Navy Vice Admiral Charles A. Richard testifies at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing considering his nomination to be the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, October 24, 2019.

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Transcript

Today we’re meeting to consider the nomination of Vice Admiral Charles Richard for the appointment in grade of admiral, and to be commander of the United States Strategic Command. And appreciate you being here and I just really enjoyed meeting your beautiful family and hearing, even though I don’t agree with a couple things that they’re pursuing. But that’s all right. (chuckling) No, I think that’s really great, and we appreciate very much your bringing them there. Be sure you introduce them to the committee. We have the required questions. Let me get these over with first. Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

I have.

Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications including questions for the record or in hearings?

I will.

Will you cooperate in proving and providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

They will.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

I do.

And do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?

I will.

Lastly, have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of your confirmation or the confirmation process?

[Richard] I have not.

All right, well, the National Defense Strategy, which is this document that we have proudly been using. And it is a good document. This is one that was put together by Democrats and Republicans. Everyone was in agreement with it, and we’ve been using it all throughout our defense reauthorization process, and it’s something that it directs our nation’s military to prepare for the return to strategic competition. And that’s also in the Nuclear Power Posture Review. If confirmed you’ll be the most prominent advocate for the requirements for our Nuclear Armed Forces. We will expect you to monitor the Navy and Air Force programs to modernize the nuclear triad. And we say that’s we’re sincere about that, because we neglected to modernize for a long period of time when we should’ve been doing it. And a lot of people even to this day, the triad, and they consider that to be somewhat redundant, just because it is three approaches. But I know that you will confirm your dedication to that system. As a member of the council we also expect to keep a watchful eye on the Department of Energy’s contribution to our nuclear modernization goals. Without strong support and continued full funding for the DOE’s warhead and the infrastructure programs StratCom will be unable to field a capable and survivable nuclear systems in the decades to come. In early 2018 the Nuclear Posture Review recommended a low-yield warhead for some of the Navy’s ballistic missiles. The program was authorized and funded the requirements that were set, and the Department of Energy completed production of all units in less than a year. This was an excellent example of the agility and the collaboration that will be required to compete with the Russians and the Chinese. That was a great job that they were able to you folks were able to get done in that period of time. I think that’s a good example for some of the other efforts that we have around here. StratCom has recently been given more responsibility for modernizing Nuclear Command and Control and Communications. That’s the NC3. This is one of the most complex engineering problems the department faces at this time. And I look forward to hear your thoughts on the best way to approach it. You will also be involved in driving requirements for missile defense, particularly the homeland. Given recent setbacks in modernization of our homeland defense capability, I’m interested in your thoughts on whether we can afford to wait another decade to modernize the ground-based interceptors in Alaska. And I’m sure we’ll get some other comments and questions about that from Senator Sullivan. Lastly, despite the creation of the new Space Command, StratCom will still rely on space systems every day. I’m interested in your plan to ensure StratCom priorities like missile warning are still supported in space. So, thank you for your willingness to serve in this capacity, and look forward to serving with you. Senator Reed.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you in welcoming our nominee. Vice Admiral Richard, thank you for your decades of service to our nation. Also, I wanna recognize and thank your family who are here today, your wife Lisa, and your daughters Allison and Emily. I know they have served and sacrificed right along with you through many, many years. Except for that one delightful year in Jamestown, Rhode Island, which was a vacation. Admiral Richard, you have an impressive record of service to our nation. And I believe you’re well qualified for this nomination, with your experience as a deputy commander at US Strategic Command, and also commanding our fleet of ballistic-missile submarines. The commander of US Strategic Command serves as the principal military officer who advises the president, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on our nuclear deterrent and our global missile defense requirements. As is often said, our nuclear deterrent must be safe, secure, and reliable. You’ll be responsible for articulating the requirement for and managing the readiness of our nuclear triad and its command and control protocols to deter threats that are existential to our nation. Integral to the readiness of our nuclear forces the ongoing modernization of our triad, we are well into modernizing the sea and air legs of the triad. And we will soon begin modernization of the ground-based ICBM leg. At this time the programs appear to be on track. But I am deeply concerned about the potential risks of this simultaneous modernization of all three legs on the workforce and industrial base. The chances of a delay on one or more programs is high. And we need a clear plan of how we will respond. I’m interested in your initial thinking on this issue. And we’re watching this modernization process very closely. US Strategic Command is undergoing a number of organizational changes. Three years ago, the command had responsibility for nuclear, space, and cyber operations. But now space and cyber operations have been shifted to other combatant commands. And one of the consequences of these shifts is the gray areas around which command will be responsible for specific programs that have strong connections to both commands. For example, our missile warning satellites, which are integral to our Nuclear Command and Control Architecture are very important, and must not be subject to any ambiguity in managing or sustaining them. While these reorganizations are necessary for our long-term strategy, they must be made slowly and carefully to avoid costly mistakes. In the area of missile defense, I’ll be interested to hear your views on the status of our homeland defenses and the steps we are taking to address this increasingly complicated threat from new technologies, particularly hypersonic missiles. Admiral Richard, again, thank you for your service, and look forward to hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Reed. Admiral Richard, we would like to recognize you for an opening statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of the record. So, you’re recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you today. It is an honor to be nominated by the President to lead US Strategic Command. Mr. Chairman, in particular, thank you for the opportunity to introduce my family. I would not be able to serve if it were not for them. Lisa, to my left, my wife of nearly 31 years is herself a former senate staffer who worked on the Senate Veteran’s Affairs Committee among others. And I just have to imagine she’s getting a bit of a kick from viewing a hearing from a new, unique vantage point. Also, here with me today are our two daughters, Allison and Emily. Both of our girls graduated this past summer, Alie receiving her Masters in Physician’s Assistant Studies, and Emily an Undergraduate Degree in Biology. Our son Chase recently moved to Atlanta and began a new job, and unfortunately is not with us today. So, it’s been a very exciting time for our family. If confirmed, this’ll be our 10th move in the last 12 years, and the 21st overall. And, maybe, said a different way, my son went to four high schools. My daughters went to three each. So, I very much appreciate my family’s patience and support to allow me to continue to serve. My mother and father-in-law, Pam and Tom Moore, my sister-in-law Trish Moore and her partner Mary Hughes are also here. And I appreciate that. I would like to thank the president and secretary of defense for nominating me, and thanks to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley for expressing his confidence that I could serve as a combatant commander. If confirmed, I will work very closely with this committee and with congress more generally to address the strategic challenges that face this nation. I firmly believe that open, honest, and timely communications will be necessary to address these challenges. And with the return to great power competition as both chairman and ranking member noted, we must never lose sight of the fundamental nature and importance of our nation’s strategic forces. A powerful, ready triad remains the most effective way to deter adversaries from conducting attacks against the United States and our allies. We should be reminded its credibility backstops all US military operations and diplomacy around the globe, and ensures the tensions, regardless of where or how they arise, do not escalate in a large-scale war. As Admiral John Richardson, the former chief in naval operations, said, “It is foundational to our survival as a nation.” Our nation’s nuclear deterrent forces must always be safe, secure, reliable, and effective. Our adversaries began upgrading their own capabilities many years ago, decade. It is now imperative that we modernize all elements of our triad to include Nuclear Command and Control and the weapons infrastructure, as well as have the amount of supplements called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. We must also ensure that our plans are globally integrated with the other combatant commands. But nuclear threats are not the only threats we face. In both the space and the cyber domains, among others, we face a myriad of threats that could have strategic implications. If confirmed, I will work hard with General Raymond at US Space Command, and ensure that he can execute the significant responsibilities he’s been assigned. I’ll also work closely with General Nakasone at Cyber Command, as well as all of the other combatant commanders to ensure we look at strategic threats globally, and execute strategies in accordance with the National Defense Strategy to use all of the nation’s capability to deter our adversaries, and if necessary defend the nation. In addition to strategic deterrence, US Strategic Command has many other significant responsibilities: missile defense, joint electronic warfare, global strike, just to name a few. If confirmed, I pledge my best efforts from StratCom to implement the National Defense Strategy in all areas of responsibility. I’ll live up to the expectations of the men and women of US Strategic Command. I’ve served there twice. It is truly a special place. I like to think of it as Rickover meets LeMay. And as one of the last officers on active duty I interviewed with Admiral Rickover to join the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program. I think he and General LeMay would be quite proud of the legacy that carries on to this day in Omaha. The command’s motto is peace is our profession. And if confirmed, I’ll live up to that motto. I’ll also live up to the standards set by the previous commanders. I’ve served for three of them, and in particular the current commander General John Hyten. He is truly a remarkable leaders and commander, and in large part responsible for my development as an admiral. It is incredibly humbling to even be considered for a position that has such an amazing legacy. And if confirmed, I look forward to working with General Hyten as he takes on his new responsibilities as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, I thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you. And I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much, admiral. I have a couple things I wanna be sure that we get out of the way early. One is a problem, now and then you hear about it. I haven’t heard recently and I don’t know if anyone around here has any real interest in any kind of a any kind of a no-first-use policy. But something, it’s always bothered me, because it seems like no one talks about it, and yet it always does appear. And there are people out there. And I’d just like to ask you some questions about that. I would assume that you would agree that that would limit our ability to deter an extremely dangerous non-nuclear attack. We’re talking about some of the chemical or biological, maybe a cyber attack. Would you agree with that?

