Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Chad Sbragia, is featured in a webinar focusing on the release of the Department of Defense’s 2020 China Military Power Report. The 20-year annual report is key in understanding China’s strategic intentions in the Indo-Pacific and beyond on September 1, 2020.
Transcript
I’m Zack Cooper from the American Enterprise Institute. I’m joined today from the Pentagon with Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense Chest Baraza. So happy to have you here a few ground rules before we begin. After a brief introduction, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Brad I will walk us through some of the highlights of this year’s report and then we’ll begin a discussion. We also have an incredible number of China experts on this assume call and a lot of other national national security expertise and audience, and so we’ll be looking forward to taking your questions. At the end. You can enter questions into the Q and A function via Zoom, or you can tweet them using the hashtag China Military Power 2020 now onto our guest for today chats. A barrage of it serves is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for China and the office of the Assistant secretary of Defense for Indo Pacific Security Affairs. In this role, he is responsible for advising senior leadership within the Defense Department on all matters pertaining to the development and implementation of defense strategies, plans, policies and bilateral security relations for China. Previously, dusty surprises served as the director of the China Research Group for the U. S. Marine Corps, has also served as the deputy director of the China Strategic Focus Group that the U. S Indo Pacific Command and Country Director for China Taiwan in Mongolia under the J five strategic Planning Policy director, and from 1985 to 2012 he served in the U. S. Marine Corps, where he led Marines up through the battalion level and deployed across the Middle East, Africa and the Indo Pacific. He’s also been a marine attache at the U. S. Embassy in Beijing. So as you can see, a daisy surprise has done just about everything possible on the defense focused world on China. We’re so glad to have him here today to talk us through This really important report is the 20th anniversary. I know you’ve got a lot, so walk us through. So does do you surprised over to you to make some opening remarks? Thank you, Jack. Good morning. Very appreciative, certainly thanks to you personally and thanks to AI for hosting the event, it’s important certainly is an aspect of the secretary’s desires to be transparent and fully share the information in the report. As you mentioned, the Department of Defense has provided the shot a military power report for about two decades now on its long served as a Touchstone for authoritative information for Congress and the reports, other audiences as well. This year’s report is almost 200 pages long. I won’t certainly try to summarize it all, and I certainly would ask those online today to monotonously quiz me. I have not memorized the entire report yet, but I strongly encouraged the audience to read it. Um instead, I will briefly discuss while why this year’s report is particularly important, and I’ll offer a view of what the major changes are were made and why. Aziz. The Department of Defense continues to address the strategic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and continues to implement the national defense strategy, in which China’s the principal focus Secretary Esper has made it clear that we, as a department must deepen our understanding of China and the People’s Liberation Army and the China Military Power Report is one of many ways in which we can support that goal. Given the growing focus on China, it’s important that this year’s report provide an authoritative and sober explanation of China’s national strategy as it relates to security issues involving China and developments within China’s armed forces. To do so. The report explains the relationship between the Communist Party of China strategy, it’s ideology, political and governing systems and the party’s view of China’s external environment, particularly systemic Calvary and the international strategic competition that’s underway. These factors are drivers of China’s foreign policy, military, civil fusion strategy, defence policy and military strategy. These relationships are essential for understanding the current and future course of the PL A, including its evolving roles and missions in support of China’s strategy and its long term goal to become Quote world class military by 2049 for the report for the report to provide the most accurate assessment of China’s strategy possible. We felt it was important to use very authoritative sourcing over my career. I’ve always found that there’s no better starting point for understanding China’s strategy than China itself. This report carefully and deliberately use, uses authoritative Communist Party documents, writings, speeches to provide a more complete and accurate picture, an account of China’s strategy, its ambitions and political and governing systems as articulated and understood by the party itself. This requires obviously careful working and attention. On one hand, we don’t want to nestle amplify the party’s false narratives. Propaganda are hollow rhetoric. On the other hand, we in the United States at large can sometimes fall into the trap of dismissing too much of what China says as indecipherable political rhetoric. And if you ignore what China says about itself, it can places at a greater risk of relying on the caricatures of China. Strategy and misunderstanding is strategic intent. So by assessing China through this lens, the China military power report is able to provide some, I think, better insights. For instance, it’s clear that in recent years the party has become increasingly confident in the superiority of its political and governance systems and its ability to manage China’s challenges towards the strategic ends. This confidence, for example, is manifesting what is often described as China’s increasingly assertive international behavior. Moreover, it’s clear that the party’s leaders, rather than risk adverse uh, rather than being risk averse or reactionary, view themselves as modernizers of a certain stripe who are confident that they have struck upon a formula that works and works better. China’s economic and social transformation under the party over the past 40 years of particular have generated greater confidence, not timidity, As this report describes, China’s strategy seeks to achieve quote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation unquote by 2049 China’s main national and state. This strategy, led by the party, entails a determined pursuit of political and social modernity and includes efforts to expand China’s national power. Perfect. It’s covered in system, revise and revise the international order. The Communist Party leadership characterizes their strategy to achieve miniter maternity as a national endeavor that will transform China and certainly, in turn the world. It’s important to acknowledge that the Communist Party does not pursue these strategic ends mechanically, or have necessarily a detailed plan that stretches out decades. Rather, what the party does is it sets long term national objectives that the party drives the party state in the Chinese society