A documentary film containing historical footage and photographs, virtual terrain, animated maps, and one-on-one interviews with Veterans of the Operation Iraqi Freedom
Transcript
[Man] My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and Coalition Forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. (epic music) May God bless our country, and all who defend her.
[Narrator] On 19 March 2003, President George W. Bush announced the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, authorizing the use of armed force to overthrow Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein. Two days earlier, President Bush had issued Saddam Hussein and ultimatum.
Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.
[Narrator] Following Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein repeated violated United Nations Security Council resolutions designed to ensure that Iraq did not pose a threat to international peace and security. Concerns about Iraq’s non compliance and non cooperation intensified after 911 and the start of the Global War on Terror. US Central Command or CENTCOM drafted a plan to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s regime and to promote peace and security in the region. President Bush’s ultimatum was part of this plan.
The military objectives of the plan were to defeat the Iraqi regular army and the Iraqi Republican Guards to establish those military conditions for the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime.
[Narrator] The newly created Coalition Forces and Component Command, or CFLCC, served as the main ground command for the planned invasion. The US Third Army served as the core of CFLCC and V Corps served as CFLCC’s main US Army Headquarters in Iraq. The First Marine Expeditionary Force or MEF also fell under CFLCC and provided significant ground forces for the operation. The scheme of maneuver directed V Corps to seize the Tallil Airbase, establish a bridge head on the Euphrates River at Nasiriya and set conditions to conduct decisive operations north and west of the Euphrates River. CFLCC also directed 1st MEF along with the British forces to secure the southern oil fields, to seize Basrah and then advance toward Baghdad, using an axis of advance and follow the Tigris River to the east. If all went according to plan, V Corps would isolate Baghdad from the west, and 1st MEF would isolate the city from the east. As the 48-hour deadline for President Bush’s ultimatum approached, Saddam Hussein showed no signs that he would acquiesce to the demands of the United States. Intensifying matters, US intelligence analysts detected indications that the Iraqis were setting fire to their oil wells. Saddam Hussein had ordered oil wells to be set ablaze in the past, seeking to avoid another environmental disaster, Coalition Forces agreed that Iraqi destruction of their Southern oil wells would accelerate the operation’s timeline.
Indications that the Iraqis were preparing to blow up their own oil fields and the wells and the pumping station was impetus enough for us to begin the operation early. Intelligence reports also suggested that Saddam Hussein and his sons were gathered at a compound known as Dora Farms,
[Narrator] Hoping for an early disintegration of Iraq’s leadership, President Bush ordered a precision strike against a high value target in the early morning of 19 March. Although the high value targets were not in the compound, the strike did foresee enemies command and control elements to relocate, effectively degrading their ability to control their military forces. Following the strike and considering the immediate threat to the southern oil wells, CENTCOM Commander, General Thomas Franks ordered V Corps and 1st MEF to cross into Iraq on 20, March, a full day ahead of schedule. Originally, CENTCOM planned to initiate air operation 16 days before ground operations, similar to the weeks long air campaign preceding Operation Desert Storm.
We thought we could take that risk because the Air Force had controlled the skies of Iraq since the end of the first Gulf War. Why should we give people the gift of sustaining our supposed pattern of operations? Let’s change.
[Narrator] CENTCOM’s decision to initiate ground operations prior to the major air campaign caught the Iraqi government and military officials off guard. General Franks possessed operational initiative. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 defines operational initiative as the setting of the temple in terms of action throughout an operation. Army Forces seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By launching the ground assault a day earlier than planned, General Franks forced the Iraqi command to react and prevented them from disrupting CFLCC’s initial assaults into Iraq. (mellow music) In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the US Army remained in Kuwait in an effort to restore the country and its people. United States planned to promote long term political, economic and social stability in the region. Field manual 3-0 describes these efforts as shape activities. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent of enhancing international legitimacy and gaining multinational cooperation, while also providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. This presence would work in the United States’ favor as CENTCOM planned Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 3rd Infantry Division, known as The Rock of the Marne, had been in Kuwait for training since mid September, 2002. Other units such as the 1st MEF, V Corps’ headquarters, and the 101st Airborne Division arrived in Kuwait between January and March 2003. Veteran Ryan Kuo from Task Force 164 Armor, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 3rd ID recalled the various training they performed in the fall and winter of 2002.
[Ryan] We did a lot of small unit training initially really focused on platoon level, soldiers level skill sets. Once we were up to speed in terms of our soldier level skills, our tank level skills, our platoon level skills, or company level skill sets, really they started to move on to higher level exercises.
