Army Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berrier, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, provides testimony at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing regarding worldwide threats, April 29, 2021.

Transcript

Before I turn to our witnesses today, I would like to give my colleagues a preview of what is ahead for the committee when we returned from the recess. Because of the uncertainty of the timing of the president’s budget submission, the committee has made the difficult decision to delay the mark up of the end a until July in consultation with the Senate in off the ranking member, the secretary of defense chairman, Millie and the military services will testify in June that leaves made to focus on hearings the civilian nominations. We now have 23 nominations or intent to nominate, including three military combatant commanders and two nominees of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Getting these nominees confirmed as quickly as possible will require many hearings, including possible full committee hearings on Wednesday. And so I asked everyone to be as patient and cooperative as possible while we perform this very necessary oversight duty. Now one other note, breaking a bit from at least the tradition of the last several months, I would like to take a moment to thank Leo Brouwer the committee nominations and hearings clerk who has been the main force behind ensuring this committee has kept operating through Covid. She has mastered the technology of the hybrid hearing. Indeed, she’s the only one that has and she has patiently rounded us up off the floor countless times to vote civilian and military nominations out of committee. She is an unsung heroine and I just wanted to publicly acknowledging and say how grateful we are. Thanks. Yeah, yeah. Now turning to the hearing, the committee will receive testimony from Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines and director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General scott barrier on the worldwide threats facing the United States and our international partners. It is important for the Congress and the american people to hear from the leaders of our intelligence community and I want to thank you both for being here. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank the men and women under your leadership for their dedication and service to the country. This year’s annual threat assessment of the Director of National Intelligence highlights the complexity of the current threat environment. The report finds that the United States and his partners face quote, a diverse array of threats that are playing out amidst the global disruption resulting from the covid 19 pandemic and against the backdrop of great power competition, the disruptive effects of ecological degradation and a changing climate, an increasing number of empowered non state actors and rapidly evolving technology. The interconnected nature of these threats will drive how we resource and transform our tools of national power, not only military but also diplomatic, economic in informational. To respond to these complex security challenges, we need to do all of these things. The United States and its Democratic allies and partners are increasingly challenged by states and non state actors that do not accept the international norms that have underpinned our security and help keep the peace for decades. A recent report published by the Director of National Intelligence sought to project global trends over the next 20 years and found that accelerating shifts and military power, demographic economic growth, environmental conditions and technology, as well as hardening divisions over governance models, are likely to further ratchet up competition between china and the Western coalition led by the United States. It is against this background that Department of Defense has appropriately identified china as the pacing threat for the United States military. At the same time, we must avoid contributing to a perception that China is 10 ft tall. I hope our witnesses today will also describe the challenges facing china, including democratic, demographic, economic and governmental, and how the United States and our extensive network of allies and partners can best take advantage of them. In the current coming years, Russia is utilizing a whole of government approach to accelerate competition and advance its interests, notably via disinformation campaigns, assassination attempts, cyberespionage and the use of mercenary groups in numerous countries around the world. I hope our witnesses will help us more fully understand the extent of Russia’s malign actions, as well as areas where our partners and allies would benefit from greater US support as they work to bolster their capacity to resist such hybrid threats. The rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea will continue demand attention and resources from the intelligence community and Department of Defense. And I’m interested in understanding how the intelligence community views the threat posed by Iran including their nuclear program and destabilizing activities in the region and how those actions may constrain the biden administration’s diplomatic efforts with respect to north Korea. I hope our witnesses will help frame the challenge we’re facing from Kim Jong un, what we may expect in the way of provocative actions and what leverage we may have to effect a change in the behavior of that regime. As we heard from the commanders of U. S. Central and Africa commands last week. The threat posed by violent extremist groups persist. While President Biden has announced the transitional forces out of Afghanistan by september 11th 2021 we must maintain the capability to continue to degrade al Qaeda ISIS and other terrorist groups and prevent attacks on the homeland. I’m interested in hearing from the witnesses as to what measures would be most effectively used to contain these threats from these groups. Now turning briefly to the cyber threats we face hardly a week passes between revelations of serious breaches by our principal adversaries and criminals against federal, state and local government institutions and private sector enterprises. While most nation states cyber intrusions against the United States involved theft of information, they also demonstrate the potential for destructive attacks by our adversaries on a larger scale. And I hope our witnesses will share their candid concerns about these threats and help us think through the best ways to confront them. Once again, let me thank you for being here this morning. I look forward to your testimony. Uh, and I will uh, before I turn it over to ranking amendment in horse, remind my colleagues that there will be an informal classified briefing immediately following this session In the Office of Senate Security Sp 2 17 ranking member and Wolf. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Since its release in 2018, the committee’s top priority has been ensuring that we implement the national defense strategy and if we’re serious about the security of the United States, we need the resources to make this nds happen. The president’s budget request does not meet this standard. It doesn’t even keep up with inflation. Our top military commanders have ability told us in recent weeks that the threats to the United States are growing at an alarming rate to cut the defense budget in the midst of these challenges is not just misguided. It’s it’s dangerous. Over the past several years, this committee has been repeatedly warned of the pace and the scope of Russia and china their nuclear modernization. Just last week, the commander of the U. S. Track command So told this committee that Russia has completed over 80 of its nuclear force modernization. they’ve been busy. The he also stated that china has reached and he used the word quote, he said. Inflection point where it is accelerating its nuclear and modernization efforts and will reach operational parody with the United States uh in the 2000 thirties. At the same time, China’s modernization of its conventional forces is accelerating at a startling pace. Uh