NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg opened the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on Wednesday 17 July 2019 stressing the importance of transatlantic cooperation.
Transcript
So I get the great honor of doing a little bit of a further introduction of the next session. First, I’d like to introduce Courtney Kube, who is with NBC News and the Pentagon correspondent, and she will actually be facilitating this interview. It is my great honor to also introduce Mr. Jens Stoltenberg. An economist by education, Mr. Stoltenberg is currently the Secretary General of NATO. Before assuming that role, he was twice the Prime Minister of Norway and the leader of the Norwegian Labor Party. He has indeed had a long and illustrious career in Norwegian politics, including a number of ministry posts between 1990 and 1997. Cumulatively, he was a member of the Norwegian Parliament from 1991 through 2014. As Prime Minister, Mr. Stoltenberg was a strong supporter of the trans-Atlantic relationship. He was instrumental in transforming the Norwegian armed forces and increasing defense spending. During his tenure as Prime Minister, Mr. Stoltenberg had to deal with a variety of national security issues, including the threat of terrorism and with the re-emergence of Russia. Mr. Stoltenberg has also pioneered the work of NATO on cyber. Under his leadership, NATO has made cyber defense a core part of collective defense and has recognized cyber security, or cyberspace, as a domain of military operations. Thanks to Mr. Stoltenberg’s leadership, NATO has also partnered closely with the cyber security industry. Speaking on behalf of Symantec, I can say that the partnership with NATO has been one of the most successful and all-encompassing with governments around the world. Please join me in a warm welcome for Mr. Stoltenberg.
In the news this week, we’re less two weeks away, or just about two weeks away from the INF Treaty potentially falling apart. Of course, most of you know this is the intermediate range missile treaty that the U.S. and Russia entered into in the late 1980s. The U.S. announced they were gonna withdraw from it, and the deadline for Russia to come into compliance with that is August 2nd. A U.S. delegation traveled to Geneva, met with the Russians to talk about arms control today. Is there any indication that Russia might be moving towards compliance, or there might be some hope for the treaty?
No, there is no indication that the… (audience laughs) Thank you, no. (audience laughs) There are no indications that Russia is moving back into compliance with the INF Treaty. But we continue to call on them, knowing that it’s only three weeks left until we meet the deadline the 2nd of August. And after that time the INF Treaty will not exist anymore. But, the reason why we continue to call on them to come back into compliance is that this treaty is so extremely important. It is cornerstone for arms control in Europe. And I am part of a European generation of politicians who were actually shaped by the deployment of the Russian SS-20 missiles in the ’70s and ’80s, and the NATO Pershing and cruise missiles as a response to the Russian missiles. And I have to be honest with you, I’ve been out demonstrating against those missiles. A lot of friends with long hair and quite radical attitudes. But, then we were so pleased when Ronald Reagan, President Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in 1987, not reducing the number of these missiles, but banning all of them, zero. And now, Russia has started to deploy these missiles again. Now the name is SSC-8. They are different, but the same effect. They are mobile, hard to detect, they can reach all European cities within minutes, and reducing the warning time, and therefore also reducing the threshold for any potential use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. Therefore, this extremely serious that Russia is violating the treaty. And, actually, the Obama administration started to raise this issue with Russia. They denied, of course, but all allies, and many of them independently, has come to the same conclusion that Russia is in violation, that they are deploying these new missiles. And therefore all NATO allies also support the United States when the United States decided, in the beginning of February, that they will start the withdrawal process. That process takes six months. At the end of that process, which ends on the 2nd of August this year, there will no more INF Treaty in the world. So, we are also preparing for a world without the treaty and with more Russian missiles. I can say something about what we are going to prepare for, but I already answered quite long. So uh… (laughs) And my advisor told me one thing, not be long in answers.
This is Aspen, there’s no rules here.
Okay.
That’s what I was told.
So, then the question’s what will we do? If they don’t come back into compliance. We have stated and we have decided that we will respond. What we will do will be measured. It will be coordinated as a NATO family, no bilateral any arrangement, but NATO as an alliance, 29 allies. We will not mirror what Russia is doing. Meaning that we will not deploy, we don’t have an intention of deploying new ground launched nuclear missiles in Europe. But, we have other options: Conventional, we have missile defense, we have increased readiness of forces, we will also support new initiatives on arms control, and we have other opportunities. We are ready to follow up because we have to make sure that also in a world without the INF Treaty and with more Russian missiles, we need to be able to continue to deliver credible deterrence and defense from NATO, because that’s the best guarantee to preserve peace in Europe.