towards um and certainly adapts to challenges and failures and successes along the way. While party leaders have consistently pursued national rejuvenation as its goal, they have demonstrated degree of adaptability and execution to seize opportunities and manage threats to their strategy and interests. Moreover, China’s strategy is not without deficiencies. China’s strategy entails numerous contradictions between China’s desires to continue benefiting from the current peace and prosperity of the current international system in order to advance China’s development towards its national rejuvenation. At the same time, China’s strategic ambitions and political governing systems, coupled with growing means and opportunity induce it to adopt him were assertive in revisionist policies, which of course threaten the peace and security it desires. In many ways, contextualizing China’s defence ambitions is another key part of this report. The report does not claim that China’s military is currently 10 ft tall nor, I think, certainly does China either. The Pale faces a number of challenges in Beijing is working to overcome those which is really an important point at the center is that the party constant? The Philly, I think, ultimately to be 10 ft tall. Ambitions matter here and over the past 20 years, what we’ve seen is that China’s ambitions drive the pill a sweeping modernization and reform efforts which this year see NPR has catalogued clearly, as have previous editions in which, for the national defense strategy identifies, uh serves as a critical source um from which, uh, we may re face eroding competitive military advantage, the comments party stated. Goals are to transform the pill a into a world class military by mid century. While China has not defined exactly what world class military means, it is likely that China will seek to build a military that is equal to, or in some cases superior to the U. S. Military or the military of any other great power that China perceives as a potential threat. Given the context of the Communist Party’s strategy of national rejuvenation, it is unlikely the party will seek to end seek an end state in which China remains in a position of military inferiority visa via the United States or any other rival. A permanent condition of military inferiority is anathema to the party’s goal of transformation that, to transform China into a quote great modern socialist country unquote, the party views China’s growing strength as useful only to the extent that the party state can mobilize it. Party is modernizing and reforming the P L. A. To support its strategy, while the advancing military capabilities are important. We want to emphasize, and I think it’s clear in the report that the pill is not intended to be merely a showpiece of Chinese modernity. The CPC has Communist Party has spent the last several years completely tearing out in rewiring the pill, organizationally with the gold to transform into um or joint force that is increasingly combat ready, innovative and global. Finally, the report highlights that China’s investments in and reforms of the pill A are intended to transform it into a more practical instruments of statecraft. And that is certainly called out within the report that put the party has called for the P L. A. To take an active role in advancing the PRC’s foreign policy, particularly with respect to China’s global interests and its aims to revise aspects of the international order. Beijing very much intends or believes it will have to use this. I use this military instrument to advance and defend its conception of Chinese sovereignty, security and developmental interests. Zach, I just wanted again reiterate my appreciation for the fourth today your efforts and certainly as well as the participation of the audience online and look for the questions. Wonderful. Well, thank you so much for walking us through the report. You’re right. It’s a long 200 pages, but there’s so much content in there, and so assed folks are probably reading through it at home. I wanted to take a little bit of time to jump through it. The some of the things that jumped out to me in the report, Um, and the first is on the comment that you ended on about Chinese power projection and overseas objectives. So this year’s report discusses China’s continue turn for US power projection. And it states that China’s military is not only intended to be merely a showpiece of China’s maternity or to keep it focused solely on regional threats. And, you know, so this is very clear that this is a global military, our military that would like to have global ambitions. And one thing that jumped out at me was that this report, unlike others, says that the PRC has likely considered locations for Peel, a military logistics facilities in Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola and Tajikistan. And the report also mentions the existing base in Djibouti and, of course, some debate within Cambodia about China gaining access to re naval base. So I’m wondering if you can talk a little bit both about the logic of China’s turn towards power projection and whether you think there’s been an acceleration. Maybe over the last year, that this report focused on in China’s looking outward beyond its near sees towards more overseas objectives as act. That’s a great question. Thank you for that. I, um I will. I will reinforce your conclusion here, which is obviously also found in the report, which is that the Chinese do have. The Chinese leadership of the Communist Party has an aspiration for great power status by virtually every measure of comprehensive composite national power that you that you could measure that not least of which is the People’s Liberation Army. And to achieve that, that means that they have to have, you know, a global convergence at at the broadest scale possible for the P L. A. That means that they do have the intent to go out. I think that’s certainly one of the aspects of what world class military means, which is the capacity to have influence at distance at a time and place of their choosing. And they certainly inspired to do that within the last year. There certainly has been an uptick in their aspirations. Aziz, they declare. Talk about them. I don’t think this is necessarily a new objective that they have. It certainly port and intimately linked to their long term nationals strategic aspirations. But things were changing, and they’re changing rapidly in China, and we see those developments unfolding right in front of our eyes. If you don’t pay attention, if you’re not attentive to them, is that you could miss those. Those basic facilities, as you notice, are important. They’re testing their trying to explore their trying to understand they’re trying to devise and come up with plans about what, where and what types of bases and how they might use those facilities overseas. Best. I don’t think that they have reached necessarily final conclusions on any of those yet, certainly with Djibouti, they have, um, but their aspirations were not small, and they’re not limited to a single geographic location. This is global in scale, so we’ll continue to modern to that. There’s aspects of this that may be helpful in the future, but truly our eyes are on how that impacts the United States national security, our interests overall and that of our allies and partners. Wonderful. And another issue that is going to get a lot of attention, I