They are outpacing us in developing critical technologies like hypersonic artificial intelligence in the quantum beauty for a long time. Most americans believe that the americans that we had the best of everything. That was something that was kind of took hold after the Second World War. And that was that was pretty true. But it’s it’s not true now for a long time that it was the case. But now it’s not at the same time, China’s military ambitions are now global. There are building bases and deploying advanced capabilities in places like Africa and where, what the africom commander called, quote a number number one global power competition. So as china accelerates, military capability, Putin has not been dormant as we’ve seen in the build up of pressure forces around the Ukraine and all of his activities there. We need to understand that the globalization of china, chinese aggression, Russian intimidation as well as the seriousness of our other threats we face around the world. So I look forward to the testimony and I have to really critical questions. I’ll be asking her witnesses. Mr Chairman, thank you senator off. And before I recognize witness, let me again remind my colleagues. This is a hybrid hearing. Uh, we will not follow the early bird rule. We will follow a seniority in terms of recognition Standard five minutes questioning around is in effect and would ask people to keep their eyes on the clock. Finally, uh, to allow everyone to participate fully, would ask all colleagues to please mute your microphone if you’re not speaking. Ah let me begin with Director Hanes. Thank you very much. Chairman. Read ranking member in half members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity To offer the intelligence community’s 2021 assessment of worldwide threats to us national security on behalf of the entire intelligence community, but particularly those elements that sit within the Department of Defense, I want to express to you how much we appreciate your support and your partnership. I would also like to take advantage of this moment to thank the men and women of the intelligence community. Their efforts rarely receive public accolades because of the nature of their work, but they do help to keep us safe often at great personal sacrifice and we remain committed to providing them with the resources our mission requires and the support we owe them. It’s my honor to serve alongside these dedicated officers and leaders including general barrier and to represent their work to you. Our goal today is to convey to you in the public. We serve and protect the threat environment as we perceive it and to do our best to answer the questions about the challenges we face. I’ll only highlight a few points and provide some context. In my opening statement for a more detailed threat picture, I refer you to the annual threat assessment we issued earlier this month, which is a reflection of the collective insights of the intelligence community. Broadly speaking, the intelligence community is focused on traditional categories of issues that we’ve been discussing for years. Adversaries and competitors, critical transnational threats and conflicts and instability now summarize our views on these. But first I want to take note of the shifting landscape we see today and the implications that has for our work. The trends underlying and intersecting these issues are increasing the pace, the complexity And the impact of these threats in ways that require us to evolve. During the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the inherent risks of high levels of interdependence and in coming years is reflected in our recently issued global trends report that was just discussed. We assess that the world will face more intense and cascading global challenges ranging from disease to climate change to disruptions from new technological and financial crises. And as we note in that report, these challenges will repeatedly test the resilience and adaptability of communities, states and the international system, often exceeding the capacity of existing systems and models this looming dis equilibrium between existing and future challenges and the ability of institutions and systems to respond is likely to grow and produce greater contestation at every level. And for the intelligence community, this insight compels us to broaden our definition of national security, to develop and integrate new and emerging expertise into our work, deepen and strengthen our partnerships and learn to focus on the long term strategic threats while simultaneously addressing the urgent crises. In short, at no point has it been more important to invest in our norms, our institutions, our workforce and the integration of our work. And doing so provides us with the opportunity to meet the challenges we face to pull together as a society and to promote resilience and innovation. And as we evolve, you will see our efforts to more effectively integrate longer term destabilizing trends into our daily work, thereby promoting strategic foresight and a deeper understanding of the threats we face, which we hope will help the policy community effectively prioritize their work to address the issues that we seek to present against this backdrop. The annual threat assessment describes an array of threats we are facing in the coming year, beginning with those emanating from key state actors. I’ll begin with China, which is on parallel priority for the intelligence community and then moved to Russia, Iran and North Korea and China increasingly is a near peer competitor, challenging the United States in multiple arenas. While pushing to revise global norms in ways that favor the authoritarian chinese system, China is employing a comprehensive approach to demonstrate its growing strength and compel regional neighbors to acquiesce in Beijing’s preferences, including its claims over disputed territory and assertions over the sovereignty over Taiwan. It also has substantial cyber capabilities that, if deployed at a minimum, can cause localised, temporary disruptions to critical infrastructure inside the United States. And while China poses an increasingly formidable challenge to the U. S. Role in global affairs, it is worth noting as the chairman did that its economic, environmental and demographic vulnerabilities all threatened to complicate its ability to manage the transition to the dominant role it appears it aspires to in the decades ahead and next, with respect to Russia, we assess, Moscow will continue to employ a variety of tactics to undermine US influence and erode Western alliances. While Russia does not want to conflict with the United States, Russian officials have long believed that Washington is seeking to weaken Russia, and Moscow will use a range of tools to pursue its objectives, including mercenary operations, assassinations and arms sales. It will also employ, as we’ve reported new weapons and cyber capabilities to threaten the United States and its allies and seeks to use malign influence campaigns including in the context of US elections to undermine our global standing, so discord and influence US decision making. Russia is becoming increasingly adept at leveraging its technological prowess to develop asymmetric options in both the military and cyber spheres, in order to give itself the ability to push back and force the United States to accommodate to its interests. And turning to Iran. Tehran is seeking to project power in neighbouring states, deflect international pressure and minimize threats to regime stability. Iraq will be a key battleground for Iranian influence in the coming year, but Tehran is also will also continue to pursue a permanent military presence in Syria, destabilized Yemen and threaten Israel. For its part, North Korea may take aggressive and potentially destabilizing actions to reshape its security environment and will seek to drive wedges between the United States and its allies. These efforts could include the resumption of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile testing in the future When it comes to transnational threats. The assessment focuses on key issues that intersect with the state actor threats