The Senate Armed Services Committee’s strategic forces subcommittee hears testimony on the Defense Department’s space activities. Testifying are: John D. Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense; Frank Calvelli, assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration; and Space Force Gen. Michael A. Guetlein, vice chief of space operations, May 21, 2024.

Transcript

The purpose of our hearing today is to examine the fiscal year 2025 budget of the Space Force, Mister Hill. I understand that you are testifying on Space Force policy issues in lieu of Dr Plum who recently left us, I will want to know the actions that your office has taken to help lower the classification levels of space programs so that the warfighter can use them more effectively. Many of these programs are so highly classified that few if any can use them prohibiting information sharing in a time of conflict. Mister Cavell, you are responsible for the acquisition of space assets in October of 2022. You issued a memo on space acquisition tenants that outlined such commonsense objectives as don’t launch satellites before the ground system to use. The data is complete. Pretty good advice. Thank you as well as efforts to hold the industry accountable for the systems that they build. I’d like to know if you believe that those tenants are having an impact and that you hope that they would on the that would, that you hope that they would back in October of 2022 General Gitlin. This is year four of the Space Force as a separate title 10 service. If you look at the wall, your flag is there along with the other service flags. Now that you’re a title 10 service, I hope that you can share with us how you are training to defend our assets in space as well as to help the war fighter on the ground achieve their objectives. If called upon for fiscal year 2025 the Space Force is requesting 29.4 billion, which is a $600 million decrease from the fiscal year 2024 request of 30 billion General Gitlin. It will be important to explain to the committee in open session how this essentially flat budget, actually declining budget is impacting your ability to train and equip our guardians to support the combatant commands. Again, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us and after our short opening statements, we will have rounds of five minute questions of our witnesses, Senator Fisher. Thank you, Senator King Mr. Hill. Are you correcting this?

Yes, he was correct. He was correcting my pronunciation. Gut line. Sorry about that. Thank you, Senator. I’m sure I’m not the first person to ever mispronounce your name. No, sir. I’ve grown up with that name and I heard it every which way. Thank you, sir. Secretary Covelli Mr. Hill General Guttle. Uh Thank you for being here today and for sharing your perspectives with this subcommittee. And thank each of you for your service. As this subcommittee knows our capabilities and space provide our forces with unparalleled communications, targeting and intelligence. Every other service relies on Space Force capabilities to close the kill chain. Our adversaries know this and space is no longer a safe haven. It hasn’t been for years and it’s taken the department far too long to openly acknowledge this. The fact is we need to be investing more in both offensive and defensive, offensive and defensive space systems to counter our adversaries and safeguard our assets on orbit. And we need a space acquisition system that can do so effectively and quickly I look forward to, to hearing about progress being made in space acquisition and what more can be done. However, we cannot maintain space dominance unless we provide the Space Force with the re resources needed to do so. I was disappointed by the president’s budget request, but I hope to work with my colleagues on this sub-committee and on the Appropriations Committee to provide funding for additional space systems, including one on General Whiting’s unfunded priority list. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Mr. Hill. Are you leading off?