think, is the reports. Statements about missile capabilities in particular. In 2000, the first China Military Power report assessed that the feel they lack the capabilities, organization and readiness for modern warfare. And this year’s report says China has marshaled the resource is technology and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the peel and nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China’s already ahead of the United States in certain areas. And the report calls out three. I wanted to just talk about one of them for a minute, which is the conventionally armed missile capability. Andi. Some of these air also nuclear capable as well. This year’s report shows a pretty large increase in the estimated number of intermediate intermediate range ballistic missiles in China’s arsenal. I assume some of those air de of 26 is, but I don’t know, um, so I wanted to ask you, you know, that the increase in this report is up from something like 80 launchers last year to 200 estimated this year. So that’s a pretty big increase, especially when the rest of the ballistic missile forces stayed relatively stable, at least as as estimated by the Defense Department. Andi, we’ve obviously just seen this capability tested last week in the South China Sea. So I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit about China’s missile forces and how they’re changing. And what do you think is behind some of these changes? Certainly, there’s not a single causal factor for that. I think this touches on on Mary many aspects of how the Chinese perceive themselves and where they need to be, both as they met or trying to meet 2020 markers, 2035 markers and then ultimately mid century markers for the development of the nation at large and the Chinese military in particular. So the missiles air are certainly a consequential aspect of what they’re undertaking, and it has our full attention, as as you can imagine, not least of which is is the ration, the reasons and the rationale behind why we have in the past, you know, accepted and promoted limitations on those kind of systems for their inherently escalatory nature of what they provide, but not having that, uh, having been constrained by that in the past. The Chinese just simply haven’t been part of those international agreements or accords, have not felt the necessity to do so and pursued a much more escalatory path for them. It’s about technology, technological prestige, fielding in advanced capabilities and, uh, and forces, certainly not least of which is what they perceived to be an asymmetric advantage that they will have of the United States, particularly during the time when we had self imposed or agreed to limitations that we adhere to and they have not. So in this case is it’s a change of condition for them where they felt some advantage, a strength and area of potential strength that they might have in a potential area of weakness that the assessed that we might possess. So it is important that the change and the numbers that you see, of course, in any reporter, only a snapshot in time. They’re dynamic and they change. They certainly changed since the previous report. In the end, alley will change as you see next year’s report, but which we’ll, of course next week, will begin developing. So with that is the P. L. A. Has fielded approximately 200 I R B M launchers and more than 200 missiles, and we continue to modern monitor that very closely and look for other ways that to extend the United States advantage and that of our allies and partners. I do expect to Seymour on the horizon, but certainly the Chinese air, aware of the change of conditions that have happened over the last really about a year and a half in terms of constraints and limitations on those. And that may be a point of departure for discussions with them. That’s fantastic. You know, one of the areas that I think is connected, obviously, toe I r B m force eyes, nuclear weapons And here, actually, one thing I really appreciate about the report is it’s, you know, we’re not just tryingto present. I think as much negative information about what the Chinese military is doing as really, very fact based. And there’s some facts here that I think I’m a surprise. Some people eso. The report states that China’s nuclear war has stockpilers in the low to hundreds. This is not a number that typically has been quoted in the China military, Power reported. And as you know, many of the outside reports suggested maybe that number was closer to the low three hundreds, or even or even higher and in some cases, much higher on DSO. I wanted to ask a little bit about about nuclear weapons. There are a couple of other interesting things in the report on nuclear weapons, one of which is that it suggests China is building a silo based nuclear capability for launch on Warning, which I think is going to come as a surprise to some people, at least in the community. Eso Can you talk a little bit about the Chinese nuclear force and how it’s changing. Obviously, we’ve seen the last few weeks. Secretary Esper on others. The undersecretary of the Anderson, for example, mentioned that China hopes to double or maybe thinking about doubling this nuclear force over the next decade. So look forward to your insights about where the Chinese nuclear capabilities airheaded. Yeah, that’s great. They should be attentive. Certainly we are, and that’s I think, the rationale for why we ensure that we included the best numbers and best understanding we could have in this report really stems from two issues. One is going back to some of the opening comments, which is as an aspect of try as long term national strategic aspirations and what those mean for China’s strategic systems, conclude the P L. A. And what they what those capacities are is you will see the trend lines that are in play right now. So the report does contend that there’s currently an estimated low to hundreds in terms of warhead stockpiles, and it’s projected to at least double in size of the next decade as China expands and modernizes nuclear forces. I think it’s also important that the report notes that China’s expanding and modernizing and diversifies diversifying its nuclear forces across the board is so just looking at number of warheads by itself is not the entire picture or doesn’t paint a holistic understanding of where the where the changes are made, where they want to go. As the report notes within the next decade, China’s on course to expand IDS ballistic submarine fleet and feel more capable of longer range sea launched ballistic missiles, complete development of its nuclear capable airlines, ballistic missiles and field them along with associated bombers. Field additional Road Mobile, I C, B M’s and potentially expand its silo based I C B M force. So, as has been noted by others on Daz, the report contends, is that there’s an aspect of that. They’re obviously in pursuit of it, the full sweetened capacities and include the building out of infrastructure for more modernized, capable and larger. The capacity in this areas wonderful. And I want to turn a little bit now, toe some regional issues and maybe start with a bit of framing about the fillets. Global Role. The report states that China’s military strategy remains based on the cop concept of active defense and, as you know well, Taylor for Bella’s written a book on this recent maybe came Out last year. Andi. He suggests that in the