goal is for our partner countries to progress from being aid recipients to partners to fellow donors. We call this, the path of getting there, the journey to self-reliance, and it focuses on increasing the capacity and commitment of partner countries to drive their own development. USAID’s mission is to advance self-reliance, mutually reinforces our focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy. In order to advance our partner countries self-reliance that is inclusive and sustainable over generations, we have reprioritized achieving gains in health and education. For example, in Burma, which has the highest malaria burden in the greater Mekong region, ASAID assistance contributed to an 82% decline in malaria cases from 2012 to 2017. In Cambodia, we have strengthened early-grade reading by helping the Ministry of Education ensure that services and policies are more inclusive and responsive to the needs of children, especially those with disabilities. Across the Indo-Pacific region, we are also supporting programs that increase women’s access to capital and land. With USAID’s support, for example, a new investment bond aimed at raising $100 million to bolster women’s livelihoods through micro and small loans will soon hit the Singapore stock exchange. In closing, I would like to thank the Committee for its leadership on ARIA, which sends a strong message of the United States’ enduring commitment to the region. We greatly appreciate the strong congressional support for USAID’s work in advancing partner countries self-reliance and a free and open, secure Indo-Pacific region. Thank you and I look forward to your counsel and questions.

Thank you, Secretary Steele. And again thanks to all of you, all three of you for your testimony today. This morning we heard from Brian Hook at the State Department talking about the impact that U.S. diplomacy and public diplomacy can have. Efforts that we can put to bear on other countries to influence their treatment of their citizens, including women. This specific example that they gave this morning, Mr. Hook gave this morning, was in relation to Iran. And he talked about the soccer FIFA match to take place that was excluding women from attending and that changed as a result, of course there were other complications that we have to address, but that public diplomacy can be very effective. And if you look at ARIA and you look at the significant amount of resources that we’ve programmed for human rights, democracy, rule of law. You look at what is happening in Hong Kong right now. And you look at what is happening in and around Asia with the Chinese activities, particularly in China, whether its the Xinjiang Province and how they are treating Ughyers, how they’re treating Christians, how they’re treating religious freedoms, what’s happening in autonomy with Hong Kong, what they’re doing in Hong Kong, what they’re doing in Taiwan. I think this implementation of ARIA matters greatly. Today we learned that the head coach of the Golden State Warriors received over 17,000 comments as a result of Chinese trolls who were standing up in opposition to an expression of basic rights in Hong Kong. There’s a headline, and CNN just from a few days ago that talks about a comment that President Xi made, vowing that an attempt to split China will end in crushed bodies and shattered bones. That hardly sounds like a nation intent on a peaceful rise. Especially when we’re simply asking to adhere to the agreements that they had already agreed to when it comes to autonomy. And so how, Mr. Stilwell, can we use and how is, Secretary Stilwell, how is ARIA being implemented at the Department of State to address not only concerns in the treatment in Hong Kong as China pursues its perhaps different directions or treatments of human rights as it relates to the Ughyers, the treatment of Taiwan and our relationship with Taiwan, and of course nations throughout the Indo-Pacific?

Senator Gardner, thank you for that question. And that’s a pretty easy and straightforward response. You know, the resources that ARIA brings and produces for the State Department and for the Secretary to then allocate against things, like public diplomacy outreach at the U.N. The Deputy Secretary hosted the Xinjiang human rights event. These are all things that can, as some say, shine some sunlight on these issues, which I think is probably the best antidote to all these things. Things that Beijing would prefer kept quiet and in the dark, in the shadows. By bringing those to light, through things like congressional visits to Hong Kong recently. Those things are huge. So certainly there are things that require funding. And I think that Secretary Steele can talk to those for sure. And State Department obviously needs those sorts of funds as well. And again, we appreciate the fact this is a reinforcing relationship with the Congress, between Administration and the Hill, that’s probably the bright spot in taking this job is that we’re working together on this. I can give you many examples if you’d like.

Secretary Stilwell, if you could maybe please cite some of the specific examples of ARIA implementation if you could, just detail the specific initiatives the Department of State is undertaking as a result of ARIA.