Thank you, Chairman King and ranking member Fisher and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting us to testify on the department’s fiscal year 2025 space budget. We are clearly in a time of rapid change in the space strategic environment, one which does not favor the slow or those resistant to change. China and Russia are rapidly fielding space and counter space capabilities to hold the joint force at risk and to deny us the space based services on which we rely. The scale and scope of the threats in space presents significant risks to the American people, to our national interests, to allies and partners to meet these challenges and working within the constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. The President’s fiscal year 2025 budget requests $33.7 billion for space. Some of the critical investments include $2.4 billion for national security. Space launch $1.5 billion for more resilient positioning, navigation and timing. $4.2 billion for more resilient and protected satellite communications and the space development agencies proliferated low earth orbit transport layer $4.7 billion to develop new missile warning and missile tracking architectures and $12.3 billion for a range of capabilities to increase the resiliency of our existing architectures and protect our interests in space during competition crisis and conflict. In addition to our space in investments, the department has made significant progress over the last two years on four key space strategy and policy priorities which I have detailed at length in my written testimony. These are space control, space cooper operation, space classification and commercial space integration. In short, we have obtained presidential guidance to assure our space missions and to protect and defend the joint force from space enabled attacks. We have significantly expanded our space co-operation with allies and partners charting a path towards true combined operations in space that will strengthen our collective deterrence and defense. And we have overhauled the department’s space classification policy to remove unnecessary barriers to information flow throughout the joint force and with our partners and with industry and we have released the first ever Department of Defense commercial Space Integration strategy to harness the commercial sector’s incredible innovation and to enhance our capability capacity, resilience, and mission assurance. Going forward, the department will continue to press on all four of these lines of effort. I believe the progress we’ve already made together will pay dividends for years to come in closing. Thank you again to the committee for its partnership and for its tireless dedication to the department and our service members. I look forward to answering your questions, Mister Covelli, Secretary Cavell, Chairman King, ranking member of Fisher and distinguished members of the sub-committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. With the growing threats in space. We must continue to transform our space architecture to be more proliferated and more resilient so that it could always be counted on during times of peace crisis or conflict. As the service acquisition executive for Space, I am focused on two things, driving speed in our acquisitions and delivering programs on cost and schedule. I’d like to highlight some of the progress we’ve made since I testified before this committee last year. Since the spring of 2023 the Space Development Agency has delivered 27 satellites to orbit nearly all of them in around three years from contract award. This includes eight new missile warning missile tracking satellites and 19 data transport satellites. With these systems. We’ve been able to demonstrate the first ever link 16 network connection from space a capability that will allow war fighters to send beyond line of sight messages. The space rapid capabilities office completed and is in the process of fielding the 1st 11 of 24 low costs, transportable terrestrial satellite communications jammers. These jammers went from contract award to fielding in about 18 months. Additionally, last June space RCO completed an on orbit testing of its enhanced threat awareness payloads and delivering those payloads to Space Force programs to use. Meanwhile, the space systems command continues to make outstanding progress towards modernizing both our missile warning and military satellite communications architectures to be more resilient. Space systems command launched the first weather system follow on microwave satellite last month to support the pivot to a more resilient, desegregated hybrid weather architecture to meet war fighter requirements. Last September space systems command’s tactically response to space mission known as Vicus Knox demonstrated the ability to go from factory floor to on orbit operations in less than five days. And since April of 2023 there have been seven national security space launches that deliver critical war fighting capabilities to orbit. SSE is also adding resilience through through allied partnerships. For example, they delivered two enhanced polar system payloads which will be hosted on Space Norway satellites that will be dual launch. This July providing protected satellite communications in the Arctic region. Space Command even broke round this summer in Australia or last summer on the Deep Space advanced radar capability site one and will award design contract for site two this summer with the United Kingdom. This partnership with Australia and the UK is critical to our Space Domain Awareness mission. We’re also continuing to take advantage of strong space industrial base including awarding contracts to many nontraditional space companies and implementing our recently published commercial space strategy simultaneously. We are aggressively tackling challenging programs to get them over the finish line. We are focused on delivering the GPS next gen operational control segment also known as OCX and making significant progress towards getting the system ready to transition operations in 2025. Another one of our challenging programs ATLAS has made significant progress. The program is on schedule to incrementally deliver Space Domain Awareness command and control capabilities next year to enable finally, the Decommissioning of the legacy spad OX system. We’ve also proven now that we can build small satellites quickly. However, as we begin to deliver the next tranche of SD A satellites this fall, getting the military services to adopt and use these satellites will be a key success to to our to our systems. Likewise, our ability to maintain assured access to space for our space capabilities remains paramount and launch providers must be ready to scale to meet the increased demand. We are also working to move programs out of special access program, stove pipes. Thanks to Dod Space classification policy update this past December. This will improve our ability to integrate space to support other domains and enable better sharing with our, with our allies overall, we are doing a lot by simultaneously transforming our space architecture to to make it more resilient. And at the same time investing in those protect and defend missions that we need to do to guarantee the advantage we get from space and protect the joint forces as we continue to drive speed into our acquisitions, our job and our top priority as acquisition professionals is centered around program execution. Simply defined, it means delivering programs on cost on schedule that work. We’re taking a special interest in making sure that upfront when we develop our action strategies and RFP documents or request for proposal documents that they are realistic and executable that we implement source selection strategies that leads us to awarding contracts with achievable cost and schedule baselines and to a contractor with the right expertise, skills, and staff to do the job. And then once under contract relentlessly managing the program based on on the daily basis to ensure we deliver on cost and on schedule, given the threats and increased capabilities of our competitors. It is critical that we deliver programs on cost and schedule and this is a key focus area for me. Thank you to the subcommittee for all your support. I look forward to your questions. General Gula, Chairman King Breaking member Fisher, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for your continued support and for the opportunity to testify on the Space Force’s Posture for fiscal year 2025 on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, the honorable Frank Kendall and the Chief of Space Operations General B Chance Salzman. I am honored to share that we are wholly dedicated to forging a new service purpose-built for great power competition. Space has never been more critical to the security of our nation and to the success or failure of the joint force depends heavily upon the capabilities that we present the repeated actions by both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China underscore the urgency for action. Although we still make control of the space over our competitors, they are working hard to close the gap and assert their dominance in space. We cannot afford to let this happen. Space is the foundation for the joint force and it is fundamental to our peaceful way of life. Gps alone is an essential part of every aspect of our daily lives. From our cell phones to our banking systems and even to our ability to get crops out of the field and groceries to the shelves. We cannot let our near peer competitors overtake us or we will lose what we hold dear if we fail to keep pace and ultimately surrender our lead in space. Every space enabled benefit we enjoy today will be at risk and the world will become a far more dangerous place. We must maintain control of the domain in order to defend the United States and to protect the joint force from space enabled attack. With only 3% of the dod’s budget. The Space Force offers a tremendous value proposition to the nation. Every dollar invested in space brings asymmetric returns. But that also means that every dollar cut creates asymmetric risk, make no mistake if we are to deter and if necessary defeat aggression in space and across the globe, we must continue to invest in the United States Space Force against a near peer. Adversary control of space is the linchpin without it, we cannot defer deter conflict without it. We cannot provide vital effects without it. We cannot protect the joint force and without it, we cannot win. The Space Force’s theory of success includes three parts, avoid operational surprise, deny first mover advantage and conduct responsible operations in space. The Space Force budget request aligns with these priorities and is designed to support the National defense strategy by building training and equipping the forces. The nation needs to preserve freedom of action in space while deterring and denying adversarial objectives. Avoiding operational surprise requires us to maintain an accurate understanding of the space domain at all times. 8.3% of our budget is dedicated to this aim operating across dis disaggregated sensor frameworks. The Space Force provides the maximum information possible to decision makers from the tactical to the strategic level. Denying first mover advantage demands that we make an unwarranted attack against the United States impractical and self-defeating. 43.4% of our budget is devoted to this objective, investing in resiliency for missile warning and tracking satellite communications and position, navigation and timing. Finally, responsible operations in space describes a mechanism by which the Space Force can test and controls the space domain. 24.7% of the Fy 25 Space Force budget is dedicated to this effort within the constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. The space, the fy 25 Space Force budget reflects hard choices and as a result slows the pace of transformation and modernization. Addressing these challenges depends on guardians that are trained and ready to meet the high tech demands of space operations. For that reason, I would like to personally thank this committee for its support of the Space Force Personnel Management Act. This will be a major force multiplier in the Space Force’s efforts to modernize the way we recruit, build and retain talent. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Space Force’s fy 25 budget and posture in the face of accelerating threats. The guardians have clearly demonstrated the capability, the resolve and the ex expertise necessary to face the challenges posed by our near peer competitors. But there is more to do. The support of this committee enables our guardians to continue to preserve and expand our strategic advantage and outperform any pacing challenge. I would look forward to working with you as we defeat tomorrow’s challenges together. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you all three. That was excellent testimony and I appreciate it first. I want to make a confession. I I noticed my colleague, Senator Kramer’s in the room when the Space Force was first proposed, I was a skeptic. I ultimately supported it but, but I just wasn’t sure that this was a direction we need needed to move in. I am now a convert. I think the Space Force is, is absolutely uh in the right place at the right time, taking the right actions. And I’m, I’m glad that we have an, an organization that’s dedicated strictly to that mission. So uh maybe I don’t know how often you hear senators admit mistakes. But uh I wanted to get that on the record. The other thing I had to notice, I had to note somewhat humorously, several years ago, I visited Pine Gap in Australia with the members of the intelligence committee, which of course is a one of the major world’s major ground stations for space assets. And we were with the Intelligence committee, I was sure that this was highly classified, came home, didn’t talk about it to anyone. They didn’t even tell him where I went until I noticed there was a Netflix series called Pine Gap, which was set at Pine Gap. So I guess it wasn’t all that classified Mister Hill classification. Have. Are you making any progress on the declassification Having information that can’t be used by the people that need?

