Navy Adm. Charles A. “Chas” Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, speaks at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium, August 4, 2020.
Transcript
Anything in front of us, and that’s what we’re all about in our business. I do want to thank Mayor Tommy battle for being an ally in missile defense. And, of course, thanks to Lieutenant General Dick Formica, Mr Ronnie Chronis, Ter and the entire symposium Committee for inviting me to speak and putting together this event. So there’s one thing I love. It’s telling See stories so severe with me here for a quick one. So you should know. I bristle when I hear the Department of Defense being accused of being stuck in a Cold War. And that happens, right? Tickling my mission sets. There’s probably only a few 100 of us left on active duty, even served during the Cold War. I was one of them. One of you I got tell you, as a young lieutenant, I can assure you, my focus was on getting qualified, getting my dolphins. And I’m pretty sure I didn’t begin to grasp the up geo strategic implications of that struggle at the time, right? A grass. One thing we did business very differently. Back then. We knew it each and every time we went underway. I’m a submariner, and we knew we did that it could happen. It could go down. And it could be for all the marbles. War could break out with little warning, and it could easily go nuclear. So we trained every day for that fight. We had the enemy order of battle memorized, and everything started with a threat. Dual the emitters, all the sonars, all the weapons systems. M. Khan was the norm. I didn’t know my submarine had a radar for a year, so it has never turned it on. Opsec was the norm. Every time I turned over his duty officer, officer of the deck, it included a review of what our shifts assignment was gonna be if the war went down on that watch, like in the next six hours. And I assert, I submit this nation in our military has not had to seriously consider competition through crisis and possible armed conflict with a nuclear capable peer in, like, nearly 30 years. Look, I know, and I certainly know this isn’t the Cold War all over again. I tell that story to explain why we need to return to a mindset where it all starts with a threat. Coal is over and we’re having a sustainment phase on the war on terror. But we’re now in an era of great competition, and I’ll tell you, that’s our national security strategy, sells us that, and we are engaged in great power competition. So we, as a nation of military need to focus on the threats in front of us. And those threats go all the way down to the gray zone that area below traditional conventional armed conflict. We cannot wait for conventional conflict to break out. Before we start thinking about nuclear deterrence, we have to go all the way into the gray zone to deter actions and compete. Make sure an adversary doesn’t miscalculate where they believe they can win with a jump in escalation. This is like us strategic command exists. We are here to deter great power war in this year of great power competition. At the end of my tours, Commander of Stratcom, I want to be able to say what my predecessor, General Heighten, and his predecessor, Admiral Haney, in back to general paler, want to be able to say we deterred strategic attack. So my three priorities for the Commander straightforward and have not changed about all else. We will provide strategic deterrence. And if deterrence fails, we’re prepared to deliver a decisive response. Is general heightened? Used to say, I mean decisive in every possible way. We’re going to do this with a resilient, equipped, trained and combat ready force. This is what it’s all about. The Nuclear Posture Review states that the highest US nuclear policy and strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale, are always ready to execute our mission on a moment’s notice. We can Onley accomplish both of those because of the 150,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians across the globe performing our mission each and every day. I also have three tenants for the command to help accomplish my priorities, these air more time dimensional, if you will, the person to be ready to man battle stations and I forgive the Navy reference there. But what that means is we all need to do whatever it takes to ensure that we, as individuals, can execute our mission with NASCAR. Hits stopped like efficiency. That’s what we focus on today. Next, we need to follow the shot basketball reference on programs and initiatives we’ve started. It doesn’t matter how many things we start. It matters how many things we complete. And finally we need to forge 21st century strategic deterrence. The strategic environment has changed from the Cold War, through the war on tower and now into great power competition. We need to ensure our strategies, plans, capabilities and operations are integrated across all domains. On the full spectrum of conflict, we must home in our capabilities based on the threats we face or frankly, we run. The risk of developing and fielding capabilities will just never use risk not using advanced