short term, the central focus of China’s military strategy and strategic planning will revolve around three areas. Taiwan, the Sino Indian border on the South China Sea. There’s obviously a lot happening on all three on. I want to delve into them a little bit, but before I do, I want to ask a little bit about the emphasis in this year’s report on China’s Desire Toe Act globally, which is really a main focus, at least in the first, a couple of dozen pages. You know, there’s a lot of added texts that walks through where China came from, especially back going to 2000 and where, where it’s headed. So can you talk a little bit about How have the Defense Department thinks about China’s regional role versus global role and the degree to which the P A is sort of prioritizing one over the other? Yeah, I can e I think that that’s ah really kind of central point of a lot of our thinking here within the department, certainly within our office is is again going back to where trying long from national aspirations are is really the best tool by which you can illuminate where you see their military developing eso in the near term. Certainly those things that are hot they’re directing on their periphery, and particularly those things that involve their national interests of sovereignty, security and developmental aspirations on those geographic locations that right along the periphery but will have been will and will certainly continue to remain priority efforts for them. But really, where China’s eyes are on is understanding about how they’re going to contend, potentially react through course of use of force for those but their eyes long from on a global capacity. When I was served as an attache in Beijing, just, uh, just over 10 years ago, just the thought about the Chinese in terms of any kind of power projection globally was almost unthinkable. Just begun certainly had been undertaking peacekeeping operations on her human auspices for a long period of time. But just taking their first four raise you would note that when they would even do a very small sort of ships on some kind of world tour, that was a significant undertaking for them. Now, now that’s a routine practice, So these things are changing in a very dynamic way. Long term. It’s for those bigger aspirations, and so those those close in issues that we study on a daily basis will become one of many. I think in the future that will necessity. And as you raise China’s military strategy, the Chinese it’s not clear that they have updated their strategy. They have Certainly Xi Jinping has provided very clear direction both in 2018 2019 to revise their military strategy. The pl A themselves have told me that the military strategy will remain predicated on active defense. You know that very term itself has modified, of course, across the course of of the police history, it does appear that were either on the cusp, Bob or it’s already occurred that the trains will have a new military strategy. What we anticipate is that this moment, this next military strategy from the Chinese or the ones in the near term we’ll start to reflect the requirements commanding control frameworks of a much more ah broader regional approach or even a global approach. But that’s where we know that they want to go over the long term. And so we’ll be looking for those and coming back now, Teoh to the region, and especially to you know, some of the more contested areas I want to ask first about Taiwan. Um, you know so much news just the last few weeks on Taiwan, of course. Yesterday, Assistant Secretary of state, they would so well declassified a set of documents about the six assurances that were provided to Taiwan all the way back in 1982 and that was obviously an effort toe decrease. A little bit of the ambiguities surrounding us, previous statements on Taiwan and to Taiwan. Um, one thing that’s notable in this report is that there’s a big change in the cross trade balance and ground forces, air and naval forces. We see a little bit of a change. But on the ground side last year, in the 2019 report, there was, ah, roughly 3 to 1 advantage on China’s edge of active ground forces in the theater. And now that ratio is closer to 5 to 1 in theater between China and Taiwan. And if you look outside the theater, the ratio goes all the way up to 12 to 1 on. And I think this is going to be something that’s going to obviously concern a lot of folks, not just in United States but in Taipei and elsewhere. Can you explain to us a little bit about what these changing dynamics mean for no potential time horizons for trying to trying to actually launched the potentials invasion of Taiwan? Do Chinese leaders think that the time horizon is that the window is opening or closing for a potential invasion. And and I know, you know, obviously we’re seeing a lot of reforms in Taiwan itself, and the report goes into those as well. Onda numbers I mentioned earlier, really only talking about active forces because obviously the Taiwan military has shifted its structure itself, and that’s part of the reason that we’re seeing this change in the in the ratio of ground forces. But can you give us a sort of general sense of how you think Chinese leaders see the cross strait military balance and where that balance is heading? That’s a great question, Zack. We might have to do about another five hours of your actions to discuss that fully. But But you know the starting point and really the starting point of the report itself. It is a very clear, very clearly draws from authoritative commentary in this case, the 19 party Congress report where they explain, as they have in the past, that the unification of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau is central component of China’s long from national aspirations. So they very laid that marker down is that’s the expectation in terms of U. S. Policy, U. S policy has not changed. I think Secretary Stilwell mentioned that yesterday as well is we have certain communicated that to the Chinese is our policy remains consistent, and but we certainly have ah requirement to continue to communicate that effectively to the Chinese and others about what that policy is in terms of the cross strait balance. That certainly drives us that we know that in the opening aspect the opening chapters of the National Defense Strategy we talked about that as a motivating aspect of where current national strategy is national defense strategies. That which is the ultimate erosion of military capacities, defense capacities by the United States and the desire to close them. And I can tell you, is that the secretary and everybody in the department is, uh, intensely focused on doing so. Those lines of effort are clear. We’re acting on them on, and there’s certainly very powerful and strong indications of how those those air working and I think effectively, and certainly not least of which is from the Chinese themselves who who see that they see the systemic transformation that the department’s undertaking the Cross Street about balance is certainly a crucial element of that, um, you raised the numbers in particular certainly are caution is that number zehr one aspect of that. But this is part of holistic maternity. The Chinese themselves have reduced forces under the current reform efforts, but not as a a symbol of lessening capability, our capacities, but in fact making better investments long term about sharpening what those forces are