I think you can look at the Indo-Pacific strategy that focuses on economic engagement, such as the Indo-Pacific Business Forum coming up. The resources required to put something like that together. For you to look at the strategy, again focus on governance, economics, and security. And I read through the Act again last night, those things track perfectly. So the resources are important, but support from the Congress as well are extremely important as we deal with things like security issues, governance, and the rest. I can get you, again the specifics, but they pretty much deal with what we are executing right now. Outreach to ASEAN, so we have the ASEAN Outlook strategy, which looks just like ARIA, which looks just like the Indo-Pacific strategy, which looks like Korea’s new Southern Policy. I’ll leave it at that.

Mr. Secretary, one of the things that came to light as result of this conversation the NBA has started in this country, more attention being focused on treatment of people in Hong Kong and beyond and China as a result. Do you think that the State Department, is it appropriate for the State Department to perhaps host or, either on its website, its official website, or perhaps through a report, do you think it’s a good idea that we should in one place keep track of all of China’s efforts to suppress freedom, to bully to those who object to China’s treatment of people in Hong Kong or people in Taiwan? I mean, in the past years we’ve seen as Apple has removed sort of different icons from their platforms, we’ve seen Taiwan flags removed from Hollywood movies, we’ve seen entire countries be replaced in major Hollywood productions with another country because of worry it would offend. We’ve seen suspension of people from gaming platforms and firings from hotel chains and airlines intimidated because they dare use the word Taipei/Taiwan in the same sentence. Do you think that it would be helpful for the American people in one spot, one source, to be able to identify and see all of the ways that China is using either economic or diplomatic power, force to bully people’s behavior?

Senator, I think that anything we can do to shine a light on this is important. I think you saw that the Secretary gave a speech in L.A. to the Motion Picture Academy of America on exactly what you’re talking about. These talking points, again, not only restricted to the Administration, highlighting these unthinkable approaches to what we consider free speech, are readily available. These speeches are available on the State Department site. Compiling in one place, again, would be helpful for sure. But I do think that the civil sector has done that job for us quite well for us of late. You know we’ve touched a nerve on some of these things and Americans are responding, just the the Australians did about three years ago. They’re responding to seeing their assumed rights and things they took for granted are suddenly no longer available to them. And so, both public state and private approaches I think would be very useful.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Markey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman very much. As I mentioned in my opening statement it is crucial that the United States government espouse the principles it encourages overseas, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Our policy should be to lead with experts who advise the President well and the President should heed that expert advice. The President has asked multiple foreign governments to investigate a domestic political rival. He asked the Chinese government to do so on October 3 and asked the President of Ukraine as well. I’d like to understand if this Administration and the State Department leadership believe asking foreign governments to look into a political rival is acceptable. Mr. Stilwell, is it appropriate for a President to ask a foreign government to investigate a domestic political rival?

Senator Markey, thank you for that question. Other than, for my region, other than an offhand comment on that subject that you quoted, I have seen nothing in that regard, and I’m not gonna go past that.

Do you believe it’s acceptable, if the request was made?

Senator, again, I don’t know that the request was made. And that’s what I’ll offer.

Well, it was made, it was made in public. President Trump’s request to China to investigate a political rival has clear implications for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. The jurisdiction of the Committee reaches that issue. And that’s why I actually sent a letter on this matter to Donald Trump today. It is a letter that I think is important and should actually be something that people on this Committee should be able to support given the implications of the President’s actions on the implementation of U.S. policy toward China and the broader region. I asked the members of the East Asia Subcommittee, both Democrats and Republicans, to join. I’m disappointed that none of my Republican colleagues joined, as protecting American democracy should not be a partisan one. I think this issue goes right to the heart of our values and what we are supposed to advance across the rest of the world. So Mr. Stilwell, are you aware of the President, or anyone in the Administration directly asking President Xi or other Chinese officials to investigate a political rival?

Senator, other than that offhand comment that you cited, I am not aware.

So do you know if there are any records at the State Department with regard to requests that were made by the Administration to President Xi or other Chinese officials?

Senator, I do not know of anything like that.

And again, I’m not asking for anything that is outside the jurisdiction of this Committee. We have a right to know. It goes right to the issue of our foreign-policy making and what it is we want to have the United States of America stand for. So this Committee takes seriously our oversight of foreign policy, the Department of State and the confirmation for department appointees. I’m disturbed at the news of private citizens conducting a shadow diplomacy instead of relying on our diplomatic professionals. Mr. Stilwell, is it appropriate for private U.S. citizens to engage with foreign governments on behalf of the United States President and without knowledge of the Department of State?

Senator, I again, I would need some specifics on that, as I’m not aware of the point you’re making.