capabilities, because our adversary may escalate the conflict with nucular used before we even get a chance. We may think escalation is linear, but I tell you, it is not particularly in a room full of engineers and scientists. You know, when you have opposing forces in a closed system is anything but linear with discontinuities. And we have to be prepared for our adversaries to think that maybe a jump in escalation is the only way to win. So just like my predecessors, Admiral Haney and General heightened stress the security environment we live in is very different than the security environment, our strategic concepts originally designed for when they were originally designed. It was for a bipolar environment. We must tailor our strategies, plans and capabilities for the full spectrum of conflict in a world with more than one nuclear capable Pierre, make no mistake, the Triad and his capabilities are robust, have been useful in ways that they weren’t necessarily designed for. The fact that our Triad still provides the flexibility to address changing threats in this new era is a testament to its original designers and everyone who has maintained, operated and sustained it. Over the lifetime of these systems, we’re in a different world. Russia, for example, has been modernizing its strategic forces for almost 20 years and is about 70% complete. They’re modernizing their try it of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear missile submarines and long range bombers, and the command and control for those systems. Additionally, they’re developing hypersonic glide vehicles. They vote, reported open press. They have them on alert. They have nuclear armed and nuclear power torpedoes and cruise missiles, and all of these weapons systems upgrades are in addition to their non treaty accountable nuclear weapons stockpile numbering in the thousands. Obviously, it would be easier for me to list the systems Russia is not modernizing instead of the ones they are now with China. You have to watch what they do, not what they say and look at what they’ve done with their conventional arsenal. If you go back to 2010 they’ve almost doubled the number of I C B. M’s from 50 to 90. By our highest estimates, they have more than tripled their number of short range ballistic missiles from 400 to 1500. They designed and built two aircraft carriers for the first time in their history. This is one of my favorites. They created from scratch a Coast Guard in 2013 and they already have 255 Coast Guard ships. Crime example of China’s Gray’s own actions, where they’re using this new fleet to enforce contested maritime claims. Beneath the level of open conflict in the South and east China seas, they’re also taking significant strides to expand and modernize their nuclear capability. They’re expected to double in size of their nuclear stockpile of next decade, there soon gonna have their version of a triad when they complete their long range strategic bomber. They’re improving Their silo, based on Road Mobile I C B M. Is working. Increased the range of their slbm, his command and control. It’s the whole thing. If you look at the writing on the wall, nuclear is just the next thing on the Chinese to do list, and it is likely to follow the same pattern as their conventional forces. And just like Russia, China spending significant resource is on advanced capabilities like hyper sonics space and cyber capabilities is a mistake to consider China as some smaller, lesser included case of Russia. The list goes on. North Korea continues his illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons are advancing their missile systems as you more than most, are acutely aware these capabilities threaten our forces and allies in the region. And beyond that, you are where the most. There I CVM test in the last few years and even pose a threat to our homeland. It was developed and fielded a large arsenal ballistic missiles in the Middle East. The systems construct targets throughout the region and threaten our interests there and our unlearned lesson that I’m borrowing this from General Raymond hashtag space. It’s hard when they attempted to launch a space vehicle earlier this year. Now they weren’t fully successful. But they are trying to enter the space domain and increased the area they’re trying to influence. So why am I summarizing the threats our nation faces? You’re all very aware of these threats. I just reiterated the threats to you because they’re the why when we talk about the capabilities and integration we need in our warfighting strategies, plans and operations that was the commander of U. S Strategic Command. I am laser focused on modernizing our triad and its supporting infrastructure like nuclear command, control and communications. I also have an important role is a coordinating authority for global missile defense. Each region is focused on protecting their assets through a combination of active and passive defensive measures. And you are the best in the world at what you do. I’m here to increase missile depends integration and enable protection not just within a Naor, but across a Lars as well. I d