with who they’re composed of, what their mission sets are. So I would only caution the numbers have changed. They there are in the report from the Taiwan’s perspective. It’s certainly better to ask the Taiwan authorities about with their view of that is from our perspective is to ensure that we stand ready and any condition based on the president’s direction. And I think that certainly we’re headed the aim here. I think from all sides to do the Chinese is is that the worst case scenario is conflict, and that’s not where anybody wants to go. I think certainly that’s our view. I think that that’s what the Chinese view is, and, uh, the best way to do that isn’t sure that we’re always prepared and ready. Absolutely, and it’s uh, 1 30 so I want to start bringing in some audience questions. We’ve got one on this specific topic from Bonnie Glaser over the Center for Strategic International Studies. She has. What is your assessment of the appeal? Is current capability to seizing control Taiwan? Do they have sufficient amphibious landing capability? And can you talk at all about what deficiencies exist that the delay has yet to master for that type of convention? See, I know some of this obviously is going to be difficult for you to talk about in a public setting. But whatever you could say, I think we appreciate Yeah, that’s a great question. Certainly it’s, uh, you know, the Defense Department gets paid to assess risk on a daily basis on DSO. We try to do that, and, uh, I think pretty successfully. It’s, uh, it’s not a simple question. It’s not uncomplicated question, but what I can say in, you know, going back to some of the opening comments is it’s always based best and start by taking stock. Of what the Chinese think the Chinese had, 2020 is critical not only in terms of how many reports we’ve put out from the Defense Department that 2020 served as a critical marker for the Chinese. The pill a themselves as directed by the party leadership. And that was a period which they started moving away from a requirement or capacity limited to blockading to now, including the capacity to dio full scale amphibious assaults on Taiwan based on what they’ve mentioned, in fact, in their own 2019 defence white paper is that they still have not made the full transition into being able to reach that capacity. But in any case that that’s what their pursuit of and they work very hard on. It’s always difficult to lay out all the different variables and how that might impact in any kind of scenario. I don’t know, and I and I am certain that comfortable speculating on what those might look like, I do know is that the Chinese have an aspiration to have the complete suite of coercion and compelling as tools at hands to change the condition as they see fit. That’s where we come in, which is to help ensure that those conditions don’t change in the favor for them. Great. I’ll turn now toe India. We’ve gotten a couple of questions on the Sino Indian border standoff, which obviously unfortunately, looks like it’s heating back up in the last few days on the report, I thought was quite interesting in this regard. Folks that are just in the middle of reading it will have to remember that this is the 2020 report, but it looks in China in 2019. So you’re not going to find a big section on what’s been going on the last few months on the Sino Indian border. But nonetheless, you know, there’s there’s a comment in here with Struck me, which is that in practice, the purest see often favors dialogues, a power play and as a means of using political, economic and military coercion rather than force. And you know, this year we’ve really seen that shift pretty substantially on the Sino Indian border in a way that has surprised a lot of us. Uh and so one of the questions that we got asked, How do you see India strengths and weaknesses of potential counterweight to China and know how does Beijing see India? Andi, how is that playing into this border standoff that’s been going on for now? I guess a couple of months. Yeah, the the as you lay out there, I think, very clearly is that the the line of control over the border issue. The disagreements over sovereignty claims by both sides is certainly part of a much more holistic picture about relations were at large and then certainly have those relations comport with broader international activities and other relationships, not least of which is with the United States. So it’s in the United States interests is that these matters air peacefully resolved. I think we’ve stated that very clearly. It certainly has been demonstrated through indications by leadership on both sides trying in India for an aspiration and desire to do so, not least of which, for what I watch is the Chinese expressing a desire to have peaceful resolution of this of the current tensions Long term, the Chinese have certainly endeavoured to cultivate India. I think for several reasons, one is to mitigate their own risk that they have and he is not a insignificant actor in the international environment, certainly butts right up against China in areas where the Chinese feel that they’re both vulnerable. And I’m highly sensitive. Um, I think that they have not. They have felt that the the Indians have not reciprocated to them as’s fully, which, UM, there’s good reasons why. I would say we have certainly talked to the Indians and and I don’t want to get into the discussions. There are aspects of what we said to them, but certainly writ large is there’s very clear aspirations that we have is for improved and increased and expanded relationship with India. There certainly, ah, core element of the international environment, large ItT’s partnership that we’ve always endeavoured to expand on and will continue to do so, Um, in the near term, there’s certainly no desire by any part. I think, is the extent have this exacerbate, er escalating crisis for conflict. But But we’re continuing to closely monitor that and watch that and certainly work efforts on all sides to t bring this back to negotiate a settlement here and then the final flashpoint that that’s often discussed has been self trying to see. The report mentions the South trying to see and goes through some of the challenges in detail. This is, you know, all the more interesting the last week or two because we’ve seen a lot of action in the South China Sea. We saw missiles shot into the South China Sea by by the P L. A. There’s a new, interesting South China Morning Post article, which stated that Beijing had actually instructed the Chinese military not to fire the first shot against the U. S. Military. Whether that applied against China’s neighbors, I think, was much less clear. And then, of course, last week the State Department and Commerce Department put a series of restrictions on US exports Teoh CC CC, which has been involved with much of the dredging in the south. China’s Teoh. So attention is just continuing. There is, they have been for the last six years or so. I’m wondering if you can talk a little bit about the direction that China milk. China’s military readers might be heading there. You know, there’s been a lot of discussion about the potential for the announcement of straight baselines around the Spratly Islands about on air defense identification zone that might cover cover parts of the South China Sea. Obviously, we haven’t seen that in the last year, but if you could talk a little bit about the direction that