Well, how would you react if you learned that a private citizen was dictating foreign policy to senior State Department officials in your region?

Senator, again, I would have to see the details, specifics, again I’m not going to speculate.

How would you tell your regions’ ambassadors to react if a foreign policy issue was being dictated by a private citizen inside of your region? Would you think that was appropriate?

Senator, I would give direction to those ambassadors on this topic, they would take that from me, so.

Well, I’m concerned that this Administration undermines Senate-confirmed career ambassadors, the very experts who are sworn to lead foreign policy with the interests of the American people being first and foremost. Are you aware of the President or any private citizen seeking the removal of any career ambassadors in your region?

[Stilwell] No, Senator.

Do you agree employees of the federal government, including the civil service and the foreign service, are protected under federal law when they file whistleblower complaints through proper procedures?

Senator, I’m aware of whistleblower regulations and rules and I enforce those in EAP.

And those whistleblowers are protected under federal law, is that correct?

Under federal law, there is a whistleblower law, that’s true.

Okay, so what have you done personally to ensure that State Department whistleblower know and understand their rights? Do you think whistleblower protection is something that’s important for the protection of the United States?

Senator, I message to all my people that we know what those laws, rules, regulations guidance is from, by law, by Congress, and by the Administration and we reinforce those with our people.

Well, I ask you to, and your colleagues, to protect career officials so that they can continue to advise this Administration without fearing reprisal. My fear is just the opposite signal is now being sent out of the White House. The Chinese government’s human rights abuses are of deep concern. In Hong Kong, China continues to intimidate those who exercise support for democratic rights. The Chinese government is indignant when the United States expresses support for human rights and democracy in Hong Kong. We can see the reach of China’s efforts to suppress free expression even here on our shores. We saw that over the last week with China retaliating against the NBA and its fans because of support for legitimate demonstrations in Hong Kong. Do you think it’s appropriate for China to attempt to use its marketplace power to curtail free expression in the United States?

Senator, it certainly breaches what we consider a separation of diplomatic or political speech and economic. But it is theirs to do, they chose to take that path. I don’t think it’s the right path. And I think that you’re seeing what happens when American people see exactly what this, it has definitely reputational costs for Beijing.

Are you troubled by the escalation of the actions by China against the NBA and what that means for other corporations inside of China?

Senator, earlier in opening statements, we noted that multiple companies, not just American companies, have felt the sting of the Chinese government using economic levers for political reasons, for their own personal or small view of what free speech looks like. And so I am disturbed but I am also encouraged in some ways that it has brought to light these things to a greater American public, something that we talked of and understood and assumed, was not well known but is becoming very visible.

Do corporate officials tell you that they’re afraid to actually express their views for fear of losing business? Do those corporations express that in a way that actually makes this something that is not an exception, but perhaps a rule in terms of the ways in which our companies interact with the Chinese government on an ongoing basis?

Senator, personally I have not had that conversation, but it’s all over the press. I mean you can read that pretty much anywhere. Again, these responses seem excessive and counterproductive.

So you’re saying that you don’t hear from corporations that their ability to speak freely is in fact curtailed because of their fear that their businesses would be impacted? No one says that to you?

Senator, I interact with them infrequently, if at all. I have had some interaction with chambers of commerce and business communities while I’m on the road. But most of the conversation has to do with things like ARIA where we’re encouraging public-private activities, such as in the BUILD Act and the rest of those activities.

Well just last evening the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, of which I am a co-sponsor, demonstrated quote “A naked double-standard which fully exposes “the extreme hypocrisy of some people in the United States “on the issue of human rights and democracy “and their sinister intentions to undermine Hong Kong’s “prosperity and stability, and contain China’s development.” Mr. Stilwell, should the United States bend to Chinese criticism of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act?

Senator, absolutely not. This is a good chance for us to stand up and be counted on exactly the things that we believe. You’re seeing the collision of two systems. A system that looks for free, open, market based. And another system that looks to, its more authoritarian, and these are the results.

Well, I’m concerned that the Administration is too easily swayed by criticism from foreign governments. China’s actions against the Ughyers and central Asian communities in Xinjiang is abhorrent and it continues. Beijing’s campaign of detention, mass surveillance, severe controls of religious and cultural expression is indeed the quote “stain of the century,” as Secretary Pompeo has said. Yet the Administration refuses to apply Global Magnitsky Sanctions. Mr. Stilwell, given—

Senator Markey, I’m going to interrupt if you don’t mind. Trying to keep it even here. Thank you for answering these questions. I wanna follow up too, because I think, and I want to see if you agree with me or not, that President Xi represents perhaps the greatest long-term threat to U.S. security interests in global stability. Would you agree with that?