c s is worn white. The missile defense community is working to integrate our capabilities when testing is complete and I BCS can link all of our missile defense systems together, that’s gonna be an enormous step forward in the Jazz C two arena. In order to deter our adversaries in the 21st century, we need toe affect and alter their decision calculus. We need them to know that any attack on the United States, our allies will have little margin probability of success and that our response will result in a very bad day for them. We as a nation had become very comfortable operating in a permissive environment. We don’t necessarily exercise their practice for conflict in a truly contested environment, and we need to prepare for that. We need to make sure capabilities provide adequate command and control for the times. We need it the most. So I understand the high altitude experts at Army Space and Missile Defense Center of Excellence is looking into technologies to supplement our existing capabilities. If our space assets are jammed or incapacitated for any period of time, I altitude assets can help provide the coverage on short notice and low costs, part of a concept called space in Depth. We need to follow the shot, ensure these high altitude capabilities air fully developed available, fielded and you wives. Our adversaries, as you know, are developing hypersonic glide vehicles and nuclear powered cruise missiles. We need ways to defend against these and normal technologies. We can’t find our way to purse aid our emissaries to adjust their decision calculus. We may not be able to deter an attack. Have a serious develop these advanced weapons systems we need to develop in fuel capabilities. To counter these threats. I want to return to integration as I think it is one of the most important pieces of our strategies, plans and ops. While the phrase any sensor best shooter typically applies toe active missile defense, perhaps we should consider it as we endeavoured implement the missile defence reviews comprehensive missile defense strategy. We go to plan our options. We know what we’re up against. We need to understand the effectiveness of offensive and defensive capabilities against an adversary before the conflict. That understanding enables commanders to make risk informed Decisions related to active and passive defense and offensive prelaunch attack operations are strategies, plans, policies and office will be affected by our ability to integrate these capabilities we failed to pursue. The MDR is recommended comprehensive approach to missile defense capabilities, which integrates offense and defense, I think is going to be next to impossible to keep up with a threat. Sweet Face is just relatively cheap for an adversary to shoot it us. But it is expensive and difficult to stop every single missile during flight. Simply put off initiative form defense vice versa. If we’re confident, for example, that are active, missile defenses can shoot down adversaries. Missile A but not necessarily their missile. See, we know we must make. This will see a higher priority for offensive prelaunch attack operations. Achieving this level situational awareness is not easy, but we must be able to integrate our offense and defense capabilities to fully realize a comprehensive view of any sensor. Best shooter in the increasingly lethal missile defensive armour. In some respects, Missile Defense Command in control is the Pathfinder, where the department needs to go more broadly and command and control is showing the way ahead for Jazz C two. So keep doing what you’re doing. So in the 21st century, deterrence is more a lot more than just nuclear. It’s deterring multiple adversaries at all domains. Strategic deterrence is the highest priority mission in the Department of Defense is foundational to our national defense and underpins every US military operation around the wall. But this is based on the most fundamental assumption of all of our strategies and plans the assumption that strategic deterrence will hold. We like to think deterrence will hold, but will it hold in ways we haven’t tested it in before? This assumption is going to be tested in new ways, but I know a minimum for it to hold. We’re gonna need that try at a recapitalized triad. We’re gonna need combat ready forces and we’re gonna need missile defense. Missile defense capabilities give our adversaries pause to rethink their decision Calculus. Effective missile defense deters adversaries from attacking because they know they have little chance for success and any potential response could be devastated. So we have to rethink how we do business in this era of great power competition. Fundamentals haven’t changed incredibly denied benefit and impose costs. But we must change how we pursue these objectives and our current plans have about as much in common with the old Cold War Single integrated operational plan is your smartphone does with an old rotary telephone, but it isn’t enough. We need to continue improving our Taylor to integrated approach to deterrence and missile defense capabilities are vital to deterrence strategy, and they must