things were headed in the South China Sea. Andi. Some of what Chinese leaders are trying to do there. That would be great, that that that’s a great question. You should be attentive to that. We certainly are. Um, I I’ll start with Is there didn’t used to be this much time? Ultimate Section C it’s This was really the result of the conditions that the Chinese undertook both through their private endeavours, as you mentioned the construction company that helped manufacture islands out of out of nothing that the refusal of China to delimit its claims in accordance with the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea auspices and which would have been the right thing to do. They have not have continued to argue Ah and put forward claims. They’re just inconsistent with international law. That’s certainly one of the aspect that we’ve talked to the Chinese about at multiple levels within the department and other departments, which is just inability to follow international law rules and norms, and further is that they seem to not be able to honor the commitments and arrangements they’ve made with others, not least of which is the negotiations about the code of conduct down there are presidents, operations are something and activities in the South China Sea I’ve called and between with our leadership have called repeatedly upon the Chinese the P l A. The PRC writ large to to limit the activities of what they’re doing to not militarise their features toe the halt These really unlawful practices in expectations they hold for us and others. Uh, we have as a result, um, increased the r d o d activity, particular military operations and activities in the South China Sea, both by ourselves and in coordination with others in the region on globally, and will continue to do so because really our commitments to the free and open Indo Pacific writ large the free and open international order. And when we say we’re committed, we’re committed and we’re all in. I know that doesn’t make the Chinese happy. They tell me that personally and certainly others and leadership here, but that’s where we’re at. The expectation is that there’s there’s rules of the Internet and laws of the international system, and our expectations are for the Chinese Stop. Hold that to the degree that they don’t what they’ll faces an increasingly network region that response to them high, hopefully in in collaboration and coordination with them. But if if need be to compete with them as exactly what the heart of our strategy is, so we’ll see that more specific to the exercise last week. The Chinese have an ongoing national level exercise that includes all five theaters that includes activities in the South China Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf. Those missile shots were actually done as a component of a very high level national level exercise, Um, but certainly the one critical aspect of that was the degree to which that that sense not only broader message of where China wants to go with its military, but it’s inescapable about the closure areas and the missile shots and the other high end activity that they placed in that region didn’t need to be there. They’ve done that on purpose, and certainly an element of that is it’s an unhelpful and really intrusive elements of coercion from multiple actors, not least of which is other claimants in the trying to see in Southeast Asia that we don’t understand why they’re trying to choose to do that, it’s it seems, um uh to be really just not constructive toe where the they’re steady. Claims for their aspirations are reach peaceful negotiations. But here we are again with the Chinese, continue to take those actions even after they were cautioned, not do so and had pledged to avoid doing Yeah, um, I’m gonna turn now toe Siris of audience questions on a couple of different issues, So I know you’ll have toe be flexible with us as we jump around Eso The first is from Eric Schmidt at The New York Times. He knows the possibility of f 35 sales, the U A. E. And asked, How concerned are you in the Defense Department that such sales could risk the transfer of sensitive technology to China? Um, which is obviously deepen ties with you A. In recent years. What steps could be taken to mitigate that risk? Andi, maybe if you could talk a little bit more about the delays technology transfer efforts, it’s a big part of the report. That’s ah gets a large section appropriately. So s over to you on that issue. Yeah, that’s a great question. I think that’s one that, of course, the new missile or new aircraft carrier or something has always drives a lot of people’s attention. But a lot of the activities of the department in particular, and all of the interagency writ large have have been in in some cases of the greatest function have been in areas like this, where we made more concentrated efforts to both identify and understand how the Chinese act the interactions, particularly through the military civil fusion development strategy and what those implications are. And we’ve identified those you noted in the previous question about state and I think in commerce, and some of the actions that have taken were working in concert with them, literally on a daily basis. A Czar, 12 37 reporting out of the Defense Department has demonstrated about helping identifying companies and entities and with those risks and working very hard to mitigate those risks. There’s more attention on those now than ever. We’re actually taking action on those, and I think it’s important and very powerful statement, certainly for China and others, and it’s having a very clear effect that also falls under really a broader set of issues. And Eric’s question is the department defense certainly has robust controls and procedures in place to protect US weapons systems and their technology. We watched Those symbols are very traditional processes which are well known, but we’ve incorporated some new ones as well. Obviously, China’s is a uniquely aggressive and capable adversary when it comes to protecting our military technology edge. Our allies and partners, including the U. A, are required to meet extremely high standards of security in order to acquiring deploy these systems. And we’ve instituted both more pragmatic help to our allies and partners to understand that improving their processes through Citius and other kinds of security cooperation practices and have begun undertaken more efforts to work with allies and partners on sharing best practices were export and import controls, oversight of technology transfers and making sure that we have all the best practices in place. So you’ll continue to see that built up. It’s obviously having an effect on the China as we speak and way anticipated will continue to have ah, broader effect. As time goes on right. I want to rent a couple of very specific points on nuclear and missile forces from some of the questioners eso it may just be that you can’t answer these or can’t do so in this forum, and in which case, just let us know and we’ll move on. The first is from Takeshi Kawahara, NHK in Japan, who asked the This report, as I stated, has something above 200 below to hundreds for the number of nuclear warheads. Uh uh that it says are operational and he wants to clarify whether by operational, this means ready to launch right away or whether these air capable of being assembled on, then deployed, you know, at at some time horizon. So