It is not very useful information. Uh Talk to me about where you are in the in the declassification process. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman King. Um Yes, we’re making progress. Uh We have with the deputy secretary having signed out the uh new policy and that took us a good year to rewrite the policy. It was replacing a policy but it was 20 years old. Um a policy was clearly out of date. Uh It provides um an updated framework for, for uh the program developers and operators to understand what, what’s the the minimum classification?

If any classification is necessary for a particular type of activity or program, we then turn that over to the services. And Secretary Calvey is, is taking it very actively uh to then um rewrite the service class, the the classification guides that they own for the particular uh systems that they develop. Um One important thing to understand nature is to over classify. Are you is there some systematic way to to say, does this really need to be classified at this level?

Is there a mechanism?

Yeah, that, that that policy very clearly provides that and the direction that the the Space Force and Secretary Gelli have taken to heart is to move as fast as they can to update to that policy, which I expect will result in many things being removed from special access programs that will enable better planning and integration across the joint force as well as and and so if what I could offer is maybe Secretary Carvelli could talk to Secretary Carvelli or so there was a 2004 policy that drove most space activities into the SAP world. I mean, it was actually a written policy thanks to John and before him, John Plum, they actually got that policy updated for the first time in 20 years, this past December. So now that frees us the ability to actually take programs out of special access channels because special access channels, all they do is call stovepipes. And so now we are active, we have a team in place that has put together a plan and strategy instead of doing it program by program, we’re doing it all at once. So we’re doing one strategy upfront will have it in place this fall to actually remove the vast majority of all of our space programs and reclassify them into ts top secret and secret, they won’t become unclassified, but they’ll become secret and TS which will allow a lot more sharing as well as the ability to have uh to get rid of all those stove pipes. Thank you. I appreciate that and hope that project will continue. Um, a big question. Not much time left. A commercial integration. One of the, you, all of you talked about resiliency. One of the keys to resiliency is proliferation, lots of smaller satellites, fewer single targets. What have we learned from Ukraine about the use of commercial satellites, particularly Starlink?

Has it has, has the theory of proliferation worked. I think we’re, we’re seeing that the, the innovation that came out of the commercial sector which we’re also adopting in any of the dod architectures that proliferation is absolutely one of the key elements of a resiliency strategy that supports mission assurance. Ukraine is as proof of that. Thank you. Uh Thank you all very much. Uh Secretary uh Senator Fisher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to follow up on the commercial side a little bit and how and how that ties in. First of all, thank you to the department for issuing some um good strategy in and driving that forward with some goals and requirements and focus. Uh Mr. uh Calvey and General Guttle especially. I believe you’ve um both need to be thanked for this. We continue to need to harness that. Um Mr. Secretary, one of those hard problems is achieving space domain awareness in finding and characterizing our adversaries activities in space. Can you speak to commercial capabilities that exist today in this area, both in track tracking algorithms and in capturing commercial imagery of objects in space as well as any work you’re doing in the private sector with this mission. Yes. So there’s a space of awareness as, as you know, is probably a key to any kind of activity we would ever have encounter in space, understanding what’s in the domain and keeping track of it. And I know it’s high on our list high on general white’s list as well. The uh we are taking advantage of commercial, we can, there are some amazing companies out there that actually have ground based telescopes today as well as other commercial data that they’re able to give and that we purchase um through multiple avenues to use that we’re also updating uh several of our radar sites actually building new radar sites. A program called the Deep Advanced Space Radar or Dark is actually a new set of radars that we’re putting in three locations, Australia in the Outback, um Texas and then United Kingdom. And that’s going to give us space main awareness capabilities uh to trace to track really small objects in geosynchronous orbit. We’re also upgrading some of our internal Space Force antennas that we have or or telescopes to do uh space based tracking, but a combination of upgrades that we’re making on our systems as well as continuing purchasing of commercial and as more and more commercial companies start to take on space demand awareness mission, taking advantage of that. I think over time we’ll grow the capabilities that we need for space demand awareness. Do you need any, any more authorities um or for funding to make sure that this is going to happen or are we on the right track now, do you think?

Yeah. Well, I never say no to funding but the um I think we’re making plan. I think we’re making progress against our plan right now. I mean, we could always accelerate things with additional dollars. What about authorities for, for buying space to awareness data?

I don’t see any showstoppers with authorities. I don’t know if general gut it, ma’am. We are, we are not challenged by authorities. We’re challenged by resources. Uh We have the joint commercial office today that is a partnership with uh industry and uh 15 of our allied partners. We have locations in Schriever uh here in the United States. We have locations in Australia and locations in Europe where we are buying space domain awareness data from all the providers and then sharing it openly between all members that did not require any additional uh authorities. But we are spending on orders of about $25 million a year to buy that data and distribute that data. That brings me to my second point about the budget request. Uh We’ve seen throughout the first four years, a lot of ramping up uh for Space Force, uh the budget increased and that’s not the case this year. Uh General, we’re looking at flat budget growth which really amounts to a cut with uh when we consider inflation into the, into this and it does limit Space Force’s ability to meet the current uh threats that we face. You alluded to. That. Would you like to expound on that a little bit more?

Yes, ma’am. I I would put it in, in the context of two things. One right now, there is a capability gap between us and our near peer competitors. That capability gap is rapidly narrowing. Given the resources we have today, we had to make some very tough decisions between balancing today’s readiness and investing in tomorrow and then balancing also within the fiscal responsibilities act that really constrained what we were able to invest in the future. If we are able to either maintain that capability gap that we currently enjoy today or to widen that capability gap, we’re going to have to expand the amount of resources that we’re spending in space. Do you, how about how can we make that point clear?

Um You know, Senator King and I speak often about uh looking at classification of information that’s out there. So that first of all, um many of our colleagues, uh I I think would uh pay more attention to, to that if their constituents or the media is paying attention to what would be declassified and the information put out. Um So how do we get, get it to the public?