be integrated and tailor to the threats ahead of us. And you have to measure it. It’s or how to measure that. Stratcom has developed a risk of strategic deterrence failure analysis. It’s based on the idea of the many risks Commander must consider. You are so consequential they must be called out, specifically measured and acted upon it all times the risk of a strategic deterrence failure and inside that the bright line of a nuclear deterrence failure and the risk of a strike on the homeland we just dropped Tom, have a lead on the first risk and we’re working, integrate planning and execution processes through competition, crisis and conflict. We want everyone across the department to continuously consider the risk of strategic deterrence failure. The progress you are making and the relations just between government and industry are important or national defense and integrated strategic deterrence. An integrated approach will help us acquire the best capabilities to achieve the national security strategy and the national defense strategy objectives in order to be successful, we need to make sure we integrate our efforts not just in the department’s planning and execution, but with industry and the whole government as well. We must look at the strategic environment as it is not is what we want it to be. And I ask each of you to work with their counterparts across the department, inter agency and industry to find the best solutions for the complicated strategic environment we face. The threats are riel, and because of everything you all are working on, will be ready if conflict begins on our watch. Thank you, Atmel Richard taking the time to record those X sexual comments. And we’re very grateful and thankful for his leadership in Stratcom doing what he does to protect our nation’s security Lieutenant Car Blur. And his role is the commanding general of the Joint Functional Combatant Command for Integrated missile Defense. And a direct report to Admiral Richard in this role will now take any questions that you may have. Hey, thanks, Ronnie. If I could just like to highlight just a couple of comments, uh, after Evan Richards, uh, talk First off, coming into this job well prior to coming to this job, you know, I got to serve. Ah is the chief of staff of Stratcom for almost three years working for general heightened, and ah, and then Advil. Richard was the deputy commander. So, uh, so really, that that background and that experience really prepared me? Well, I think for ah for what? The challenges that we face here. It s and D. C with particular to, uh, missile defense. He heard ever Richard talk about the risk of strategic two turns, failure, analysis that that goes on there at Stratcom and here, Jiffy I m d and with an S and D. C. That analysis is something that we’re doing all the time from the missile defense side. As Admiral Richard said, many times we talk about stratcom, we only think about the nuclear triad, But strategic deterrence is really more thin. Just the nuclear triad, Uh, in its basics, strategic deterrence is about imposing unacceptable costs, denying the adversary benefit and then providing incredible capability. And that second part about denying the adversary benefit is what what we’re doing every day within the missile defense arena and so part of our risk of strategic deterrence failure analysis is making sure that we’re understanding the threats that are out there on that our capabilities are ready now and that our future capabilities are gonna address those feature threats that the adversaries can present. So it is just a great honor to be able to work for Admiral Richard again. Ah, in my, uh, my job here is the S and D. C, c G and the Commander for Ah J F C C. I indeed. So with that, I’ll look forward your questions. I will tell you that I will answer questions within the missile defense lane. Nuclear policy questions with us reserved for Strat comment and another venue. Thank you. Thank you. General Carver, this is Joe Fitzgerald. I’ll be asking you several questions that came in from our 10 days this morning. First off, thank you for agreeing to answer these questions on behalf of Capital Richards. We have a couple of questions here. How is the creation of space Force Affected the command space com and its capabilities and authorities. Hey, thanks, Joe. And so I’ll go back and I’ll put on my my former hat as the Stratcom chief of staff and we were in the throes of, well, let me back up. So So before Space Command stood up on its unified command plan, responsibility, Strategic Command had responsibilities for space. And those were all those. All came from when the original Space Command stood down in the early two thousands. So Stratcom took on the space role. If you ever listen to General Heighten, though he would talk about space was on its best. Day was only number three in his priorities because he had strategic deterrence, nuclear operations, and then he had space responsibilities. So in space com Space Command stood up. We did a lot of work within the Stratcom staff to help enable Space Command to stand up. We called it. We deemed it space East. So