how does how should we read the word operational in the report this year? You know, I don’t recall. I think we refer to it as a component of their stockpile. Certainly there’s some that are operational to some stand. I’m not exactly sure, but the precise definition of that so I will stay away from that in terms of specificity. That question, I’m certain I can’t go into much greater detail to that. But I can say is that that’s an aspect of what we pursue for greater transparency from the from the Pele in particular, and China writ large, which is, it is time for us to talk about these issues, particularly with what we’ve reported on and understand is their aspirations and will seek that they do. So There’s other facets beyond just the numbers themselves or even the operationalization. There’s there’s critical aspects of, Well, you would refer to his co mingling or entanglement of nuclear and non nuclear system that really vital that we begin to address with the Chinese. Um, and we certainly have plans in the near term to raise that with him. Another question along similar lines is from Tony Kvasha at Bloomberg, and he wants to know a little bit more about the Jin class. Nuclear deterrence patrols it. These are mentioned in the report. Obviously, the report says that in order to hit the continental United States that have toe someone close to Hawaii on DSO, Tony’s question is, uh, can you say anything publicly about whether the feel like Navy has actually started any of those nuclear deterrence patrols and whether they do, in fact, sail close enough to Hawaii that they could be operational? Yeah, I really can’t speak to that issue on this four year. The report. I think it’s gonna have to stand for itself. But what What’s in there right now? I can’t elaborate. Pass that. Certainly the genesis. Something that does go to see from time to time and what their capacities are and how they’re loaded out on. But the readiness is it is just not something I can dive into too deeply. Yeah, I completely understand that. Um, and then one more on missiles. I think this is really more about you know what the Defense Department puts out in the public view. This is from Musashi Murano over at the Hudson Institute. Hey knows that there used to be an upper limit on the number of missiles in the China Military Power report on, uh, this year. That’s obviously transitioned for those of you that I’ve had a chance to look at it. So rather than providing a range, it gives ah, lower bound, but not an upper bound on dso Musashi. Murano is wondering if you can say anything about sort of what the the logic of this change was. And then, ah, is it possible that d o. D. Assesses that the Chinese are actually retiring a certain number of Egypt missiles so that they can have ah, more ready force of more modernized missiles. I appreciate that numbers. Obviously, there’s a lot of numbers across the entirety report accounting practices for how we count things, you know, that could be It’s often a subjective rather than objective process. We did change the practice where we did that this year. There was multiple reasons for that. One of the instincts here was too broad, the greatest clarity and accuracy of the report that we possibly could, um, in terms of retirement, retiring systems. I’ll tell you, I thought my head. I don’t recall that that might be something I’ll have toe reengage on specific aspects. I don’t believe that that’s the case, although there have been some very older model that they believe that they’re starting to do. But I gotta say, I’m getting into territory that I don’t have great certainly on, So we’ll have to We’ll have to reset after a different time. Please do that, Um, and, uh, over to a couple of questions that a number of folks have asked about China’s maritime buildup. So one thing that really sticks out in the report is that early on the document notes that China now has the largest navy in the world. Last year’s document said China had the largest navy in the region, and, you know, I don’t think it’s necessarily that the numbers have changed a huge amount on the Chinese side if you actually go towards the back and look at the naval numbers. But the report notes that China now feels the feeling Navy feels 350 ships compared to the US Navy’s to 93. Um, and yet at the same time, you know, there’s a lot of discussion in public about, uh, whether Chinese leaders might be restrained by the fact that they haven’t fought a major war and decades and don’t have a lot of experience doing so. And I’m wondering if you can say anything about whether that fact plays a restraining role, at least in your view, on the Chinese leadership’s willingness to use force. Yeah, uh, two great questions both linked. I think I’ll start with your Ladder one. First. I’ll begin with the number one, which is we do report, I think, actually, about what the Chinese numbers are and what their growth that looks like ad in the future, which is an increase. Certainly, I’ll note that this year the Chinese again increased their defense budget, telling us that they still have aspirations for those to grow and not least of which is the Pilates capacity, particularly delayed Navy. And they’re there supporting almost feeling Marine Corps’s requirements to have greater far seas or global power projection capacity. So those those numbers will likely increase. And we estimate that they will, of course, numbers air one element. That’s not all of the elements. There’s tonnage, capacity, capability sets sophistication on a whole range of other kind of logistics communication aspects of that. So, of course, the cautions always numbers air one element, not the entirety of the element. I can’t speak to us forces that those air things that will come out and discussions between the departments and certainly the secretary. But this report obviously is intended to help inform that discussion. So the deepest investing, clearest understanding that we have should be for That’s one of the reasons we provide this to Congress so that we could help have those discussions across all elements of the United States government in terms of as they go forward and out in the future, and particularly on our more global scale that that remains a critical element. This is highly consistent with Chinese military strategy and its concepts and teaching about its own military strategy. They have a very unique, in fact, very specific definition of active defense itself of what the purpose of their military strategy is. They referred to that as the’s. As you know, these. These constraints on the really in China logic, which is the dialectic, is a requirement on one hand to safeguard its national interests and on the other hand, not do so in a manner that would be catastrophic towards long term aspirations. I don’t I don’t think that’s an unusual constraint on any use of force by any leader anywhere but for the Chinese themselves. They call it the dialectical unity of war, restricted more winning and always having to make sure that they’re calculating about how you balance between those two things that I talk to the Chinese. Their current military strategy includes at their 2019 defence White paper express that as I’ve talked to him and when I talked about their their near term military strategy reforms or reformation. They they’ve they’ve communicated that they find that will remain a consistent aspect of Halle to find their own