So NATO is going to employ or deploy some sort of a missile defense system that’s geared, in Europe, geared specifically towards Russia?
We already have an integrated air and missile defense in Europe, but, of course, we want options to strengthen that. I am a bit careful to be too specific. Partly because we are still calling on Russia to come back into compliance, and we don’t want to give them any excuse for not coming back into compliance. Second, because, I think it is important that we launch, or that we announce the concrete measures when we see… After the 2nd of August. And some of the measures will take some time to implement. Some others will be possible to implement more quickly. And, we also have to understand that the new Russian missiles are actually part of a broader pattern. Russia has modernized the nuclear weapons over a long time. And they have invested in new modern military capabilities over a long time. And, therefore, NATO, in many ways, have already started to respond, not by deploying new nuclear weapons in Europe, but by increasing our military strength in Europe. For the first time in the history of our alliance, we have combat ready troops in the eastern part of the alliance. In the three Baltic countries and in Poland, one of them led by the United States. And these combat battalions, or combat groups, are not very big, but there are multinational, NATO troops. Meaning that NATO is already there. So, if any of those countries are attacked, there’s no doubt that it’ll trigger the response from the full alliance. And will also increase the ability, the readiness of our forces to reinforce quickly if needed. So, in many ways, NATO has already started to respond in a measured, defensive way, to a more assertive Russia. And the new nuclear missiles are extremely important and extremely serious, but they are part of a broader picture we have seen developing over some time.
But that enhance, I mean, that really began after the invasion of Crimea, right? NATO enhancing the, against an aggressive Russia. So, do you know how many of these INF-violating missiles Russia has—
I know, but I can’t tell you, so…
So, in 198—
And they know that we know.
So, in 1987, it took from mid-1988, I guess, until about 1991 for all the 2700 or so missiles to be destroyed. Which, as you mentioned, the treaty bans these missiles and their launchers. Which means, to be in compliance you have to destroy them. Is it even logistically possible, at this point, for Russia to come into compliance and destroy all their missiles?
As I mentioned, last time, in 1987, they were able to destroy almost 2000 missiles in a matter of weeks. So, it is possible to start to destroy missiles if they want. So, if we really saw a real willingness from Russia to start to destroy these missiles, I’m certain that we will have been able to find a way to save the treaty. But, NATO and the United States has raised this issue with Russia for years. In the beginning, they denied the existence of the missile. Then, they had to accept that the missile exists, but they say that the missile doesn’t violate the INF Treaty. That’s wrong. As I said, the U.S., but also other allies, have independently assessed, determined that these missiles are violating the treaty. And that’s the reason why we also have said that there has to be a limit. Because, if we accept that Russia violates this treaty with impunity, then we are not only undermining the INF Treaty, but we are weakening the credibility of all arms control treaties. If Russia thinks that they can just violate a treaty without consequence, then what kind of credibility would all the other treaties we have have if we accept that?
But, with all due respect, they’ve been in violation of the treaty for years. As you mentioned, President Obama brought it up with Vladimir Putin years ago. So, what kind of deterrent can you employ after the treaty assumes it falls apart in a couple of weeks. What kind of deterrent can you possibly employ? Could you, you mentioned that you don’t want any ground launched cruise missiles, or ground launched missiles, but what about air launched, or sea launched? I mean, could you have a nuclear deterrent that’s just not ground based?
I will answer that in a moment, but fundamentally, the most important deterrent NATO provides, is one for all and all for one. As long as that’s credible, that if you attack one small ally, or a big ally, the whole alliance will respond. Then we are, by far, the strongest alliance in the world. We are 50% of the world’s military might. So, we are strong, and stronger than any other potential adversary, as long as we are together. So, of course it is important what we do, but the most important thing is the resolve, the political will, the unity of the alliance. As long as that’s in place, then we are safe, all of us. So that’s my first answer. And, I’m from Norway, and Norway’s a beautiful country. We have beautiful mountains. But I have to admit that you have beautiful mountains here too. (audience laughs) So, I’m actually considering coming back to do some hiking and some downhill speed, or a little fun skiing. But, they told me actually that you don’t only do downhill skiing here but also cross-country skiing. That’s even better.
Yeah. It’s good cardio.
So if you see.
Were you talking about skiing to avoid my question on air launched cruise missiles?