we had all the space expertise, expertise within the stratcom staff that instantly became part of space Commander. They work towards becoming part of space command eso that when Space Command formally established, it was it had a good head, good legs underneath it, um, the integration piece then became, Actually, it wasn’t too tough them because you already had embedded in the different battle rhythms in different different events that were going on within Stratcom. They were already practised by that Stratcom staff that now was supporting space command. And then we helped establish the structure there in Colorado Springs, where space com currently has had. So, uh, um it was a lot of teamwork that went in there. We had a lot of support from from all the services to provide to provide structure and forces into stand up space command. Um, and again that that that integration and then flow from stratcom to space com from those mission sets actually went pretty. Well, then we had different exercises that were able to participate in Teoh to show our readiness. Thank you, General Cooper. We have several other questions. Hope you don’t mind. I hope you have time this morning. Um, I really appreciated the utmost comments on integration, which is also a part of this year’s symposium theme. What obstacles do you see in us achieving the rial integration? Okay, you know, theon, you know, obstacles. You know there’s challenges, and there’s there’s opportunities. Um, you know when when we look at integration and I have a saying I talk about we do integrated planning and synchronized operations. Um, so one of the first obstacles is overcoming the relationship barriers that are out there. And actually, this mornings, uh, this morning’s speakers goes a long way towards overcoming some of those periods. When I look at Emma Richard and then John Shaw and then John Hill, many symposiums, you know we’ll we’ll, we’ll put the speakers in there and it’s kind of a pickup team. Well, those gentlemen that I just mentioned, we talk multiple times a week. So already within our organizations within the leadership, what were beaten down some of the stove pipes, or some of the firewalls that might be up there and integration just because our organizations ah, and the leaders, their relationships, and then and then at all that off trickles down then throughout the workforce throughout our processes, Rod are, ah, working groups are other battle rhythm events. Um, there’s gonna be technological hurdles that we have to get over that we’re gonna have to fight through whether those air inter service or whether those among services and and we just have to get through those. But when we have the concept and we all agree on the concept and the work, the role of the roll up our sleeves and get after it. We can do it and again, though, but it goes back to the relationships and within the organizations that are participating between senior leaders and you get no daylight between between us stratcom space come or the Missile Defense Agency. Thank you, General Copper. Another question. Speed is the name of the game speed of intelligence assessment and in our response, has that paradigm changed. And if so, how has it changed over the course of the last few years? Yeah, sure. It sure has a the generation again, the the benefactor of three years working for him and, uh, he would always talk about. We have lost our ability to go fast. And so just with him making that statement during my time in Stratcom and carrying it on here is, um, you he’s taking the governor off. He took the governor off its track common so we could go fast. And if we if we made a mistake, you know, he accepted that, and then, you know, we corrected it moved on eso So I do see us want to go faster the adversary isn’t slowing down. Every Richard laid out many of the threats there in his talk, so we can’t afford to be complacent. We can’t afford to go slow. We have got a go faster. Gotta be willing to assume some risk. Underwrite that risk so that we can maintain pace with our adversaries. Thank you, sir. There’s been talk of reorganizing the various J FCC says has or is that happening? If so, what will be the outcome? What? What functions will it before? Yes. So, uh, so we’re always taking a look at Ah, you know how we most efficient helping optimize our organizations? Whenever Richard came into commander of Stratcom, he wanted to take a look across the organization as well. We were fortunate again because he was the deputy. He had a lot of background at Stratcom, where general heightened normalized stratcom to look like other combat commands. So instead of the 18 subordinate past forces in JFC sees that run any stratcom, he normalize it with the J fac with the maritime component he established the space component. Andi kept a Jiffy Chi MD So So instead of 18 different That’s and talks. If you will reporting up through General heightened where he became the integrator just because of the breath of ah, of all the different mission sets that were that he was responsible for you put four stars in charge or Pacific Ivy case of three star in charge. And for