Senator, yes, my best military advice would be to not adopt a no-first-use policy.

Yeah, and I appreciate that. But I also want to mention a couple other things about that, because people, I want to get that into the record. And one would be our allies, wouldn’t our allies be concerned as to whether or not we’d have the capability and the desire to do the things that we are doing for our allies, if we had such a policy.

Senator, yes, I think adoption of a no-first-use policy would have a significant negative effect on our commitments to our allies.

And so I think you have pretty strong feelings about that. Anything else well, the other thing that they talk about is the de-alerting. To me the whole idea of de-alerting is the whole idea on responding is to respond quickly and you don’t have the luxury of time, but to deliberately de-alert. I would assume you’d agree with that. That’s something that we should not be concerned about. What we should be concerned about if someone starts bringing this up.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would not recommend that. It would diminish one of the key attributes that the intercontinental-ballistic-missile leg adds. And, also, in a crisis situation, a potential race to re-alert would be destabilizing probably when we need it the least.

Yeah, well, I appreciate that. Now, in my opening statement I mentioned that we recently canceled a program for modernization of ground-based interceptors in Alaska. And I’m sure our senator from Alaska is gonna be bringing this up, but according to the initial plans the proposed replacement program, the next gen interceptor, will likely not be fielded until 2030. What are you gonna be doing between now and 2030 in that field? What capabilities do we have even though we have been a little disappointed in what’s happening in Alaska?

Mr. Chairman, the capabilities that we have fielded today are quite effective against the threats that we face today. General Dickinson, the responsible commander, recently discussed his confidence, and I share that confidence, in the ability to field the system today to defend us. Any delay, of course, is of concern. I have great confidence, though, the Missile Defense Agency and the services will be able to work through the challenges represented in not being able to pace the threat.

Well, I’m sure that’s right. Lastly, I mentioned in my opening statement that this document that I’m very impressed with. And do you support the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review as well as the recommendations in this document, including the the low-yield, submarine-launch ballistic missile?

Mr. Chairman, I do, I think they’re both well-written documents.

[Chairman] Very good, Senator Reed.

Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, again, thank you for your service and your dedication. Our nuclear posture is in the context also of decades and decades of arms control agreements, the most significant one is the new START agreement, which if nothing is done will expire in January of 2021. There is the option to renew it for five years with agreement between ourselves and the Russians. It caps the number of strategic missiles at 800, so we’re not in a race to produce more and more missiles, and warheads at 1,550. Do you think there is a significant value in maintaining this agreement in place?

Senator, I support any arms control agreement that enhances the security of this nation. And there are many historical examples that go to that. You’re quite correct, the new START Treaty has provided us with valuable insight into Russian, in this case, capabilities. It gives us a feel for their size, capacity capability. But it also doesn’t address large categories of weapons that are not treaty-constrained. It is only with Russia, and they are developing new systems. And I would provide my best military advice, if confirmed, into the pros and cons of any future agreement, including this one.

There is a possibility. We’re hearing very disturbing comments coming out of Turkey that President Erdogan wants nuclear capabilities. He’s not, I think, unfortunately, alone in that. If the new START agreement is dispensed with, we will find ourselves in the first time in a since the 1970s, I believe, where we don’t have an ahm-tish-rol regime in place at all, which could give rise to people like Erdogan, thinking they have a free ride. Is that a concern you have?

Senator, any effort at proliferation of nuclear weapons is of concern, and so I would support any efforts to maximize this nation’s longstanding goal in minimizing proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thank you very much, admiral. One of the key initiatives in Secretary Mattis’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 was reorganizing Nuclear Command and Control and Communications. And Strategic Command is now in the process of standing up a new NC3 Center. Could you give us a notion of what the key issues you see in this process?

Senator, one, I applaud this committee’s leadership and the department’s actions to stand up the NC3 Center that you just described. And I think General Hyten and by bringing this under a single responsible commander, providing visibility across a large and complex enterprise with the focus on the acquisition and sustainment pieces of this by the secretary of defense for acquisition sustainment. I think we are on a good trajectory to understand the system we have today, which is very reliable and ready to go. Understand what the threats that this system will face in the future. And then recapitalizing and in fact, redesign, reconceive the NC3 System. And so I am very pleased with the direction that we’re headed in that. I think the number one issue between or the two issues would be sufficient intellectual capital to think our way through that, to achieve the same results that our predecessors did in the system we have today. And then adequate resourcing, stable, timely, adequate, predictable is the number one thing under our control, and ensure that we’re able to do that.

I think the point about intellectual resources, we discussed this in the office that in the good old days it was more of a government-led, government think tank, government approach. And now a lot of particularly cyber and sophisticated computer technology and intellectual property is outside. And that’s something you’re gonna have to bring under the tent, if you will. I think you concur.

[Richard] Congress senator, I agree.

Just a quick question here. I did more of a list of questions ’cause my time is expiring. I did indicate concerns about the potential for delay in our triad modernization. This I the first time we really tried to do everything at once. We’ve already seen the submarine field, they’re the lead-off hitter, if you will. Problems with nuclear tubes and welding and say, this goes to the whole issue of the industrial base. And, again, I know you’ll do this, but you have to be very, very diligent and vigilant watching the nuclear base, both the submarines, the air and ICBMs. And, hopefully, you’ll keep us informed of any significant trends, particularly unfortunate trends you see developing.

Senator, I absolutely agree.

[Senator] Thank you very much, admiral.

[Chairman] Senator Fischer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Admiral, nice to see you. You touched on this with Senator Inhofe, but I’d like maybe a clearer answer. Do you support the deployment of the supplemental systems called for in the Nuclear Posture Review, and do you believe these enhancements are truly necessary if we are going to maintain deterrence?

Senator, I absolutely do. I think the Nuclear Posture Review got it right. These modest supplements add to the flexibility and capability in the triad, and that’s what’s necessary to deter the threats we face today.

Thank you. Your predecessors have strongly recommended against any unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces. You talked about that somewhat with Senator Reed. What impact do you believe any kind of unilateral reduction would have on our ability to deter threats?

Senator, I think it would have a negative effect. It would be harmful for ability to deter. And I’m reminded this nation has led the world in unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons throughout our history, and no one else has matched us with that. Everyone else has gone in the other direction.

As you’re aware in the past year a number of critics have argued that the ICBM Force is not necessary for deterrence. And many have sought to reduce the funding for its replacement, which is this GBSD Program. What are your views on the deterrent value of the ICBM Force and how important is it in the recapitalization effort to proceed without delay?

Senator, the intercontinental-ballistic-missile leg, GBSD, is an essential component of the triad. It adds special, unique capabilities that we have from no other leg. It is essential in achieving our nation’s deterrence objectives.

Following on that point, you and I discussed a couple days ago the larger problem of our nuclear modernization schedule. And that there really is no margin for delay in that schedule. Can you talk a little bit more about that, and how we simply cannot extend the life of our current systems. You and I focused on an area that you are truly an expert on and that would be our submarines. Can you really talk to us a little bit about what we’re facing with the Ohio Class?