No, no…
I’m just asking.
Hardly.
I’ll talk about skiing, too.
No but, first of all, we have air launched nuclear weapons. That’s part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent in Europe. That’s no secret. We have, we call it, it’s something we do together. The weapons are owned by the United States, but the planes are owned by different European allies. And then, the different support capabilities and so on are owned and operated by other allies. So, the air launched nuclear component of our nuclear deterrent is really a joint effort by many allies. So that’s, of course, part of our deterrent and will be, also, part of the deterrence we have after the potential demise of the INF Treaty.
There was a disclosure just this week, actually, of a report that acknowledged that, in fact, there were 130 nuclear bombs across five NATO nations that belonged to NATO, essentially. And, as you mentioned, it’s been widely known. But, this is sort of an official way of acknowledging where those weapons are and that they actually exist. And it also included some talk of the U.S. nuclear component that’s overseas as well. Did that concern you? That disclosure? And particularly, the acknowledgement that there’s actually, there are nuclear weapons at Incirlik, just miles from the Syrian border.
I don’t comment on the details of our nuclear deterrent, where we have deployed the weapons. But, it is official, it’s public that we have air launched systems, and that different allies deliver this together. This paper is not actually a NATO paper, it’s a draft from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Some parliamentarians, so not a paper from me and from the NATO structures. So I cannot confirm what is there. But, of course, if we have nuclear weapons in Europe, we have them somewhere in Europe, so I cannot deny that. (audience laughs) But, actually, for what reason I mentioned Norway, that was not because of mountains, but it was because of deterrence. Norway, five million people, and I remember when I was doing my conscription, I was a soldier back in the late ’70s, at the height of the Cold War. And we bordered Russia. But I felt safe. Because I knew that if Norway was attacked, the whole of NATO, including the United States, will be there. And as long as deterrence is credible, and deterrence is in the mind of your potential adversary. As long as your potential adversary knows that we will be together, then he will not attack. So credible deterrence is the best way, not to provoke a conflict, but to prevent a conflict.
But, I just have to push back on the deterrence a little bit, because, you know, while it seems that the NATO alliance has been able to deter an actual attack on the NATO allies from Russia, Russia continues to push the line. So the deployment of these potentially nuclear ground launched cruise missiles, you know, right on NATO’s doorstep. At what point is it not deterring Russian behavior considered not effective deterrence. It’s deterring an actual attack, but Russia’s walking right up to the door, armed, and ready for an attack.
Well, I think, for deterrence to be credible, it has to be very clear what we are deterring. And we are deterring an armed attack on a NATO ally. Of course, we would like to see Russia change their behavior, but we have seen before that Russia is behaving in a way we don’t like. Or the Soviet Union. That was very much the case during the Cold War. Then, Russia had many more nuclear weapons and many more combat ready troops, just at our border. And then, we really needed a deterrence saying that, if you cross that border, then the whole alliance will respond. So deterrence is working. That doesn’t mean that Russia behaves exactly as we want. But it means that, since we established NATO, no NATO ally has suffered a military attack. And, we are the most successful alliance in history because we have been able to deliver that. The challenge, now, is that we are faced with new threats. Which is not, what should I say, the classical military attack is armies crossing borders, or missiles crossing borders. But, cyber… Meddling in democratic processes, election processes. We had the Skripal case in U.K., where a chemical agent was used on the territory of a NATO ally. These, what we call, hybrid attacks or hybrid warfare, they blur the line between peace and war. Before, it was very easy to say whether there was peace and war. Again, I’m from Europe, and the Second World War in Europe started in my country, the 9th of April and it ended 8th of May. And there was no question where it took place. When we now are faced with cyber attacks, it’s hard to say when you’re attacked, where you’re attacked, who is attacking you. Or the fight against Daish, it’s hard to say when it started, where it took place, and when it’s going to end. So, we are faced with a much more difficult kind of threats. These blurred line or hybrid threats which is blurring the line between peace and war.
Another NATO ally that’s been in the news a lot lately is Turkey, with their acceptance of some of the components for a S-400 radar. The White House put out a statement about it today saying that accepting the S-400 undermines the commitment all NATO allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems. The U.S. military also is saying that the S-400 endangers military intelligence, that the radars allow Russia to be able to read intelligence on this Joint Strike Fighter, this new advanced aircraft that Turkey was supposed to take possession of. And they no longer will. One critical part of the NATO alliance is this integrated interoperability, integrated air defense systems. A Russian-made air defense system like the S-400 cannot be integrated with NATO. So what does that mean going forward, now that Turkey has taken possession of it? Are there technical changes that NATO members now have to make to exclude Turkey from having access to their systems? Are there physical air defense infrastructure that has to be altered?