And we have got to talk about it. If you look at uh the Space Force that stood up in 2019, prior to 2019, we didn’t talk about this. It was too highly classified. We didn’t share data with our, with our allies, et cetera. Since 2019. We have changed that dialogue. We have a long way to catch up though in this information environment of educating the both the public as well as our members on the hill of what the challenges in space are. But more importantly, the dependencies that we have as a nation as a free society on space outside of the military on a day to day basis are immense and we’ve got to get that message across. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’ve often thought of the Fiscal Responsibility Act as a straitjacket we put on ourselves. Uh And now we’re, we’re dealing with the consequences not only in your budget but across the board. Um Senator Kramer, the godfather of the Space Force. Th thanks and your confession was very heartwarming. Um I bet it was really good for your soul. Um Anyway, that’s um thank you gentlemen for being and Frank and thank you for your candor too. I think this is really important. Um The um I want to start with the disruptor side of things. Uh Secretary cove you referenced nontraditional, you know, partners. Um Space is so interesting because the Air Force has these wonderful prime contractors that respond to whatever they’re asked of. Space seems to me to be responding to the private sector itself, the commercial side which, you know, has been so active. Um And that’s good. I remember one of my very first discussions with General Raymond was you have a white sheet of paper, please don’t please utilize the, the, the freedom that that provides and, and don’t adapt to the culture that you’re coming from. Um So whether it’s AAA disruptor in the private sector with the, the, you talk a lot about fixed price as a, as a contributor to competition. Um When I think of the SD A, the Space Development agency, I always, I always think of the SD A as the disruptor within the service itself. And I’m sure that creates a lot of tensions and, and I can recount several conversations in the last few years, particularly the early couple of years. Um So with the spiral development concept you all use with and the SD A uses help me understand the role of SD A as the acquisition, you know, sort of part of the shop and then their role in, in providing, whether it’s maintenance or management um participating or are they just sort of the, do you just go to them and say, buy, we need 100 more of these things by them. Um And, and I say that I asked that question, honestly, with some concern that SD A could end up getting a little bit handcuffed and not be the disruptor. We need them to be within the larger Space Force does if that, that makes sense and you could elaborate and correct me where I’m wrong. I think you’re right. Thank you. So, so SD A has been doing a magnificent job in terms of getting capabilities to orbit. So their first spiral of what they call T tr zero got 27 silts on orbit, 88 missile warning missile tracking satellites and, and uh 19 transport satellites and we’re demonstrating those capabilities. Now, tranche one will start launching again. Uh This December will be the first set of launches for there again, more transport satellites and then next spring more tracking satellites. So from where they fit in all things proliferated at low earth orbit that relate to missile warning, missile tracking as well as data transport SDAS or go to that is their strength. Their strength is small sats proliferation, low earth orbit, hundreds of miles above the earth. We tend to go to like space systems command for the more traditional missions such as military satellite communications at higher altitudes, higher altitudes of missile warning for a launch for space Domain awareness. And then we tend to go to space RCO for things that are related to, I’ll say protect and defend kind of missions that are unique that uh that go, that would go directly to support space command. But uh overall it’s working out pretty good. Um SD A is part of the Space Force. They’re part of the family they fit in even though they’re a little bit disruptive, they fit in pretty nicely. Actually, I think they are showing the way to the other parts of the organization that by building smaller and by using fixed price, you actually can go faster. I’m really impressed with the them bringing in new space companies like Sears Space and Rocket Lab and New York systems and using commercial bus lines like we see like at Airbus and at uh and at Turan Orbital and I think those are all really healthy things for the country. So, you know, under my watch, I expect to continue to see SD A can keep doing their great work. And I think the biggest thing we’ll see down the road is we need to make sure as we launch tranche one, which is operational systems next year that people use it, right. It doesn’t matter how fast we build them if no one uses them and we need to get the services to, to ramp on it and adopt it general just elaborating a little bit on that. And then is there a handoff or does SD a continue to sort of operate in that space?

Um, after the assets are, are, are launched in, as, as the secretary said, if no one uses them, but if no one’s using them does SD a continue sort of using them and, and helping develop, develop new and spiral as, as, as they’re operating what they’ve done already. Yes, Senator. So as Secretary Calve said, we have integrated space development agency fully into the United States. I understand that they are a part of the team, their capabilities are being detail planned into our war games. Our exercises uh going forward and into our uh war plans. So we are already counting on that capability and starting to test it. As like like Secretary K said, we’ve already proved link 16 from space. We are now taking that capability and playing it into the exercises to see how it plays, understanding how it’s going to uh support in a contested environment and how do we continue to take advantage of it?

Thank you. And I may, I, if there’s another round, I may get into some of the budget stuff. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. We use, we, we recently had a, a discussion with General Salzman about refueling. Uh and he wanted $20 million I think in the 2025 budget of how far are we behind China in refueling?

This, this 20 million was only for a study. Uh can, can you explain that, I mean 20 million for a study other than 20 million more for learning how to refuel and why we need to refuel and, and how far behind we are?

Anybody won’t answer. Yes, Senator. That’s a good question. And, and I do recall you asking the CSO about that question right now, we are doing the exploration of refueling and space to understand what does it actually contribute to the fight because there is a balance between building refueling capability into a satellite which is semi expensive and buying proliferated lower costs constellations. So we’re going to need a combination of both. We’re not sure what orbits are going to be, which we’re not sure how we’re going to do refueling as a service yet. So the $20 million is to actually study those effects anybody else wanna. And, and some of the fun actually goes to some demonstrations as well. We’re not, not on space, but on the ground side, actually looking at what it takes to go build the, the refueling unit and some demonstrations that we’re doing on the ground side in terms of just the, the cons of, well as the two space vehicles docking and being able to actually put a refueling module in and how the refueling works. So some of that money is, is going to study work to see where the bigger picture is. Um And other other, some of that money is also going to actually design work and demonstration work, going back to commercial capabilities. Um Are we leveraging those the right way. General. Yes, Senator, we are uh uh Secretary uh Hill just talked about publishing of the Dod S Commercial Space Strategy. On the heels of that, we published the Space Force Commercial Space Strategy, which is all about how do I take advantage of space to start filling in resiliency, capacity and redundancy into our capabilities?

What we do know today is, I cannot build all the kit that I’m gonna need. We’re going to have to rely on partnerships, partnerships with allies and partnerships with our uh industrial partners. If you go back to the history of the United States, we’ve always relied on our industrial base during times of crisis or conflict and this is gonna be no different. So we are currently designing in how to take maximum advantage of those capabilities and innovation that’s coming out of commercial to build out what we call hy hybrid architectures, which are a combination of dod civil allied and commercial platforms altogether to get us to that capacity and that resiliency that we need in the future. There’s not a week goes by that. I don’t have somebody coming from Huntsville that’s building new uh satellites. Uh uh I mean, it seems like it’s a growing trend and whether it’s building or refueling or using nuclear energy to, to in, in satellites or offensive defensive satellites. Uh Do y’all see the same thing?

