A Senate armed services subcommittee hears testimony about the Department of Energy’s atomic energy defense and the Defense Department’s nuclear weapons programs. Testifying before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces are: Jill M. Hruby, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; William White, senior advisor for environmental management at the Department of Energy; Navy Adm. William J. Houston, deputy administrator for the Office of Naval Reactors at the National Nuclear Security Administration; Marvin L. Adams; deputy administrator for defense programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration; Air Force Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command; and Navy Vice Adm. Johnny R. Wolfe Jr., director for strategic systems programs in the Department of the Navy.

Transcript

This hearing on the Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Programs and Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs of the Armed Services Committee sub-committee on Strategic Forces will come to order and I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here today and for their service to our nation. I first want to welcome Admiral Houston, our eighth director of naval reactors to the sub-committee. And we look forward to hearing from you over the next eight years. Thank you, Admiral. Congratulations. Today’s hearing consists of two panels to review the budget request for defense nuclear activities at the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense we’re undertaking. Now our third era of nuclear modernization. The first two were conducted in 1960 1980 mainly in a situation of competition with the Soviet Union. However, now we face two heavily nuclear armed near peer competitors, Russia and China. More than ever, we are relying on modernizing our triad to perform the deterrence mission, the deterrence mission, which is the bedrock of our national security strategy. This year, we were informed that there is a non McCurdie breach of the sentinel ICBM replacement program, General Bossier, I will want to know how your command is investigating this issue. Administrator Ruby pit production costs continue to climb at the Savannah River plant and I look forward to your telling us how you’re tracking and working on containing them. And Mister White, you perhaps have the toughest job of all managing the largest liability of the federal government, which in 2023 was estimated at $531 billion. I want to know what you are doing to work your way through this backlog of clean up and whether there are less costly methods to dispose of some of the tank waste at Hanford while still meeting our commitments to the state and to the environment. Because we have two panels, I would appreciate if you could make short 2 to 3 minute opening statements, we’ll have five minute rounds of questions again. Welcome to the committee. Thank you for your service, Senator Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today. Our nuclear deterrent underpins our entire national security strategy and it must remain safe, reliable, effective and credible. We face two peer nuclear adversaries for the first time in history while our current nuclear weapons and delivery systems meet the threats of today. I am increasingly concerned that our planned force posture for the 20 thirties and beyond will be insufficient. We need to start laying the groundwork today to set the conditions for success in the future. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on both panels on the progress being made with current programs of record and what additional resources or authorities are needed to accelerate that progress. I would also like to note that last year’s report from the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission included 81 recommendations that I believe laid out an excellent framework for this nation to revitalize our entire nuclear enterprise. Senator King and I work together on a bill, the restoring American deterrence Act that encapsulates many of these recommendations. I look forward to working with all of our panelists over the coming months as we seek to implement some of those changes. Thank you again for joining us today and thank you, Mr. Chairman administrator Ruby. Well, thank you um Chairman King, ranking member Fisher. It’s a pleasure to be here um to present the president’s fiscal year 2025 budget request for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration in today’s complex and dynamic security environment. N NSA is delivering last year, we provided the Department of Defense over 200 modernized weapons on schedule. Our nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs are advancing technologies and partnerships that are responsive to today’s global environment. We are preparing for the future by revitalizing our infrastructure and staying at the cutting edge and select science and technology. NN Sas Fy 2025 budget request of $25 billion reflects this these priorities, the nuclear weapons program of record has grown from 5 to 7 systems to be delivered or in active production within the next decade. This request supports all those systems with the exception of Slick Em in just due to the timing of the 2025 budget request and the fy 2024 NDA A. However, N NSA is fully committed to fulfilling the Slick um in requirement. These seven systems represent modernized weapons for all three legs of the trium and the new capabilities responsive to today’s security environment. Additionally, the request supports two phase one studies to prepare to meet future deterrent needs to deliver this demanding schedule. N NSA is prioritizing infrastructure investments to get needed capabilities completed on time while also pursuing a longer term strategy of a responsive, flexible and resilient enterprise. High priority projects include the pit production facilities at Los Alamos and Savannah River and the uranium and lithium processing facilities at Y 12. Our defense nuclear nonproliferation activities are also responding to today’s global dynamic and anticipating the future. In summary, N NSA is hoist is holistically supporting nuclear deterrence and strengthening relationships with our allies and partners. There’s a lot of work ahead and we appreciate your support. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. Chairman King, ranking member Fisher, distinguished members of the sub-committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Your support for the naval reactors enables my team to design, operate and maintain a globally deployed force of submarines and aircraft carriers that reliably and consistently carry out our national security missions around the world. Today, the US Navy’s nuclear power warships are operating alongside our allies and partners in hostile regions providing forward presence and safeguarding stability in a world that is increasingly tense. Our global presence continues to be supported by strong allies and relationships through the Aus Agreement. The United States, United Kingdom and Australia have demonstrated a trilateral commitment to a free and open Indo Pacific region. While expanding the region of effectiveness of all three nations military forces, naval reactors has delivered the advanced technology that provides our fleet competitive edge in the maritime environment through investment in research and development. In the past decades, our talented people, our peerless technology and our state of the art facilities give us the ability to operate submarines and carriers wherever and whenever we choose, we must step up this investment if we want to sustain and exploit that advantage. My budget request for fiscal year 25 is 2.12 billion and invest in each of the following three carriers, three areas and two priority projects. First, my request supports our most important resource. Our people, the talented and dedicated people within the naval nuclear propulsion enterprise are essential to the management and oversight of the important work we perform for our nation. Second, the budget reflects continued investment in R and D of technology to support our current and future fleet to substantively lower costs, reduce construction timelines and add fleet capability. Finally, my request focus on investment to modernize the critical infrastructure throughout our 70 plus year Department of Energy Laboratories and address our legacy environmental liabilities. I’m also seeking our continued support for two national priority projects. The first continued development of the reactor plan for the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine directly supporting the Navy’s number one acquisition priority. The second project is continued construction of the naval spent fuel handling facility in Idaho which enables long term reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from the navy’s nuclear fleet. In closing your strong and enduring support enables naval reactors to provide the nation a nuclear power fleet that is unrivaled. I respectfully urge your endorsement of our fiscal year 25 budget request. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral Mr. White. You must have one of the toughest jobs in the federal government. Give us an update. Thank you, Senator, um Chairman King, ranking member Fisher. It’s an honor to appear before you. The em mission reflects the United States commitment to cleaning up the environmental legacy of national defense programs that helped end World War two and the Cold War. While our mission is rooted in the past, we’re very much focused on the future clean up progress at the Savannah riverside in South Carolina, for example, is leading to a greater role for N NSA. There. Clean up accomplishments are boosting the clean energy economy in Tennessee and helping the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y 12 National Security Complex prepare for expanding national security and research missions as buildings like the Biology complex have come down. National security and science missions have the space to be built up. The budget requests positions em to deliver on these and other priorities that drive risk reduction progress, skyline changes and help us ramp up tank waste treatment, which is the largest part of the environmental liability that you mentioned earlier in Washington. 800,000 gallons of tank waste have been treated at Hanford and will ultimately be stabilized in glass. The waste treatment plant melters have reached operational temperature and have been used to pour the first containers of test class from both melters. The test bed initiative is advancing as another potential option to accelerate the Hanford tank waste mission through commercial grouting and disposal. In parallel, we’ve reached a breakthrough agreement with the state of Washington and the EPA that charts a safe and achievable path for the Hanford tank waste mission. The fy 25 request is consistent with this agreement which will enable us to begin addressing Hanford’s high level tank waste and achieve risk reduction while exploring alternative treatment technologies to accelerate our work on ems largest environmental liability. By turning this corner with our regulatory partners. We hope to aggressively move forward with our mission at Hanford. Honoring our responsibility to the environment and our commitment to the communities and the tribal nations around the site. Demolition efforts across em are also moving forward after bringing down four buildings at the Nevada National security site last year, we’ll continue reducing our footprint as we work to complete the legacy clean up there within a decade. Demolition work at West Valley in New York will advance as well as cleanup of the highest risk excess facilities in Tennessee. This request also enables continued shipments to the waste isolation pilot plant as we modernize the facility to meet the needs of both clean up and national security programs. While significant progress has been made, we’re always looking at opportunities to improve the budget request allows for continued improvement to the rigor of program and project management as well as opportunities to progress clean up safely and more efficiently. This includes technology development, targeted R and D investments, evaluation of cost effective treatment options and investment in building future workforce pipelines. I thank the sub-committee for its historical support of our pro program and our mission and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. You’ll notice the vice chair and I are the only ones here and I want to explain that uh we’re hoping that someone with an A I capacity will figure out how to schedule the Senate. Uh It’s not uncommon for us to have three hearings scheduled at the same time and I think that’s happened this afternoon on top of that as a vote on the Senate floor. So, but be assured, uh we all know these people and they are keenly interested in what, what you’re doing. Um uh Administrator Ruby uh is Savannah River a, a practical project?