that I just outlined. Starting with COVID-19, the effects of the current pandemic will obviously continue to strain governments and societies over the coming year, fueling humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest and geopolitical competition as countries such as Russia and china seek advantage through vaccine diplomacy to build influence and in some cases demand accessions from other governments countries with high debts or that depend on oil exports, tourism or remittances face particularly challenging recoveries while others will turn inward and be distracted by other challenges. The critical impact of the pandemic has also served to highlight the importance of public health to national security, ecological degradation and a changing climate will continue to fuel disease outbreaks, threaten food and water security, exacerbate political instability and humanitarian crises. And although much of the effect of a changing climate on US, security will play out indirectly. In a broader political and economic context, warmer weather can generate direct immediate impacts, for example, through more intense frequent and variable extreme weather events. In addition to driving conflicts over scarce natural resources, the changing climate conflict and economic deprivation will drive vulnerable populations from their homes, heightening humanitarian needs and increasing the risk of political upheaval. The scourge of illicit drugs and transnational organized crime will continue to take its toll on american lives, prosperity and safety. Major narcotics trafficking groups and other transnational organized criminal organizations will continue to drive threat streams, while also being used by adversaries employing cyber tools to steal from us and foreign businesses and use complex financial schemes to launder illicit proceeds, undermining confidence in financial institutions emerging and disruptive technologies, as well as the proliferation information of technology in all aspects of our lives pose unique challenges. And cyber capabilities to illustrate are demonstrably intertwined with threats from our infrastructure to foreign malign influence, threats against our democracy. And we need, as many of you have stressed to us to focus on the competition in critical technical areas such as high performance computing, micro electronics, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, fiber optics and metamaterials with regard to global terrorism, ISIS and Al Qaeda remain the most pressing threats to US interests overseas. These groups seek to conduct attacks inside the United States, but sustained counterterrorism pressure has broadly degraded their capabilities domestically, lone actors and small cells with a broad range of ideological motive, motivations pose a greater immediate threat. We see this threat manifest itself in individuals who are inspired by al Qaeda and ISIS, often called homegrown violent extremists and those who commit terrorist acts for ideological goal stemming from other influences, such as racial bias and anti governmental and sentiment, which we refer to as domestic violent extremism or DVD and D. V. And increasingly complex threat that is growing in the United States. These extremists often see themselves as part of a broader global movement and in fact a number of other countries are experiencing a rise in DVD, for example, Australia, Germany Norway and the United Kingdom. Consider white, racially or ethnically motivated, violent extremists, including neo Nazi groups to be the fastest growing terrorist threat that they face. And of course, regional conflicts continue to fuel humanitarian crises, undermine stability and threaten US persons and interests. The fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria has a direct implication for US forces. While tensions between nuclear armed India and Pakistan remain a concern for the world. The violence between Israel and Iran, The activity of foreign powers in Libya, and the conflicts in other areas including Africa and the Middle East have the potential to escalate or spread. And Asia has periodic upheavals as the burmese military seizure of power in february latin, America is contested elections and violent popular protests are likely to continue to produce volatility, while Africa will continue to see ongoing marginalization of some communities, ethnic conflict and contentious elections. In closing, we face a broad array of longstanding and emerging threats whose intersection is raising, the potential for cascading crises are increasingly interconnected in mobile world, offers enormous opportunities. But at the same time, it multiplies. Our challenge is calling us to even greater vigilance as we seek to protect our vital national interests, promote resilience and invest in our institutions and our people who will be the only invest answer to addressing these challenges. And investing in our workforce means taking care of our people and we are committed to doing so. The intelligence community is currently focused on supporting the retrograde that will occur as we withdraw from Afghanistan by ensuring that we provide the best intelligence to support the Secretary of Defense and the chairman’s work as they bring our forces home in a safe, orderly and deliberate way. And taking care of our people. Also means investigating the source of anomalous health incidents that have affected our personnel and caring for those affected. We appreciate the support that many of you have shown for our personnel. As with everything else we work on around the globe and we look forward to answering your questions about these and other worldwide threats. Thank you. Thank you very much. Director General barrier please. Okay, good morning Chairman Read Ranking member Inhofe. And committee members. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the threats facing this nation and D. I. Support to the national defense strategy, the nature and scope of the national security environment in which we operate is largely shaped by strategic competition. The continuous push and pull among the United States china and Russia for global strength and influence. D. A. S. Cadre of remarkable personnel works diligently to provide the integrated defense intelligence picture providing the US along with our allies a decision advantage across all warfighting domains and geographic boundaries with competitors who intend to challenge limit or exceed our military lead. Their capabilities include more lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles and grey zone measures such as ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, economic coercion, advances in materials, high performance computing, artificial intelligence and biotechnology will augment potential adversaries, military and technological capabilities. The evolving threat from the COVID-19 pandemic has also had major implications for our national security. China and Russia are using COVID-19 circumstances to conduct information warfare aimed at undermining Western governments attacking coalitions and compelling economic and political outcomes in their favor. China remains the long term strategic competitor to the United States As a pacing threat, it poses a major security challenge. Beijing views the international environment and its ties to Washington as increasingly adversarial. It uses multiple approaches, including diplomatic, economic espionage and the military. To achieve its strategic games, china continues its decades long military modernization to build an increasingly lethal force that will almost certainly be able to hold us and allied forces at greater risk and greater distances from the chinese mainland. The Russian military is an existential threat to the United States. Russia has a growing ability to project power with long range precision cruise missiles, and its military leaders are incorporating lessons from Russia’s involvement in Syria into training and exercises. They improve their joint forces, Moscow investment in conventional forces, strategic nuclear forces and enhancement of strategic deterrent places the US homeland at risk. Russia seeks to dominate its periphery