I mean, are, are y’all overwhelmed with, with people that are getting in the satellite business sector. It’s, it’s amazing. I mean, we’re very fortunate, knock on wood and I hope it keeps the way that the space economy is starting to boom. And we’re seeing a amazing entrepreneurship from across the United States and companies come in. I it’s a week, doesn’t go by that. A new company doesn’t come in and tell me about some great concept that they’re pursuing and doing. And what’s really wonderful is that they’re also getting great investment dollars as well to be able to start themselves off. So we’re excited about the new space economy. That’s booming. Seems like they got a lot of money they want to invest, which is fine with us, right?

It helps us all uh general. What about um retention, recruiting and retention in the Space Force?

Could you talk a little bit about that?

Thank you, Senator. We have the highest recruiting and retention in the United States Space Force today. We have continuously exceeded our recruiting goals by several 100. We have more people beaten on our door to come into the Space Force than we can possibly take efficiently today. So that’s a great problem from the retention side of the equation. We’re also doing great. We’re in the high nineties on both the listed and on civilians and we’re able to retain that technical talent that we need for a complicated domain. It seems like that would be your, one of your most important things of retention experience a lot of money out there in the private sector as we just talked about bill and satellites. So you don’t see any problem in retention. We haven’t had that problem. No, sir, we have not had that retention tonight today in the United States Space Force, we are constantly watching for it. We are constantly trying to make sure that we’re giving our guardians an experience and they were giving them the tools that they need to be successful. But like I said, right now, we’re in the high nineties for both our enlisted and our officers for retention. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Send the rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First. Let me just say thanks to all of you for your service to our country and we appreciate the opportunity to have this open briefing. Um II I want to focus on just a couple of items that I think um we sometimes miss in the discussion when we’re in a classified session and, and, and part of it is, is the budget itself uh on May 1st of this year in front of the uh the S ac hearing on the Space Force Posture. Um It was reported that that we’ve got basically a decrease in the Space Force budget for 25 from 24. Um The request in the Fy 25 is 29.4 billion, which is a decrease of $600 million from Fy 24. Uh 18.7 billion for research development and testing. Um The fy 24 request was 19.2 billion. The enacted was 18.6 that’s almost $600 million less. Uh We’re talking an additional 600 million, 650 million less with regard to procurement. And we’re talking 100 and $22 million less with regard to operations and maintenance. And we’re looking at uh about 9 million less almost 10 million less with regard to military personnel. Look at it that does not bode well for the fact that out of the five domains, we’ve got airline C space and cyberspace to walk in and suggest that while China and Russia are both expanding their operations in space, it would appear from the budget numbers themselves that we’re suggesting a decrease in our operational capacity. Mr. Hill, your thoughts, Senator Rounds that hits the nail on the head of a problem we face this year. We’ve all mentioned it. Uh I mentioned it uh I think chairman or the I remember mentioned the uh the constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. One, that was one of the factors we had to deal with this year. Two is something that uh General Gule spoke to the the the different nature of the Space Force budget. So when you get through, putting together all the must pay bills and the Department of Defense says must pay bills of salary and support to families and, and uh operations and so forth of the forces. Um And you get down to what’s left of discretionary you come down to and areas like readiness research, development, test and evaluation and procurement. And so where are you going to make those cuts?

The cuts focused more, maintain the readiness sacrifice some of the future and that those investment accounts are very uh the Space Force has a high concentration. Let me, let me go on General Goodle iii, I think you, you wear the uniform and it’s always your professional opinion that we’re looking for. And that is, is how much do you need in order to do your job. And right now, I’m looking at this saying we’re reducing what you have and expecting you to get the job done. The bottom line is, is we’re expecting more out of Space Force in the next couple of years than we’ve ever expected in the past as we remove some of our air based capabilities. ISR specifically, what is the number that is appropriate as opposed to what we’re seeing in the proposed budget?

Senator, I can’t give you a number. I can tell you that the threat is increasing daily. They are intent on not only denying our ability to use space, they are actually proving extremely capable at denying our ability to use space and they are trying to narrow that gap of capability down to zero or even negative and we’ve got to increase that gap general, if, if, if we were in a classified session and we asked you which programs, which products, which plans you proposed were denied in this budget?

Would you be able to give us a straight answer at that time?

Yes, sir. Thank you. Uh Lo look, let me go on just a little bit right now. We’ve got guys in the Gulf setting on destroyers and other, other, other uh uh equipment that we’ve got that are in harm’s way. Part of what we expect is to be able to provide them with accurate information. Intel ISR, uh, to be able to identify the guys that are shooting at them. The hoodies today, uh, in the Gulf, we have reduced numbers of those types of assets available and yet we’ve got guys still sitting there now they’re knocking off the actual, the actual weapons that are being shot at them. But I think it’s about time that we start using the assets that we’ve got to find the guys that are making the decisions and when to shoot them and take them out before they’re attacking our people. The ISR that we’ve got right now is air based and space based. Are we in a position to provide the type of ISR necessary today in space to actually provide these folks with real time information about who the bad guys are and where they’re at and how we get at them?

Yes, Senator, we can’t provide that information from space and we do it every single day. But as this threat continues to mature, we’re going to need additional is sr capabilities both in air as well as in space. Thank you. I think that’s a very straightforward. We need both, don’t we?

In, in, in air and space?