Is it, are we ever, is it, is it going to be able to be brought in at a reasonable time at, at a reasonable cost that the numbers keep going up and the date keeps moving out. Give me an update on Savannah River. Yeah, thank you, Senator King. I, I’d be happy to um in short, I would just say ab absolutely. Uh It’s a practical project and real progress is being made. Uh uh We have um we’ve done a lot of things uh to make this project more realizable. Uh uh uh But the costs have gone up. Uh We have much, I have much more confidence in the cost. I think we all have much more confidence in the cost and the time uh and the time estimate to complete this. Our goal now is to complete construction of Savannah River uh by I I in tw in twe in 2032. Uh And then to start the process to do rate production and have that complete in, in 2030 35 or 2036 is is going to be able to meet the, the, the, the demand that we have for pits in the meantime, they are so Los Alamos will be producing 30 pits per year in, in 2028 for the W 87 dash roll war been already produced this year. Is that correct?

We have, uh, we, we’ve made pits at Los Alamos. Uh We have not, we’re gonna make our first fully wr certified war reserve, certified diamond stamped as we call it uh pit this year. Uh but we made uh nine com complete pits last year plus five developmental pits last year at Los Alamos. So we’re feeling uh a lot more confidence in our ability to make pits there repeatedly. We’ll get our certification. We’ll be on our path. Uh We have a uh a very, um you know, detailed schedule path for 30 pits per year at Los Alamos. Let me, let me change the subject. Uh One of your areas that you mentioned is, is nonproliferation. One of my biggest concerns is nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists in an open setting. What can you tell us about what steps are underway in order to prevent that from happening?

We have nuclear states, some of which are rather unstable. Uh We have a nuclear state that seems inclined to sell things. Um That’s the nightmare because we’ve all talked about deterrence, deterrence doesn’t work with a terrorist. They don’t have a capital city that is at risk and they don’t care about dying. So we’re going to have to rely on nonproliferation and intelligence. But what can you tell us in an open setting about dealing with that issue. Well, we work with everybody that we can to get rid of weapon, usable material or materials that we make bombs. Uh terrorists are usually not in that group. Uh So what we do is we work with our allies and partners to make sure we have very strong border uh protection and crossing so any illicit movement of materials. Uh and we, you know, we have, fortunately or it depends on how you think about it. But in this case, fortunately, we have allies that live in bad neighborhoods around these places where terrorist cells exist and we have a strong collaborations with them to make sure we can detect, we have technology that can detect the movement of nuclear material. Uh somewhat, we’re in an open setting but in so far as you can answer that question, yeah, somewhat. Uh it depends on the amount and it depends on whether or not they shield it. There’s lots of, you know, lots of details that matter, but we certainly work on those technologies and we deploy them. Uh you know, frequently when we think they’ll be effective and where we think they’ll be effective. I’m, I’m gonna start with you admiral, but we’ll come back in a, in a second round. Um I worry about the submarine industrial base. We’re, we’re barely building a submarine a year. And if you add Aus, I just don’t know who’s going to build those submarines. Is that a concern of yours?