[Narrator] In preparation for the invasion, V Corps held a theater level exercise, which focused on the timetable and synchronization of the border breach operation. For the exercise, engineer battalions from 3rd ID constructed an exact replica of the 10-kilometer deep water complex known as the berm. The exercise verified that V Corps’ ambitious plan, a nighttime breach of a massive border obstacle was feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, suitable and complete. It further help them maneuver units understand the distance and speed they should expect to maintain during the actual operation. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 explains the importance of rehearsals to command and control. Training and rehearsals also provide opportunities to foster teamwork. Team building is essential to achieving the effective teams required of mission command. Action such as these enable subordinate commanders to act decisively in a degraded or uncertain environment. To breach the border optical, the operation required three major tasks. One, destroy the Iraqi forces’ main defensive positions. Two, clear and secure lanes through the berm. Three, safely pass following forces through these cleared lanes. 3rd ID received the invasion order on 18 March, 2003 and units moved into attack positions approximately five kilometers from the border. The next day, in coordination with Kuwaiti armed forces, 3rd ID began conducting breaches into the massive berm. With conditions set to pass through the berm, artillery fire engage targets within Iraq.
It was dark out and I don’t remember the exact time but it was like a little before midnight on the 20th we started firing the preparations fire and for the cannon battalions in 3rd F3 Division, that was really shooting the individual guard towers, the Iraqi guard towers and kind of shooting smoke so the engineers can move up and breach the (mumbles) obstacles.
[Narrator] That night, rocket fires from first battalion 39 Field Artillery Regiment MLRS delivered 63 strikes into Iraq, shaping the battlefield by destroying critical command and control nodes and enemy headquarters. After completing their difficult night breach of the obstacle, lead elements of 3rd ID started through the lanes. As the first and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams or BCTs established battle positions inside Iraq, the division’s third squadron, 7th Cavalry or 37 Cav and the 3rd BCT executed a forward passage of lines. Army Doctrine Publication 390 states that a forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy and it’s used to sustain the tempo of an offensive operation. After conducting a forward passage of lines, the combat elements of 3rd ID began moving toward their first objectives, Tallil Airbase and the areas around Nasiriyah. Operation Iraqi Freedom had begun. (mellow music) Iraqi army was deployed to meet the imminent invasion. Iraqi commanders planned to conduct a defense in depth using the southern oil fields as sanctuaries. They also intended to form an impenetrable defense around the Capitol. Pentagon officials dubbed this defensive zone, The Red Line, an area inside which they believed the Iraqis were most likely to employ chemical and biological weapons. Of all the Iraqi units, only the Special Republican Guard would be allowed inside the city in order to discourage a coup against Saddam Hussein. Beginning at Basrah in the south, the Iraqi units were echeloned along Highway VI in the Tigris River. The 51st Division, supported by armor units, was deployed south of Zubair. The 6th Armored Division defended just north of Basrah. The 18th Infantry Division was located in Gurna. The 14th Infantry Division, along with the 10th Armored Division was deployed between Gurna and Amar. The 11th Infantry Division defended the area around Nasiriyah. On the evening of 19 March, Iraqi forces were in position to defend the Tigris-Euphrates River Valley with these six divisions. (mellow music) Two main objectives during V Corps’ drive to Baghdad were Tallil Airbase, codenamed Objective Firebird, and the Highway I bridge over the Euphrates River in Nasiriyah. V Corps’ operation orders directed that 3rd ID commanded by Major General Buford Blunt III seize his objectives on the division’s advance north. Major General Blunt tasked 3rd BCT to seize the airfield and neutralize the 11th ID in the area. Successfully securing this airfield meant CFLCC could establish a logistic support area, or LSA, and use it to provide close air support for forces attacking toward Baghdad. Major General Blunt also tasked the 3rd BCT to seize the Highway I bridge over the Euphrates River, codename Objective Clay. If they seize this bridge, 3rd ID could use Highway I as the main supply route for the advance. 3rd BCT executed the plan by employing the combined arms of maneuver, fires and attack aviation. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 explains that combined arms is a synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve and effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. For the attack, Task Force 130th Infantry advanced from the south and Task Force 115 Infantry moved to a blocking position, northeast of the objective. 3rd ID provided air support from their fourth brigade’s attack aviation. Following artillery and attack aviation strikes and concealed by artillery fired smoke, Task Force 130th infantry quickly seized objective Firebird against minimal resistance. Within days, air force, army, marine and British engineers built revetments and refueling points for aircraft. Convoys of C130 air lifters then transported equipment and materials to the base. Soon, A-10s began operating out of the airfield. With Tallil Airbase secured, V Corps continued their rapid advanced north. While Task Force 130th Infantry secured Tallil Airbase, Task Force 269 Armor seized Objective Clay and secured the route across the Euphrates River. Concurrently, Task Force 115 Infantry occupied Objective Liberty, suffering only one soldier wounded in action. Having successfully secured their objectives, and set blocking positions between Highway I and Nasiriyah, the 3rd BCT then transferred control of the bridge to the 1st MEF and moved out to prepare the lines of communication. In order to maintain operational tempo during the drive to Baghdad, CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan ordered V Corps to bypass urban areas. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 warns that close combat is most often linked to difficult terrain, where enemies seek to negate friendly advantages in technology and weapon capabilities. Urban terrain represents one of the most likely close combat challenges. Commanders often tried to ensure urban operations do not interrupt critical timelines, unnecessarily slow tempo, or delay the overall operation.