Senator, the approach he has taken, I mean it starts with the 18th Party Congress speech. Most recently, the 19th Party Congress. Then 2018 naming himself, becoming President without a term. Those things are all troubling choices that deviated from a system that had been becoming more regularized. And in some ways that predictability brought stability. It’s becoming less predictable.

Secretary Schriver.

We clearly identify China as our long-term strategic competitor in the National Defense Strategy and in our Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. And Chairman Xi’s advocacy of the ‘China Dream’ and ‘Asia for Asians’ simply underscores why we feel that way and why we need to be postured for that long-term competition.

Obviously the United States, when we were attempting decades ago to build an open relationship with China, whether it was trade opportunities or diplomatic overtures, we were hoping that values that we as a Western democracy hold would I guess rub off on China in a way that freedom, democracy, human rights would somehow prevail. That our interests would I guess appeal to the leadership in China in a way that could allow a nation of over one billion people eventually to enjoy the same rights, the same opportunities, the same trajectory. Now, the trajectory has been significant, from an economic power, from the growing military power of China. But obviously the export of U.S. freedom, democracy, and values has failed to be adopted in China. Those ideas of religious freedom and freedom to protest, freedom to worship as you choose. If you look at what the United States has in turn imported, you go to a basketball game and a sign that says “Google Uyghurs” is removed from a U.S. sporting event. People are removed from a game because of a T-shirt they’re wearing. It seems like we have now imported, as people and commentators have well noted, we’ve imported some of the totalitarian aspects of China as our exports of freedom, human rights have failed. Would you agree with that, Secretary Stilwell?

Senator, that’s an interesting way of putting it. And I definitely see the logic to that. The outcry, even to late-night talk shows on these things, actually again is encouraging. This isn’t unusual, I mean this sort of thing happens. You use cultural influence to your own benefit or detriment. You know, a wise way to think—

To be clear, I think they’re actually using our cultural sporting events and other things to their benefit.

They do, but the fact that the NBA is so popular in China, I think, is a positive thing. The fact that so many Chinese people, this is not about Chinese people, it’s Chinese government decisions and we always need to make that very clear, you know are disappointed that they can’t watch NBA at home. It shows another poor decision on the part of their government. Meantime here in the U.S., like I said, I believe these things that people are now recognizing, the fact that it’s all over social media, that people are asked to take down signs or told not to chant certain things at a basketball. Those pressures on American businesses will have an effect. And I think it’s going to wake a lot of people up, too. We’re finally aware of what Australia figured out three or four years ago.

Secretary Schriver, getting back to question that I asked Secretary Stilwell on implementation of ARIA, could you identify some of the initiatives that you’re undertaking as a result of ARIA? I had a conversation with Secretary Esper several weeks ago and in that conversation he said that the Department of Defense was gearing up toward a sort of whole-of-department approach toward ARIA. If you could talk about some of the specific initiatives you’re pursuing that’d be great.

Sure. The Department of Defense is organizing itself for the long-term strategic competition with China. ARIA is a powerful tool for us in that regard. We’re working internally. We’ve created a new position in my office and my organization to help with that alignment process throughout the Defense enterprise that Secretary Esper spoke with you about. Outwardly looking, ARIA has been great tool for us. It’s often mentioned to me from foreign interlocutors when I travel in the region which is a sign that they do feel reassured and they see that congressional and executive cooperation. But I think that some of the things that ARIA highlights that we’ve been working to implement. The capacity building of our partners in Southeast Asia, maritime Southeast Asia, so that they can have better awareness in their maritime territorial waters and through their EEZs. The work we’re doing with Taiwan to engage and give them confidence in the lead-up to their election to include providing sufficient weapon systems for their self-defense would be included. I think the work were doing on the emerging partners, the ARIA speaks a lot about emerging partners such as India and Vietnam. I’ve traveled to Vietnam six times. I’m going back for a seventh time in less than two years next month with Secretary Esper. It’s a terrific partner. India we have a new two-plus-two process, supported by what we call a mini two-plus-two at our level. We’ve had three of those this year and we’re building out our defense relationship. So this has been a terrific tool for us and very empowering for us.