through hole of state efforts. Both china and Russia consider space integral to winning wars and have reorganized their militaries to integrate space operations and space counter space capabilities. In addition to these two state actors, North Korea also poses a serious challenge to the United States and our allies. Pyongyang did not abandon its nuclear long range missile test programs as it pursued diplomatic engagement to soften international support for sanctions since mid-2019, it has tested dozens of missiles, including three types of new short range ballistic missiles and a new sea launched ballistic missile. In the Middle East. Iran is the primary state challenger to the U. S. Interest because of its sophisticated military capabilities, broad proxy and partner networks and periodic willingness to use force against US and partner forces. Iran security strategy aims to ensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain internal stability, secure dominant regional power status and achieve economic prosperity In South Asia. Violence in Afghanistan remains elevated as peace negotiations have, blood has flowed since the initiation in late 2020, talks are highly unlikely to result in extended ceasefires or violence reduction. While the Taliban continues to apply military pressure on the Afghan government at the same time, the threat from terrorist organizations organizations will persist. IsIS remains the preeminent salafi jihadist group, sustaining more than a dozen insurgencies globally. It is expanding its african presence and probably rebuilding its ability to direct attacks against the west. Al Qaeda’s appeal to salafist jihadist has waned since ISIS is emergence and counterterrorism pressure has eliminated many of Al Qaeda’s senior leaders. Transnational, racially and ethnically motivated, violent extremists or Mv organizations operate across borders and attract recruits and spread ideology online. The United States will increasingly face advanced, persistent and sophisticated cyber attacks from an array of state and non state actors. Adversarial probing and exploitation of military and intelligence networks, efforts to coerce our personnel and monitor US force movement and attempts to steal weapons. System technology are all threats. Today’s threat environment reflects rapid, significant technological change and adversarial challenges in every operating domain. I am committed to ensuring Dia is positioned to meet these challenges through the efforts in such areas as modernization of the top secret network D. Manages for the D. O. D. And the intelligence community, building advanced modeling and simulation capabilities and creating a data environment that will enhance and enrich how we provide foundational military intelligence to warfighters and decision makers. Your support of the exceptional D. I. Enterprise enables us to provide an integrated defense intelligence picture which gives the nation and our allies a decision advantage. I am privileged and proud to lead DEA and its outstanding workforce. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I along with the director, look forward your questions. Thank you very much. General let me direct the question to both the director and two general barrier. Uh There has been a public debate about our commitment to Taiwan right now. We maintained issue, we maintain the practice of strategic ambiguity. There are others that urge us to take explicit uh action in the case of any chinese demands against Taiwan. Uh starting with Director Hanes, how would you uh evaluate China and Taiwan’s reaction to a change in our policy by adopting explicit commitments? Thank you Chairman. From our perspective, if we were to see a US shift from strategic ambiguity as you’ve identified it to clarity over a willingness to intervene in a Taiwan contingency that the chinese would find this deeply destabilizing. I think it would solidify chinese perceptions that the US is bent on constraining china’s rise, including through military force and would probably cause Beijing to aggressively undermine US interests worldwide. That would be our assessment and the reaction in Taiwan, Would that precipitate uh a surge towards uh further separation from china? I think that’s possible. I would say that already Taiwan is hardening to some extent towards independence as they’re watching, essentially what happened in Hong kong and I think that is an increasing challenge. Thank you, General your comments please Chairman From a from A. D. I perspective, we we understand that is a goal for a she to unify Taiwan with china. We don’t know that he’s actually made a decision on how or when to do that. We have seen an increase in P. L. P. L. A. Activity uh on the CNN in the airspace around Taiwan over the last year. With everything going on in china right now. And I’m thinking Hong kong Tibet also the wigger issue. I think these are one of the key core issues that we have to deal with as we watch as we watch china. Just a quick follow up. Uh some have suggested, I think Admiral Davidson was here is that there’s a critical uh time frame between now and 2030 in terms of Taiwan six years. Because his interpretation as I recall, was after that demographic issues, economic issues, stuck playing a more prominent role in chinese policy. So is there any sense director Hanes of of a timing issue here or a period of vulnerability for? I think maybe we can discuss this further in closed session and I’d be happy to thank you. Uh Director hands again in your testimony uh in your confirmation hearing, you indicated the support for far malign influence Response Center, which would be a whole of government effort. Where are we on that regard? What status can you give us? Thank you, Chairman. So we have begun to try to establish essentially an outline of what this would look like been working with uh the intelligence community more broadly, to make sure that what we do at the office of the Director of National Intelligence isn’t replica sort of a redundancy of what’s already being done in different components, but rather as an opportunity for us to coordinate this work across the community, provide coordinated assessments to policymakers and ultimately provide some expertise that might be valuable again across the community where it may be uh filling gaps that certain components don’t have things along those lines. But we are moving with alacrity towards that. And if you’d like further information on this, we can give it to you as we’re sort of um forming it effectively. Now, there’s been some discussion about a social media data threat analysis center since social media is playing a role, critical role in everything we do. It seems uh any thoughts on the possibility of standing something like that. Thank you. I think I’m not aware of a plan to do that more generally. Uh that may be the case in other departments and agencies. I would say that um we would expect that open source information will be a critical aspect of what we would you know, essentially analyzed in the context of a foreign malign influence center. And we obviously have open source centers across the community that work on these issues. Thank you. My time has expired in general barry but I want to commend D. I. A. For taking the lead in integrating artificial intelligence and other techniques into our intelligence gathering. And we’ll have an opportunity to close session to discuss those issues. Uh Thank you very much, Senator. And hopefully yeah, thank you. Mr Chairman. As I said in my opening statement, the we have been repeatedly warned in this committee about what Russia and china are doing in terms of their nuclear modernization and frankly what we haven’t been doing over the last many years. Last week, the track commander talked about over 80% of the nuclear force. Uh Russia is actually excelled and china’s reached what they call the Inflection point. So general barrier recent report that by the Independent Institute for Defense analyses concluded that neither China Russia nor North Korea would view the United States adoption of a no first use policy on nuclear weapons as credible. They just wouldn’t believe us. And as