Yes, sir. And right now we’re short on both in the closer in though. We get to the actual threat itself. We need to start going more towards space to become resilient and to get around the anti-access area denial capabilities of our adversaries. But the standoff capability very much needs to be airborne and into other types of conflict. It also needs to be airborne. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warren. Uh Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it destroyed Ukraine’s internet and its telephone access and to help get Ukraine back online. SpaceX, one of our defense contractors donated satellite internet terminals called Starlink. And this allowed Ukrainian soldiers to run apps to target Russian forces and to be able to communicate with loved ones back home. Earlier this month, I wrote to dod about Russia’s use of starlink terminals. Uh Reports indicate that Russia has been able to buy starlink terminals on the black market and that SpaceX has not cut off their access and that provides a major advantage to Russia on the battlefield. Now, SpaceX is owned by Elon Musk who has advocated for quote a peace plan close quote that report suggests may have been developed. After speaking with Vladimir Putin commerce has a constitutional responsibility to make sure that taxpayer money does not go to companies that undermine us national security goals. So I think it’s critical that we get to the bottom of this Mr. Hill, you oversee our space and missile defense and you’ve been working with space X to counter illicit use of starlink terminals. Let me start by asking was SpaceX completely cooperated with dod in its efforts to address the use of starlink terminals by Russian forces. Senator. Not only has SpaceX been very cooper with the entire United States government and the government of Ukraine, they’ve been forward leaning and identifying and bringing information to us. Good, good. I’m glad to hear it because it’s obviously critical that dod contractors aren’t undermining us foreign policy. So Russia’s outdated communications have been a major contributor to their failures in Ukraine. Starling obviously would be enormously valuable to the Russians. Uh It would provide Russia with secure communications that they sorely need, which would significantly erode Ukraine’s advantage on the battlefield. And I understand this is classified uh an unclassified environment. So I don’t want to go anywhere where we shouldn’t, but I think there’s a compelling public interest to conduct this oversight and to understand how dod is plugging leaks here. So Mr. Hill in the broadest terms, can you describe how you worked with Space X to address it to this illicit use. So in broadest terms, um recognizing that um Russia has long standing experience operating black markets and now leveraging black markets of their own. Um uh We have one point of the commercial integration cell. This is a cell uh that combined Space Operations Center where commercial companies and the US government can work together and can share information including company proprietary information and classified information. That’s one point where we can learn what’s going on. They can share with us what they’re seeing, we can share what they’re seeing um broader across the government. Uh We can, we can then develop strategies. Is it better to identify all the terminals that should be left on or should we identify terminals that should be turned off?

Different types of approach to list?

We’ve done that with them?

Ok. So let me ask this, maybe, uh a little more pointedly, do you have confidence that moving forward dod can identify illicit Russian use of Starlink services and completely shut them off?

I think this will be a continuous problem. I take that as a no, I, I think we, we can continue to identify them and turn them off, but I think Russia will not stop it. Ok. So you think it’s going to be an ongoing process?

You know, war obviously is an unpredictable unfolding, but we shouldn’t have to worry about whether or not us contractors are supporting our adversaries or giving access to our adversaries and my understanding is that Space Force is negotiating an extension of its Starlink contract with SpaceX. So Mr. Hill, can you assure me that as you renegotiate this contract, that you will have provisions in place that will require SpaceX to do everything within its ability to prevent illicit use by Russia and other forces. Our contracts in conjunction with the licenses that regulatory agencies provide and that’s dod doesn’t control those together. They ensure that they ensure what you’re looking for and SpaceX complies with our contracts and they comply with the licenses they have from regulatory agencies who can enforce those licenses and the various civil inc criminals. Well, ok, I’m, I’m not quite, I just want to make sure I’m understanding and I get it. We are in an unclassified setting here. The devil is always in the details. Uh I taught contract law for many years. Uh So I would ask you to submit to the committee the conditions that give you confidence that SpaceX is bound contractually so that it will prevent illicit use of those terminals by Russia. You know, I just think it’s critically important that dod hold its contractors accountable for any mismanagement or any illegal acquisition of its hardware and services by bad actors. And we just want to make sure that Russia is not getting an advantage here. And in responding to the letter that you mentioned at the outset, we will be addressing those kinds of things for you appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mister Chairman, Senator Kramer was next. Thank you. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Uh Thank you for all being here for the work that you do really appreciate it. Um I’m gonna just go right into it and talk about uh Iran Russia. We’re going to stay on this topic, uh a little bit about Russia, but now Iran Russia and their space collaboration because they’re both driven by a shared interest in countering us superiority in space. Iran and Russia, they are deepening their co-operation in space. And we know just this past February Russia launched an Iranian satellite into orbit and the two countries have signed agreement for their space industries to cooper. Iran’s tenure. Space program relies on Russian assistance for its operations from launching their high payload satellites to the ultimate goal of sending an Iranian into space. So Mr. Hill, what are the security?

And I’m not sure if you can speak to the threat implications, but uh uh maybe the general can and knowing that we’re in an open session of the joint Iranian Russian Space Cooper operation. And how is the US addressing and navigating this emerging state partnership uh that uh I think we might be worried about. And I would add, it doesn’t stop at Iran. It also involves North Korea uh as as we’ve seen with Iran and North Korea providing Russia uh missiles to uh support Russia’s operations in Ukraine and then Russia likely providing them technology assistance uh in the, in their programs to expand the threats that they present to us and to others. Um The uh responses of uh controlling transfers of technology have, have their limitations. Um The uh ability to, you certainly are, are watching what they’re doing. But the ability to continue cutting off Russian and Iran and North Korea is fundamentally the crux of it, but they’re going to keep pressing on and maybe we probably need a closed session to talk about how, what this really entails. And so um if you can speak to it at all, otherwise we will wait for the closed sessions. Senator, I cannot go into the, the specific details. I can tell you it’s troubling. Uh We are seeing proliferation of technology. Uh We are seeing uh support of launch technology which can quickly lead to something larger like an intercontinental ballistic missile. Uh Russia is a nuclear armed nation, we definitely don’t want that technology to proliferate and then it also opens up additional fronts of concern uh in during conflict. Thank you. I appreciate that. We’ll look forward to the closed session. Um And I’m gonna build on this because um we have international partners, just like they have international partnerships, we have our own international partnerships and so we work with our partners and allies. It’s crucial to providing this layered um comprehensive approach that we’re gonna need to combat this. And so the success of International Cooper was actually seen in the recent unsuccessful attack on Israel carried out by Iran and the successful shoot down of over 300 inbound threats. And that defensive action relied on sharing space capabilities with our partners in the region. So general, can you discuss the importance of these international partnerships?

Um as much as you can in, in response that we just asked and, and really about what happened just recently, we thwarted that attack helped to thwart that on Israel by Iran. Yes, ma’am. I, I would say our partnerships both with industry and with our allies is one of our competitive advantages that we continue to nurture and to uh uh expand. Um It is hard to be everywhere at all times. As you saw in the Middle East, there, there were threats coming from multiple different directions. And luckily, we have spent many years working with our allies to integrate our capabilities so that what we see they see uh and that we can actually do handoffs of threats from one nation to another and that actually paid a lot of dividends. So going forward, I would expect to see greater partnerships with our allies, not less, a lot of our strength is in our partnerships and our allies and friends around the world. And that continued training and investing in that. And speaking of investing in what you need to do all this, it relies on technology. So we have to have the technology workforce and we have a huge shortage. There is uh not just in this area and in every area of technology, it’s a vital part of ensuring that every bit of our armed services is capable and prepared for the threats that are coming towards us, especially space. And so I’m gonna keep going back to you general as the newest branch of the armed service. Um Do you currently possess and have access to the skilled workforce?