Thanks Secretary Schriver. Senator Markey, any more questions?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thailand is one of our oldest allies, our closest friends. As I have stated many times I hope to see our two countries further improve our relations. However, I have expressed serious concerns about the State Department’s decision to label this year’s election in Thailand as free and fair. Authoritarian behavior continues, including brutal attacks on Thai dissidents. Weeks ago, a judge made headlines after his impassioned plea against using the judicial system to scapegoat innocent people. Mr. Stilwell, in your view, what are the most important steps that Thailand can take to establish stronger democratic institutions?

Senator, that’s a great question. For one thing, the fact that we interact with them on a regular basis is a far better approach than isolating them and keeping them at arm’s length. The more we can interact and as we have done, in fact this year as the chair for ASEAN, we’ve spent a lot of time with our Thai counterparts. I certainly have and again, on 4 November, we’re going to all go to Bangkok for the East Asia Summit in the Indo-Pacific Business Forum. And in doing so, we have the chance to help them understand the benefits of, again, the sanctity of elections, the importance of democratic processes and all those things. And I know they—

Should we ask them to make changes to their constitution so that they can in fact be promoting democratic ideals that we would hope that their country would adopt?

Senator, I haven’t read their constitution. I don’t know what I would change, but I would say, over history, I’ll just tell you my father lives there and so I’m pretty in tune to what goes on in Thailand. Their constitution, their process, their democracy is fine. Our job is to work with them to help them understand the benefits of enforcing and doing—

No, I understand what you’re saying. But the military’s influence on the 2017 constitution undermined the freedom of this year’s elections well before a single vote was cast. For example, the army appoints all 215 members of the senate making it for easier for the army’s favorite candidate to become prime minister. So that’s just the opposite I would think of the direction in which we should be going. Mr. Schriver, could you comment upon the direction of Thailand and the need to have constitutional reform?

Well we do use our engagements with Thailand, not only to address the security environment and the shared interests, particularly with respect to the pressure they face in their maritime spaces. But we use our engagement also to underscore the importance of the military’s role in a democracy if we’re at a point where we can restore IMET, for example. A lot of that training goes to that effort, so that they understand the appropriate role for a military in a democracy. So we plug away at this. They do have a troubled history and a flawed system. We want to see them get in a better place because the strategic challenges in the region, we’ll be much better off if Thailand stays on sides.

No, without question. You know there’s been 12 military coups since 1932 so I think that’s just the case for us increasing our demands for constitutional reform for real democratic principles to be imbued into their political system. Now I want to turn to one particular tool that the United States could be using to press reform in Thailand. As you know, this Administration has accelerated our arms sales to Thailand. Mr. Stilwell, I’m interested in understanding the government’s approach to U.S. arms sales to Thailand. For instance, would you support an approach that withholds equipment that can be used to repress domestic opposition but otherwise provides the Thai military what it requests?

Senator, I’ll take that one, but I would definitely defer to my Defense counterpart for that judgment. Again, Thailand’s been a very strong security partner for many years. I mean one of our longest allies in the region, 150 years. The large majority of that time has been spent using those weapons, which can be used against any number of people, you pick appropriately. So working with them and through programs like IMET and other things I think will only highlight to them the importance of appropriate use, the importance of democratic processes and the rest.

Well, from my perspective, that’s why we have, that’s why Senator Gardner and I worked on ARIA. It’s to give you additional tools on top of arms sales that can be used as leverage. Because otherwise the arms sales only further reinforce this military leadership within the country and its ability to, in fact, repress real democracy from emerging. Could you comment upon that, Mr. Schriver?

We do apply some scrutiny to the arms sales that we make and we work with Congress through the notification process. They’re certainly not intended for the types of use you’re describing. We do have some end-use monitoring and some follow-on activities to try to enforce proper use of the military systems. They do face legitimate external threats and we do want them as a partner. So I think exercising prudent judgment and scrutiny is important and we’re willing to continue to have that discussion with Congress on a case-by-case basis as we consider these systems.

Well again, from my perspective I see ARIA as a better approach than arm sales to this country in order ensure that we’re incentivizing the right parts of the country, the private sector, the civil society emerging so that we just don’t continue to see a repetition syndrome going back to 1932 with the military constantly injecting itself where we should in fact have a different approach that takes place in that country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Steele, the implementation of ARIA, the question that I’ve asked both Secretary Stilwell and Schriver, if you’d like to make some comments on how USAID may be implementing various provisions of ARIA.