Yes, senator. We have delayed and life-extended the current triad systems to the maximum extent possible. What I mean by that is we are bumping into physics and engineering limits. As the senator alluded to, I am a submariner. So, one, the Ohio Class was designed for 30 years, it went for 42. A great credit to the people that put it together. But there are only so many times that you can take a high-strength piece of steel tubing, subject it to the great pressures of submergence, cycle it by taking that off, to the point you just don’t want to get in the tube anymore. We don’t have confidence in the strength corrosion and others. That’s the type of thing we’re bumping into with all the triad systems. It is just not feasible to life-extend them anymore.

And staying on our schedule when would we see the first Columbia Class?

It would be in 2031, ma’am.

That’s a long ways away still. Yes, ma’am.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your confirmation. You have my support.

Thanks.

Thanks, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I represent the state that is home to the Columbia-Class Program as you know. And we would be very happy to host you there as we did Secretary Esper just very recently in August. I don’t know when the last time is that you visited Electric Boat and the shipyard there.

Senator, that was the last time up with Secretary Esper.

Right, well, we welcome you back. As you know, then and now, one of the major hurdles to that shipbuilding program is in fact the industrial workforce, development of the skills and training that are necessary for the thousands of new employees, Electric Bode, and the supply chain that is essential to build those submarines by the date that we need to do it. And I’d like your commitment that you will continue to support those training, and apprenticeship, and other programs that are necessary for that program.

Senator, absolutely, and, again, I applaud the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island for their efforts to also contribute to the development of that workforce.

We have no margin of error in the Columbia-Class Program. As you know, China is rapidly developing its submarine capability. Russia has long been pacing our nuclear threat in the undersea environment. Last week, from October 15th to the 17th, Russia conducted a military exercise called Thunder 2019. They actually launched one ballistic missile submarine-launched ballistic missile. Another apparently failed. Could you give us your assessment of both that threat and the North Korean threat, that country also recently launched a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Senator, thank you for reminding us of that. Both of those graphic, real-world demonstrations of the capabilities that both those nations possess. And I can’t think of a better way to demonstrate what the threat is to this nation from those countries, and what we have to do to defend and deter against it.

Are you confident that we can track the Russian and North Korean and Chinese submarines? The North Korean submarine according to my understanding was a diesel-electric powered submarine that was pretty noisy. But I don’t know about the Russian and Chinese.

Senator, as you know I am a submarine force commander now. I have great confidence in our ability to address any threat, including the ones that you mentioned. And we’re not static. So, it is a competition and the US Navy has made great strides in recent years, and is poised to make some really great strides in the near future to address that threat.

Do you believe as I do that these recent tests also emphasize the importance highlight the critical significance of continuing the Virginia-Class Fast-Attack Program?

Senator, this nation’s military advantage in the undersea is one of the last remaining places that it is unquestioned that we have the advantage. And continuing the Virginia program is an essential piece of making sure that we maintain that advantage into the future.

And are you familiar with the issues that have arisen with respect to the coating on the stealth or the adhesive that is used to attach the stealth coating to submarines? I don’t know whether you can address it in this setting. But are you familiar with that, those issues?

Senator, I am, and I am confident that the Navy’s engineering ability will work through that issue.

It’s been a longstanding issue. Has it not been?

Senator, that’s correct.

And are you confident that we will develop new technology or new manufacturing expertise to address it?

Senator, it’s actually both, but it is more in the adhesion process where we expect to make the best gains.

I’d like to ask you to my time has expired, but if I could ask you to or your staff to brief me in my office on these issues. I would appreciate it.

Senator, I appreciate that opportunity.

Thank you, thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator (chattering away from mic).

Thank you, Admiral Richard and your family, for your service and their support. When you look at the threats of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, what’s your biggest concern about what the United States needs to do that we might not be doing, or that you’re concerned that we might not do in the future?

Senator, I could give you pretty long list of technologies and capabilities that have my attention in terms of threats to the United States. But I would start the list that both of those nations don’t view the world the same way that we do. They don’t necessarily agree with us on rule of law, market-based economic competition, free and open order. And I look forward to diplomatic efforts to attempt to resolve that, but in the meantime we’re gonna need to defend ourselves. And then that will get to a number of capabilities, hypersonics, quantum, AI, on top of the capabilities that we have today, that we’re gonna have to think through and be ready to defend.

Do you think we’re allocating enough resources to be able to do that, when you look at the budgets that we’re passing?

Senator, specifically in my areas of responsibility, yes, for the larger defense budget, also yes. But I would add that in addition to being adequate, stable, timely, predictable enables us. That’s a fundamental assumption, the National Defense Strategy and the recapitalization of the triad. Things like a continuing resolution don’t help with that.

So, what we’re going through now with the continuing resolution, how much will that impact your ability to do your job?

Senator, it results in multiple tens of billions of the department’s loss of buying capability. It inhibits our ability to pivot the funding into areas that we need to move faster on, specifically in research and development. It will loss in excess of 10 billion in terms of readiness accounts to lock in the readiness gains we’ve achieved over the years. So, across the board, it keeps us from moving fast to be able to pace a rapidly changing threat.

When you look at the amount of money that China is committing, and just the overall resources they’re committing to their nuclear ability, do you believe the path we’re going down will be enough to deter them?

Senator, if we recapitalize the triad on schedule, we will be able to maintain sufficient capability to address China’s actions. But you’re quite correct. She is modernizing and increasing every aspect of their strategic forces.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator (chattering away from mic).

Thank you, Chairman. Admiral Richard, congratulations on your nomination. I know you’ve been out to both Sandia and Los Alamos in the past. If you’re confirmed, I’d certainly like to welcome you back to those facilities. With that in mind, as you know DOD has had an initial requirement to produce 30 plutonium pits per year at Los Alamos Labs by 2026. How important this that milestone?

Senator, that is critical to our ability to maintain the strategic plan and the recapitalization on our weapons complex.

The secondary goal is for 80 pits per year by 2030. How confident are you that NNSA will meet that requirement?

Senator, one, I applaud the committee’s leadership in establishing the Nuclear Weapons Council, which gives the commander of US Strategic Command a direct opportunity to go address that. That requirement is sound and, yes, I recognize that there are issues in terms of DOE’s ability to meet that. And I would pledge to look very close at that, if I was confirmed.

StratCom took over the modernization of our nation’s Nuclear Command, Control and Communication Systems from the Air Force Global Strike Command just over a year ago now. And I’m encouraged to see that the SAC System, which is a system used to send emergency action messages from nuclear command forces in the field recently retired these. Some of my colleagues may recognize these. Some may be too young to recognize these. (council members laughing) So, one of the things that concerns me is just the timeline for the rest of that architecture, much of which was developed in the ’60s and ’70s, and currently still expected to remain in service for a few years. Talk to me about the timeline for that transition.

Well, senator, one, I applaud your depth of interest inside this subject.

I think this was retired in June.

Senator, the first step, which General Hyten has that good plan, is making sure that we re-conceive the cost, the concept of operations that we’re operating on. And then to make sure that we put together a system, not because it’s the way we used to do it, but the way we ought to do it in the future, particularly pacing the threat. There are several nearer term decisions that we have to go make with some urgency to recapitalize pieces of the Nuclear Command and Control System. So, the bottom line on the timeline is we must move with urgency to go redo this system.

My understanding is that NC3 modernization is largely being handled by the individual military services in part because StratCom doesn’t have acquisition authority. Is that the best arrangement? Is that working well in your view? Are there changes we need to make in terms of the authorities for StratCom?

Senator, what I’m encouraged by the department’s decision to standup the NC3 Center is the stack of authorities that is held by Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. And all the services report back to the secretary. That’s the mechanism, I think, that will be effective in addressing the issues that you mentioned.

So, you don’t have concerns about that arrangement?

Not today, I would pledge to look at it in the future to make sure it maintains the effectiveness we expect.

Talk to me a little bit about the situation with regard to the ground-based, strategic, deterrent program and the development that we may only have one final bid. Do you have concerns about that? What issues do you foresee if that does become the situation as we move forward?