We wanted to avoid a prolonged series of street battles. How we were going to do that was we determined that in route, we were going to have to take the risk and bypass a number of the smaller cities en route to Baghdad.
[Narrator] Another concern with regard to urban areas was that the lines of communication would have to pass along the edge of the enemy-held cities. The proximity of these roads to the southern cities generated some risk to sustainment units. Field Manual 3-0 states, “Supplies and material should remain “close to the maneuver force to ensure short response times “for supplies and services.” In the case of V Corps’ invasion of Iraq, across hundreds of kilometers of desert, this was particularly important.
Moving those big trucks underway in the sand of the desert. So that’s something we learned too is big heavy trucks like to bog down in the sand. We in training had vehicles buried down to their axles. Insane as we were figuring this out, moving through desert terrain.
[Narrator] So even though Lieutenant General Wallace would have preferred to bypass cities, the lines of communication had remained close enough to be useful to the maneuver units they supported. (mellow music) To maintain operational tempo, and reduce the risks to the lines of communication, 37 Cav advanced towards Samawah to secure two canal bridges and contain any resistance within the town. The plan directed 37 Cav to move through the town, cross the Euphrates River, then head north along Highways I and VIII toward Baghdad. Lieutenant General Wallace or 37 Cav to faint toward Baghdad in an attempt to deceive the Iraqis as to the direction of the main columns advance. Field Manual 3-0 explains that a faint is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and or time of the actual main offensive action. It is important also to note that forces conducting a faint make direct fire contact with the enemy, but they avoid decisive engagement. While a daunting mission, they did not expect much resistance, especially in Samawah where intelligence predicted that pro-American sentiment dominated the population. Unfortunately for the troops of 37 Cav, they were not welcome by a parade of grateful Iraqis.
There was gonna be a parade and we were going to be agreed as liberators to the city. The parade was bullets. They were dug in and they were fighting for the bridges.
[Narrator] As they approached one of the bridges across the Euphrates River, they were greeted with small arms and RPG fire from the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary organization loyal to the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, the Fedayeen Saddam proved to be more of a threat than anyone had expected. The fighting turned into a full scale battle. On 23 March, it became clear that the paramilitary forces in Samawah posed a severe threat to V Corps’ lines of communication. In order to maintain the momentum of the overall operation, Lieutenant General Wallace ordered logistics traffic and soft skin vehicles to bypass the town. 37 Cav continued to fight the Fedayeen. However, it was unable to control Samawah. As a result, Major General Blunt directed 37 Cav to pass the mission of containing the Fedayeen elements in the town to the 3rd BCT. By this time, 37 Cav had killed more than 550 Iraqi fighters destroyed 30 anti-aircraft systems and three command and control facilities. Relieved, 37 Cav resumed its role as the vanguard of the offensive, moving north toward the next objective, Najaf. The fighting did not seriously impede 3rd ID’s advance, but paramilitary forces continued to stage attacks on the lines of communication. On 25 March, five days after 3rd ID crossed the berm, 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division received the order to clear the town. The fight was not over. (mellow music) While 3rd BCT secured Samawah, the schema maneuver required that 3rd ID’s 1st and 2nd BCTs move north to establish a forward arming and refueling point or far at Objective Rams southwest of Najaf. It would be here that the division would rest, repair their vehicles and prepare to move through the Karbala Gap on their way to Baghdad. The 2nd BCT arrived at Objective Rams late in the afternoon of 22 March. Task Force 164 Armor seized the objective against light resistance. However, as the night continued, they found themselves fighting paramilitary forces similar to those that 37 Cav battled in Samawah. This was their first major engagement of the campaign.