And what do we do to address it?

Uh uh Chairman uh obviously uh construction of submarines, career submarine or it’s near and dear to my heart. Um With the Columbia and the Virginia class, the one plus two, we have invested heavily as a navy in the submarine industrial base to build that cadence and really helping those sub tier uh suppliers that actually feed our prime shipyards to build those submarines is really key. And um we are fully committed to that and your investment on the navy is significant. Do your current five-year plan indicate that we’re going to have the capacity to build the submarines that we, that we hope to um by for my uh naval reactors. Hat on my doe side. Absolutely. And for the navy side right now, we are progressing on a plan to get to 2.0 by 28 and 2.33 by 32 which corresponds to the time that we would be delivering the first um submarine purchased by Australia, that’s going to take some serious workforce. It’s significant work. If you look at what we have done in 2014, we’re building a single Virginia and in 2024 we’re building two Virginias that are 25% bigger than the Virginias we’re building in 2014. And we’ve added on top of that, the Columbia class, which is 2.5 times that original Virginia. So we have increased by fivefold, the tonnage we’re building on submarines in the middle of COVID in the middle of supply chain issues and we are progressing on that. And that is why the navy is so invested in the submarine industrial base to improve that cadence on submarine construction, which is absolutely critical to the roles submarines play for our strategic deterrence and also in the Western Pacific. Thank you, Admiral Senator Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As members of this sub-committee are acutely aware. N NSA has extensive infrastructure needs. Some of your facilities date back to the Manhattan project and budget constraints and uneven performance on past recapitalization effort have increased the level of risk to the nuclear enterprise administrator. Can you provide this committee with an update on the ongoing capital asset projects, particularly the new facilities planned for the process processing of the critical minerals?

Ok. Um Thank you. Um So your pleasure. Uh Yeah, we have, we do have a lot of infrastructure projects underway. Um Our, our um our strategy uh is to try is to start keeping them done and then as opposed to start them all at the same time. Uh And so we’ve been uh we’ve been very um stringent on our prioritization of these facilities and we’re doing this for reasons why we need them. So we, we, we, we need them to get our weapons done. And, and the second thing is it’s cheaper if you can get them done than if you just continue to drag them out. We’ve seen cost increase as a result of that just by keeping people on roll, that might not be at their full capacity. So we have a plan to get uh projects finished now with respect to critical uh minerals. Can I ask you what the priority is on the facilities?

Which one you’re prioritizing some do similar uh minerals obviously, but most of them are doing different ones, right?

So the our, our highest priority is pet production. Uh So the two facilities, one at Los Alamos and one at Savannah River. Uh the other facility that we’re, we’re, we’re pushing towards completion is the uranium processing facility at Y 12. And the next most crucial facility from a single point of failure perspective is our lithium processing facility at Y 12. In addition, we have high explosive facilities underway which are also um uh critical um to be able to produce the weapons that we have. Um we have lined up. Did you wanna give us uh did you wanna finish your, your first comment when I?

Well, I just think that with RE II, I wanted to um say more newer to our discussions, the fact that we broke ground on the lithium processing facility. Uh And uh this facility is that at Y 12 that is at Y 12. Uh It re it replaces a, a very old and, and facility that has some serious both safety and structural issues. Uh And so we um we’ll be talking about that in the years ahead. Uh And I think it’s also to the point that Senator King made earlier to get these pit production facilities done is gonna require uh fast, is gonna require higher investments over shorter periods of time. So you’re gonna, you don’t see that in the fy 25 request too much, but II I will, I think it’s coming and out your re request. Thank you uh administrator and Admiral between the Aus Agreement and the possibility that we’re going to need to increase the number of planned hulls for Columbia class Virginia class or SNNSSNX submarines. How are we managing the increased demand for the highly enriched uranium for the naval reactors?

Do we need to put plans forward uh for any new enrichment facilities?

The highly enriched uranium supply is projected to last to the 20 fifties. Even with these increased demands, we are well aware of that na actors is working very closely with the N NSA and doe because as you know, we’re, we’re currently getting our highly enriched uranium from older nuclear weapons that we’re reprocessing. So it’s something that has our attention. We have to develop a plan to do that. Um And we’re watching that very closely, the increased demands from AUS we’ve looked at that. It’s very, very small in the overall scheme. The bigger thing is is that we have to get the capability in time to support about 2 to 3 metric ton delivery to support our fleet needs in the 20 fifties and we’re working very close. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair Admiral. I visit the Portman Table Shipyard fairly regularly and always climb down in a, in a submarine that’s under overhaul. By the way, I flunk the virtual welding test every time I keep trying, but it’s very difficult anyway. Um Are you doing any thought in your design to accelerating the overhaul process?

I’m, I’m concerned about availability of these very expensive assets and how much time they have to spend in dry dock?

Uh Are there, for example, uh Senator Fisher and I were in North Dakota and we went down into the missile field and the old missiles, you’ve had to practically take them all apart to get to some of the pieces that needed maintenance. Is this something that you think about in the design of the submarines in order to get them in and out of, of, of overhaul on a more accelerated timetable?