Chairman Gardner. Yes, ARIA has really strengthened and provided a framework for us to implement our Indo-Pacific strategy. As I mentioned earlier, in FY18, using FY18 funds, we have allocated $534 million to work on strengthening democratic institutions. Working with civil societies, with private citizens, and with the government to make sure that their democratic systems are strong and misinformation is prevented. And civil society is able to serve as watchdog to government and the private sector. At the same time, we are using the resources to level the playing field for legitimate private sector so that they can trade and provide investment in the region and help to increase growth in the region. And finally, we are working with civil society and governments to make sure international standards for environment and social safeguards are taken into account and enforced as infrastructure, in particular, are developed in these countries.

Thank you. Secretary Stilwell, when you’re talking in the region, what is the response has been to U.S. efforts through the BUILD Act and ARIA and other leadership initiatives?

Senator, the track record of other proposed infrastructure and other initiatives has come home to roost. People understand that you can’t get something for nothing. They’ve come to understand the importance of high standards and market-based, true win-win arrangements. And so we’ve seen a number of countries reconsider deals that they’ve made and they’ve come to the U.S. and asked for help both in renegotiating, that’s one thing we do offer through the Transaction Assistance Fund, TAF, the ability to consider a contractor they’re looking at. But again I think what you’ll see in about two weeks following the Indo-Pacific Business Forum, the second one by the way with a much larger number of attendees, is sort of the ribbon, tying a bow on this thing to demonstrate. As you know, these things do take time to develop interest for us to message properly. And so I do think this one will have some significant outcomes and I definitely look forward to coming back and briefing those out to you.

Secretary Schriver.

Response has been overwhelmingly positive and they do feel reassured, as the title of your legislation sought to do. As I said, it’s often commented on when I travel through the region and they note the strong congressional executive cooperation on implementing ARIA and the Indo-Pacific Strategies. So overwhelming positive, and as Secretary Stilwell said, countries are looking for an alternative. OBOR and the relationship with China, there’s a lot of buyer’s remorse out there. Now we feel more empowered with the tools you’re helping provide to provide that alternative. So it’s been quite positive.

Secretary Steele.

Yes similarly, response has been very positive. I think by now, as was mentioned earlier, countries have seen what happened in Sri Lanka and what we offer, what the United States offers, is long-term sustainable development. One that takes advantage of people’s labor in the countries to develop their capacity to be able to participate in the growth, rather than putting them in a path of indebtedness which they have seen in other countries. I believe that with ARIA and the finances, the funding that we have been given through the Indo-Pacific Strategy and through ARIA, we will be able to level the playing field and strengthen democratic rights in these countries.

Thank you. Secretary Schriver, in Secretary Stilwell’s opening comments he states, “President Xi Jinping has set forth an ambitious national strategy to break down all barriers between the civilian and military technological spheres by fusing the defense and civilian industrial bases through what Chinese officials call ‘military civil fusion.’ Could you talk about concerns from the Department of Defense from this approach?

We are concerned because it means that normal commerce is not oftentimes not normal and that their objectives in developing their commercial relations related to their military modernization goals. So we look at their attempts to acquire dual-use technology. For example, with what another company might be genuine interest in developing a commercial relationship, developing a product for commercial use, we’re highly suspicious in these cases and believe, in fact, the motivations are otherwise. In fact, related to military modernization. So we keep a close eye on it and we’re trying to adjust as a whole of government to account for that development in China.

Secretary Stilwell, how do you, how does the Department of State, or perhaps even the Department of Defense, how do you reach out to U.S. businesses that may be unwittingly subjected to this fusion?

Senator, I think obviously the best way is messaging and again that’s my number one priority. You can do that in formats like this. You can do that through the media. But I think one of the best ways is to do it one-on-one. During the time in New York City here recently for the General Assembly we had an opportunity to do that, and visits to the region. We’ve done lots and lots of chamber of commerce events. And we do raise this issue of this risks raised, the risks you put yourself at, and we can use historical examples to show how these things are being used. Not only to deny them their intellectual property and the profits they so richly deserve, but also how these things can be turned to use from a civil to a very unhelpful military use.

Thank you. Senator Coons.