[Ryan] Figured out those guys had the Fedayeen which we hadn’t met yet. And so the Fedayeen and the militia had been abducting their families and forcing them to fight.
[Narrator] What was supposed to be a maintenance stop for the unit and fort for an upcoming attack into the deep area, instead became a 72-hour fight between the 2nd BCT and paramilitary Iraqi forces. This unexpected delay had consequences for other units in the area, and proved to the soldiers involved how important maintenance and rest was in combat. (mellow music) During large scale combat operations, lines of support often become strained as requirements for repair and replacement of weapons systems increase, especially during high tempo offenses, as mechanized forces consume large amounts of petroleum oils and lubricants or POL.
We issued more lubricants for each armored vehicle that they would normally carry. It’s hit or miss I think but I don’t recall anybody having lubricant problems and then the fuel piece was, we worked very, very hard. Class IX, our biggest problem was if we had it, fine, it was on hand. If we didn’t, it was back in Kuwait and the problem was getting it forward. And by the time we got to Baghdad, we were really hurting on some key components. We knew 3rd Brigade and 2nd Brigades track on their tanks and Bradley’s had exceeded the mileage recommendations. The tracker was in good shape, generally but once you put another 500 kilometers on it, it was absolutely worn out. We were running on short tracks without roadway alarms and in some cases without roadway in some cases. So it was, we couldn’t have gone another 100 or 200 kilometers. We were about spent.
[Narrator] Sustaining V Corps’ offensive deeper into Iraq, required lengthening its lines of communication, and managing an ever-lengthening logistics tail. According to Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, widely dispersed forces, longer lines of communication, and congested road networks increase stress on transportation systems. To mitigate this, units conduct movement controlled by coordinating and directing movements on main supply routes or alternate supply routes, and regulating movement on line of communications to prevent conflict and congestion. Commanders expedite traffic on main supply routes through the use of special circulation control measures, such as temporary route signing, checkpoints, holding areas and traffic control posts. These points are particularly important circulation control measure during large scale combat operations, and commanders position them along the route to prevent congestion and confusion. Despite these control measures, fog and friction can intervene. On 23 March, an element of the 507th maintenance company with 33 wheeled vehicles and 64 soldiers mistakenly entered Nasiriyah instead of traveling along the designated route. The 507th missed a traffic control point and drove into the city. In the process of returning to the correct route, Iraqi paramilitary forces ambushed the convoy killing 11 and wounding nine. Seven of the nine wounds were captured. The captured soldiers were ultimately rescued, and the ambush of the 507th demonstrated the need for realistic live fire training for combat support units. (mellow music) While the 507th paramilitary forces and V Corps support area, the 11th attack helicopter regiment, mounted an attack in the deep area against the Elite Republican Guard. Army Doctrine describes a deep area as the portion of the commanders area of operations in which the commander sets the conditions for future success in closed combat. Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted or out of contact enemy maneuver forces from being committed in a coherent manner or in preventing enemy enabling capabilities, such as fires and air defense from creating effects in the closed area. V Corps planned for the 11th attack helicopter regimen composed largely of AH-64 Apache helicopters to conduct an attack into the Karbala Gap, a key strip of narrow land on the route to Baghdad. The attack was to serve as a shaping operation, intended to destroy the artillery and armor forces of the Republican Guard’s 2nd Almudena Armored Division. 3rd IDs faster than expected advanced toward the gap prompted Lieutenant General Wallace to order the attack a day earlier than planned. Inadequate planning and preparation puts a force at risk, but so does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 emphasizes that commanders need to balance attention between protecting the force and accepting and managing risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. However, effective commanders must often adopt a satisfactory course of action with acceptable risk as quickly as possible. Accepting the risk presented by the delays two of the three units, the 66 Cav and the first of the 227th took off on the evening of 23, March and headed toward the Karbala Gap. The Apache pilots soon found that their flight paths were not as safe as their maps depicted. The maps available showed the route traversing only desert, but they were in actuality, flying over large areas of urban sprawl. To protect these urban areas from aerial attack, the Iraqis had devised several low tech, yet effective means of defense. First, they launched their anti aircraft missiles without radar guidance, and set them to explode at high altitudes. Second, they had developed an unorthodox method of communicating aircraft movements by posting spotters along suspected flight routes with cell phones. Third, Iraqi engineers had established remote controls for each town’s power supply, allowing them to turn off the lights in various neighborhoods with one switch. When the lights were switched on, they silhouetted the helicopters, making them easier targets for enemy fire. Due to the damage inflicted by heavy anti-aircraft fire, very few aircraft made it to their objectives. On their return, the regiment found that 30 out of the 31 aircraft were damaged by ground fire. One Apache had been forced to land and both pilots were captured. 22 days later, marine successfully rescued the pilots. In spite of this setback, Operation Iraqi Freedom was going well. coalition commanders had successfully maintained a rapid operational tempo since crossing the berm three days earlier. Moreover, the outcomes of the initial operations led to courses of action that enabled follow one forces to be successful during the rest of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, V Corps was soon forced to halt their rapid advance. (mellow music)
[Ryan] And that’s when the mother of all sandstorms hit and it was like Mars.