Yes, Senator, that was my first time. I met you. You were a governor and we commissioned the main up in the Portsmouth shipyard. So it’s an incredible shipyard. It’s one of our leading submarine shipyards there. It’s a tremendous uh uh site and I will tell you we from the nuclear propulsion side are doing everything we can to expedite those. Um We play a part in the submarine overhaul, a large, large portion of it. Um We are working with our inc to do a once in the life of the ship upgrade on that. Um We have a very robust design on that. We are looking at maintenance activities such as our media discharges to do a once in life. And we are pushing technology. We have invested heavily in additive manufacturing because from a naval reactor standpoint, I own both the technical requirements and I also own the financial levers to Paul. And I’m actually leading the way for NAF C and I have components now that are being additively manufactured, that are going into our primary plants, our reactor plants to lead the way. So we are trying to accelerate that because I see the same thing. It’s more than just shipbuilding. It’s that ship repair and ship sustainment. Well, I’m glad to hear about the uh the attitude manufacturing. My belief is that there should be a 3d printer on every ship and in every hangar and that we should be buying the IP when we buy a platform so that we can maintain and build parts in a much, much more efficient way. I absolutely agree. The carriers do have printers on them. Some of our submarines have actually deployed with printers and they actually additively made, manufactured some components already for that. We need to expand that and it’s more about speed now than it is so much about the process you use. And we find with additive manufacturing that it takes, it’s faster than some of the just pure casting, pouring molten metal into sand and then removing all that excess metal is all that work that you have to do is taking away from actual production time that you could be using for other things. And so I absolutely see it the same way as you do and we just have to keep on lead the way. I appreciate that. And I can’t resist mentioning that the University of Maine has the largest 3d printer in the world. And last year they printed a house. So it’s an amazing technology that I think is going to change everything, but it could also help us with maintenance of our, of our naval and in fact, uh air and armed forces assets, Mr. White, um I mentioned in my opening, the cost of the estimated cost of half a trillion dollars. You mentioned in your comments, looking at different technologies and techniques. Is there any hope of finding technologies that will enable us, enable us to meet our obligations at the same time, maybe chip away at that 505 $100 billion. Uh Senator. Thank you for that, that question. II, I absolutely think so. And I think some of them we’re doing currently and we’re um working uh with our state regulators and partners on the agreement we just signed. I mentioned earlier with the state of Washington will allow us to explore alternative treatment technologies for the bulk of our tank waste there. The low activity portion of that um this committee supported our test bed initiative in the past which looks at commercial uh disposal and grouting options. And I think just that ability alone to, to, to deal with the low activity piece of the tank waste in that fashion would save hundreds of billions of dollars beyond just simply um uh vitrifying the waste. There are other things we can do that. We’re uh this committee has supported our R and D efforts. Uh looking long range at our tank waste mission. One of the things folks don’t always think about in terms of our tank is we have about 50 million gallons at Hanford. But over time, because of the way we have to retrieve the waste, we use water to retrieve it. You end up having to treat about 100 and 50 million gallons of waste because you have to create more waste as you retrieve what’s there to be able to treat it. Um Part of our R and D effort that we just awarded this past year, for example, is going to our laboratories to look at alternative retrieval technologies so that we can reduce the amount of water that we have to use in retrieval to ultimately be able to reduce the amount of tank waste that we have to treat. So I think there are opportunities like that across the enterprise. Um And we’re trying to take advantage of those. Could you hazard an estimate as to when Hanford will be done?

I, I can give you an estimate, Senator, but I can almost guarantee you that I would be uh wrong. I think our best case uh for getting done. I if we can uh work through our, our technical challenges and use alternative treatment technologies could be as early as the 2060 ish time frame. Um I think if we use 60. Yes, sir. Wow. And it could otherwise be much longer. Keith Richards might be dead by then Senator Rosen. On that note. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for holding this hearing. It’s really important. Thank you all for the work that you do. It’s so important to us in Nevada. Um As you know, and uh um because the Nevada national security site, it has been called the battlefield of the Cold War and what was then known as the Nevada test site. Those of us in Nevada still call it the Nevada test site. It was ground zero for the majority of our nation’s nuclear tests were 100 atmospheric and 828 underground tests were conducted from 1951 to 1992. We know these tests contaminated our soil, our groundwater, the facilities in the area and cleanup is still ongoing. And so uh Mr. White, can you please provide us an update on the cleanup projects within the security site. And uh do you have the adequate resources to complete the task?

Uh Thank you for that. Uh Senator and I, I very much appreciate the support from Congress over the last couple of years in adding additional funds to our clean up budget in Nevada. I think that helped us in a couple of cases. Um We, we’ve been able to install more robust inspection uh capabilities for our disposal activities there and we’ve been able to optimize some of our D and D efforts right now. We’re very much focused on what I think is a historically interesting part of the site where um some of the nuclear rocket work was done. So the test cells and the old uh facilities that are being uh D and D with within our our current approach, we should be able to get that work done in the 2030 by the 2030 time frame. Wonderful. Thank you and administrator Ruby. Today. Uh The site conducts the sub critical experiments to verify the reliability, the effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile so that we never ever have to return to the days of above or below ground testing, explosive testing. And so last week, this first sub critical experiment in roughly three years was conducted in the principal underground laboratory for sub critical experimentation. It much easier to say pulse facility. And so can you discuss the importance of that experiment why sub critical experiments and other experiments taking place in the Nevada National security site are vital to our stockpile stewardship and ensuring that we can continue to certify the stockpile without again ever returning to underground explosive nuclear testing. Yeah, thank you. Um Senator Rosen. It’s good to see you again. And we’re very proud of the fact that we um had a successful sub critical experiment. Um just last week. Uh These experiments are so important because they allow us to study actual plutonium without do without uh without doing a, without creating a chain reaction, right?

So there, that’s why we call them sub critical. Uh And so we can actually look at the real material uh under conditions that are important to us under very dynamic conditions. And as a result of these tests, we can make sure um the aged material still behaving as we would expect it to, we can look at newly produced materials and see if it behaves the same. Uh And we can learn new things uh by our high fidelity experimental um data collection. So uh we anticipate this is the best way um to maintain our stockpile without uh returning to nuclear testing, especially with the demands that we have right now uh in our production uh enterprise as well as uh um perhaps new weapons that we need in the future to meet these changing global conditions. It’s important that we do these. And uh we talk about um all of our missions and particularly our counterterrorism mission. We have another thing not besides having the test site, we have the amazing remote sensing laboratory. I love to go out there. They’re doing, um, just wonderful things and of course, they’re both at Nevada’s Nellis Air Force Base and joint base Andrews. They provide that emergency response capability and crisis support teams and they are ready to deploy anywhere around the world and the personalities cases. I said I’ve been out there many times and uh and those of the national security site, they’re the nation’s experts in locating bombs, loose nukes sources of radiation in addition to determining origin and attribution through nuclear forensics. And so madam administrator given the critical role that both our facilities play and remote sensing lab in particular um in our national defense architecture. Can you speak a little bit about how important our remote sensing lab is and the safety and security that they provide to the American people?