You need to complete your mission?

And what are the challenges um that you’re facing?

Uh recruiting?

What do we need to do to help you invest in, in that kind of um workforce that you’re gonna need to enter in to uh keep us safe and space. Thank you. As I, as I stated a little bit earlier, our retention and our recruiting are extremely high. We are exceeding our recruiting numbers every year by several 100. But what’s more important is the quality and the experience level of those recruits is off the charts. Uh Most of them are a little older than their, than their normal peers that are coming in recruiting. 53% of them have at least a bachelor’s degree or a uh 14 hours plus towards it. 14% of our recruits actually have a bachelor’s degree or higher. When we recruit them, it is a very technical workforce. So today we are meeting those numbers. Uh the, the, the challenge going forward is going, how do I grow efficiently?

I can’t just accept everybody that wants to come in today and, and get them trained. Uh So we are trying to balance our, our training resources with how many people we can recruit going forward. And what is, what is an efficient way to grow forward in the, in the future?

Thank you. Appreciate that. I yield back. Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, I think I’ll start with the secretary here. Um So China and Russia has continuously and uh developing anti-satellite systems. Um and that really concerns. I think all of us and I want to talk specifically about one capability we have on orbit and that’s the space based infrared system that we use. It’s on orbit today that we use to detect launches from the surface um often um strategic ballistic missiles that could be heading in our direction and they could be vulnerable. And I wanna understand from you, Mr. Secretary. Um have we be been thinking about the degradation and maybe denial of use of that system?

And what that would mean overall to our missile warning capability?

Yes, yes, we have. In fact, uh we are re architecting that system and building a plier layer at medium earth orbit and a plier layer in low earth orbit. In fact, there’s eight satellites that we launched already for the leo option just against that threat. And so we’ll maintain the through orbit diversity and through proliferation. So we’ll maintain the GEO orbit for the, for the near term. We’ll have the neo orbit coming of age starting in 26 and we’ll have the Leo orbit starting to get populated now. So because you are correct, because of the threat against capabilities, like missile warning that the nation relies on it needs, we are fundamentally changing the architecture to build a plier layer layer at Leo and Mio. That’s highly, much more highly resilient than the few big juicy targets today at GEO. And you know, beyond that, um you know, we have uh you know, system that looks over the horizon, you know, with radar, but beyond that, there’s o other than the um you know, orbit capability, the infrared capability we have in space, there’s probably not many other ways to detect a first launch of a of a ballistic missile. Is that correct?

I’m not as familiar with uh what our terrestrial based systems. I I know from space that we, we rely really heavily on the old D SPS as well as what’s known as Cibber, like you mentioned for there a warning from space. Yeah, I’m really concerned about this because if, if we were to lose the, you know, space based infrared, you know, system, um it makes us very vulnerable to a first strike without being able to detect it. You’re right. But I mean, on the good side, sir, we are the Space Force has been very proactive in this area. We are funded and we are building and we’re already starting to launch more proliferated systems to do missile warning and ad to also help track and to the extent that we can talk about it in this setting. Uh Can you, can you give us an idea of when this Mio and Leo system will be complete?

Yeah, the uh so there’s a demo satellites on orbit and Leo today that are being tested, there’s uh there’s another 32 that will go up over the 2526 timeframe in Leo. That’ll be what we call a tranche one. And on the me O side right now, we have plan nine satellites in the 2627 time frame. And what level of redundancy does that provide us?

So what I’m getting at is how many of those could we lose in Leo and Bo and still retain the full capability to detect a launch from Russia or China?

The system is really interesting is, is the, I think our space warfare analysis did a great job designing it. And what it is is that they’re basically independent layers. So you could take out all of one and still do the mission with the other. As an example, you could take out the Leo’s constellation, you could get everything from me o or vice versa. Could you take out half of the Mio satellites as well and get the coverage you need, you know, the the beauty of proliferation is uh you know, you, you get the coverage through having more assets. I think the more you take out, you know, the the more capability you lose. Right. And so, but uh but building smaller systems, you can replenish much quicker as well. So, but, but obviously sir, like you’re right, the more you take out, the more it hurts. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mister Turner. Thank you. We’ll have a second round for those who are interested, Mister Hill just to clarify in your exchanges with Senator Warren. Is there any evidence that Starlink or SpaceX is willingly or knowingly allowing the Russians to utilize those black market terminals that they’ve acquired?

To. The contrary, there is every evidence that when SpaceX becomes aware of things, they try to work with the US government to come up with the best solution for how to turn them off to confirm that those terminals should be turned off and that they’re not getting like a false positive. So there’s no, there’s no evidence that SpaceX is, as I say, willingly trying to utilize. You are correct. Thank you, General, you’ve talked several times about working with allies. It strikes me that that’s one of our really asymmetric advantages. Are we working with allies also?

And I suppose this could go to either of you in terms of the development of this, of these technologies. In other words, all wisdom on technology doesn’t necessarily reside here and we’ve got allies like Japan, the Eu Scandinavia that could be very, we could get more uh more out of our dollars if we are working jointly with uh with these close allies. Yes, Senator, we are, we are building uh uh collaborative projects. Uh for example, uh sat com with Luxembourg, sat com with Norway uh PNT with uh Japan. Uh So we are broadening out those partnerships on a daily basis building ground based radars in Australia uh as well as in the UK uh collaborating on launch with New Zealand. So we are across the board trying to embrace our allies and I will give uh uh kudos to our folks and policy that we’re able to break down the classification barriers that once we put those into place, we’ll also allow us to have broader conversations with our allies in my discussions with some of our allies. Itar keeps coming up as a possible barrier. Is that how do we, how are we dealing with that?

Pass that to Secretary Chia passing to John Hill?