[Narrator] The massive storm forced coalition forces to conduct an operational pause.
So the Red Day definitely sticks in my mind when the sand storm came in, couldn’t see anything, you couldn’t even see five feet in front of your face. So at that point, we were all kind of little worried because we didn’t know what the enemy, since that is their terrain, we didn’t know if they can sneak up on us and attack us without us seeing them.
[Narrator] V Corps exploited the pause by conducting sustainment activities earlier in the operation of the plan. Sustainment activities that V Corps facilitated during the sandstorm included resupply, vehicle maintenance and much needed rest for its soldiers. Lieutenant General Wallace had already anticipated the need to slow the V Corps’ rapid movement in order to resupply and prepare before attacking through the Karbala Gap on their way to Baghdad. The sandstorm actually assisted with this requirement by allowing logistics units to catch up with the fast moving mechanized forces. The pause also provided time for the effective echelons to get much needed rest after several days of continuous offensive operations.
[Ryan] It’s all about speed. So after the first few nights, I don’t think any of us had slept. I definitely had slept. I don’t think I ate for the first few days.
[Narrator] The operational pause worked and V Corps’ favor. The earlier than plan sustainment operations increased V Corps’ operational reach, ensured its freedom of action and prolonged its endurance as it prepared to move through the Karbala Gap. (mellow music) While the Shamal raged, CFLCC Commander Lieutenant General McKiernan, V Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Wallace and 1st MEF Commander, Lieutenant General James Conway met at 1st MEF headquarters to discuss the next steps for securing Baghdad. Lieutenant General McKiernan outlined his estimate of the enemy situation by stating that CFLCC now face to enemies centers of gravity. The Republican Guard near Baghdad and the Fedayeen Saddam in the rear. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1 explains. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces, and are either physical or moral. Understanding that commanders must make careful analyses of centers of gravity in order to not incur undue risk or adversely affect the operation, Lieutenant General McKiernan argued that the best approach would be to neutralize the Fedayeen Saddam, and their potential effects against the lines of communication before advancing on Baghdad. Lieutenant General Wallace replied that he thought the Fedayeen had been contained, but their containment was fragile. His immediate concern was the Karbala Gap. He indicated that he might need more time to insert reconnaissance teams to acquire intelligence of the area. He also agreed that he could use more time to secure V Corps’ rear area. Taking their concerns into account, Lieutenant General McKiernan decided the V Corps and 1st MEF should consolidate the gains they had already made by reducing the threat from the Fedayeen Saddam in the rear. Field Manual 3-0 explains that consolidating gains is essential to retaining the initiative over determine enemies because it ultimately removes both the capability and will for further resistance. Consolidation of gains activities consist of security and stability tasks, and will likely involve combat operations against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units. After containing the Fedayeen in the south, V Corps planned to resume the attack toward Baghdad, with five coordinated and simultaneous attacks. One goal of these attacks was to regain initiative and momentum following the sandstorm. Although V Corps had conducted numerous smaller operations during the operational pause, it was no closer to Baghdad. Another goal was to deceive the Iraqis into believing that V Corps would cross the Euphrates River south of Karbala and not through the Karbala Gap. Field Manual 3-0 notes that deception at the core level is most likely to succeed and mislead the enemy of the true disposition, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. By planning five simultaneous attacks across all echelons of V Corps, Lieutenant General Wallace developed a promising deception operation. First, the plan called for the 2nd Brigade 101st Airborne Division to faint towards Hillah and test enemy disposition in the area. While the 2nd Brigade conducted the faint, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division moved to contain the City of Najaf. The third attack featured the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, attacking to the enemy in Samawah. While ground forces worked to contain enemy forces in Samawah, Najaf and Hillah and attack helicopter battalion from the 101st, attacked in Iraqi army post southwest of Karbala. 2nd BCT, 3rd ID would perform the fifth and final attack and reconnaissance and zone toward the town of Hindiyah. This action was a directed effort to obtain detailed information on the route, obstacles, terrain and enemy forces near the Euphrates River. According to the plan, all five attacks were to begin at 0300 on 31 March. In reality, some of them were already in progress. The 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, augmented by 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, a mechanized battalion from the 1st Armored Division arrived near Samawah on 28 March. Two days later, on 30 March, they began probing missions to determine enemy strength in the area. As the paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne engaged the enemy in Samawah, the 1st Brigade 101st Airborne conducted attacks to contain the City of the Nijaf. (mellow music) Najaf with a population of nearly half a million people, is located 160 kilometers south of Baghdad, and 60 kilometers to the south of Hillah. Najaf is the home of two major Shia holy sites. The first is the Mosque of Ali. The other is the Wadi Al Salaam, which is one of the largest cemeteries in the Muslim world. Coalition commanders planned to bypass the major cities along the route to Baghdad. However, as US forces approached Najaf, paramilitary forces streamed out of the city to attack elements of the 3rd ID as they advanced north. These attacks threatened to slow V Corps’ advance and posed a severe threat to the lines of communication. To prevent the Fedayeen elements in Najaf from disrupting the lines of communication, Lieutenant General Wallace ordered Major General David Petraeus’ 101st Airborne Division to isolate and contain the city. Major General Petraeus, in turn gave the mission to its first brigade. Second Battalion, 327th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes was one of the first elements in the city.