Yeah, absolutely. It is fun to uh talk to the people who work at these labs. They do amazing things in amazingly short time frames because everything they do is usually associated with emergency response. And I would just like to say that it’s been, it’s not only for the American people when a source goes missing or something unexpected happens in the US, it’s also for the international community and they’ve been critical in our work. They have everything they need to continue their mission. I wanted to ask you. I do think so. I think that the, uh to be honest, so they’ve had a big, uh they’ve had a boost because of the supplemental funding for Ukraine. They’ve done a lot of work for Ukraine. I know. Uh So that, that’s not in our base budget. Of course, that’s in our uh supplemental budget. But as a result of that, we’ve been able to really exercise all the muscles um uh uh with that, with that team. Well, we have the remote sensing lab and the test site. Amazing teams work out there and I’m proud to uh go visit them and see the good work they’re doing. Thank you, Senator Senator Fisher administrator. I just have uh one more comment and question. First of all, I want to thank you for submitting your unfunded um priorities list to the committee earlier this year. I agree with the programs that you listed and uh I do believe that they warrant this committee’s attention and additional funding. Would you speak to the three programs that are listed?

Uh Slicker in the Analytic Gas Laboratory mission enabling construction project. And then we’ve kind of talked in the past about the need for the binder, the production and qualification efforts for that for the insensitive high explosives. Uh Why do you need, why do you need more resources for those?

Yeah. A as I mentioned in my opening comments, uh slicker in is the is a very unique case in this regard that uh you know, it wasn’t in our program of record until the fy 2024 NDA A was passed. Uh And by, at that time, we had already submitted our fy 25 budget request. So the slick him in uh budget request when the unfunded requirements is for $70 million that’s an amount that we think is reasonable to do what we anticipate needing to do in that program. We’re still working very closely with the dod and the Navy to define the details of that program. Uh But we are gonna need some budget to do it. Um The uh the I’m gonna do the binder. Uh Let me address this uh binder issue. Uh We uh we have uh we uh emerging issue has uh come up as a result of changing environmental regulations concerning uh forever chemicals uh that we have a binder material on our explosives that falls into this category of materials that are now being regulated uh very uh very closely by the EPA. And so we need a new binder material and we’re gonna work on a new binder material. Uh And, but meanwhile, we also have to figure out how to get through the program of record that we have with uh a limited supply of this particular material and, or finding another supplier. Uh So, uh so that’s an issue that emerged after the budget was formulated. Uh and that’s why it’s in and the uh analytical lab is uh again, just to make sure that we can, uh we have all the facilities we need uh to make sure that we can um we can analyze um the WW what we need to do to make to, to produce the pets that we need to produce. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ok. Thank you all very much. We’ll have our second panel come forward. Thank you. L he’s from Vermont. Yeah, actually his family’s in. Is that right?

Yeah. Ok. Ok. There’s still time. So when Senator Kelly comes, he’ll probably ask Johnny Wolf admiral handles nuclear programs about the slicker man issue. Yes, I know Doctor Adams. Are you leading off?

Um some, some short opening remarks, sir. Are, are you requesting short opening remarks?