Let me just briefly thank Senator Gardner and Senator Markey who’ve worked so well together on such an important topic and to express my gratitude to this strong panel. And my apologies, there’s other committee hearings going on at the same time. A particular topic of interest to me that has been touched on, but I think deserves a little more exploration if I could, to Assistant Secretary Schriver, is unforced modernization. China is of course rapidly modernizing all of its military capabilities and I’m concerned about steps that we could take that would better secure both U.S. and partner interests in the face of that. And in particular, a concern I have about existing forces and the cost of sustaining long-standing relatively slow, irreplaceable large legacy equipment, aircraft carriers, as compared to inexpensive expendable potentially autonomous systems. The new Marine Corps Commandant, General Berger, recently noted in his planning guidance military equipment that has served us well yesterday may not serve us well today. How will we get ahead of technology trends that are increasing favoring low-cost high-impact systems rather than high-cost low-impact systems?

With leadership that is very focused on preparing for strategic competition with China. As I was saying earlier, we’re doing unprecedented work to try to bring the whole defense enterprise into alignment in an appropriate way for the China challenge. And that includes the elements of our department that are involved in research and development, acquisition, and talking about the future force. So our national defense strategy makes a clear priority on the theater and the pacing threat which is China. If you look at the resources that we’ve asked for in the three budgets in this Administration, there is a movement towards investing more in the contested domains of cyberspace, hypersonics, AI. And so I think we’re moving in the right direction. It’s a very dynamic environment. And the Chinese ‘get a vote’ as we say in the military. The enemy gets a vote.

Let me just push back a little on that. I agree with you that there’s increased investment in those areas. But the areas where there is traditionally the heaviest and most costly investment, take ships, is a platform like aircraft carriers, where if I get my numbers roughly right, you know a missile that’s $10 million can take out something that costs literally billions to build and deploy and sustain. I’m worried about legacy systems that are large and expensive both in air and in space. I agree with you that there are new domains like hypersonics or well-known domains but that are relatively new like cyber where we have to invest more. But the majority of what we’re investing, what we’re already got and what we’re building, is in these very significant and costly legacy systems. How are we reexamining what we’re doing in terms of war fighting? Not some future research project for 25 years from now, but today?

No, I understand. And what I can say is that conversation is well underway and it’s at the direction of our leadership. To make decisions that are appropriate for the competition with China and the threat that we face. And China’s approach, and what many call the Anti-Axis/Area Denial, which means that we’ve got to think about dispersal, we’ve got to think about diversification. Lethality means survivability and sustainment. We are bringing together the war fighters, the planners, those that are involved in R&D, those that are involved in acquisition, and having as a sophisticated a conversation as we can have about that. And all I can tell you is the leadership is focused on this. There are obviously legacy platforms that have advocates. And I see a need for continuing investment for some of the other mission sets. But I’m confident that we’re gonna come out in the right place given the focus and the prioritization that the leadership has on this.

I appreciate your answer. I wish we had time for a more robust and broader engagement but it’s already 4:20 and I suspect that we’re gonna have votes called any second.

Thank you, Senator Coons. Folks we’re now at 4:30 if you want to continue. We can continue. I’ll ask a question to follow-up on what Senator Coons has to say. In terms of war fighting, forced modernization efforts, could you maybe get into a little more specifics on ARIA and how that can play a role in forced modernization efforts and weapons systems, those kinds of things. The very beginning stages of ARIA we had a number of conversations both with Senator McCain and with the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative as well as Ambassador, excuse me, I guess then Admiral Harris, at PACOM. Could you talk a little more about how ARIA fits into that and what can be used?

Well I think it informs the process. It talks about our national security objectives and gives us really a blueprint for the future. So it really helps inform those discussions as they unfold. I think, again, there’s no confusion over what our priority is and what the pacing element is, so it’s another tool to help us keep that alignment as we go forward and, as advocates for other ways try to emerge, it keeps us aligned and keeps us focused on what we need to be focused on.

And can some of the funding from ARIA, I mean that obviously can be used to help with this effort, is that correct?

I’m sorry, Senator?

[Gardner] Funding, funding through ARIA.

I don’t know that we’ve worked out exactly how it would be apportioned. Certainly, we do see it as a potential tool for us as long as we can work with our inter-agency colleagues on that.

Okay, thank you. Secretary Stilwell, in your testimony you talk about ARIA calling for pursuing a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement. Could you give us an update of where we are with that ARIA principle?