Senator, I have great confidence in the Air Force’s ability to execute this acquisition program in a timely fashion. I am responsible, if confirmed, for the requirement, and would be willing to engage with the Air Force to make sure that we are trading requirements against our technical ability to achieve them, to best benefit for the nation.

Getting back to pit production for just a moment. You mentioned that the Nuclear Weapons Council, of which you would be a member, if confirmed. The chair of the council is required to certify each year that NNSA is on track to meet the military’s requirements. Undersecretary Lord’s last certification was in April of this year. If you’re confirmed, will you commit to a review of NNSA’s status and plans, and then provide that feedback back to both the council and this committee? Senator, I will.

Thank you. Thank you, chairman.

Admiral Richard, thank you for your service. Thank you for your family’s long record of service as well, and for your willing to answer the call of service, again. I want to speak about the Open Skies Treaty, a treaty that allows overflight surveillance of United States and Russia, in addition to many other partners but those are the two main partners. In 2017, the United States government determined that Russia had violated the Open Skies Treaty, specifically by limiting overflight of Kaliningrad, Russia’s vital, strategic enclave in Northern Europe between Poland and Lithuania, as well as limiting flights in the vicinity of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia. That was reiterated last year, and by some of your predecessors and colleagues. Here’s what Admiral Haney said in 2015. The treaty has become a critical component of Russia’s intelligence collection capability directed at the United States. Here’s what General Stewart, the director of the DIA, said in 2016. The things that you can see, the amount of data you can collect, the things you can do with post-processing allows Russia, in my opinion, to get incredible, foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure bases, ports, all of our facilities. So, from my perspective, it gives them a significant advantage. And two years ago, General Joe Dunford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, “We believe that on balance “it would be best if the treaty continued to be in place. “But we don’t believe the treaty should be in place “if the Russians aren’t compliant.” So, there’s a decidedly aggressive, diplomatic effort right now to bring the Russians back into compliance, which we think would be the best outcome. That was more than two years ago. That diplomatic effort has continued a pace to no avail. Russia remains in violation of this treaty, while the United States continues to adhere to it. I would submit that, perhaps, rather calling this the Open Skies Treaty, maybe, it should be the called the Open Skies Over America and the Closed Skies Over Russia Treaty. Admiral, do you see value in remaining in a treaty where only one side is following the rules?

Senator, one, I will support any arms control or treaty that enhances the security of this nation. Your analysis is quite correct. On the Open Skies Treaty we do derive some benefit from it, particularly with our allies. We would need to make the appropriate resource and operational commitments to utilize the full provisions of the treaty if we were to remain. And I would just offer my best military advice, if confirmed, if a decision were to be reached.

Do we have the best satellite constellation in the world?

Senator, we do.

Superior to Russia’s?

Senator, not directly in my area of expertise, but, yes, I think so.

So, it would stand to reason, then, that Russia gains more from this treaty, which they are violating by gaining the overhead imagery from these flights since they have an inferior satellite constellation system.

Senator, again, you’re getting into an area that I pledge to look closely at, if confirmed. I don’t have direct expertise in that. But you are hitting at the factors that have to be considered in whether or not we stay in the treaty.

And would it be to a signatory country’s advantage if they also had on-the-ground intelligence officers coordinating with their overflights of another’s party territory to collect intelligence on military bases or other critical infrastructure?

Senator, it is important in any greedy or treatment or treaty or agreement for all parties to comply.

Okay. The Air Force has sent up a long, unfunded priority list to reach the growing force of 386 squadrons, more spare parts for F-35s, more additional tanker capacity, supply inventories. We also propose to spend $250 million on open-skies aircraft and operations. Perhaps, if Russia is not complying with the Open Skies Treaty, that money might be better spent on some of these urgent priorities for the Air Force?

Senator, again, you are getting at the actual elements of a decision.

All right, thank you, admiral. I appreciate that. I just have to say I think this is a lot like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Everyone agrees that Russia is not complying with it. Everyone agrees it would be best if we brought Russia back into compliance. Everyone agrees it would be great if everyone had a pony as well. But we’ve spent years trying to get Russia into compliance with this treaty, and in the meantime Russia has continued to gain significant intelligence advantage over the United States, a situation in which because we have our superior satellite constellation would be advantaged if Russia was not taking these advantages of the Open Skies Treaty. Congratulations, again, on your nomination.

Senator (chattering away from mic).

Admiral, it’s 2:00 a.m. on a Monday morning in July. You receive credible evidence that there are incoming missiles from Russia. The GPS is out, satellite system is out, the phone system is down. Can you communicate to the president, and can the president communicate to our triad?

[Richard] Senator, yes.

And you’re confident of that. I think command and control is an essential part of the deterrent.

Senator, one, I couldn’t agree with you more that command and control is an essential element to the deterrent. That scenario that mission set is practiced every day at US Strategic Command to allow people like me to be able to say that.

Without satellites, without the telephone network?

Senator, we have thought through all of that, it works. Obviously, satellites are a critical component to our NC3 capability, but we have capabilities beyond that.

That’s reassuring but I want your commitment to keep on this issue. And, interestingly, it seems to me it has to be more or less public. I mean, we don’t want to advertise to our adversaries our techniques. But we do need for our adversaries to know that we have a credible deterrent, because we can continue to communicate, otherwise the deterrent effect goes away.

Senator, you are absolutely correct. You absolutely have that commitment. And I have that responsibility in writing from the secretary of defense.

Thank you. Let’s talk, again, about deterrence. Deterrence has worked as a strategy for 70 years. But it’s based upon a principle of a kind of mutual rationality in effect that neither side wants to incinerate their country and their countrymen. What worries me is the theory of deterrence doesn’t work if non-state actors get a hold of nuclear weapons, because the normal what happens if, a, it’s not a country, and, b, the people don’t care about dying. I think we need deterrence 2.0 to be thinking about that eventuality, because I see that as a not as a probability but at least a possibility and a very frightening one.

Senator, I agree with you. Deterrence is based in the eye of the opponent. Can I deny your aim? Can I impose a cost on you that is unacceptable to you? And do you believe me based on your value and how you judge things? A terror scenario is a very challenging one. The value systems are very different. Denying them the ability to have the weapon. Deterring them, again, their value system. The efforts this nation has been after for many decades will be essential to ensure that you what described doesn’t happen.

It seems to me that part of the key to that in that scenario is intelligence. We have to know that such a threat is imminent or possible and how to deal with it in a different way than the traditional deterrence, because obviously to somebody who is willing to give up their life instantaneously, that’s not an effective control. Let me change the subject entirely from these very serious matters we’re talking about, and go back to the beginning of your testimony. This is a more general question. You talked about having redeployed, I think, 10 times in 20 years, every two years. Does that make sense in terms of both national policy and wear and tear on your family and their furniture? It worries me that a person of your expertise and knowledge gets set in a job, gains some expertise and knowledge, whether it’s commander of a submarine or of all the submarines or our commander in Afghanistan. I worry that the churn undermines the continuity of information and knowledge and experience that would be beneficial if the tours were longer. Give me some thought. I want your personal reflections as an experienced officer.

Senator, one, I may not be the best example of the military writ large. Also, if you go earlier in my career, I tended to stay longer in—

Could you not get along with the people where you went to all these places?

I was appreciative of the opportunity to broaden my experience base that the department gave me. And so there is a difference between particularly after making flag rank and what happens before. The military very much values exactly what you’re talking about. It’s a policy, for example, the submarine force. We don’t turn over commanding officers of submarines, except about every three years to make sure we have the continuity that you’re talking about.

Is three years the right number? How about five years?

I think three years. We’ve actually moved that around. No, three years is very demanding. You have to go all in for three years. So, three years is about the right amount of time. Endurance, stamina, commitment, refresh with new leadership. Three years is about the right time.

Well, I appreciate those comments. But I remain concerned about this general policy, and whether two and three years is the right amount of time. There’s also an enormous cost to the taxpayers in terms of retraining and moving people. But I appreciate your comments. And thank you for your commitment. I understand the knowledge and experience you bring to this, and I think it will be a great benefit to the country. Thank you.