Ok. Thank you. Yes. So, Chairman King, ranking member, Fisher and members of the committee. It is an honor to be here before you to discuss the president’s fiscal year 2025 budget request for the weapons activities portion of doe and N SAS um activities. Thanks to support from this sub-committee and the full committee and Congress in general and the efforts of our outstanding dedicated workers across the nuclear security enterprise. We are steadily improving our infrastructure and our capabilities while we are also taking on new challenges as they arise from a worsening global security situation, the fy 25 weapons activity’s budget request of about $19.8 billion will support our continued commitment to design manufacture, certify transport, maintain and assess the safe, secure and reliable warheads that are needed to keep our deterrent credible and effective. Toward that end, we have added programs for the B 6113 gravity bomb and the nuclear sea launch cruise missile to the other five warhead programs that have been and continue to be in our program of record, we have accepted the challenge of delivering the two new warheads within the same time frame spanned by the other five in fiscal year 2023. As administrator Ruby mentioned, we delivered more than 200 modernized warheads to the military with all deliveries on schedule. The F I 25 budget request supports our commitment to continuing on time deliveries into the future. It reflects time phasing of many efforts including construction projects to ensure that capabilities are ready by the time they are needed for warhead delivery. In closing, I would like to thank again this sub-committee, the full committee in Congress for the support that has enabled N NSA to deliver on its important national security missions to date. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir. A wolf. Chairman King, ranking member Fisher. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of the Navy’s budget priorities for nuclear forces as Director of Strategic Systems programs. My mission is to provide credible and affordable strategic solutions to our warfighter for nearly seven decades. And with Congress’s steadfast support, the navy submarine force has served as the foundation for the US Strategic Posture operating on continuous patrol and providing assured second strike capability. Since I testified before this panel last year, we have built on this remarkable history of deterrence, marking such milestones as the final demonstration and shakedown operation for our high class ballistic missile submarines. Establishment of a new nuclear office for the sea launched cruise missile slick them. In. Additionally, in coordinating with our N NSA partners, we are initiating a nuclear weapon project to adapt a nuclear warhead for this new capability. This work has not been without its challenges. Long periods of nuclear sustainment have atrophied the domestic industrial base and its critical skills. Significant investments are required to build back capacity to handle multiple, multiple concurrent nuclear modernization programs. Furthermore, we are seeing exceptional inflation based cost growth due to the aging industrial base associated supply change challenges and material obsolescence. Nevertheless, we must continue to sustain today’s deterrent while modernizing for the future. First and foremost, we must maintain the current D five le missile inventory and provide the necessary operational support to sustain Ohio class submarines through the end of their life in the early 20 forties. Secondly, along with Pe Os SBN, we must continue to ensure a seamless transition between Ohio class and Columbia class submarines for my command SSP this requires a seamless transition of the current trident two D five le weapons system onto the new Columbia class ballistic missile submarine. Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States has is its alliances and partnerships for decades. Us policy has recognized the contribution of an independent British nuclear deterrent adds to NA NATO. And indeed global stability SSP will continue to support and sustain this most important relationship. Execution of these priorities is only possible through investment in our people, our infrastructure and our industrial base, nuclear modernization will take time. And I echo the Strategic Posture Commission’s findings that urgent and comprehensive resourcing and whole of enterprise effort is absolutely essential. It is only through your continued support that the department’s highest modernization priorities can be achieved and the Navy can deliver a reliable sea based strategic deterrent capability. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the dedicated Americans that make strategic deterrent their life’s work. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Admiral General, good afternoon, Chairman King, ranking member Fisher and distinguished members of this committee. I’m honored to represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command and provide you an update on our mission, our airmen and our ongoing modernization efforts and the challenges in sustaining our legacy weapon systems. I’d like to thank Congress for its support, not only to national defense but the Air Force’s long range strike in nuclear deterrence missions. My full statement has been submitted for the record Air Force. Global Strike Command was established in 2009 to ensure focused leadership and oversight of the Air Force’s nuclear mission. I am grateful to the members of this committee for your steadfast support as we continue to move forward with the modernization of our weapon systems. The timely modernization of our nuclear triad of which global strike is responsible for two thirds remains the command’s paramount focus with our current modernization efforts including our land based ICBM S bomber force, helicopter force, nuclear command and control platforms, weapons generation facilities and nuclear weapons. This committee is keenly aware of the threats facing our nation today and in the foreseeable future, we currently face the challenge of deterring two major nuclear armed competitors. The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, both armed with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities. Additionally, we are aware of the escalating nuclear threat presented by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran, not only is the command leading the charge in sustaining current forces and deploying future long range strike weapon systems. Global strike command is acutely aware that the nuclear deterrence mission is the bedrock of our national defense strategy and foundational to our nation’s defense and essential to that of our allies and partners. The air force nuclear enterprise is at a critical juncture. Our operational margin is razor thin. Our resources are stretched to their limits. Today, I request your continued support as we confront these pressing challenges while upholding our nation’s security. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much, General Admiral Wolf. We who work in this area so frequently, sometimes things just go by and we take them for granted. You said something very important in your opening statement about a secure second strike capability. Why is that so important to deterrence?

Yes, sir. I mean, obviously, if you think about it from the adversary’s perspective, um, anything that they may think they could do as an initial strike, the SSBN force is always out there on alert, on patrol unknown where they’re at, but certainly if ever called upon, they are survivable and could ensure that a second strike from our, from our nation could be, could be performed. So that is absolutely critical as you look at deterrence and what it means. So the idea is that the adversary can’t think that they can knock us out entirely with one strike. If you’ve got the survivable at sea capability, that must give them pause. That’s, that’s absolutely correct. Thank you, Doctor Adams. Uh many of the production lines and I think you’ve touched on this in your testimony for the components have been dormant for many years. Do we have the, the physical assets and the people to be able to bring those lines back in order to meet the demand that we’re seeing in our, in our uh modernization. Yes, sir, we do. Thank you for that question. Um Yes, thank you. Um I’ll repeat my answer. Uh Thank you for the question, Senator King. The short answer is yes, sir. We do. We don’t have a lot of margin. We have to time phase things carefully so that we um deploy the needed capabilities in time for when they’re needed for given warheads. As I think, you know, uh as we progress through our program of record, successive warheads will require more and more of the components to be newly manufactured um as opposed to reused and that, that’s an integral part of what goes into our planning and our budget requests that support that planning. But the answer is yes, we can do it. Is there a, is there AAA an end date to a nuclear warhead?

In other words, I’ve, I’ve seen in, in, in New Mexico, those rows and rows and rows, is there some point where they’re deemed useless?

And we have to reprocess uh what, what’s, what’s the estimated lifespan of a nuclear warhead?

The answer is different for different warheads and it’s different for different components. Um We are a conservative bunch by our, by our nature and by the importance of our mission, we don’t certify things to be out in the, in the stockpile unless we are highly confident that that um they can still meet all the military requirements. If there’s an exception to that. We duly note it and work with the services and um, dod to accommodate those exceptions, but we do retire our warheads and we dismantle them and we do recycle that material and that’s when that material can go to, to Admiral Houston for naval reactors. It, it goes various places. We recycle the material that goes into our newly manufactured warheads. For example, the plutonium we will use for pit production will be recycled. The, the highly enriched uranium that we use for our warheads is recycled. And of course, yes, it’s um older secondaries that are the source of material for naval reactors and also for some other uh defense related and in NSA related uses. Thank you, General busier. You’re engaged in the overseeing and in many ways, managing the sentinel rebuilding. Are you satisfied that we have the organizational structure to manage that process?

Because as you know, we’re facing a non McCurry breach, I think it’s important to note that that the problem is not the missiles, but the civil works, do we have the, do we have the, the structure and the people in charge that are necessary to make sure we can get beyond that and get that project moving forward?

Senator King?

That’s a, that’s an excellent question as it relates to how we’re rebuilding the management team that oversees the Sentinel weapon system, your mic on. I’m having a little trouble. Could you get a little closer to your mic, please?