The S-400, a Russian air defense system, is not possible to integrate into the integrated NATO air and missile system, which is about sharing radar picture. Which is about joint air policing. Which about shared capabilities. And Turkey has not asked for that. So, the S-400 will not be integrated into NATO’s air and missile defense system. But, Turkey can still be part of, with other capabilities, Turkey will and is still part of NATO’s integrated air and missile defense. They have also planes, they have radars, they have other capabilities which are important for our air and missile defense. It is up to each and every nation to decide what kind of systems they acquire. But what matters for NATO is interoperability and the S-400 system will not be interoperable with NATO. And, therefore, this is an issue I have discussed many time in Ankara with President Erdogan, in Washington with President Trump and other officials. And, of course, we tried to avoid to end in the situation where we are now, where two allies so fundamentally disagree and where Turkey as a… I’m concerned about the consequences of the Turkish decision because it means that Turkey will not be part of the F-35 program anymore. I actually visited Lockheed Martin at Fort Worth I think a year ago or something. And I saw the production lines. And I saw the different flags of the different allies producing, having planes coming out from that production line. And there were some Turkish planes there, but now they will not be part of that. That’s not good. It’s bad for all of us. But it’s a consequence of that decision, and therefore, what I welcome is the direct, ongoing dialogue, contact between two NATO allies, Turkey and the United States, on this issue. I know that they’re talking about Turkey acquiring Patriot assistance. Turkey’s also talking with two other NATO allies, Italy and France, about acquiring SAMP/T Italian-French system as a air defense system. And, you have to remember that NATO is augmenting Turkey’s air defenses today. We have deployed a Patriot battery, a Spanish Patriot battery, in Turkey and we deployed an Italian SAMPT/T battery in Turkey as a part of NATO assurance measures for Turkey. So, we do what we can, but now we are in a difficult situation because of the consequences of this decision.
But, it’s not just, I mean there’s also the symbolism of it. That Turkey, you know, they were trying to acquire the Patriot, it didn’t work out. But the United States, under President Trump has said that the U.S. would figure out a way to sell them. In fact, they’ve even offered to help with some of the cost of it, to encourage Turkey to get another Patriot battery and not to buy the S-400. And Turkey, symbolically turned towards Russia, and bought this system, knowing that it would mean no F-35, no interoperability of the air defense system with the S-400. So what does that mean? Is this Turkey turning away from NATO and towards Russia?
No. This is a serious issue. It’s about S-400 and F-35. But Turkey’s contributions to NATO, and NATO’s cooperation with a NATO ally, Turkey, runs much deeper and is much broader than F-35, even though that’s important. For instance, Turkey’s a key ally in the fight against Daish, ISIS. The fact that we have been able through the global coalition to defeat Daish, to liberate all the territory Daish controlled in Iraq and Syria. They controlled a territory as big as the United Kingdom, 8 million people, and now they don’t control that territory anymore. That’s not least because of the contributions of Turkey. We have used the bases, infrastructure, and Turkey has played a key part in that fight. Turkey’s contributing to many different NATO missions and operations in the Balkans and Kosovo, and also in Afghanistan. So, I’m not underestimating the difficulty related to S-400, but I’m saying that Turkey, as a NATO member, is much more than S-400.
There’s some people who, you know, commentators are saying that Turkey deserves to be kicked out of NATO because of this. Which, of course, there’s no mechanism for doing. But, are there other members, other NATO allies, who are expressing that kind of sentiment? That they don’t trust Turkey anymore with this decision? That they have, in essence, with the activation of the S-400, they’re opening up a door that potentially exposes other NATO allies to spying?
Turkey is a NATO member. Turkey is an important NATO member, and no ally has raised that issue at all. Because we all see that we are dependent on each other. Then there is a disagreement on the issue of S-400. That’s correct. And I think that my responsibility is partly to try to help, to solve the issue, but as long as that issue’s not solved, we need to minimize the negative consequences and also highlight, as the White House has in the statement today, that the partnership, the alliance, the role of Turkey in NATO is much broader than the F-35 or S-400.