Thank you, senator.

[Chairman] Senator (chattering away from mic).

Admiral Richard, thank you for being here today. Congratulations, again, on your nomination. I enjoyed visiting with you the other day. When you and I met in my office, you offered what I thought was a very compelling argument for how to think about the cost of nuclear modernization relative to the size of the defense budget as a whole. And I wondered if you might just share that today for the record, for the committee, ’cause I think it’s of great perspective.

Senator, thank you. We were discussing the large numbers that are sometimes used to describe the cost of the recapitalization. And, for example, there’s a recent CBO number. That is a 10-year, overall cost, and by itself looks very large. But that’s only 3.5% of the defense budget on top of the 3.5% that we spend to maintain the system that we have. That defense budget is itself a fraction of the discretionary budget of this nation, which is also a subset of the overall things that this nation chooses to spend its resources on. So, if you do that math, the recapitalization is a fraction of a percent of all the things that this nation chooses to apply its resources to. And that’s what buys our deterrence and defense against the only existential threat this nation faces. I think that is a good investment. And in the words of the former Secretary of Defense Mattis, this nation can afford survival.

Thank you for that, I think that’s very compelling. Let me ask you about the Nuclear Posture Review which stresses the need to integrate a conventional and nuclear forces. Could you define for us conventional-nuclear integration, and maybe give us a sense of why it’s so important, and why it actually strengthens conventional deterrence?

Senator, both of those are capabilities that this nation has in our ability to think through use of both conventional, non-kinetic space, cyber, in an integrated way, worldwide, in a synchronized and integrative fashion, across combatant commands, is the best way to address the threats that we face in the 21st century, which are global in nature.

Let me ask you this. The director of the DIA said earlier this year, that like Russia, China is working to field nuclear, theater-range, precision-strike systems. Is it possible in your judgment that Beijing would use limited nuclear strikes, or at least threaten them to compel the United States to surrender if we found ourselves losing a conventional war, or if they found themselves, rather, losing, China did, losing a conventional war with us over a Taiwan-fatal, complete scenario,

Senator, unlike Russia, China is very opaque in terms of what her doctrine and strategies are, and she does that, I believe, intentionally. I think she believes that she derives benefit from that. They are certainly possess capabilities that would allow them to adopt that type of strategy if they so chose.

Let me ask you this, for some time the disarmament community has argued that the US could maintain nuclear deterrence while dropping to a nuclear dyad, say, or even just sea-based nuclear platforms. In your view can you tell us how do the different legs of the nuclear triad reinforce one another, and why are they each so important?

Senator, the Nuclear Posture Review, I think, wisely has us on a strategy that tailors our deterrent response to each individual adversary. This is not the Cold War. We face multiple threats from multiple actors, and the complementary nature of the attributes of the triad enable us to be able to tailor our deterrent strategies. We could go into a lot of detail, but the ballistic-missile leg, the submarine leg is the survivable leg. The intercontinental ballistic missile has a promptness that is not achieved by any other system. The bombers provide signaling and man-in-the-loop opportunity that the other systems don’t have. That’s just a very high-level wave at the tremendous wisdom of the initial designers of the triad.

Let me ask you about the ICBM leg since you mentioned it. How would you respond to the argument that we could cut the ICBM leg of the triad and offset that capacity by uploading additional weapons to our SSBN Force, for instance?

The ICBMs provide unique attributes that cannot be provided by the other legs of the triad.

Thank you very much, admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator King.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, Admiral Richard. I enjoyed our visit yesterday, and have two topics I want to ask you about. The value of the nuclear triad and deterrence is very clear. A concern about the nuclear posture of this in other nations is the risk of miscalculations. And so you’re balancing off the deterrent value in trying to minimize risk of miscalculations. And I am, along with many, increasingly worried about risks of miscalculations in the world for a variety of reasons. In January of 2018 in the same week there were two kind of shocking instances of emergency alerts being sent out, one in Hawaii and one in Japan about North Korean incoming missiles. The Hawaii instance was sent out by a state emergency response department. It was countermanded about 40 minutes later after a call to INDOPACOM, and the Hawaii officials realized there was no incoming missile. The Japanese missile alarm was sounded by a broadcaster and then was retracted. Offer the committee and the country some reassurance that we have mechanisms in place to reduce the risks of miscalculation.

One, senator, I agree with you. And, oh, that drives back to the need for as much transparency as we can provide between us and other nations to minimize that possibility of miscalculation. Transparency adds to strategic stability. The nation has a great capability to understand the threats that it faces. The Department of Defense does inform other elements of the federal government who have responsibility for the warning functions that you described. And we take those responsibilities very seriously.

In the aftermath of the Hawaii incident which was one that we needed to grapple with here, the FCC did an investigation and imposed some additional requirements with respect to the early alert systems that are often managed by state departments or emergency management. I think NORAD was involved in after action analysis as well. But this is something that I think we’re gonna have to continue to really focus on, and give our public the confidence that there will not be an accidental use of these or other weapons. You and I talked yesterday in the office, and I was impressed with your thought about how the Space Command could pertain to our strategic deterrent strategy. You had mentioned the importance of the work this committee and the administration has done to elevate Space Command as a combatant command. Talk a little bit about why you think that new structure is gonna be important to our strategic deterrence and how you would foresee StratCom and the Space Command interacting going forward.

Senator, thank you, and you’re referring to some advanced policy questions that I received prior to this hearing. So, I have been asked in those, am I concerned about the effect on StratCom’s mission of the elevation of Space Command? In fact it is quite the opposite. I am encouraged by both this committee’s leadership and the department’s direction to establish a separate Space Command. That is one of the most direct and immediate steps that we can do to ensure Nuclear Command and Control capability, adequate warning. And I’m particular encouraged about General Raymond’s assignment as the sensor commander. And so this is the beginnings of us starting to think across individual mission areas, and think more broadly. In this case, missile warning, missile defense, and space situation awareness, to optimize this nation’s ability to achieve all of those missions. And also do so with an effective use of our resources.

This is gonna be a hard question to answer, specifically. But I just want to sort of get your general sense of it. Obviously, the triad that we have is more effective, because we have been able to forward-deploy some of our assets around the world, and that increases the effectiveness of the triad. There’s been recent concern in the press about the US-Turkey relationship, for example. As, should you be confirmed as StratCom commander, how will you approach the question of where we should forward-deploy assets to continue to maximize the deterrent value of our triad?

Senator, as you know I can neither confirm nor deny the presence of any US nuclear weapon anywhere in the world. But all US nuclear weapons, no matter where they are, are under responsible US commanders, and I have great confidence that they maintain the safety and security of those weapons, or take steps, if necessary, to achieve that objective. I would like to remind the committee. I would love to find the person that came up with our extended deterrence and assurance policies, including the forward-deployed weapons. I can think of no other single thing that has been more effective at achieving this nation’s non-proliferation goals than our extended deterrence and assurance policies, and it’s an example of why the United States is the security partner of choice. And there are advantages to allying with us.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, sir, thank you, admiral. It gives me great confidence in our future when American institutions like the Department of Defense and our Navy can produce leaders like you and families like yours. And I want to thank you for stepping up again. You have my full support for this nomination. I hope you get it soon, get out there and do what you know how to do. I want to talk about two things very quickly. One, when you and I visited NORTHCOM I went out to visit the USS Truman, you made probably the greatest quote of any individual since I’ve been in the United States Senate. Now, I’m gonna give you full opportunity to deny this quote today. But I remember this very well. You said, “Give me a boomer, an air command post, “a president, and I guarantee you “we will never say, I surrender.” Today Secretary Spencer has assured us that the Columbia-Class is a top priority procurement item in the US Navy. We have a president. And I want to talk about the air command post. First of all, I’ve been aboard the NAOC, the E-4B. They were gracious enough to take me up and demonstrate its capabilities and so forth. I understand that there’s a neat program that we’re looking to update several different aircraft, including the C-32A and E-6B. The Navy has an airborne op center. If you’re confirmed, tell us how important this is and what are your thoughts regarding the updating, particularly the E-4B, since it’s very long in the tube.