So as you know, in nd 823 we were directed at Global Strike Command to stand up a site activation task force relating to the transition from Minim Man three to the Sentinel weapon system that directorate stood up last August and General Connor is the general officer that I put in charge of that. And as you know, the 24 ND A requires the department to look at those uh various different authorities within the Department of Defense that should be delegated to that task force to oversee the transition from men and man three to the Sentinel program. Um We, we do, we have the structure that we need. We, we haven’t returned back to, to Congress with, with our recommendations on those responsibilities, primarily because of the pause with the nun McCurry process going through right now. So we still owe that answer from the 24 ND A back to Congress. We’ll look forward to having that because this is one of the most important and frankly expensive projects that we have underway and we really, I’ll sleep better at night if I know somebody’s in charge, my philosophy of management is you want one throat to choke. Uh I think we need to be sure that there’s somebody who’s ultimately responsible for this. Yes, Senator, and I think you’re looking at him. Thank you. Thank you for volunteering Senator Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen for being here today and thank you for your service. Uh Admiral Wolf, one of the recommendations of the Strategic Posture Commission’s report was to quote, accelerate development and deployment of D five le two end quote. How is your organization evaluating different avenues to ensure that this critical update is available as soon as possible?

Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. Um So what, where we’re currently at right now?

We are, we are within a year of getting to what we call milestone B, which is really where we will settle in on what, what the trade studies have told us the right architecture is gonna be and then where we start to get the entire program in alignment uh to move forward to understand what the schedule will really be to first meet where we know we need to get, which is in the late thirties when we run out of current assets. But then once we anchor that, that will give us the opportunity to look to see if there are any, are any opportunities to accelerate. Um We’re certainly aware of what the Strategic uh Strategic Posture Commission recommended. And as we go through this, that will be taken into account as we start to lock in that program, you have a, a really important responsibility just to manage the transition from the Ohio class to Columbia to be, to make sure that um we have the warheads necessary um to, to um put on those, those uh boats that are out there. Um How, how are you managing all of that?

What, what input do you have there?

Because that’s what 60 70% of warheads that are, that are deployed. Uh How are you able to, um, control the timeline and make sure we can meet it by getting all these, all of the factions together?

Yes, ma’am. So, um administrator, Doctor Adams, uh you know, how’s this?

I think it’s a whole of navy effort with the way we originally structured, the way we would transition between Ohio and Columbia. And that’s why if you look at the decision that was made when we said we were going to have a replacement for Ohio, we made the decision that ostensibly the weapons system that I’m responsible for and the warheads that go on that weapon system, we are ostensibly picking that up and moving it to Columbia. So from a design development perspective, although there are a few differences, um it is essentially the same system and as we manage this transition, the way we’ve done it is as a, a uh Ohio will come offline, we take those assets and then we’ll load those onto a Columbia. So that’s how we guarantee that when we’re asked to meet operation global citadel requirements for us, Strategic Command, we have the assets, we have the timing because we will not download anything before we know we’ve got the new platform to upload. So I’m able to manage all of that with the assets we have so that as the timing works, we control when that will occur and there will not be a gap. No, ma’am. As a matter of fact, as you are very aware to ensure that there’s not a gap, although not in my portfolio, the navy has decided we are looking at a certain number of Ohio class that we could potentially extend in the event that a Columbia may show up late. So we can always meet the stratcom requirements of operation Global Citadel. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much. Uh General Lucier. Nice to see you, sir. I am pleased to see that the Air Force has moved forward with say, can you provide us with an update on the program and how uh fiscal year 25 the budget request is gonna support um that specific part of our NC three architecture. Yes, Senator Fisher, we’re really excited about the decision and the announcement of the industry partner that was selected for the Strategic Airborne Operation Center, Sierra Sierra Nevada Corporation was selected by the department and the threshold number of the platform is uh six aircraft with the objective number of the platform is eight aircraft. The 25 budget I think like we previously talked about briefly is primarily for research and development and uh as well as starting to look at some of the construction projects required for the additional aircraft uh that will be based at off an air force base in Omaha. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today. I’d like to uh talk a little bit about the submarine launched cruise missile. Um The nuclear version Slick A man, the development of Slick A man has been driven by a perceived need for deterrence against the growing Russia and China nuclear threat. And Russia, as we all know, maintains a stockpile of um maybe about 2000 low yield tactical warheads and has an employment doctrine that envisions some limited nuclear use. Uh The slick of men is theoretically meant to ensure that our adversaries know that we have the ability to respond in kind in short. It should give us more flexibility, but I’m concerned that we are spending money and taxing our manufacturing capacity for a redundant capability with the addition of the B 61-13 and the uh Slick a man, the National Nuclear Security Administration has a lot on its plate. We’re also developing a uh W 76-2 low yield warhead and the air force is soon going to have the long range standoff missile on A B 21 and it’s uh W 80 warhead has a low yield option with it. I’m also concerned about the changes we would have to make to Virginia class subs to accommodate Slicker Men. So Vice Admiral Wolf, what would it cost the Navy in time funds long term limitations to take conventional torpedoes off of our attack submarines to accommodate a low yield nuclear weapon slicker in. Yes, Senator, thanks for the question. So certainly, um, we’ve started to look at that and actually there is a report out already to Congress at the classified level for some of those initial impacts. But based on where the nd A this past year, um asked us to go look and with support uh from this committee and others, we’ve asked for flexibility because we absolutely recognize yes, there will be some impact to our SSN force. But if, if you look at the options that it provides to the president and if we’re allowed to go look at how to not impact anything else to your point with the nuclear modernization that we’re already doing for the triad, which is absolutely fundamental. We are looking at what options we can provide that will give us that capability with minimum impact uh for both the Navy and for N NSA to go make this happen. So we are in the process of looking at all that right now with, with the added flexibility that we’ve asked for today, I I read the report yesterday and you say limited impact and I don’t wanna get into details of a, of a classified report. Um but some of it did not seem like the different options that were given were not limited impact. And I want you to go into a little bit about what, what would we need to do to a Virginia class sub in terms of modifications, um, and cost to the sub itself and to the extent you can do it here a little bit about how the operations could change for in order to put that capability onto a uh Virginia class of attack sub. Yes, sir. So certainly from a cost perspective, um, it would be premature to give you an exact cost of what we think a program like that would cost. That’s why part of what we’re going to look at in this next year is to your point, what solutions are out there that would minimize the number of modifications we would have to make to one of our SSNS. Uh And, and you particularly pointed out Virginia, there is no doubt that based on the solution, uh the impacts could be great greater or they could be less depending on which is why we’ve asked for the flexibility to be able to go look at multiple solutions to try and weigh that. That’s from an impact to, to the actual platform. And we believe that there’s other things out there and, and I, I can’t talk about them here that might get us to a capability that would actually, and I do believe, minimize the impact of modifications we would have to make to. All right, we’re gonna understand that. Now, from an operational perspective, you’re absolutely right. Anytime you have a conventional uh uh mission with a nuclear mission. You have to be very careful to segregate those and make sure that, that our war fighters understand how that operates again as we come through. Material solutions impacts to, to the fleet will also be taken into account as we get through what a solution would look like. And then it’s just gonna be a matter of what would the cost of that solution be as we lock in and what support do we need to go make that happen?