I was ordered to move up and meet at the time Colonel Perkins the 2nd Brigade commander, 3rd Division, Dave Perkins was up there and I was to coordinate with him because I suddenly received the mission to establish a blocking position and leave an entire armor brigade with a light infantry battalion and hold the enemy in Najaf and prevent them from the influencing the lines of communications, the logistics tail of 3rd Infantry Division so they could continue up to Karbala pass.
[Narrator] While approaching the city, soldiers of the 327th captured over 150 men who were seemingly defending Najaf from coalition forces. After hearing from the captured Iraqis that the Fedayeen Saddam are holding Shia families at gunpoint in the city, Lieutenant Colonel Hughes felt compelled to push his troops closer to Najaf.
They gave us more intel than we knew what to do with, but the most glaring piece of information they gave me was, “We’re just civilians. “The Iraqi Republican Guard and the Fedayeen “are up there and they have our families in the square “and they’re holding at gunpoint. “They handed us a pistol and said, “Go meet the infidels, the American dogs “or we’ll kill your family, and if you’re killed, “we’ll take care of your family.” I had to pass that piece of information back to Colonel Hodges. Matt Hodges was the brigade commander at that time. I know it proliferated very quickly, because right on the heels of information, it was take the city of Najaf, which was never the intent.
[Narrator] During the assault, Lieutenant Colonel Hughes relied on the information provided by a free Iraqi fighter and native of Najaf, Kadhim Al-Weili, who was coincidentally assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Hughes and the 327. Now, Wiley was an Iraqi exile, recruited and trained by the United States to help army commanders during the invasion.
The Battle of Najaf went off for about three and a half hours. The battle probably could have gone on a little bit longer, but not much. But it stopped because of a very significant event, which was again Kadhim Al-Weili, the free Iraqi fighter, his hometown comes up to me, as you can imagine how busy we were because this was all line of sight. There’s no drones, there’s no nothing. It’s just line of sight. Kadhim comes up to me and tugs on my sleeve and I didn’t know him well enough yet to pay that much attention to him and I turned to him and he said, “Colonel, you’ve got 30 minutes ‘to call the prayer.” And he just stepped away. I thought for a second and I said, “Wait a minute, “wait a minute.” I had been priding myself up to this point of understanding the history to see if there’s a way to win without a fight. And I’m in the middle of the biggest fight I’ve ever been involved in, in my life and it’s pretty intense. But still the back of my mind, it was maybe I can not do this. Because I’m gonna really upset these people right now and I’m terrified, we’re gonna hit that mosque. If I hit the Mosque of Ali, with even a pebble, I’ve got the Syrians coming in and I’ve got the Iranians coming in. And I will be the guy who goes down history as winding the war when you didn’t have to. So I go, “Kadhim, come back.” I said, “I’m sorry, I apologize.” “What?” He goes, “You got 12 minutes to call the prayer.” And I go, “Are you telling me in the middle of all this, “those people are gonna go to prayer at that mosque “through this firefight?” And he said, “Absolutely,” and I went, “Okay.” I said, “Standby.” And I got on the radio, and I called it off. And that’s when we started realized understanding their faith, understanding the significance of the Sunni and Shia, understanding who Ali is, and understanding what makes this city tick, Kadhim Al-Weili suddenly became my primary weapon system.