all those problems, supporters to report up through, which really helped out again putting on my chief of staff had again it really helped out. So then, as we had, folks come into Stratcom officers, NGOs or civilians, we looked normal compared to how you know, compared with our fellow combatant commands. And so that was that was very helpful. I could joke work. Are there plans for a Midwest interceptor range with North Dakota Be a prime option for such a sight. You know, I just don’t have any knowledge of ah of any of that. So I don’t know. And they what would you say are the budget challenges of the challenges to modernization to meet our peer adversaries modernization objectives, given the impact, but it impacts of cove it in the pandemic. It is critical that we maintain sustained budgets, uh, at their predictable so that as we as the program managers and CEO’s lay out their programs. To be able to have that predictable, sustained budget is just critical. Um, you know, we’re operating within the Kobe 19 environment right now. We’re doing very well, but we understand that the challenges are to the industrial base, uh, that are out there again. Having that predictable, sustained budgets for our programs is important. So you know, we will continue to keep an eye on the budgets and make sure that it is. Our programs go forward, they state budget informed. We have another question for you, General. Can you provide your perspectives on innovations needed in space control and counter space areas? Yes. So you Joe Biden would talk about how many times he and General Raymond were the only two that would be able discuss any kind of programs and how four stars, many clouds, the action officers. So one of the things that we’ve got to talk about General Dixon talked about it in his confirmation hearing is ah is his classification levels and making sure that capabilities that we have out there aren’t classified. It’s such extreme levels that then planners and, uh, and folks that have to executed are unaware capabilities. Eso that again we can apply them as we need to on the battlefield. So that would be probably one of the one of the main here is that we should take a look at and a thank you, sir. I have another question. Really appreciate your comments on possible competitors, particularly with hyper sonics. Is there talking OSD acceleration? But this seems far behind Russia and China’s current path. What are your views on how we proceed with high percentage? Yeah, again. So this is about going fast and making sure that we meet, uh, we’ve got to, uh, keep up with our adversaries air going that would ask you So John Hill, we’ll be talking later on this morning, Really save that question for him and because that’s that’s really his expertise. And he certainly has, ah, lot more depth of knowledge and talk talk about that much better than I get. Thank you. Sure. Another question for you. What are some of the specific measures are metrics you’re looking at is part of a risk of strategic deterrence failure analysis. That’s a great question. So Well, first off, we look at the threat. We got to see what the threat is doing out there. We take a look at them. It Ah, at our current ready, just in our posture. And then? And then we take a look at the long game. And what are modernization efforts? Uh, are how they’re progressing, be able to provide, uh, the capabilities to counter what the adversaries are doing in the future. So so threat, Current readiness, end of in future posture. Sir, we have another question. What are what new challenges that cove in 19 has Kogan 19 brought to threat assessment. Um, so So my my my intelligence. And I know we we worked very closely with the Strack. I’m j two. They the threat doesn’t sleep, and so are our intel experts And distract I’m intel experts. They still work 24 7 So? So Thoko video may challenge us. Um, I know that that our intelligence professionals are up to the task, making sure that we stay on top of what the adversaries air doing. Thank you, sir. Sure. Really appreciate your time this morning. And I hope you stay with us for a few more minutes. So, but you have a few more questions for you? How do you see the Titan capability integrating the spice layer into the tactical edge? Gonna be critical. I mean, you got to be able to see the threat. You got to be able to attribute where the threat came from so that you can counter the threat. The integration of Titan, then into ah to our capabilities is going to be critical right down to the tattle edge. And that really shows the importance of space to army formations and and army space capabilities critical to the Ted. You said, as the question said, Joe, down to the tactical edge. Thank you, sir. This may be a This may be a hardball or maybe a softball. I don’t know, but I’m gonna have a sketch because my friend asked the question. Well, much baseball back in season, Joe. Say what? New organizations? My hunt. Still particularly Redstone Restaurant Arsenal wants for gain over the next few years. Yeah, so, uh, you know, I don’t know. Um you know, every day that I come to work for us in D. C. I make sure that