One big concern I have is when you look at a conflict between the United States and a near peer adversary that has maybe in some cases could have a bigger fleet, both in naval and merchant vessels. Our submarine capability is substantial. It’s significant, it would, it would um weigh heavily in that kind of conflict. And when I think about the probability of firing a conventional torpedo, you know, out of a submarine, you know, out of a torpedo tube, um and the likelihood of having to do that multiple times and, and just the rather shallow depth of a magazine and not a lot of rounds you have aboard the sub. Sure, certainly you could, you can, you know, re reload, but that takes some time and there’s risk involved in doing that, weighing that with the very unlikely event that we would deploy a tactical nuclear weapon in combat. One of my biggest concerns is that we would be giving up something we really need for something we are unlikely to use. Yes, sir. I appreciate that. And certainly all of those discussions will, will take place as we look at what, what, how do you weigh options available to the President for a deterrent capability as opposed to a conventional capability?

And certainly, uh the next year will inform us a lot more on how we’re going to get at being able to balance all of that. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman to follow up Admiral. The theory is that if all we have is massive retaliation, that’s not credible in response to a tactical use by an adversary. Isn’t that really what we’re talking about here?

I certainly in a regional conflict. Absolutely, sir. There, there is no doubt. Um, and, and you know, and to Senator Kelly’s point, although we have deployed a 76 2 and we’re, we’re, we’re done with that. So we’ve, we’ve gotten that impact out of N NSA. Um You know, you, you ask yourself again, is that a credible scenario?

Um, if you’re trying to deter in a regional controversial, all of those things, Russians are talking all the time about using the possibility of using nuclear weapons as Senator Kelly points out part of their doctrine escalate to deescalated. Yes, sir. And it really is a matter of, as you talked again earlier about a second strike capability, anything that we can do to cause China or Russia to have pause on whether they would even consider any type of, of nuclear response. That’s really what we’re trying to get after with all these systems. Thank you. Um I, I want to ask a very basic question. The idea of the Ohio class and then the Columbia class with the ICBM S goes back, I know with ballistic missiles. Sorry, goes back many years. That decision was made. I don’t know, 3040 years ago when this was first being discussed, are we making a mistake by sticking with ballistic missiles and not moving toward uh hypersonic cruise missiles or some?

Uh uh, in other words, the problem with, as we, we had a hearing last week with the missile defense agency, a ballistic missile, sir, Isaac Newton can tell you where it’s going to land. It’s, it’s, I wouldn’t say it’s easy to intercept, but it’s much easier to intercept than a maneuverable cruise missile. Should we be thinking fundamentally about?

Are we putting a seventies or eighties weapon on this modern submarine?

Maybe we should be thinking about what these submarines are going to be armed with. Is that a, is that an off the wall idea or is that something that you’re thinking about, sir?

That, that’s a difficult question to answer in, in an unclassified scenario. I’d, I’d be more than happy to have that discussion in a classified setting, but here’s what I would tell you. Um, based on technology and the things that we’re all experiencing, we, there is no one solution that fits every scenario where we could think about how we would credibly deter our adversaries. So I think certainly the, the triad that we have today still remains the bedrock and the foundation of our nuclear deterrent capability. There is no doubt when we talk about things like sea launch cruise missile or we talk about some of these other things, there is a place for them and those discussions need to be had in the future. I just want to be sure those discussions are happening and that we’re not just doing what we’ve done. You know, we’ve never done it that way before. I hate that attitude. So I just want to be sure there are those discussions. Yes, sir. We do have those discussions all the time. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, I don’t have any more questions but I appreciate um, your, your answer to Senator Kelly about Slick a man. And I, I think it’s extremely important that um not only do we look at um what our adversaries are doing and, and their um their comments that they, their public comments that they make, that we have to be able to have different options. And so I really appreciate um the work that uh that you do on that and to make sure that that a president would have options that would only add to the deterrence to make sure we would never have to use them. So, thank you. Uh I want to conclude the hearing but General Bossier, you mentioned the, the, the new NAOC and a group of us almost 10 years ago, went on one of the NAOS around the country on a flight with a simulated attack. And it was one of the most sobering experiences of my life. I would urge you to think about inviting members of the committee members of congress to, to take that trip because it, it, it, it takes it out of the hearing room and becomes much more real as you think about what challenges this country might face. What challenges the president might face in a, in a situation that was what came through to me was that clock on the wall that told you how long you had to make a decision. I want to thank you all for the work that you do. It’s some of the most important work uh that, that this government is doing. Deterrence is the bedrock of our strategy. You’re on the front line of deterrence. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony. We’ll hold the record open for additional thoughts and testimony and questions from our members. Uh But uh for today, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. Hearing is adjourned.