[Narrator] 1st and 2nd battalions 327th Infantry, conducted the initial advance by attacking from the south on 31 March. Armor and mechanized elements of the first armor divisions task force 270th armor supported the attack, relying on the intelligence received from reconnaissance assets inside the city. Elements of 1st Brigade conducted raids against these designated targets and drove deep into Najaf. According to Field Manual 3-0, a raid is a form of attack to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or in the case of Najaf, destroy enemy capabilities. Raids are usually small and involve battalion size or smaller forces. Employing this form of attack, the 2nd Battalion captured the Baathist Party Headquarters and reach the vicinity of the Mosque of Ali and Wadi Al Salaam Cemetery before the end of the day. The following day, as precursor to future operations in Baghdad, Task Force to 270th Armor conducted a company-size reconnaissance and forced into the center of the town. Field Manual 3-0 explains that reconnaissance and force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy strength, dispositions and reactions or to obtain other information. They conducted a second reconnaissance enforced on 2 April. And by 4 April, the 101st Airborne Division controlled the town.
I get up there, and I told my guys they’re taking me and I’m telling them with a smile, and I’m forcing a smile, and I’m absolutely convinced that there’s cross hairs on me and somebody’s about to shoot me, but they’re trying to figure out why is this crazy guy smiling? Because that’s not what we expected and we don’t advance. And so I told him to get up and turn their backs and walk away, just walk away. And they did. I love those kids. They did. And it gave me enough of a break ’cause the crowd froze. It was like, “What did they just do?” You could just see the absolute confusion on their faces. It’s like it’s working, keep going, keep going, get as much space between us and them as we can. We got about a half a block and the guys kept going. I went back out of the middle because they’d seen me telling everybody what to do and I did this twice.
[Narrator] The 101st had also been tasked with conducting a faint toward the City of Hillah To support the faint, Major General Petraeus committed enough forces to convince Iraqi commanders that it was a legitimate attack. He reinforced his 2nd Brigade with an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter battalion and an artillery battalion. The brigade also received two combined arms companies from Task Force to 270th Armor. The attack began on the morning of 31 march with the mechanized companies from Task Force to 270th Armor in the lead and heading north on a four-lane highway. Among the enemy troops captured during the faint were soldiers the Republican Guard, Nebuchadnezzar Mechanized Division. This discovery came as a surprise, since CENTCOM intelligence had the division positioned north of Baghdad. Apparently, they had relocated undetected south of the capital. As Second Brigade 101st approached the southern edge of Hillah, the brigade commander ended the operation and withdrew. The faint succeeded, convincing the Iraqi commanders that the V Corps’ main effort was coming from that direction. V Corps also tasked the AH-64 to the 101st Airborne to conduct reconnaissance in an area south of Bar Ah Mil Lake, northwest of the main effort. This was the fourth action, and its intent was to determine if there were any sizable Iraqi forces in the area. The Apache pilots to their effort revealed that there were no major Iraqi forces, but they did successfully destroy a number of anti-aircraft guns and a large ammunition supply depot. (mellow music) The fifth and final operation was an attack toward the bridges at Hindiyah, designated as Objective Murray. The purpose of the attack was twofold. First, it was meant to turn Iraqi units from the Karbala Gap and reposition their indirect fire assets. Second, it was to convince the enemy that the V Corps’ crossing of the Euphrates River would take place at Hindiyah rather than near Karbala. The 2nd BCT 3rd ID began their attack on 30 March when two mechanized task forces, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 15th Infantry, advanced on Hindiyah from the southwest against live opposition. After killing numerous dismounted Fedayeen fighters, and destroying a number of machine-gun-equipped pickup trucks known as technicals, the two battalions took up defensive positions for the night near the western city of Limetz. Colonel Perkins’ forces for the 31 March attack consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 15th infantry, and two tank-heavy task forces. The 1st and 4th Battalions of the 64th Armour. At 0600, the three assault task forces began moving towards their objective. Enemy fire was intense and consistent of mortar and artillery fire, as well as RPGs fired from alleys, street corners and buildings. By 0650, the tanks of Task Force 464 Armor were at the south end of the objective. The Iraqis had wired the bridge for demolition, but had not installed any explosives. Since the operation was a faint, the Armor Task Force did not cross the bridge, leaving the enemy to believe their defenses had succeeded. This also induced Iraqi forces on the far side of the bridge to send reinforcements to the area to prevent a crossing. As Lieutenant General