military strategies in their use of force, which is there’s to be bound by those two conditions. So I think that’s informative when you understand about how the Chinese make and think about the use of force, which is always in that context, the degree to which it might result in a permanent loss of an as the strategic national interest or objective set political objective, but also the degree to which it might ultimately distract or have a catastrophic effect on China’s long from national aspirations. But you’re right now prioritized on developmental issues. Great. Um, and then another question. Talking about an issue we haven’t discussed yet, which is space from Jack Mayer at the Washington Free Beacon? He asked, Could you talk a little bit more about China’s space capabilities and their long term trajectory in terms of their strategic and economic interests in space? Yeah, I can. It’s Ah, um, this is going to begin to sound like a little bit of a repeating record, and but But I think that’s important, which is you know when you listen to the Chinese Communist leadership degree, She Jinping, who serves as the Chinese say, is the core of the party. He’s. He’s outlined very specific requirements and expectations he has in multiple areas and domains. We raised about the Chinese aspiration for achieving maritime great power status. He’s done the same in terms of having AH, space, great power status. And that’s being a space great power by every measurable yardstick that you can throw up. They’re not least of which is capacity for the military. This includes enhanced communication, tracking, surveillance, eyes, our research exploration, every facet that’s interlinked, not only with the space based capabilities that you that you think about every day in terms of how you would apply those, but also as a critical element of attaining what they call it a technological great power status, which is to being in the most advanced fields and seizing the technological high ground are seizing dance Kate high ground in advance capabilities, which they think that that will give them a national advantage. Spaces certain essential tonight there’s other fields. I don’t think spaces any lower on the priority than any anything else it’s a it’s a top priority for them. They see that as a critical advantage, and it’s always a good reminder. I think certainly when we talk about it within the department itself is is that you know, those are choices that countries have to make those air technological choices. They certainly bring advantages. There’s also bring disadvantages. Those air huge costs. That’s huge. Intellectual investment, bureaucratic organization, transformation of organizations intent its capital investments, time investments, prestige, investments they made in. They’ve chosen to make those investments, and they’ve chosen for a reason, which is that their aspirations are not small. They’re not moderated. They’re not. I don’t think the Chinese air settling on becoming just one off. They do have a very clear and definitive aspiration for becoming, ah, global power, preeminent, by all measures O r. At least in terms of status to any others. And space is not the not the least of that. So I know that’s why not. Great death, I can tell you is I don’t have off the top. I have a role index of all the different satellite capacities that the Chinese air producing or space based capabilities, but it’s it’s self evident. Watching what they’re doing in terms of their exploration capacities is some things to the moon and then the other commercial and military aspects of space activities. It’s not insignificant, and it’s it’s not gonna go away any time soon. Waterfall. OK, we’ve just about restart endpoint, but I want to ask you one final question because it’s gotten so much attention recently. This is from Adams over at the Voice of America, and he asked, How would you assess the delays? Infiltration of universities outside of China? Of course, Onda. How is duty working with US research institutes and others? Uh, toe handle this issue? There’s there’s been a lot of press about this recently, and I know you know, the Department of Justice appears to be doing a lot of work on this issue. Is there anything that you can tell us about about this before we close? Yeah, I will. A You know, I mentioned some of the economic actions that the entirety of United States government, particularly the inter agency, has taken, and this is another one of those fields. So in concert through the interagency, really coordinated, obviously by the national Security staff is identifying and understanding where threats and risks are, where the challenges of what we face and really for a long time it’s not necessarily. We didn’t know these things are going on. We just weren’t actually taking specific action. So that’s what’s happened. The national security strategy, the guidance and direction from the White House and the sort of national security staff is. We’ve gotten on these tasks, and it’s a very robust and very comprehensive elements. So again, it’s not necessarily a new ship. Our new tank, but certainly in terms of policy practice is one of those things we have undertaken and within the department itself, mostly through acquisition and sustainability, and the research and engineering elements have identified where there might be. Either Krugel risks, too, uh, supply chain issues within the department or even within the research organization. Those take balances and choices that we have to make. We’re doing those in conjunction with other elements that Department of Justice, State and others in terms of how we react to that, and we’re trying to make sure that we find a good balance between ensuring that the activities of anybody any of these research organizations air through the universities is properly accounted for, understood on and watched, monitored very carefully and that they don’t have a critical aspect that might provide, um uh, undesirable insights to what the Department of Defense is doing. But I’ll tell you, we’re all over it. Fantastic. Well, thank you so much for your time. I want toe provide 33 big thank you’s for this event. First is for the audience for joining us on for asking so many excellent questions, and I will apologize that there were many more that we were not able to get to. The second is to our x pm it ai on yours with Pentagon for putting this all together. I know it’s a huge amount of work easier for us to do the video than it is for your team to actually write the 200 page report. But we’re really happy to be able to join you for this rollout. And lastly, thank you, Chad, for joining us today and for talking so thoroughly about all of these issues. We really appreciate it, and I hope you stay safe and healthy and best wishes to everyone on the call going ahead Zack. Thank you. I’ll certainly I come. I appreciate appreciation to you. All the staff you have there, ai all the participants itself. Well, it would be wrong of a I didn’t highlight the role of the defense Intelligence enterprise and the others around the department here and producing the report. You see, my face, but it’s really their work. And I encourage you to read it, Others to read it, examine it, and certainly will try to make ourselves available. That began to help discuss it for wonderful. All right, well, thank you so much for joining us and everyone stay safe and stay healthy. Thank you.