Senator, one, I thank you for your interest in this vital segment of Nuclear Command and Control, the airborne piece. I have over 160 hours of mission crew time in the airborne command post, the Navy element of that. And it’s absolutely critical. And this is our ability to provide command and control no matter what threat faces the nation. So, you’re quite correct there’s analysis of alternatives going on to determine how to recapitalize that. The capacity may have to be adjusted based on the threat. It is worth remembering we used to operate the Looking Glass Aircraft, which was a much larger aircraft up airborne 24/7 based on the threat environment that we have. But, senator, I’d also commit to you the goal is survivability. Airborne command post provide that survivability today. It is important for us to look to see is that still the best way to provide that survivability in the future. And the NC3 Center is on a trajectory to go answer that question.

Thank you, sir, I’d love to have deeper conversation in a classified environment about that to be comforted about that, thank you. I want to talk about the missile development that China has been under over the last 30 years, really, and the fact that many people in the Navy say that we are clearly outsticked, that’s their term today. In early August, the United States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We talked enough about that today. I’m not gonna go there. But I want to talk about China has been doing in those 32 years to where now they develop the foremost conventional missile force in the world, with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers as I understand it. Admiral Harris in 2017 testified when he was then commander of PACOM. And I quote, “Beijing controls the largest, “most diverse missile force in the world “with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic “and cruise missiles.” And 95% of those, according to Admiral Harris, violated the INF Treaty, which implies that we obviously don’t have that capability since we complied with the INF. Now, unshackled from the INF what are your thoughts, and what can and should the US do to level this playing field?

Senator, one, you are quite correct on the analysis of the situation in the Pacific. And now that we are not under the INF Treaty, I think it is important to us to accelerate our research and development into competing systems. And, also, as your submarine force commander, I would offer that the submarines have an ability to counter that. And that’s also an important capability to make sure that Admiral Davidson in INDOPACOM have those capabilities to address that threat.

One last question, I’m almost out of time. The Navy was gracious enough to expose me to their FONOP capability in the South China Sea. And I participated in one with a great crew out there. What are your thoughts on the importance of the FONOP efforts out there, and the frequency in which we’re doing those? And are those a continuing necessary part of the deterrent strategy vis-a-vis our friends in China?

Senator, they are. As you well know the Freedom and Navigation Operations have been going on for many, many decades. And it is a part of the way the United States asserts freedom of the seas in compliance with international norms, even more important today, given the actions that China is taking in the South China Sea.

Well, thank you, sir, for being willing to do this. Thank you for your career and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the chairman, let me recognize Senator Shaheen.

Thank you, Admiral Richard, thank you very much to you and your family for your service, and for all those moves. And congratulations on your nomination to be commander at StratCom, and for taking time to sit down with me yesterday to talk about some of the challenges. One of the things we discussed is the lawful versus unlawful orders in terms of a decision to make, use nuclear weapons. In November of 2017 at the Halifax International Security Forum, then StratCom Commander General Hyten said during a panel discussion that he would push back if the president asked him to carry out an illegal order. He further went on to say that we think a lot about these things, and when you have this responsibility how do you not think about it. Now, if confirmed as commander of StratCom, you would be responsible for providing strike options, if a nuclear launch was ordered. Have you talked about what you would do in that situation, and if you believe an order to be unlawful how you would respond to that? And can you walk me through the process and what is determined to be a lawful versus an unlawful order?

Well, senator, one, General Hyten gave a textbook definition of what a lawful order is in that interview that you refer to back in Halifax. What I will say is, one, not addressing hypothetical situations, but I want to make it very clear I will execute all lawful orders that I receive, and I will not execute any that are not.

And, again, can you describe for us the difference? I understand that General Hyten referenced that, but can you describe the difference between lawful and unlawful?

Ma’am it has a very strict definition. We’re all trained in it. We have staff advocates that advise us on that. But the bottom line here is for me to say anything other than I will follow a lawful order that I’m given starts to call into question civilian control of the military. This is an ideal that is a long cherished American ideal. I strongly support that. And that would be the basis of my decision.

Well, I’m sure everybody on this committee agrees with that, that it’s a very important aspect of our democracy. I think what I’m still trying to understand is what’s the difference between lawful and unlawful order, and that I think is not clear to the public.

Yes, ma’am.

So, maybe, you could direct me on where to get further insight into that. Or, maybe, we can have that discussion in a classified setting.

Senator, I’d be happy to do that.

Which answer?

I will, happy to come back in a classified whichever one suits you best, ma’am. I can come back in a classified setting. I can certainly give you the definition of a lawful order. Happy to do both.

Okay, I’ll appreciate that. We will followup with a question for the record on that so that you can give us what the definition of a lawful order. I want to followup a little bit on what we do next now that we are no longer part of INF Treaty. And I know that or at least I understand that we’re looking into options to deploy our own ground-based system. Can you comment on the political realities in Europe, and whether our allies in Europe would work with us on deploying such a system?

Senator, my current responsibilities don’t afford me any particular insight on the current political dynamics in Europe. I would pledge, if confirmed, to provide my best military advice and understand that situation very carefully. We have historical precedent there where we were able to deploy those systems, but there was a large amount of political effort that had to be thought through to enable that in a way that was acceptable to those nations.

And as we look at future disarmament and the effort to try and bring China under an umbrella that would include their limiting or getting rid of nuclear weapons. Do you think there’s a role for NATO to play in that? Or how do you is there an international initiative that might help get that done, as we’re thinking about how we might make overtures to China to participate with us in any future negotiations?

Ma’am, there very well could be, and, again, I would welcome any effort by any mechanism that would provide greater transparency into China’s capabilities and intentions.

And do you think NATO has any potential role in that?

NATO potentially could, yes, ma’am.

Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much. And thank you for the visit yesterday. I appreciate it. The conversation and talking with you a little bit about spectrum and spectrum utilization. And I think it’s fair to say that the EMS has been treated as a permissive environment, and I’d like for you for the record to talk a little bit about how we regrow the expertise that is necessary to operate in a contested EW environment, and then how we conduct our modeling and testing without revealing our expertise to our adversaries. And you and I spoke a bit about this yesterday. And as we look at moving forward with your confirmation, which we hope will be swift, I’d like for you to just expand on that for a few minutes.

Senator, one, I think you for the question today as well as the conversation yesterday. This is an area that deserves more attention and conversation. You are quite correct that our military’s ability to operate in electromagnetic spectrum is being contested in a way that we have not seen in a long time. It is no longer a permissive environment. I could draw parallels to what is happening in the cyber domain and the space domain. So, we have work to do. StratCom has very specific Unified Command Plan responsibilities in terms of ag-veh-ski for joint electronic warfare. And a lot of that starts with building the expertise. Services are doing this. I did give you this example yesterday. But I have just reorganized the submarine force to bring electronic warfare into a principal warfare area on its own, and regrow a series of specialists that will put that on par with cyber and communications in terms of a certain number of sailors dedicating their careers to expertise in that area. Beyond that, we have to get more agile in spectrum. We have to be able to dynamically maneuver. You are quite correct that our ability to do modeling and simulation will enable us to train better without revealing what our capabilities are potentially to our adversaries.

Do you have the simulation capabilities that are necessary?

We have some but we don’t have sufficient ones. We have work to do.

And quantify that a little bit, if you can, the amount of work that is necessary to bring us to par.

It is, one, an intellectual challenge. There is a resource challenge to it. Models are not accurate enough yet for us to be high fidelity. There’s a joint nature to this that we need to bring it together. The services are doing individual things. We are just in the beginnings of putting the joint interoperability pieces on this to the level that we need to do.

Do we have a concept of operations plan or not?

Senator, we have multiple, individual service concepts of operation.

But nothing cohesive.

We have not pulled those together in a more current, total joint look across all services.

Okay, would that aid us in being more intentional with our spectrum use. As you and I talked yesterday I think that inventory and analysis on our spectrum utilization, and especially looking at the mid-bands, is something that we probably should do. So, talk a little bit about that.