Senator I think I mentioned earlier the engagement part is where we are best postured or best suited. I think the U.S., this chamber, and all of us, even the best of times, the worst of times, we represent to many, to include North Korea, a model, certainly the North Korean people would like to see. Would definitely enjoy if they could get there. And so Special Representative Biegun I know is working on engagement and trying to get these folks to table to reassure them that their security interests, we take those into consideration as we work through this problem. It’s been 60-plus years of this process and so it’s not going to go away right away, but we’re certainly on a better track now than I think we were in the past. They’ve come out to talk. We need to encourage them to continue doing that. I think ARIA does help. At least the message certainly is we’re here to engage.

You’re talking about North Korea’s security interests? The issues that North Korea has brought up in terms of their security interests, that’s correct? Are you concerned that recent actions in Syria could influence the thought-process as it relates to security interest guarantees that North Korea may be making?

Senator, as you mentioned during the intro, I started in this world in 1980 looking and tracking and trying to understand North Korea. There’s only one thing that North Korea thinks about and that’s North Korea. A lot of these other things that they throw out there are distractors, leverage in some form. But in this security dilemma that we face in somehow convincing them that a massively overpowering U.S. force truly will have their security interests and they can successfully trade this nuclear program, which frankly makes them less secure, for U.S. assurances, that’s where we make our money. Yeah, I think that’s where we should focus.

Senator Markey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you may recognize as a consistent refrain, I want to see the United States and Asian countries develop strong relationships. That is what ARIA is all about. But this desire to keep a closer relationship with countries is always in the context of the history of the country that we’re dealing with and their own leadership right now. So that’s no different with the Philippines. However, my colleagues and I continue to call for the Administration to hold the government of the Philippines accountable for extra-judicial killings and unjust imprisonment of political rivals and journalists. The most recent State Department Human Rights Report raises numerous significant concerns including persecution of human rights defenders and detention of political prisoners, including Senator Leila de Lima. I have introduced a resolution on that issue. Extra-judicial killings perpetuated by the government of the Philippines under cover of a government-directed anti-drug campaign continue, yet President Trump says he has quote “A great relationship with President Duterte.” Mr. Stilwell, in light of President Trump’s great relationship with President Duterte, how is the State Department holding Duterte accountable for his human rights violations and those of his government?

Senator, we do that by leading with our fundamental beliefs in human rights, by demonstrating those. And certainly by engaging. I think that you’ve heard from their Defense Minister and from my counterpart, or the person I work most with is Secretary Locsin, and we express this concern. And I think you’re heard from other parts of the Philippine government the similar concern. So the message is getting across. As far as the presidential decisions, I can’t speak to that. But as far as my interactions with the foreign affairs side, we’ve had significant progress in certainly communicating our message and getting them to read it back, demonstrating their concerns as well

Okay, so what is the Administration’s strategy to exert more pressure on the government to release Senator de Lima from detention as soon as possible?

Senator, we are aware of her continued detention. And again, when we interact we raise this. And to me that demonstration of concern on a repeated steady basis is the way that you convince sovereign governments to take decisions that benefit themselves and us as well.

Again, I think that there’s a mixed message that’s being sent, obviously, when the President says that he’s got a great relationship with Duterte. I think it makes it more difficult for you and others to hold Duterte accountable for extra-judicial killings and unjust imprisonments which is what we’re talking about here with Senator de Lima. So I just think that there has to be some public statement by this Administration with regard to the immediate release of Senator de Lima. To have it happen in a way that reflects our concern about the way in which Duterte is punishing those that are critical of his administration’s policies. So that would be my message to you. So I thank you Mr. Chairman. And I could ask one more question if you want Mr. Chairman?

He just asked if I needed him and I said I don’t think so. Was that the right answer (laughs)?

Yeah, okay, good.

Well, thank you Senator Markey. And I want to thank Senator Johnson for his willingness to come in at 4:30 and take over. We’re gonna start votes I think any time now. So I’m gonna go ahead and wrap up the hearing if it’s all right with you, Senator Markey. So I want to thank everyone for your time and testimony today. For providing the statements that you did. For information, members of record will remain open until the close of business on Friday, including for those members wishing to submit questions for the record. I kindly ask that the witnesses would respond as quickly as possible, promptly as possible. And your responses will be made a part of the record. And so with the thanks of this Committee, the hearing is now adjourned.

Share with Friends:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.