Ambassador Burns talked about the importance of Afghanistan, there’s talks right now, potential peace talks. NATO forces are there and committed until 2020, but it’s a conditions-based mission. If Ambassador Khalilzad, Zalmay Khalilzad, if he’s successful and negotiates a peace deal, it could have an impact on NATO forces deployed to Afghanistan. You’ve said numerous times that he briefs you frequently, he keeps the NATO allies in touch with what he’s doing, but if, in fact, he comes to a peace deal that leads to a full withdrawal of all NATO troops, Resolute Support mission troops, will NATO have a veto over that? Will NATO have any kind of a part in the negotiations for what that would look like?
We are very much involved in that now. We consult with Ambassador Khalilzad frequently. I speak with him. He has been in the NATO North Atlantic Council many times. We have our NATO representative in Kabul closely linked up to the negotiations. So, of course, this is a U.S. envoy, but all NATO allies are involved. Because we went into Afghanistan together, we are going to make decisions of future posture together, and when the time is right, we’ll also leave together. Because, we have to remember that, as Nick Burns said, the first and only time NATO invoked the collective defense clause, Article 5, was after an attack on the United States. I think everyone expected that Article 5 was for, you know, Soviet Union attacking a small NATO ally. No. That never happened. Because deterrence worked. But then, suddenly, we had an attack on the United States on 9/11, and all allies stood behind the United States. Hundreds of thousands of European soldiers, Canadian soldiers have served in Afghanistan, and more that 1000 have paid the ultimate price. And, we had, at the peak, we had more than 140,000 troops there in the combat operation. Roughly 1/3, at some stage even more of those soldiers were non-U.S. soldiers. So this has been a big operation, not only for the United States, but for many NATO allies and partners. Therefore, we will decide on the future presence in Afghanistan together. We strongly support the efforts by Ambassador Khalilzad to reach an agreement with the Taliban. We will not stay in Afghanistan longer than needed. We have been able to go from 140,000 to now roughly 16,000. To go from a combat operation with casualties and to train, assist and advice mission with much fewer casualties. And, of course, we hope that Khalilzad will succeed. This is not a leave deal we are seeking but a peace deal. Meaning that it has to secure that Afghanistan doesn’t once again become a safe haven for international terrorists. It has to secure a inter-Afghan dialogue on how to maintain the gains we have made there. We have invested heavily, blood and treasure in Afghanistan for many years. And, of course, it will affect the presence of international forces, NATO forces, U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In what way, it’s a bit early to say, because that’s now negotiated. I hope we will see a result. And as Secretary Pompeo said, I think it was a NATO meeting recently, hopefully something within weeks or months. So we hope, but nothing is agreed before everything is agreed. And, therefore, it’s a bit early to try to speculate about the different elements.
The Taliban have been pretty open about the fact that they want all foreign troops out, not just American troops out. So if, in fact, there was a negotiated peace settlement that involved withdrawal of all NATO troops, NATO would be on board with that if that’s the terms.
We will supp… If there is a negotiated peace deal, then we will support that deal. And that’s the reason why we are so close involved in the process, and that’s also the reason why we brief and involve allies in the process. But it remains to be seen what kind of deal we will get. And, of course, the NATO support to Afghanistan now, as I said, it’s not combat. What we do now is to train, assist, and help the Afghan forces. And we have to realize that the Afghan forces are now doing what we did for them with 140 combat troops. So there are many problems in Afghanistan and many reasons to be concerned. But, at least this great achievement, that instead of having 140,000 U.S., European, and NATO troops in Afghanistan, we have 16,000 troops, which are enabling the Afghans to fight terrorism themselves. And I think that one of the lessons we have learned from Afghanistan, from Iraq, from Libya and elsewhere, is that in the long run, it’s much better to train local forces, than to deploy large number our own forces in big combat operations. I remember Ambassador Doug Lute, when he was in NATO, he said, “Prevention is better “than intervention.”, and I totally agree. So, we train local forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to help them stabilize their own country so we can reduce our presence and our, what should I say, combat operation in these countries.
Do you feel confident, like, you know there’s talk of a negotiated peace settlement pretty soon, potentially in a matter of months. If NATO troops were to withdraw and abandon this training mission as part of the negotiated settlement, that the Afghan forces could stand on their own. I mean, they continue to have a difficult time. There was, a district was overrun in Paktika over the weekend, and Afghan forces fled. Do you feel confident