No, senator, you are, again, quite correct in that, one, spectrum is essential for military operations, our ability to access, and it’s not only in the mid-bands, but this gets up into ultraviolet and infrared. So, it’s a scarce resource. Static allocation, while effective in a permissive environment will not work in a dynamic environment. There are competing commercial demands that need to be addressed in peace time. And so there’s work across the board in our understanding to dynamically use and operate inside spectrum.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Richard, thank you for your service and your commitment to our country, as well as your family’s commitment to our country. We appreciate all of you. Admiral, Russia has been developing an unmanned, nuclear, autonomous, underwater vehicle known as Poseidon, which some have described as a doomsday weapon. Last April, Newsweek published a story detailing the Poseidon’s capability and quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin as saying, and this is a quote from Mr. Putin, “They are quiet, highly maneuverable, “and have hardly any vulnerabilities “for the enemy to exploit. “There is simply nothing the world “capable of withstanding them.” End of quote. Putin himself during the March 2018 State of the Union Address confirmed Russia’s development of, again, I quote, “Unmanned, submersible vehicle “that can move at great depths, “I would say extreme depths, “intercontinentally at a speed multiple times higher “than the speed of submarines, “cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels “including some of the fastest.” So, my question to you, admiral, is how would a strategic competitor with an unmanned, autonomous, underwater vehicle that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons change or alter any of your thinking in regards to deterrence?

Well, senator, one, so I would point to that as a vivid example of the threat that this nation faces in a way that we haven’t seen in many decades. You’re correct, that would not be constrained by new START, by the way. In the end, senator, it comes back to the basic deterrence equation. Can I deny you your aim, or impose a cost on you that is intolerable to you, such that you don’t take the action? So, this nation certainly possesses the capability to impose a cost greater than what they seek to gain by the use of that weapon.

Admiral, in your advanced policy question response. When asked if the Department of Defense leadership has leaders with the training, academic degrees, and expertise in the scientific and technical skills disciplined to lead StratCom, a future joint force, you stated, and I’m gonna quote from quote your statement here. You’re concerned about our ability to continue to attract and retain the highest-quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense Strategy. To that end we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent and further establish the department as an employer of choice, was your quote. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Outlook shows that a nuclear engineer career field has 50% less growth over the next seven years compared to all other engineering fields, and 3% less than other occupations. And, certainly, as the United States shifts its energy sources away from nuclear power and turns to renewable energy to protect our nation from threats associated with climate change, we need to maintain a pipeline of future talent to support the defense industry, particularly nuclear engineers. So, my question is how should we work with universities to ensure that we are cultivating this talent in this sector?

Senator, so, one, I applaud your interest in this area. It’s very important. There are a number of things the department can do. But one I would point to specifically is US Strategic Command had an academic alliance with over 70 universities and colleges designed to solicit, encourage, and develop the talent that we need. It is not quite as focused on the nuclear propulsion side of the house that you referred to. It’s more in strategic deterrence theory. But it’s mechanisms like that that the department can use to encourage us to develop the intellectual capital, both capability and capacity inside this nation, to address our challenges.

I appreciate that answer. Do you have some specific proposals on how the department can market itself to the limited number of nuclear engineers that are in that field as to why they would choose to come to work with the Department of Defense, as opposed to other options that are out there?

Senator, in addition to I mean, I look at this, for example, as the submarine force commander I was just in a meeting last week changing the nuclear bonus structure to attract and retain more talent to your direct point. We should not forget that the other thing that happens if you’re wearing the uniform that I am wearing is that you’re given a license to do organized violence on behalf of this nation. You get a chance to defend this nation in a way that no other occupation, or no other person can do. We should remind people that is a unique attribute of being in the military. And I think that is something that is worth some people choosing to come join us.

Thank you, admiral.

Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, admiral, congratulations to you and your family, and thank you for your decades of service, all of you, including your family. No, it’s not always easy. As the chairman mentioned, I certainly want to focus a little bit more on missile defense. It’s a really important element of what your job is gonna be. And it’s actually been a really, I think, a good news story coming out of this committee. There’s been bipartisan legislation in the last three NDAAs on this. The president launched the Missile Defense Review at the Pentagon earlier this year in March. You may have seen MDA successfully completed its first ever salvo test, which was really remarkable, didn’t get a lot of news, but very successful. Certainly, our adversaries took notice. Now, I have a particular interest all through in a lot of this legislation, but as you probably know Alaska is the cornerstone of our nation’s missile defense with the radar sites out in the Aleutians, a long-range discrimination radar site being built, Fort Greely, testing at Kodiak. So, that’s the good news but then I will tell you I and, I think, a number of the members of this committee were surprised in August when the undersecretary over at the Pentagon abruptly canceled the redesign kill vehicle. And, first of all, very little notice. I wasn’t given any notice, and I focus on this issue as much as anyone in the congress. So, can I first get your commitment, any kind of major policy, decisions, that to be honest, this body has been driving, not the Pentagon, the congress has been driving missile defense the last five years. If there’s gonna be major abrupt changes, we need your I need your commitment to make sure you reach out to the chairman, the committee, other members, to make sure we know what’s happening, make sure we know what the reasoning is. Maybe, even seek our advice on it. We, sometimes, have a little wisdom over here, too. Can I get your commitment on that?

Absolutely, senator.

So, in the explanations for this abrupt cancellation we’re all over the place. I was actually in Alaska when this happened. First, it was about hypersonics. As you know the GBIs aren’t even focused on hypersonics. They’re focused on road missile, like North Korea, Iran. The estimates for the next interceptor are, again, all over the map, that we would develop five to 10 years. I know the number is classified. But to be honest, nobody really knows. Are you aware of this? And if we’re not gonna be testing the new RKV over the next several years, how do we show deterrence?

Senator, one, my current responsibilities don’t afford any particular insight. I am generally aware of what you’re referring to—

Well, if you’re confirmed, which I think you should be, we will need to sit down and go into this in a lot of depth. There’s a lot of members on both sides of the aisle who were quite surprised by this announcement. And I think it leaves us open. I think it leaves us vulnerable to be perfectly honest. Do you have a view on that?

Well, senator, one, I will absolutely commit to that. I will look very closely at this issue. But I have confidence today that the system that we have fielded will defend us against the threats we face today. You are quite correct in the future something we need to go look at—

But there’s a continuing threat from North Korea, from Iran. These are the rogue states. Again, our GBI System is meant primarily for rogue states, not a deterrence against Russia or China.

[Richard] That’s our policy, yes, sir.

It does seem to me a little bit, again, and I know you haven’t fully briefed into it. But in search for the perfect, which is what I think Undersecretary Griffin was looking for. We are leaving ourselves a bit vulnerable, particularly given that the system that was being developed as was demonstrated in this March salvo test, seemed like it was coming along quite well. Do you have a view on that?

Sir, I agree with you that we need to be very careful about setting too high a bar in our effort to develop any system, such that it delays us. We used to move faster in history, being willing to accept some failure and learning along the way. And I would support our ability to get back to that pace.

One of the things that we had in our legislation in the past was to and this was MDA’s request to us, to encourage more testing, even if we “fail,” because as you know, admiral, when you fail, you’re not really failing. You’re still learning. I’m sure you’ve seen that in your career. Again, do you think that I’d like to work with you on looking at to make sure this cancellation of the RKV Program doesn’t undermine the ability for us to conduct. We had pressed for it in legislation, at least yearly testing. Can I get your commitment on that as well?

Absolutely, senator.

And, finally, do you have any views on and, again, this is a different topic. It’s certainly an emerging threat. The chairman certainly talked about it a lot. But it’s not the threat that’s being addressed by our GBI System. What we should be doing and how we should be looking at the hypersonics threat.

Sir, the, one, nation has some limited capability against hypersonics today. I agree with you we need to accelerate our ability to address that threat. And it starts with the ability to track. If I have the ability to track and warn against hypersonics, it opens up a number of responses, including direct defense.