That’s a state department issue. OK. Is, is this ITAR is always a concern um uh that our allies will have if they are worried about having to incorporate us technologies into systems, they are developing, they worry that somehow our licensing system will prevent them doing what they want to do. I think with respect to the question though of just general collaboration between the defense department and allies um as they grow their defense budgets to meet, for example, NATO targets ITAR isn’t really a factor in, in that situation, we can develop the collaborative program and, and then work with the allies, all of what we’ve been talking about today. In terms of defense has largely been about resiliency, proliferation, many systems, the cornerstone of our defense strategy for 70 years has however, has been deterrence. That is the adversary fears, the consequences of an aggressive action against this country is deterrence part of our strategy in space. Mister Secretary, I think. Absolutely yes. But I think one of the challenges is, is, is the classification levels. And so it’s not deterrence. If the adversary doesn’t know about it, you are correct and I’ll, I’ll defer it to uh to General Gula, the Space Force on deterrence. That’s Doctor Strangelove, 101. General Senator integrated deterrence is a foundation of our strategy. Uh We do balance on a day to day basis, what capabilities we decide to reveal and conceal uh to make sure that the adversary knows that uh we are intent on maintaining that capability gap and protecting and defending our capabilities on a day to day basis. Uh So in, in deterrence is the cornerstone of every, everything that we’re trying to do. And if you think back to General Saltzman, uh one of his core themes is a competitive, endurance, under competitive endurance. We’d rather be in a state of constant competition and to deter aggression rather than be into a state of conflict. Thank you. I have to go to another hearing. Vice chair Fisher is going to preside and it’s over to her for a second round of questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman uh General again to follow up with uh uh what the chairman was talking about and tying it into the budget. Um I know there’s a robust unfunded priorities list, both from General Whiting and from General Salzman. And in this setting, can you discuss some of the general capabilities that Space Force could move ahead with if you were provided with those additional resources?

Um When we talk about deterrence, that’s, that’s the point of this. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator uh General Saltzman earlier last month, submitted our unfunded priority list to the tune of about $1.15 billion in that list was resiliency for our ground systems, uh power upgrades, uh HVAC systems, what have you because the Space Force fights from in place. So our facilities, our power and cooling is really our JP eight, our fuel if you will, that is our weapon system. So he’s asking for money to invest in real. He asked for money in the working capital fund uh to get it to, to remove it from D A over to the Space Force so that we have a business model to actually procure additional commercial capacity for our warfighters in for our nation. He asked for $19 million for National Space and Test and Training Center, which is building out our ability to do advanced test and advanced training in a live virtual constructive environment. He asked for $60 million to restore the the small launch uh program so that we can provide rides, shares to our uh industry partners and to our academic partners. He asked for $786 million in classified space control capabilities to ensure that we can protect and defend our ability, our capabilities on space. And he asked for $43 million to allow the Space Development Agency to do experimentation. Thank you, sir, very much. Hopefully we can uh start to deliver on some of those. Uh Senator Kramer. Do you have additional questions?

Thank you. Send rounds any other questions?

Thank you madam chair or vice chair uh for Mr. Hill and uh General Gut Line. Are you aware of the uh 20 month embers study that authorized, it was authorized to explore the sharing of the electromagnetic spectrum in the critical 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band?

I am. Yeah. And are you aware that this was a study that included the whole of government as well as representatives of defense contractors and the telecommunications industry?

Yes, Senator Senator, are you aware of the finding of this interagency study group that sharing in this band between federal and commercial systems is not feasible unless and I quote certain regulatory technological and resourcing conditions are met and implemented. Yes, sir. Are you also aware that the estimate of this interagency study was that implementing the conditions could take 30 years and $260 billion in this portion of the electromagnetic band alone, even if the very stringent conditions were able to be met. Are you also aware of the legislative proposals in the Commerce Committee calling for the use of the 7 to 8 gigahertz band of the spectrum where the Space Force and other services maintain similarly critical systems for the defense of our country. Can you tell the subcommittee where you stand on these efforts if they proceed forward without the most stringent conditions such as the development and implementation of the dynamic spectrum sharing, the interference safeguards and a massive influx of federal resources to maintain the defense of this country. Center spectrum is vital to our way of life. It is actually a natural resource just like water or air and just like water or air. We need to protect that vital resource. We need to make sure it’s not contested. We make sure it’s not polluted and we need to make sure it’s not controlled. If you look at the 7 to 8 gigahertz spectrum band that you’re talking about, that is where most of our uh NC three. So our nuclear command and control capabilities lie uh those systems have been purposely devi designed for that spectrum. And if we were pushed outside of that spectrum, those systems that took us decades to develop and billions of dollars to develop would have to be reconstituted in some sort or fashion. If you look at just the wide band gap filler system, we have 10 of those on orbit today. They cost about $600 million a per a piece. Each one of those takes four years to develop. Just looking at just that one piece of the architecture for wide band gap filler, that’s $6 billion and at least a decade to reconstitute to, to, to, to assume that we can even find another spectrum that it could operate. You amplify that across all of our capabilities and you start to see the large numbers that you just uh talked about in that study. So it would be detrimental to us to lose that spectrum. Mr. Hill. Anything to add to that?

That was excellent summary of how we use it. The National Security Community, Defense Department, intelligence community. When we have been allocated spectrum, we have invested heavily to utilize that spectrum. The nation has tremendous investments that are put at risk. When we, if we carelessly start reallocating spectrum, the national security community needs to be at the table. Whenever this conversation comes up. Would you suspect that our adversaries would love to see us uh try to disrupt our ability to use those specific bans. Absolutely. Our adversaries always like to see us disrupt ourselves. We have met the enemy and sometimes the enemy is us. One other thought. I I note also that in the 3.1 to 3.4 gigahertz area, the uh LRDR or the long range discriminating radar actually sits in that band as well, doesn’t it?

It does. And that is our last line of defense to protect the homeland from a nuclear launch from North Korea. Thank you. Thank you madam chair. Thank you, Senator rounds for opening up that line of discussion. I would just follow that up as a member of the Commerce Committee that there um are some bills out there that look at spectrum auctions. Uh There are deep concerns by many members obviously on armed services committee, but uh on Commerce Committee as well. And do you believe it would be wise?

In fact, it would be vital for senators before um moving on any kind of legislation to have auction in the bands that were discussed previously by Senator rounds that they would at least contact dod for technical advice. Yes, Senator, yes, the defense department needs to be part of the conversation. Thank you. As you said, this is a national security issue and it would be detrimental for us to lose access of that spectrum for our security. Is that, am I restating that correctly?

Yes, it would be detrimental for us to lose access to that natural resource correctly and more, more succinctly than I usually do. You did a nice job, Mister Hill?

Thank you very much. Anything else from senators that are present?

Thank you very much. And with that, I thank our uh panel for being here. Look forward to continuing our discussions and this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.