Wallace planned, the enemy reinforced and repositioned their defenses around the bridge thus allowing 3rd ID counter fire efforts to destroy a large amount of enemy artillery. After completing their mission, the 2nd BCT withdrew to block positions on Route nine southeast of Hindiyah. Field Manual 3-0 explains that during the performance of offensive tasks, there may be enemy counter attack penetrations into the flanks of advancing divisions and BCTs. The divisions and BCTs employee security forces on exposed flanks to provide early warning and reaction time. Blocking positions also served to counter possible enemy counter attacks to prevent an enemy from leaving an area or to deny an enemy terrain. In the case of the 2nd BCT, the blocking positions were also designed to deceive the Iraqis into expecting another attack, as well as support the rest of divisions operations for the attack on the Karbala Gap. (mellow music) Lieutenant Gerald Wallace expected that the toughest fighting of the campaign would take place as V Corps fought its way through the Karbala Gap. The gap was a natural choke point and thus could be easily defendable. However, it provided the fastest avenue of approach to Baghdad. The name Karbala Gap is almost a misnomer, sounding more like a pass for the mountains instead of what it really is, a narrow swath of farmland situated between the Euphrates River and Bar Al Milkh Lake. Maps available to V Corps made the area appear easily traversable, when in reality, irrigation ditches, canals and soft fields crisscross the area, creating an effective deterrent against armored movement. By ordering V Corps through the Karbala Gap, Lieutenant General Wallace assumed a degree of risk Field Manual 3-0 discusses, risk, uncertainty and chance are inherent in all military operations. Operational art balances risk and opportunity to create and maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. While it’s understood that the Iraqis recognize the importance of the gap, but believe that pushing through it allowed ground forces to retain the initiative as they closed on Baghdad. The 2nd Republican Guard Corps defended the Karbala Gap. In support, they had only Karbala’s militia forces on the eastern side of the gap and what remained of the Republican Guards Medina Division to the north and west of it. According to plan, the 3rd BCT would lead the attack and isolate the eastern half of the city. The 1st BCT would follow, isolate the western half and seize bridges on Highway 28 and a dam west of Karbala. Once through the gap, 37 Cav would screen to the northwest to protect 3rd ID’s left flank. The 1st BCT would then fight its way through objective chargers. A former Iraqi army training ground and continue 30 kilometers farther north to secure the vital LK Bridge, codename Objective Peach. Once objective peach was secured, the 2nd BCT would then depart from Objective Murray, pass through the 1st BCT at Objective Peach and attack to secure the junction of Highways I and VIII located about 15 kilometers south of Baghdad. The 3rd BCT would remain in Karbala to secure it until relieved by the 101st Airborne. At midnight in 1, April. 3rd ID launched the attack on the gap by sending the 3rd BCT to isolate the eastern portion of Karbala as planned. At 0200, the 1st BCT began its advance to the Western reaches of the city. By 0600, they were in the gap. Sensing an opportunity to increase the operational tempo, Brigadier General Lloyd Austin, the 3rd ID’s Assistant Division Commander for maneuver, ordered the 3rd BCT to take over the fight for Karbala, and he sent the 1st BCT to seize objective charges. In taking the bold risk of continuing the advance without a full force, Brigadier General Austin compensated for any lack of information and pressed the battle. As a result, 1st BCT seized the objective charges ahead of schedule. The 1st and 3rd BCT’s quick successes in isolating during the gap enabled Major General Blunt to accelerate 2nd BCT’s timeline as well. In order to enable it to arrive more quickly Objective Peach Colonel Perkins order the 2nd BCT to take another route farther east, rather than following the 1st BCT through the city. This decision however, resulted in further difficulties. The 2nd BCT encountered heavily damaged roads and marshy terrain on the new route. And at approximately 1630, Colonel Perkins ordered his brigade to return to the original plan and follow the 1st BCT through Karbala.
As we get into Karbala, there were dismounts everywhere. We would have dismounts running on the sides of the road popping up out of holes. They were just they were everywhere, and just taking pop shots at us from all different angles.
[Narrator] Once through the Karbala Gap, the lead elements of 3rd ID began to advanced toward the last major objective on their way to Baghdad, Objective Peach. It was 2, April when they began to move. V Corps had advanced over 300 kilometers into Iraq in 11 days. Relying on high rate of speed and bypassing major southern cities during their advance from Kuwait, V Corps had maintained the initiative and kept Iraqi forces off balance. Now, if they successfully seized this bridge over the Euphrates River, 3rd ID would have direct access to Highway VIII, the paved freeway that led straight into the heart of Saddam Hussein’s capital. CFLCC now stood on the threshold of their final objective, Baghdad. (mellow music)