All right, thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Duckworth.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Admiral Richard, for your service for our nation. And I couldn’t agree with you more being able to serve in uniform is truly a privilege that not everyone gets to enjoy. And I also want thank your family for their dedicated service as well. Today I’d like to examine how, if confirmed, you would leverage your previous experience as deputy commander of StratCom to practically transition into this top position. Specifically, I’d like to sort of plumb your background and experience. How will you make sure the department successfully modernizes all three legs of the triad? And I want to get a little bit more detailed. I don’t need to tell you how important avoiding schedule slippage are in the B-21, the Columbia-Class Submarine, and ground-based, strategic, deterrent programs. Unlike most procurements, delays in the schedule for these programs are guaranteed to result in a gap in the capabilities. And, yet, like any procurement, there will be failures and schedule slippages. So, how are you planning to mitigate the impact of such inevitable problems?

Senator, as the chairman noted in the opening statement, one of the responsibilities of the commander of Strategic Command is to be the leading advocate for the recapitalization of the triad. So, really, my responsibility want to follow these closely to be able to describe concisely what the impacts of potential delays are. And, senator, the way we will go mitigate this is on the acquisition side of the house. We have pulled the operational real estate about as far back as it can go. That’s what enabled us to get to the delays we’ve already had in the recapitalization. As to specific operational mitigations the systems are a ways off. It’ll depend on the threat environment at the time. We’ll address that if necessary.

Thank you. While I do support the modernization of the triad, I do want to note that presence of both parties have committed to lessening our dependence on the use of weapons of mass destruction in our National Defense Strategy. As we return to great power competition what is your vision for how StratCom can effectively balance the need to advance our nuclear non-proliferation goals while also preserving our capability to deter adversaries? For example, based on your experience can we employ cyber attacks, conventional, prompt-level, strike weapons, and other non-nuclear weapons to achieve the same deterring effect as low-yield nuclear weapons?

Senator, let me answer that in two pieces. So, first I don’t see the nation’s non-proliferation goals in tension with our strategic, deterrent objectives. Actually, I see them complementary. The less proliferation we have, the easier the burden it is to accomplish strategic deterrent. And I go back to our extended deterrence and assurance guarantees as one of the most effective mechanisms that we have available to us to lessen the threat that we face, and therefore make it easier to accomplish strategic deterrence. To your second point about space and cyber. I think the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was very wise in acknowledging the possibility that strategic attacks could be other than nuclear and start to set a policy for us to address those. But to answer your question today, no, not today. There is no cyber or space attack that could have the same strategic effect as a nuclear weapon including a low-yield nuclear weapon. Will that be true into the future? I don’t know, probably not. But today there is no threat on par with what nuclear can do.

Which, again, goes back to my first question, really stresses the importance of not having schedule slippages, and making sure that we stay on track with the modernization of the triad. Switching topics, I’d like to get your best military advice on treaties and the role they serve in our national defense. Recently, there’s been signals that the United States may refuse to renew the new START and the Open Skies Treaties. Without commenting on the merits of hypothetical policy action, can you please expand on what you believe would be the projected, real-world impacts for StratCom if we were to exit both treaties?

Again, ma’am, I will support any arms control or other treaty that enhances the security of this nation. You had mentioned new START specifically, and their new START has provided us valuable insight in terms of the character and composition of Russian strategic forces in exchange for the Russians having that visibility into ours. That provided a level of strategic stability. But there are a large number of capabilities, weapons, that the Russians have that are not covered under new START and there are a number of novel capabilities that we were just discussing one earlier that is also not covered. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice in terms of the pros and cons of a decision such as that.

What are the cons of us leaving Opens Skies?

The primary negative to that, ma’am, I would put in the category of the assurance of our allies. We’re not the only signatory to that treaty. It provides valuable insight and partnership opportunities with our allies. But it does require us to make the capital and resource investments to fully use the provisions inside that treaty. And it does come at a counter-intelligence cost to the United States.

Thank you, admiral. I yield back.

Thank you, Senator Duckworth. We are at the conclusion of your remarks. We’re going to not entertain any others in the hearing. I think we are aware that right now that we’re in the senate chamber. We have the group that’s going to be attending Elijah Cummings’ lying in state.

[Senator] Mr. Chairman, I just have—

Of course, no, you have all the time you need.

Okay, no, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Admiral Richard, let me just say thank you for your service, but more thank you to your family. They moved 10 times in 12 years? Yes, sir.

Whoo! They got battle scars. God bless them all. And next of all, I wanted you to know that I have the upmost appreciation and respect for the submarine class. And I’ll tell you why USS West Virginia I got to spend as a governor. I would spend two or three days with them. They took me out and I have a deep appreciation of what the commitment that they make and what you’ve done. A great ship and it’s great. We have a boon-gold crew and they’re great, great crews and we love them. Next of all, I know you’re a proud Roll Tide Alabama. And Nick Saban is my dearest friend. We grew up together in coal-mining towns four miles apart. So, I’ll be going down to visit him. I give him your best. I know you’re still rooting for him. I just got back from the Middle East, and I was on the USS Abraham Lincoln. And then I went over to the Ramage to see the operations of our sailors and what they’re doing to keep us safe, and keep those open lanes, if you will. How many carriers do we have in the fleet right now?

Senator, I think the number is 11.

11, how many are operational, sir?

Sir, I don’t have the number right off the top of my head, it is a fraction of that.

And I’m just going by what I was told. We only have three operational out of 11. And I don’t know the status of the other eight. How soon they will get back, how much of a retrofit is going on.

Senator, we have more than three that are operationally available. That’s, I think, the number that are currently deployed.

Deployed, well, here’s what else I was told, which this is concerning to me, admiral. I was told that Harry S. Truman can’t get out of port because of electrical problems. So, it’s in right now supposed to totally retrofit the same as Abraham Lincoln. And we got Reagan down. The reason I’m saying this is my question will be very quickly is what is the greatest threat the United States of America faces, or who is the greatest threat we face?

The greatest threat, senator, is that we can’t move fast enough to pace the threats that face us, whether they come from Russia or China. We have lost a level of agility that we used to have that we need to get back.

Well, and the reason my observation was this when I was in the Arabian Sea. We’re not even in the Gulf anymore. We moved down to protect our carriers, ’cause it’s not that safe in the Gulf. And that’s why we have our destroyers there. But in South China Sea, if we’re that thin, we don’t. Do we have any carriers in the South China Sea trying to keep that?

Senator, I am not current on the force laydowns in the Pacific, I’d be happy to provide—

Maybe, we can do that later, later. Time to sit down and go through.

I will offer, though, that we have a substantial undersea presence that is able to execute missions in the Pacific.

Well, the concern I had is the same concern. You mentioned China and you mentioned Russia. The Middle East is where we seem to be bogged down no matter what’s taking all of sources and taking basically our inventory, if you will, as sparse as it is. And it just seems to me South China Sea is gonna have a greater threat to us economically, world economic, than what we are bogged down where we are right now. Probably in the classified hearing, I’d have to get in deeper in some of this with you, and maybe you could help me on it to understand it better and how we give the support that we need.

I’d be happy to do that today.

Okay, you could on the aircraft carrier, sir. I’m really concerned about that, ’cause I talked to some of our captains and commanders on those, and there were some concerns they were sharing with us. And I’m sure you’ll be on top of that pretty quick.

Happy to offer you a followup.

Okay, well, thank you so much. I know every question has been asked that could possibly be asked. And I was anxious to hear your answers, and it’s very informative. But I look forward to meeting with you, and sitting down in a classified setting in a skiff and, maybe, getting more information. Certainly, senator.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Senator Manchin. It was not my intention to rush you on this. I was only saying that other members will not be recognized. Why?

Because of the event that’s taking place—

I know that, sir, and I appreciate it very much. I want to be very quick.

Okay, thanks so much. We really appreciate your responses, and your willingness to meet, I guess, with each one of us prior to this meeting. And I would like to tell you the reason. There was a reason I wanted to pursue your thoughts on the no-first use, because while we were starting this meeting there was a meeting taking place with a group that is very supportive of the no-first use. And I didn’t know whether or not you were aware of that. That was taking place today.

[Richard] Senator, I was not.

Well, we appreciate it very much, your family, and I would say to Allison and Lisa, is it, that would you like to be able to do this every day? That’d be great. So, thanks for your patience. We appreciate that very much, and thank you. We look forward to serving with you in this new capacity.

[Richard] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And we’re adjourned.