we’re but we’re doing here with the workforce has provided our nation’s our capabilities in space, and missile defense has two new organizations that are coming in here. You know, we on the arsenal, you know, we see the construction going around Gate nine, the FBI headquarters that came in. But as far as that, I really don’t want to speculate on future missions or future organizations coming into the coming into the arsenal. Thank you, sir, while we wait for another question or two coming in. Would you like to make any comments or remarks about this morning’s about Admiral Richards? Everything or any Mike is your sir? Yeah, you know, you’re just in the missile defense side of what we do, what we provide for strategic, strategic deterrence and having Richard. He’s a big fan for missile defense and were able to brief I was able to brief the SEC def on our missile defense contributions to strategic deterrence and the SEC def kits that natural Richard gets it. So within the department we have we have a tremendous support for what we do with missile offenders, both from from homeland missile defense as well as our regional missile defense, And I couldn’t be any prouder of what our forces do. 24 7 I get. You know, every morning I get my option. Intel update. And I looked at what our missile defenders were doing around the world. Whether it’s in Centcom or end up a calmer you come and and I could be more proud of what they’re doing in support of Stratcom in its in its mission. Thank you, sir. We have a couple of more questions and we’ll wrap this up. If you don’t mind an awareness of f d o challenges. How can the integration of allies and partners, including foreign liaison officers, be improved? Yeah. And, um so we work very hard. It was It was a bad day at Stratcom and again. So I’m gonna channel Stratcom because they have the Stratcom commanders discussion. A bad days track that when I was the chief of staff was when somebody said, Well, we’re gonna have to excuse the allies out of the room. Generally, it wouldn’t tolerate it. So we had We worked very hard to make sure that our allies were in every discussion permissible, uh, because they’re major contributors to what we do as the chief during exercises. I would have my own separate meeting with our with our Ellen knows just them and myself. And I would explain to them contextually um uh, different things that were going on so that they could understand the operating environment in this situation. If we were in an exercise, for example, eso. So even though there was for disclosure fto, you know, things that required them to go out of the room, I would I would at least take the time to follow up with the Allies to give him some context, Of course, not breaking into the FTO rules but just making sure the Allies knew that they were still part of the team. And eight, sir, According to U. N reports, North Korea is probably developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into the warheads of its ballistic missiles. What is the strategy? If you’re able to comment on that, a missile defense specifically against North Korea’s ballistic missiles? Well, because we have a hard time determining what’s what’s on what’s on every warhead. We’ve got to treat every every missile that comes out of North Korea as the um, highest consequence threat. That’s why we have to have trained and ready forces in the best capabilities within our missile defense interceptors. Thank you, sir. How much of a concern is there with respect to the anti satellite capabilities of China and Russia to our space based assets for the US revive? It’s a sad program from the 19 eighties, so we know our adversaries. Air contestant US in space. Uh, John Dickerson talked about that in his confirmation hearing. John Raymond talks about it. Um, unusual disturbing behavior is how he characterized Ah, Russian, Ah, Russian operations on orbit. And so we’re always keeping an eye on what the adversaries air doing in space. Um, we stayed concerned about it because again, we know that were being contested in space all the time from our adversaries. Thank you. Serving. It’s that one final question here, If you don’t mind. Is there any planning for system sustainment with the organic industrial base? Whenever, whenever we build any programs, you always have to build in. This is sustainment line into that. So so absolutely, it’s it’s critical for what we’re doing. So, um, you know, I think we’ll have Rob Brashear later on. Is one of the panel members asking that question on how we build it in there. But what’s sustaining lines are critical on And making sure that the industrial base stays healthy to support those lines is of great importance to us because it will contribute to readiness Indeed. Thank you, sir. General Carver. Thank you for agreeing. Dance with questions from Admiral Richards briefing this morning. Your experience and keen insights are greatly appreciated. Thank you for taking the time out of your valuable schedule this morning to be with us. And we look forward to your space. The missile Defense Command update later this morning. Thank you, sir. Great. Thanks, Joe.