a result, the United States adoption of no first use nuclear policy would likely have little or no impact on their nuclear ambitions or policy. But what it would do is significantly undermine the confidence of our allies in the United States security guarantees. So I’d ask you general barrier are first of all, you agree with this assessment and then do you know of any organization? Any intelligent assessment that you’re aware of that would contradict these conclusions? Senator Inhofe, I am not aware of any current intelligence that has been produced lately that discusses that topic. I believe that the Russians and chinese value evaluate their own deterrent capabilities. Um and they look at threats broadly across the globe and make decisions about their nuclear force. Just the same way we do. Mm And when your personal opinion, my opinion is that any any statement? We probably would not have a significant impact on how they view their. Thank you for us. Thank you very much. Now on the committee heard last week from Africa on the general Townsend that china views Africa as a key power projection platform for its military. And I believe that’s true that china is built for the first up until just about two or three years ago, china didn’t do anything outside of its own limits. But now of course they got busy down in Djibouti. I’ve been down there, I’ve flown over that area. I know what they’re doing down there. It’s aggressively pursuing a naval base on the west coast of Africa that would give china and enduring military presence in the landing. And General Townsend called this his number one global power competition concern general barrier. Do you agree with General Townsend that china views Africa as a key power projection platform for its military senator. I believe the chinese in order to safeguard their belt road initiative will in place military forces where they see they need that kind of capability. Africa is certainly one of those places where they have done that. The interesting thing about the way they look at Africa is sort of this long term developmental approach which will allow them um over over a long period to put more forces there. So I do agree with General Townsend. But in the extent that Africa is 11 area where strategic competition will play out. It will also play out in latin America and south America and wherever they extend their markets you will find that activity, that activity. But staying with Africa, we’re talking about East uh and West Africa, their activities. This is something that is not somebody that’s fairly new. And I would agree with your comments on that as well as General Townsend. Thank you. Mr Chairman. Thank you. Senator Inhofe. Let me now recognize them as Shahin. Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you both for your testimony this morning and for your very good work. Um Director Hanes, I would like to begin with you because I’m sure you’ve seen the report in on CNN today that um suggests that there were at least two possible incidents on U. S. Soil of um the directed energy attacks that have created symptoms sometimes called Havana syndrome in a number of our personnel. One of the incidents described here was happened on the Ellipse in late 2020 and that’s very close to the White House. So I’m not going to ask you if that report is correct or not because I recognize that um there there has been a real effort to try and keep this information classified. But I do want to ask you about the concern that I have that that kind of clamp down on information that’s available to Congress that’s available to the public has lead to leaks and it’s not clear whether the information we’re getting is correct or incorrect. And so I wonder if you could speak to that and to what more can be done to declassify some of that information, share it with members of Congress in a way that allows us to better respond. After all, we have to fund operations. And there are a lot of personnel, not a lot. There are personnel who have been harmed, who need to, we need to make sure get the care and benefits they need. Thank you senator and thank you for your attention on this issue. It’s critically important. And it’s something that that I I know general barrier I know across the intelligence community, frankly, leaders are focused on this issue, on your particular question. With respect to information. I’d be happy to look at this with you to be honest. I think I completely understand getting the information is critical for you to be able to respond to these issues and ensure that you’re able to make good decisions. Uh, Maybe we can talk more about this also in closed session on these questions and I think um you know, our concern obviously with the classification is because we believe that either it’s protecting sources and methods and it’s critical to our national security and we’ll have to figure that out with you. But you should certainly have access to the classified information and we should figure out if there’s a way to help you address these issues more generally. Well, again, I would argue that with stories like this with stories that appeared over the last two years really and those people who have been affected who have gone public that the horse is out of the barn on this. Um the information is already out there and I I think it behooves us all to try and make sure that the information that gets out is accurate and that people understand what’s happening and that there is an effort to respond to that. So I would urge you to consider that. And as we’re talking about classification, I should also think, um your office for providing a declassified assessment of the impact of our withdrawal in Afghanistan on the Afghan women. It’s something that I requested. I appreciated that we got that yesterday or the day before. So, thank you for doing that. Unfortunately, it shows that it suggests that there is a real threat that faces women and girls in Afghanistan after we withdraw. Um but I really, in my limited time, I want to go to Syria because one of the real challenges that I believe we’re still facing there is the detainee camps that have tens of thousands of people and some of them in the alcohol camp in Northeast Syria. Um we know that there are ISIS um leaders who are still there, who are raising a whole another generation of potential terrorists. And the I understand the kurds just did an operation there to try and root out some of those ringleaders, but we also, two years ago um put into the N. D. A. Uh a position to create a detainee coordinator to try and help get some of these detainees repatriated to the countries that they came from. No one has been appointed to that position yet, and I believe that continues to be a real threat. And the more we can do in cooperation with our allies in the international community to respond to that, the better we’re going to address that potential threat. So I would urge you to take a look at that and if you could report back to the committee about what the plan is for that detainee coordinator. Thank you. Senator I suspect that is a detainee coordinator at the Department of Defense. Is that right ma’am? It is okay. I’ll work obviously with Secretary of Defense and will work through, Yeah I’m assuming you all talk to each other so we do thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Shaheen let me recognize via webex. Senator Fisher. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. A general barrier B. I. A. S. 2018 report on the global nuclear landscape stated that Russia is quote updating its warhead production complex and is producing what we assessed to be hundreds of nuclear warheads each year. The following your your predecessor, General Ashley stated that quote Russia claims to be developing new warhead designs for strategic systems such as a new high yield earth penetrating warhead to attack hardened military targets like the U. S. Allied and chinese command and control facilities. End quote. Do these assessments remain valid? And has there been any decrease or reduction in terms of warhead design or production activities taking place? Senator Those those assessments remain valid today and I’d be happy to go into more detail in a closed session. Thank you. Also. General Ashley stated quote the United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the yield with the zero yield standard. The United States, by contrast is upholding a zero yield standard. End quote. He went on to indicate that china was also not adhering to the same zero yield approach to nuclear testing that the United States observes. Does that still remain D. A. S. Assessment? It does. Senator Director Hanes. Is there anything that you would like to add to this? No ma’am thank you. Thank you. General barrier in your prepared testimony. You describe chemical and biological threats from Russia and North Korea in particular, but also china. Can you broadly characterised chemical and biological threats? Are they significant? Are there trends that you can share? Is the threat increasing or decreasing? For example, Senator, What I can say in open testimony is that those countries that were mentioned in the assessment do have active programs. We monitor those very, very carefully in a number of sensitive ways. And we’ve actually seen the Russians use some of their latest weapons on individuals recently so we can go into more detail in a closed session. Thanks. It also notes that China’s chemical infrastructure and Russia’s pharmaceutical based agents program can provide those nations with chemical and biological capabilities, respectively. Can you talk a bit more about the dual use nature of an industrial capability and how that can also support a military capability? Senator? The the dual use nature of some of those technologies to produce pharmaceuticals and chemical and biological weapons are intertwined very closely. And it’s it’s sometimes difficult to discern uh, the real true, um, intent behind some of those facilities. But beyond that, I can go into more detail in a closed session. Also, sir, in your prepared testimony, you note that Russia has restarted production of long range missile delivery platforms that they are fielding ultra quiet cruise missile submarines and they are investing heavily in hypersonic weapons. What is your overall assessment of Russia’s long range conventional strike capabilities? And is this a reflection of a desire or a strategy that involves holding the homeland at risk below the threshold of nuclear conflict, Senator, the Russians can hold the US homeland at risk below that threshold. They have invested heavily and and modernizing a number of niche capabilities and weapons that you mentioned. And they continue to develop those weapons even even in a constrained financial environment, uh, in the hydrocarbon market at its lower rate, continues to challenge their ability to fund their their programs. Director Hanes, do you have anything to add on these points? No, thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Fisher. Now, I’d like to recognize Senator King via Webex. Uh, thank you. Mr. Chairman. Uh Director Hands. I’d like to ask you a question. I asked pretty much every foreign policy leader that we had before this committee. What is your analysis of what china’s goals are? What does china want? Thank you Senator. Well, um, obviously I’m not here as a foreign policy analyst, but regardless, I’m happy to give you a sense of how the analysts perceive it. I think as a general matter, china sees itself as rising and sees the United States as declining and is not interested in going to war, but perceives that as a concern as these trajectories, from their perspective pass each other in a sense. And in that context, china believes that the United States is trying to check China’s rise and in that context is countering from their perspective again, what they perceived to be our influence and our efforts in this area. I think, uh in their perception They are increasingly perceiving it as a zero sum game and that promotes, in a sense, their efforts to really push us out in a way, um and to be a threat across a range of factors and and see us as a threat to them in that context. Let me change the subject to what extent. And you mentioned this in your opening testimony and then your written statement uh expand a bit on climate change as a national security concern. The one I’m particularly concerned about is uh incipient migration from areas of the world that become essentially uninhabitable because of drought, famine, extreme heat. Uh do you see this as a threat multiplier as a serious national security concern as well as, of course, an environmental concern? I do absolutely. I mean, I think part of the challenge for us is recognizing that climate change has just enormous impact in every aspect of our lives and in with respect to almost every threat that we’re facing, is figuring out how to actually embed and integrate climate science and analysis essentially across the board of our Intelligence community work so that we can ensure that we’re actually lifting up the places where it’s in fact having that kind of impact. So, to your point without question, the impact of the climate is having on migration is something that we’ve written about within the intelligence community. The trend lines that that produces the concerns that that creates another example is in the context of increased drought and and sort of the shifting boundaries of dry areas. Uh what you see is that affects agriculture, that in turn creates tension uh that can drive conflict, for example, that’s another aspect of it. You see, increasing floods. That’s obviously a challenge for countries around the world, particularly ones that don’t have the resilience to react to them in a way that allows them to continue. Um, you know, and can actually promote uh fractures of society as a consequence over time. So there’s just there’s so many different aspects and dimensions to this challenge, and what we’ve been trying to do is ensure that we can actually bring in that expertise and integrated effectively and make it available across the community so that we can um, integrate that work into our daily work in effect, while also looking at the long term trends that it produces. And of course historically access to arable land has been the cause of wars throughout history. Uh we’ve pivoted largely from a focus on terrorism to uh Pierre and near pier state competition. And I understand that and I think that’s appropriate. I’m still concerned however, about the terrorist threat and the particular one that keeps me up at night is terrorist access to a nuclear device either through development or more likely through purchase. Uh deterrence has protected us from a nuclear conflict for 70 years. Deterrence wouldn’t work with a terrorist organization. Uh talk to me about the role of intelligence in protecting us from the nightmare of a nuclear weapon in the hold of a tramp steamer bound into the port of New york or Miami. Yeah, absolutely. Senator. And I know you, you know, a fair amount about how we work on these issues, particularly given your role on the Intelligence committee. I I would say that part of the effort in um and as you say, the rebalance in effect, recognizing the rise of state to state competition is not taking your eye off the ball of non state actor and transnational threats, including terrorism. And that is absolutely something that we’re committed to. And in the context of in particular terrorist groups. Uh we monitor and try to track them to the best degree that we can. It’s a diffuse issue, as you know, you know, spanning many regions of the globe. We are in particular looking for the kinds of weapons that they can use that give them uh you know, extraordinary capacity to have catastrophic effects. And we look to ensure that we understand those networks as best we can and uh and then provide whatever warning were capable of providing under the circumstances. I think beyond that we can obviously talk further in closed session. Thank you. I think that the Attackers on September 11 killed 3000 people. They would have killed three million if they could have. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you Senator King and via Webex and a cotton. Please thank you. Mr. Chairman. General barrier. You stated in your testimony submitted ahead of this hearing that we had previously expected china to double their nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade. But both you and Admiral Richard had not testified or the committee P. L. A. Is going to exceed that estimate. Why do you think the P. L. A. Is so rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal? Is it to defend its homeland, the Terps perceived regional threats or to project power globally? Senator Cotton, thank you for the question. Broad, broadly speaking, china’s rise has also included this massive military modernization And in the span of capabilities that they have. The nuclear peace has been one component. It has been a priority for them and I think they have racked and stacked that and the things that they think that they need to get done by 2030 or 2035. And so I think they have accelerated this as a as a deterrent quite honestly, why do you state that the chinese government tends to keep its nuclear forces in a launch on warning posture? And how is that a change from previous assessments of china’s nuclear forces? Senator Cotton, I think I think the chinese military, through their modernization and training efforts have undergone a lot of exercises where they try to understand what gives them the most viable capability the quickest. And I think this is an evolution of of their training and doctrine is china capable of arming uh, it’s hypersonic client vehicles with nuclear warheads. And if so, what kind of risk does that pose to the United States and our interests? The answer to that question is, yes. And that poses a significant risk. Could you explain why it poses at significant risk? The speed at which those those weapons travel makes it very, very difficult to track in their entire trajectory. We could go into more detail Senator in a closed session as compared to a traditional ballistic missile, correct? Okay. Let’s turn to Russia. You testified in your written statement to Russia now claims to have modernized over 80 of its own nuclear triad, including silence submarines, new strategic bombers and an upgraded uh, IC. B. M. Force. How does the Russian ICBM force now compared to that of the United States? In terms of modernization senator, I prefer to uh to discuss that in a closed session. Okay. Have the Russians created or fielded hydro sonic fly vehicle that’s capable of matching up the nuclear warhead? Senator? They’re in the process of doing that right now pose the same risks that china’s hypersonic glide vehicles that aren’t the nuclear weapons would correct Yes. Over on the topic of Russia, um in 2019, um General Ashley indicated that Russia is violating the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and last year the Department of State reported that China may be doing the same. Um General do you agree that it’s important that we collect against and evaluate and inform our policymakers about our adversaries adherence to or a violation of international arms control agreements. Senator. Yes I do. Um and you assess that Russia and china are violating the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Senator I would like to take that question for the record and get back to you. Director hangs. Do you have an opinion on that? What? Thank you senator. I think. Um I don’t believe that the Comprehensive Test ban treaty is enforced but I like general barrier. I think it would be better for us to take it for the record and provide you comprehensive answer. Okay thank you both appreciate your testimony. Uh Thank you Senator Cotton. Let me now recognize Senator Sullivan, thank you. Mr Chairman and I appreciate the witnesses being here today. Um Director Hanes, congratulations on your confirmation general. Good to see you again. It’s always um let me begin with kind of a basic question. Director, do you track communications between private citizens and known terrorists? Senator? Uh I’m I think there are obviously um parts of the intelligence community that do track communications that maybe between terrorists and individual citizens by his own admission as a private citizen. Former Secretary of State, john Kerry communicate communicate several times with the Foreign minister of Iran, the world’s largest state sponsored terrorism. Do you know what happened any of those calls or communications? Thank you Senator. No, I was not privy to any of those calls. Maybe in a getting communications or read out of those calls from the intelligence community, I think would be helpful given the current controversies that are surrounding those communications with one of our biggest enemies and biggest state sponsor of terrorism. So I’d like to follow up with intel community on that. Let me ask another question. Um, you and I spoke a lot about during your confirmation process, the prospects of the United States becoming the world’s energy superpower again, producing more oil than Saudi Arabia, more natural gas in Russia, more renewables than any other country, All of the above energy. Do you believe that status as the world’s energy superpower, a net exporter now of energy degrades or enhances our national security? Thank you, senator. I think we did discuss this. And if I recall correctly, you were looking at this question through the lens of whether or not through our pursuit of renewables and so on, that might actually create challenges change, I asked And you had answered yes. That being the world’s energy superpower helps us absolutely. Our natural resources, including our energy peace help us. You agree with that general being a net exporter of energy helps the United States as national Security foreign policy senator? I don’t I don’t really have an opinion on that. These are not hard questions. It’s of course really instruments intelligence. Excuse me. I said it’s not really related to defense intelligence or threats. So I’m not comfortable answering that question. You don’t think that weather were an energy exporter importer affects threats the United States? Is that what you’re saying is the head of Dia know what I’m saying is our area of expertise is foundational military intelligence about the threats that our country faces. I don’t study the export of energy. Okay, let me ask this. Um, do you believe being a net importer of energy enhances or degrades China’s national Security Director? Thank you senator. Honestly, it is not something that I have studied deeply, but I would imagine that their export of energy under certain circumstances is a help and at the same time obviously they want to use a fair amount domestically as well and it would depend on the particular circumstances of what it is that you’re looking at. Here’s a article for the Records Chairman I’d like to submit it. It’s from the Global Times. This is the Communist Party of china’s mouthpiece with US status as net exporter. Next net exporter of oil reminds china of energy disadvantages. So the Chinese Communist Party clearly thinks being a no importer of energy creates disadvantages and even mentioned it here that the United States isn’t that exporter, it helps the United States national security. So the Chinese Communist Party believes that I certainly hope our intel communities can just say it definitively that whether it’s Dia or the DNI that being a net exporter of energy, all of the above energy enhances our national security and foreign Policy director. You told me that during our confirmation process I just like you to definitively stated here. The reason I’m doing this is we are undertaking policies right now the biden administration to restrict the production of american energy unilaterally. We are importing more Russian oil right now than we have ever before. Is that good or bad for our national security? From your perspective, relative to our relationship with Russia with respect Senator. I’m not trying to be obtuse. It’s just that honestly, I think it depends on the particular circumstances and as a representative of the intelligence community, what I try very hard to do is provide you with what analysts assess with respect to particular situations and give you that assessment so that it can help your decision making if you wish to provide us a question for the record about some aspect of our energy, peace and how that affects foreign actors. By all means, we will absolutely do our best to answer it. Okay, I’ll do that. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Uh, thank you very much. Senator Sullivan uh, Senator Tuberville could feel already. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thanks for being here today. Uh, Director Hanes you made a statement a few minutes ago that China is looking at us as declining. Would you clarify that? Thank you. Senator. Just clarified in the sense that declining, you said, you said China is looking at us as basically declining nation. Could you clarify that? Sure. The leadership has made various public statements that indicate that they see the United States as a declining power? It’s obviously not what I believe, but that is their perception. Okay, thank you. Thank you. Uh, you know, many, many throw around the stat that us spends more on defense than the next 10 or 12 countries combined. Yes or no, is that correct? General? We spend a lot on defense. Senator direct trains. Thank you. Uh, she’s keeping uh, cement power in the CCP. How concerned are you that uh, he’s surrounded by yes men and general barry based on your intelligence. Does this raise the threat level for a miscalculation? Especially with regard to Taiwan Senator? I think I think she is firmly in control of the party of the military and every aspect of chinese society. We’ve had several generals tell us that they know for a fact. He has yes men around him and implemented that. Does that concern, you know, I mean, is that different than has been in the past other dictators? Uh, center, I’ll I will take that for the record and come back to you. Okay, thank you. Uh Director Hanes says North Korea taking any concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation at all that we know of. No, sir, thank you. You said a few minutes ago that there was an impact on climate change and other countries across the world is causing migration. What countries are those senator? We produced reports from the Office of Director of National Intelligence over Um I don’t know, I think the last 10 years and and we can make some of those available to you. But what we uh indicate is that the trend lines are such that over the next several decades, particularly in certain parts of Africa, you’ll see um climate have an impact on essentially, conditions in those countries in these areas. In africa that is likely to promote migration across the continent at pretty increased levels essentially. It’s been forever though, right? I mean it no, that climate change is actually accelerating that. Okay. It seemed likely, as my colleague Senator King said last week that a cyber attack will be the person you’re of to the future of great power conflict. Director Hanes, uh what can what can the United States do to deter our adversaries from cyber attacks? I mean, what’s the best thing that we can do now? So, Senator I think this is largely a policy question that our policy folks work on. But I think as a general matter, obviously there are a variety of theories of deterrence. Part of it is indicating red lines saying if you do this, we will do something that will cost you, essentially as a consequence, working with coalition partners, Allies too, raise the cost essentially of taking those actions, also promoting resilience generally. So that the effect of their actions are not as damaging as they might otherwise be. A variety of things that can be done to create essentially a framework of deterrence. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you. Thank you. Senator Tuberville. Now let me recognize via webex. Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Mr Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses today uh for being there. I director hangs I have a question for you. Pardon me. One of the things that we have seen, and one of the things we know is that the intelligence communities reports, periodic reports are helpful when we’re trying to quantify threats and prepare for some of these black swan events, which covid 19 is one of those. So what I would like to know, are there resources collection methods, authorities that would better and more comprehensively support the work of the intel community’s ability to exercise at some of this foresight. And I ask this question in regard to Russia and china and some of their participation and um also if there is a way for interagency share on some of these resources and information, right, Thank you Senator for the question. I think we are going to be obviously submitting a budget in the context of the President’s budget and that will indicate I think the resources that we’re looking forward to try to promote the work that we do in this area. Um beyond that, I think probably best to leave it to the budget. If there are particular thoughts that you have on things that we can do better in this respect, please don’t hesitate to let us know obviously. Well I this would need to be things that you all say we’re missing or you need more of and I appreciate general barriers statement. And I will come to you with this part of the question when we look at china and Russia and how they have expanded their security ties. Um and I would be curious to what degree do you assess this closest closeness between Russia and china? And I would add to that Iran and north Korea and those four comprising a new axis of evil. But what in what way do you attribute this to a growing relationship between Putin and uh she and between the leadership of these countries? And how do you assess these countries, unwillingness, pardon me to agree to a formal alliance? General senator. Thank you for that question. We see uh some cooperation between china and Russia and I would say that it is opportunistic and transactional. I think neither country would would prefer to have a deep military alliance. It provides them flexibility. Not not to actually have that. Um There probably is some cooperation between all four of the countries you mentioned on some level and we can go into more detail on that in the closed session. But if you if you wouldn’t mind, I would like to go back to your question about the pandemic. You may know that D. I. A. Has the National Center for Medical Intelligence and in this in this uh organization at Fort Dietrich we put analysts and scientists together um and we use a variety of methods from open source intelligence, too sensitive reporting to try and understand the pandemic and everything that’s happened as well as medical phenomena going on around the world. So that is a unique jewel in the crown for D. I. And for the I see quite frankly, I think we have the right authorities in place and as the director said in the budget will be will be looking for continued funding for that center. Okay, let me ask you this when we talk about Russia and China enable cooperation. Um how do you see this affecting the Indo Pacific with Russia having added 15 new warships and support vessels to their Pacific fleet? So certainly something that we should keep an eye on with our indo pak com partners. Obviously more forces, there requires more intelligence surveillance reconnaissance assets to keep an eye on it. And we will watch out for additional partnership between P. L. A. N. And Russian Navy forces. And I would also, and this may be better for a closed session but to know how you assess Russia’s uh geopolitical understanding of or participation in china’s belt and road initiative. I’d be happy to discuss that in closed session. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Blackburn. Now, let me recognize via Webex, Senator Manchin. Um, then I mentioned is obviously having some problems communicating. Okay. Apparently Senator Manchin is not available this time to Webex his questions since there are no other members seeking recognition. Uh, let me thank the witnesses for their testimony. This open session, uh, immediately upon a german of the open session will retire to SPC 2 17 for a classified briefing on these issues again. Thank you madam. Director. Thank you. General. And I will declare the open session adjourned.